Owings v. Currier

Marbury, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The bill of complaint in this case was filed by the appellant against two daughters of his deceased wife by her first marriage, for the purpose of having declared null and void two separation agreements which he had made with his wife after marriage, and of having established his statutory right as surviving spouse in certain real estate conveyed to the defendants by his wife about six months before her death. The defendants set up the agreements as a bar to any right appellant might have in the property left them by their mother. The issue before the Court was the validity of these agreements.

From a decree dismissing the bill, the appeal was taken here. It appears from the record that at the time of the marriage, in 1932, Mrs. Owings owned a forty-five thou ⁵⁹² sand dollar residence property near Annapolis, and the appellant testified that he was then worth about twenty-thousand dollars in personal property. On September 21, 1942, the first separation agreement was executed. The appellant’s testimony as to what occurred is that they separated on September 3, 1942.

At the time he was working at the Experimental Station and he gave her practically all the money he made, but they did not seem to get along, and finally one day they decided they were going to see a lawyer. Mrs. Owings went to see her lawyer. He came and talked the matter over with both of them. Mrs. Owings wanted more money than appellant could give her, so the only thing he could do was to leave.

He said he was forced to leave but did not explain how. After he left, they apparently saw each fairly frequently, and at times went out to dinner together. Then appellant contracted pneumonia, his wife visited him, and looked after him, and he finally returned to live with her in June, 1943. He then lived at her home until her death in February 1945.

At the time they became reconciled, they executed a second agreement dated June 3, 1943. The first agreement of September 21, 1942, recited that differences had arisen between Owen P. W. Owings and Anna T. Owings, his wife, in consequence of which they had separated and intended for the future to live apart, and desired to enter into an agreement as to their personal and property rights. Appellant covenanted with his wife that she could at all times live separate and apart from him and free from his authority, and he would not molest her in any way; that all property, real, personal and mixed, that she then had or might thereafter acquire, or such property as was held by her subject to his marriage rights, should be her sole and separate property wholly free fom any rights of the appellant during her life or after her death, with full power to her to • convey, assign, charge or will the same as if unmarried, and that the appellant would not, at any time, claim any right in any such property as husband, widower, ⁵⁹³ heir, next of kin or successor, and that appellant would execute such deeds and papers as might prove necessary or convenient to enable her to deal with her said property as if unmarried. In consideration of this agreement by the appellant, Mrs. Owings covenanted that she would not molest him, would not incur any debt or obligation on his account, would hold him harmless from any and all liabilities incurred by her, and would not bring any suit of any kind to compel him to pay her support, maintenance or alimony, waiving all her rights thereto.

She further agreed that she would not claim any interest as a wife, widow, heir, next of kin or successor in his property, and that she would execute any necessary papers to permit him to dispose of his property. The agreement also states that it is fully understood by the parties, that it shall be a full release and discharge of each in the property of the other. There was another provision that notes outstanding in various banks, amounting in all to $690, should be paid by the parties in equal amounts, and inasmuch as the appellant had no property subject to attachment or execution, Mrs. Owings retained his furniture and silverware as security for his carrying out this obligation. The second agreement recites the first agreement and the fact that the parties had agreed to live together again, and, therefore, it became necessary for them to nullify the other contract insofar as their individual personal rights were concerned, but to confirm the same so far as it related to their individual property rights.

The parties agreed that such property rights should remain as set forth in the first contract and confirmed the latter with the proviso that each party might provide for the other by will, but this provision is stated to be not mandatory but discretionary. Appellant also agreed that he would pay his wife as long as he was earning the salary he was then receiving, the sum of $25 a week, and would continue to pay her a sum commensurate with his earning capacity, and that neither party would incur any debt or obligation on account of the other. ⁵⁹⁴ On August 9, 1944, Mrs. Owings conveyed to the appellees, who, as above stated, were her daughters by her first husband, the remainder after her own death of her real estate in Anne Arundel County, reserving in herself the power to mortgage, sell or convey the property. She died without having executed this last power, so that the appellees became vested with title to the property, subject to the curtesy or marital interest of the appellant in case the agreements are invalid, as he claims, or free of such rights of the appellant if the agreements are valid. The appellant was asked why he signed the first agreement, and he said because he did not have money to keep the property up.

He had spent the greater part of the money he had when married in the support of his wife and her home during the first 10 years of their marital life. It was an expensive piece of property, his earning capacity was not great, he was dissatisfied, and he thought the best thing for him to do was to leave; that his wife agreed to it, and said that if he would sign off she would release him from any alimony, so he said all right. He was advised that he could get an attorney to represent him, but he did not do so. On the date of the signing of the first agreement he was worth altogether six or seven thousand dollars.

He acknowledged signing and executing the second agreement, and said, that, after the reconciliation, he and his wife got along all right. His wife excuted a will, about which she told him, which left the real estate in trust for the use of her daughters and for him for a period of five years, at the end of which time the trust should cease and the property should vest in the daughters, subject to an owelty for his benefit for five thousand dollars which was to be a lien upon the property. She also left him her engagement ring and her automobile. This will was made on May 4, 1944, while they were' living together, and less than one year before her death.

If the subsequent deed to the real estate is valid under the separation agreements, then, of course, the will is inoperative as to the ⁵⁹⁵ real estate. However, the appellant renounced this will. He was requested to sign the deed to the appellees, and he said his explanation of why he did not sign it was because he did not care to sign it. He had signed some papers and would not sign any more.

But one of the daughters testified that when he was asked to sign it, he said he had no interest in the property and it was not necessary for him to sign any more papers. The appellant said he performed his part of the first agreement by paying off the notes. He felt that he wanted to live under the first agreement, and would rather do that than go back to his wife. He said he tried to live up to both agreements.

He -was not satisfied with the terms of the will, but his wife was ill, and he said that he was satisfied, because he did not want to worry her about it. That when he waived all his rights in Mrs. Owings’ property, she told him he would not have to pay alimony, and he was then much worried about finances and other things. There was some conflicting testimony produced as to the personal relations between the appellant and wife, and as to his habits and his attitude towards her and towards her daughters and her mother. This has some bearing on the reasons for the separation, as it appears that the household was not always completely harmonious.

The bill alleges that the wife conceived the idea to defraud the appellant and in pursuance of such plan, constantly nagged him to such an extent that she forced him to leave her home under the pretext that she would not ask him for alimony or support and that all he would have to do would be to get out and go to her lawyer’s office and sign the papers. And that having gotten the agreement signed, the wife carried out the idea of willfully defrauding her husband by executing the deed to her children. And that the bequest in the will was made for the purpose of pacifying and silencing her husband. But the testimony of appellant falls short of proving these allegations.

The evidence produced by him, viewing it in the most favorable light, is that, due to his wife’s nag ⁵⁹⁶ ging about money, it was thought best by both of them that they separate. He was willing to give up his rights in her property if she gave up her rights in his and if he did not have to give her money for her support. There does not seem to have been any fraud or force or undue, persuasion exercised by the wife, and the settlement agreements were both freely entered into by each of the parties. Appellant also contends, apart from the question of actual fraud, that a confidential relationship exists between husband and wife, and that the wife, who in this case was the dominant party, by her actions forced him to leave her on account of his fear of having to pay alimony, which he claims he would not have had to pay under the circumstances.

As a result he entered into an agreement in which he gave up' his right to a $45,000 property, while his wife only gave up her rights in his property, which was very much less valuable. He asks the Court to void the agreements on the ground that they are unfair and inequitable. In Restatement of the Law, Contracts, paragraph 497, it is said “Where one party is under the domination of another, or by virtue of the relation between them is justified in assuming that the other party will not act in a manner inconsistent with his welfare, a transaction induced by unfair persuasion of the latter, is induced by undue influence and is voidable.” In Comment A on this section is found the following statement, “The relationships that ordinarily fall within the rule are those of parent and child, guardian and ward, husband and wife, physician and patient, attorney and client, clergyman and parishioner. In each of these cases, however, it is a question of fact whether the relationship in a particular case is such as to give one party dominance over the other, or put him in a position where words of persuasion have undue weight.” In paragraph 584 it is stated, “* * * a bargain between persons who are married * * * * made after separation or in contemplation of an immediate separation which takes place as contemplated, for a ⁵⁹⁷ division of assets or for future maintenance or alimony, is legal if the bargain is a fair one in view of the circumstances of the parties.” In Williston on Contracts, Revised Ed., paragraph 1625 A, it is said, “In the absence of a relationship between the parties to a transaction which tends to give one dominance over the other, undue influence must generally be proved by the party setting it up and will not be presumed.” As pointed out in Coomber v. Coomber, [1911] 1 Ch. 723, this doctrine does not rest merely upon the existence of a fiduciary relationship, but is applied only on those in which normally one party occupies a position of dominance toward the other.

Williston further states that where a relationship of dominance exists it throws upon the dominant party the burden of establishing the fairness of the transaction, and that this principle has been generally applied to gifts rather than to contracts, but is not confined to such cases. Two New Jersey cases are cited as authority for the statement that a deed from a husband to a wife will be presumptively invalid if in fact the wife is shown to be the dominant party. Haydock v. Haydock’s Ex’rs, 34 N. J. Eq. 570, 38 Am. Rep, 385, and McCambridge v. Daly, 109 N. J. Eq. 43, 156 A. 372 .

In the Haydock case an aged and infirm husband had given his wife, within two months before he died, stocks and bonds, and a promissory note for $5,000. The Court said that the evidence impressed him with the conviction that at the time when the transfers were made, the mind of the husband approached so closely to the line which defines the limit of legal mental capacity, that he should be inclined to hold the gifts were void on this ground. However, he went on to say that upon the theory that the husband was a person who possessed sufficient mental power to make a gift, he thought under the circumstances the duty was upon the recipient, that is, the wife, to show the fairness of the transaction, and he stated the situation and the law applicable to it