Padilla v. State

HOLLANDER, J. At a bench trial in the Circuit Court for Cecil County, Louis Charles Padilla, appellant, proceeded by way of an agreed statement of facts and was convicted of possession of heroin with intent to distribute, in violation of Md.Code (2002, 2007 Supp.), § 5-602(2) of the Criminal Law Article (“C.L.”). He was sentenced to seven years of incarceration, with all but three years suspended. At issue here is appellant’s pre-trial motion to suppress the narcotics seized from a hidden compartment of his vehicle during a traffic stop. The vehicle search occurred after a police dog alerted to the presence of the contraband.

Appellant poses one question for our consideration: “Did the trial court err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress evidence?” Appellant concedes that suppression was not required under the Fourth Amendment. However, he urges this Court to reverse based on Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. In his view, Article 26 requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a dog scan, which he alleges was not present here. For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On August 3, 2005, appellant was pulled over for speeding while on southbound 1-95. During the course of the traffic stop, a police drug dog alerted to the presence of illegal drugs. A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed a hidden compartment containing over 1,500 grams of heroin. As a result, appellant was arrested and charged with possession of heroin with intent to distribute under C.L. § 5-602(2). 1 ²¹⁴ On December 19, 2006, the court held a hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress the drugs seized from his vehicle.

No testimony was taken. Rather, the parties submitted an agreed statement of facts, presented orally by the prosecutor, and argued their respective legal positions. A summary of the facts presented at the suppression hearing follows. 2 On August 3, 2005, Trooper First Class Kennard of the Maryland State Police 3 was operating a stationary laser in the area of 1-95 southbound at the 99-mile marker in Cecil County, when he observed a green Honda Accord traveling southbound at a speed he believed exceeded the posted speed limit of 65 mph. After pointing his radar gun at the vehicle, Kennard obtained a speed reading of 73 mph.

At approximately 8:29 p.m., he initiated a traffic stop near the 97.3 mile marker of southbound 1-95. Trooper Kennard approached the vehicle and made contact with appellant, who was the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle. Appellant gave the officer a New York “temporary license” bearing the name “Melvin Allen,” but lacking a photograph. Upon questioning about the ownership of the vehicle, appellant advised the trooper that he did not own the car.

He explained that the vehicle was owned by and registered to his sister, who lived in North Carolina. Appellant initially told the trooper that his sister’s name was “Sandra Lane,” but later told the Trooper that his sister’s name was “Sandra Allen.” In addition, appellant told the trooper that he was driving the vehicle to High Point, North Carolina to return the car to his sister. However, appellant could not provide his sister’s specific address in North Carolina, and told the trooper that he was going to contact her for directions upon his arrival in the area. While conversing with appellant, Trooper ²¹⁵ Kennard “smelled an overwhelming smell of air freshener coming from the car.” 4 Upon receipt of Mr. Padilla’s “temporary license,” Trooper Kennard went back to his patrol vehicle and asked dispatch to perform a check on the vehicle’s registration and on the driver’s license.

On the basis of appellant’s representations and the circumstances, which the prosecutor characterized as “criminal indicators,” the trooper also radioed for a K-9 unit to conduct a scan of the vehicle. Minutes later, at approximately 8:41 p.m., Trooper First Class Joseph Catalano, a certified Maryland K-9 handler, arrived with “Bruno,” his drug detection dog, and performed a scan of the exterior of the vehicle. Approximately twelve minutes after the initiation of the traffic stop, the drug dog alerted to the presence of a controlled dangerous substance in the vehicle. By the time the dog alerted, however, Trooper Kennard “still hadn’t received anything back regarding the defendant’s ... identity____ [N]othing was coming back on that license.... ” Therefore, the traffic stop had not yet concluded.

As a result of the alert, Trooper Kennard conducted a search of the interior of the vehicle. He noticed an irregularity in the side wall of the driver’s side rear passenger area and discovered a hidden compartment behind the side wall secured by a hydraulic piston. Inside the compartment were two large plastic-wrapped packages containing a total of nearly 1,600 grams of heroin, equal to over 3 pounds. Appellant was then arrested. ²¹⁶ The court then heard argument on the motion.

In sum, appellant claimed that, under Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, police must have reasonable, articulable suspicion of illegal drugs before conducting a dog scan. Further, he argued that reasonable, articulable suspicion was not present in this case. Further, defense counsel alleged that the Maryland State Police “currently have in place a policy requiring that there be reasonable, articulable suspicion before the police can conduct a dog scan.” Appellant’s attorney indicated that the policy was instituted pursuant to a settlement agreement in a suit between the ACLU and the Maryland State Police. 5 According to defense counsel, the policy requires State troopers to fill out an “MSP-130” form that sets out their reasons for any search or dog scan. Without objection, defense counsel introduced an MSP-130 form filled out by Trooper Kennard pursuant to his stop of appellant.

It described the trooper’s grounds for conducting the K-9 scan of appellant’s vehicle, as follows: “Driver did not have a valid form of identification. The driver did not know who the registered owner of the vehicle was or where he was taking it. The drivers [sic] hands were shaking and his breathing was shallow and rapid when he handed me his license.” The State responded that, under Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 , 125 S.Ct. 834 , 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005), the Fourth ²¹⁷ Amendment does not require police to have reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a dog scan, and opposed appellant’s argument for extension of Maryland constitutional law. Moreover, the State contended that, even if reasonable and articulable suspicion were required, it was present under the circumstances attendant here.

Before ruling on the motion, the court remarked: “I think it is a trial judge’s job to make decisions and rulings that can be structured in such a fashion that an important issue or point of law is framed for an appellate court should they desire to address it.” After reviewing relevant case law, the court made the following findings: First, the traffic stop of the defendant was lawful; second the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to request a K-9 scan and they complied with their own internal procedures or policies regarding that, specifically Defendant’s Exhibit No. 1 [the MSP-130 form]; third, I find in accordance with the foregoing cases that a K-9 sniff is not a search under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or under the Maryland Declaration of Rights as that is presently interpreted by Maryland courts; fourth, I find that reasonable suspicion existed for both the K-9 sniff and the subsequent search and seizure of [heroin] from the car that the defendant was operating. The matter then proceeded to the trial phase, at which appellant waived his right to a jury trial. The prosecutor presented an additional agreed statement of facts, which provided more details regarding the traffic stop, search, and arrest. According to the agreed statement, “[o]nce Mr. Padilla was placed under arrest and taken back to the barrack, he was later identified, having run his prints, as being Louis Padilla from Brooklyn, New York.” 6 ²¹⁸ DISCUSSION When we review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we look only to the record of the suppression hearing.

Owens v. State, 399 Md. 388, 403 , 924 A.2d 1072 (2007). We do not consider information from the trial record when ruling on a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence. Paulino v. State, 399 Md. 341, 348 , 924 A.2d 308 (2007). 7 Moreover, we “do not engage in de novo fact-finding.” Haley v. State, 398 Md. 106, 131 , 919 A.2d 1200 (2007). Instead, we “extend great deference to the findings of the motions court as to first-level findings of fact and as to the credibility of witnesses, unless those findings are clearly erroneous.” Brown v. State, 397 Md. 89, 98 , 916 A.2d 245 (2007).

In addition, we “ ‘view the evidence and inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the prevailing party on the motion____’” Owens, 399 Md. at 403 , 924 A.2d 1072 (quoting State v. Rucker, 374 Md. 199, 207 , 821 A.2d 439 (2003)). We then make “an independent, de novo, constitutional appraisal by applying the law to the facts pre ²¹⁹ sented in a particular case.” Williams v. State, 372 Md. 386, 401 , 813 A.2d 231 (2002). The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” It protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996).

Appellant concedes that the Fourth Amendment offers him no relief, and that no controlling Maryland precedent presently creates an exclusionary rule for dog scans that are not supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion. Nevertheless, appellant points to Fitzgerald v. State, 384 Md. 484 , 864 A.2d 1006 (2004), claiming that in that case the Court explicitly declined to decide whether Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides such an exclusionary rule. He suggests that the case sub judice is an appropriate vehicle to revisit the question. As we see it, the question is not one for this Court to decide.

Although appellant concedes that the dog scan was permissible under the Fourth Amendment, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is our starting point. In Lewis v. State, 398 Md. 349 , 920 A.2d 1080 (2007), the Court of Appeals summarized the relevant case law with regard to traffic stops. It said, id. at 360-62 , 920 A.2d 1080 (footnote omitted): The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 550 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

The Supreme Court has iterated that ²²⁰ the “[t]emporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons’ within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment].” Whren, 517 U.S. at 809-10 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 . The Fourth Amendment, however, is not “a guarantee against all searches and seizures, but only against unreasonable searches and seizures.” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (emphasis added). Therefore, “[t]he touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’ ” Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 , 98 S.Ct. 330 , 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977), quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 . In assessing the reasonableness of a traffic stop, the Supreme Court has adopted a “dual inquiry,” examining “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 , quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 .

A traffic stop is justified under the Fourth Amendment where the police have a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot. Whren, 517 U.S. at 812-13 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 ; Myers v. State, 395 Md. 261, 281 , 909 A.2d 1048 (2006); Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 284-85 , 753 A.2d 519 (2000). Thus, a traffic stop violates the Fourth Amendment where there is no reasonable suspicion that the car is being driven contrary to the laws governing the operation of motor vehicles or that either the car or any of its occupants is subject to seizure or detention in connection with the violation of any other applicable laws. ²²¹ Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 650 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); Rowe v. State, 363 Md. 424, 433 , 769 A.2d 879 (2001). We pause to review the “reasonable, articulable suspicion” standard referenced in Lewis , because it is central to appellant’s claim.

It derives from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). There, the Supreme Court held that a police officer may briefly detain a person “for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest,” id. at 22 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , so long as the officer is “able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Id. at 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 . The reasonable suspicion standard requires the police to possess “ ‘a “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting legal wrongdoing.’ ” Collins v. State, 376 Md. 359, 368 , 829 A.2d 992 (2003) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002)). Accord Lewis, 398 Md. at 362, 920 A.2d 1080 ; Myers v. State, 395 Md. 261, 281 , 909 A.2d 1048 (2006).

It is a “ ‘less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.’ ” State v. Nieves, 383 Md. 573, 589 , 861 A.2d 62 (2004) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000)). On the other hand, the standard requires more than a mere “ ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.’ ” Cartnail, 359 Md. at 287 , 753 A.2d 519 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)). Whether reasonable suspicion exists in a given case is determined based on the totality of the circumstances. “Even though each of a series of acts is innocent standing alone, taken together they can constitute reasonable suspicion.” Nathan v. State, 370 Md. 648, 664, 805 A.2d 1086 (2002). See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 , 122 S.Ct. 744 .

Nevertheless, “ ‘it is impossible for a combination of wholly innocent factors to combine into a suspicious conglomeration unless ²²² there are concrete reasons for such an interpretation.’ ” Cartnail, 359 Md. at 294 , 753 A.2d 519 (citation omitted). In Whren, 517 U.S. 806 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , the Supreme Court held that a law enforcement officer may effect a traffic stop whenever he observes a traffic violation, even if the officer’s subjective motivation for the stop is not the traffic violation itself, but the hope that the stop will enable the officer to discover evidence of some other crime. Evidence of the unrelated crime will not be suppressed so long as it was obtained within the scope of the original traffic stop. Id.

The Court of Appeals explained in Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356 , 735 A.2d 491 (1999), that there are limitations with respect to the length of a lawful traffic stop. It said, id. at 372 , 735 A.2d 491 (internal citations omitted): [T]he officer’s purpose in an ordinary traffic stop is to enforce the laws of the roadway, and ordinarily to investigate the manner of driving with the intent to issue a citation or warning. Once the purpose of that stop has been fulfilled, the continued detention of the car and the occupants amounts to a second detention. Thus, once the underlying basis for the initial traffic stop has concluded, a police-driver encounter which implicates the Fourth Amendment is constitutionally permissible only if either (1) the driver consents to the continuing intrusion or (2) the officer has, at a minimum, a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.

The Supreme Court articulated the same principle in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 , 125 S.Ct. 834 , 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). It said, id. at 407-408 , 125 S.Ct. 834 (internal citations omitted): It is ... clear that a seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by the Constitution. A seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission. ²²³ The Caballes Court concluded that a scan by a drug detection dog during a lawful traffic stop “generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests,” id. at 409 , 125 S.Ct. 834 , and is thus permissible, without any additional justification, so long as the stop is not prolonged for the purpose of conducting the scan. The Supreme Court reasoned that because “governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband ‘compromises no legitimate privacy interest,’ ” a sniff from a drug detection dog “does not rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable infringement.” Id. at 408, 409 , 125 S.Ct. 834 (emphasis in original; internal citations omitted).

Clearly, Caballes did not alter the constitutional landscape in Maryland. Instead, it confirmed the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that Maryland courts had applied for many years. See, e.g., Fitzgerald, supra, 384 Md. at 503 , 864 A.2d 1006 ; Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554, 573 , 774 A.2d 420 (2001); Whitehead v. State, 116 Md.App. 497, 506 , 698 A.2d 1115 (1997); In re Montrail M., 87 Md.App. 420, 435 , 589 A.2d 1318 (1991); Snow v. State, 84 Md.App. 243, 259 , 578 A.2d 816 (1990). See also Nathan, 370 Md. 648 , 805 A.2d 1086 (illustrating traffic stop principles, although not involving a drug detection canine); Seldon v. State, 151 Md.App. 204 , 824 A.2d 999 (2003) (same); Charity v. State, 132 Md.App. 598 , 753 A.2d 556 (2000) (same); Munafo v. State, 105 Md.App. 662 , 660 A.2d 1068 (1995) (same).

A comparison of In re Montrail M. and Snow illuminates the rule barring the deliberate prolonging of a traffic stop in order to conduct a drug dog scan. We quote from In re Montrail M., 87 Md.App. at 436-37 , 589 A.2d 1318 (internal citations omitted): In Snow , a police officer, who had a trained dog in his police car, stopped a vehicle in order to issue the driver a speeding ticket. After the ticket was written, the officer continued the detention in order to remove the dog from his cruiser and conduct a scan. We noted that the officer had actually engaged in two separate detentions — one to issue the ticket and the other to conduct the scan.

Because the officer had no reasonable, articulable suspicion as to drug- ²²⁴ related activity, we found that the second detention was unjustified. Only one detention occurred in the case sub judice [i.e., Montraü MJ. The trained dog arrived on the scene while Deputy Owens was still running a check on Matio C.’s license and registration, and the scan took place as the deputy completed the check. In short, the initial detention of the appellants was based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion, and no additional Fourth Amendment rights were implicated by the canine scan of Matio C.’s station wagon.

Therefore, under the Fourth Amendment, “[u]sing a dog is accepted as a perfectly legitimate utilization of a free investigative bonus as long as the traffic stop is still genuinely in progress.” State v. Ofori, 170 Md.App. 211, 235 , 906 A.2d 1089 (2006). But, “[o]nce a traffic stop is over, there is no waiting for the arrival, even the imminent arrival, of the K-9 unit.” Id. As Judge Moylan wrote for the Court, the use of a drug dog in a traffic stop is “an effective investigative tool if the police can squeeze it in before the buzzer sounds....” Id. at 238 , 906 A.2d 1089 . Appellant does not dispute that there was reasonable suspicion to justify his initial traffic stop for speeding.

Moreover, given that the dog alerted within twelve minutes of the inception of the traffic stop, at a point when Trooper Kennard had not yet received the results of the registration and license check, appellant does not contend that the traffic stop was impermissibly extended in order to conduct the scan. Nor does appellant dispute that the dog’s alert provided the trooper with probable cause to further detain appellant and to search the vehicle. See Wilkes, 364 Md. at 586, 774 A.2d 420 (“[0]nce a drug dog has alerted a trooper ‘to the presence of illegal drugs in a vehicle, sufficient probable cause exist[s] to support a warrantless search of [a vehicle].’ ” (Internal citations omitted.)); State v. Cabral, 159 Md.App. 354, 376-81 , 859 A.2d 285 (2004) (concluding that a drug dog’s alert generated probable cause for a search). For these reasons, appellant recognizes that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated here. ²²⁵ Instead, appellant stakes Ms suppression claim on Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

It provides: That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without naming or describing the place, or the person in special, are illegal, and ought not to be granted. Appellant urges us to consider decisions from several other states, in which those courts have determined that their state constitutional analogs to the Fourth Amendment require reasonable suspicion prior to a dog scan. See Commonwealth v. Rogers, 578 Pa. 127 , 849 A.2d 1185, 1190-91 (2004) (citing Commonwealth v. Martin, 534 Pa. 136, 626 A.2d 556 (1993), and Commonwealth v. Johnston, 515 Pa. 454 , 530 A.2d 74 (1987)); People v. Cox, 318 Ill.App.3d 161 , 251 Ill.Dec. 133 , 739 N.E.2d 1066, 1070-71 (2000) (citing People v. Easley, 288 Ill.App.3d 487 , 223 Ill.Dec. 826 , 680 N.E.2d 776 (1997)); State v. Pellicci, 133 N.H. 523 , 580 A.2d 710, 717-18 (1990). The State responds that “the plain language of Article 26 is vastly different from the language of the state constitutional provisions on which Padilla relies.” As the State observes, the relevant constitutional provisions of Pennsylvania, Illinois, and New Hampshire all contain a textual prohibition on “unreasonable searches and seizures,” see 111.

Const., art. I, § 6; N.H. Const., Pt. I, art. 19; Pa. Const., art.

I, § 8, but no such provision is found in Article 26. Rather, the State notes that Article 26 “addresses only the requirements and limitations of a warrant____” 8 ²²⁶ In considering appellant’s Article 26 claim, we observe that the cases are legion in which Maryland courts have construed Article 26 in pan materia with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 9 See, e.g., Parker v. State, 402 Md. 372, 400 , 936 A.2d 862 (2007); Patterson v. State, 401 Md. 76, 113 , 930 A.2d 348 (2007); Byndloss v. State, 391 Md. 462 , 465 n. 1, 893 A.2d 1119 (2006); Davis v. State, 383 Md. 394, 408 , 859 A.2d 1112 (2004); Scott v. State, 366 Md. 121, 139 , 782 A.2d 862 (2001); Richardson v. McGriff, 361 Md. 437, 452-53 , 762 A.2d 48 (2000); Gadson v. State, 341 Md. 1 , 8 n. 3, 668 A.2d 22 (1995); Gamble v. State, 318 Md. 120 , 123 n. 2, 567 A.2d 95 (1989); State v. Smith, 305 Md. 489 , 513 n. 9, 505 A.2d 511 (1986); Potts v. State, 300 Md. 567, 576 , 479 A.2d 1335 (1984); Gahan v. State, 290 Md. 310, 319-20 , 430 A.2d 49 (1981); Liichow v. State, 288 Md. 502 , 509 n. 1, 419 A.2d 1041 (1980); Merrick v. State, 283 Md. 1 , 4 n. 2, 389 A.2d 328 (1978); Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 492 , 124 A.2d 764 (1956); Johnson v. State, 193 Md. 136, 144 , 66 A.2d 504 (1949); Blum v. State, 94 Md. 375, 382 , 51 A. 26 (1902); Purnell v. State, 171 Md.App. 582, 607 , 911 A.2d 867 (2006), cert. denied, 398 Md. 315 , 920 A.2d 1060 (2007); Blasi v. State, 167 Md.App. 483 , 511 n. 12, 893 A.2d 1152 , cert. denied, 393 Md. 245 , 900 A.2d 751 (2006). Nevertheless, “although a clause of the United States Constitution and one in our own Declaration of Rights may be ‘in pari materia,’ ... ‘each provision is indepen ²²⁷ dent____’ ” Gahan, 290 Md. at 322 , 430 A.2d 49 (quoting Att’y Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 714 , 426 A.2d 929 (1981)). See also Parker, 402 Md. at 400 , 936 A.2d 862 ; Fitzgerald, 384 Md. at 506 , 864 A.2d 1006 ; Davis, 383 Md. at 408 , 859 A.2d 1112 ; State v. Suddith, 379 Md. 425 , 449-50 n. 3, 842 A.2d 716 (2004) (Eldridge, J., dissenting); Liichow, 288 Md. at 509 n. 1, 419 A.2d 1041 .

Yet, despite the caveat of independence, the Court of Appeals has never held that Article 26 provides greater protection from State interference than its federal counterpart. Indeed, when presented with such arguments, Maryland courts have uniformly rejected them. See, e.g., Scott, 366 Md. at 143-45 , 782 A.2d 862 (consent search initiated after “knock and talk” was legal under Article 26 as well as Fourth Amendment); City of Annapolis v. United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 400, 317 Md. 544 , 566 n. 4, 565 A.2d 672 (1989) (Article 26 does not protect government employees from random, suspicionless drug testing to greater degree than Fourth Amendment); Potts, 300 Md. at 575-76 , 479 A.2d 1335 (appropriate standard for reviewing magistrate’s determination of probable cause to issue a warrant under Article 26 is the Fourth Amendment standard as articulated by the Supreme Court); Gahan, 290 Md. at 319-22 , 430 A.2d 49 (neither Fourth Amendment nor Article 26 confers “automatic standing” to contest illegal seizure, where defendant did not have property or possessory interest in thing seized and therefore had no reasonable expectation of privacy); Purnell, 171 Md.App. at 603-607 , 911 A.2d 867 (Article 26 did not bar policeman’s search of passenger’s unworn jacket during lawful search of vehicle pursuant to driver’s arrest, where Fourth Amendment did not bar search); Henderson v. State, 89 Md.App. 19, 24 , 597 A.2d 486 (1991) (under Fourth Amendment and Article 26, a fleeing suspect is not “seized” until actually apprehended); Howell v. State, 60 Md.App. 463, 467-68 , 483 A.2d 780 (1984) (failure of warrant applicant to sign the warrant as provided by statute did not compel exclusion of evidence seized under either Fourth