Parker v. State

ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION JAMES R. EYLER, J. Maurice Andre Parker appeals from orders dismissing three petitions for writs of error coram nobis, filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, in which appellant challenged his convictions in three separate cases on the ground that his pleas of guilty and nolo contendere were not knowing and voluntary. We hold that each petition stated a cause of action. Consequently, we shall vacate the orders of dismissal and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Factual Background On April 4, 1996, in criminal case No. CA951438X, appellant pleaded guilty to theft over $300 in violation of Md.Code (1957, 1996 RepLVol.), Art. 27, § 342, 1 and nolo contendere to carry ⁶⁷⁶ ing a handgun in violation of Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 36B. 2 On November 30, 1998, in criminal case No. CA982263J, appellant pleaded guilty to theft over $300 in violation of Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 342. 3 On October 28, 1999, in criminal case No. CA992410A, appellant pleaded guilty to theft over $300 in violation of Md.Code (1957, 1996 RepLVoL), Art. 27, § 342.

On June 18, 2003, appellant filed petitions for writs of error coram nobis naming the State as defendant, seeking to vacate the convictions entered in the above cases. In his petitions, appellant alleged that he was scheduled to be tried in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland on a charge of felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1). Appellant further alleged that, under federal sentencing guidelines, he would face an increased sentence of up to 28 months of imprisonment as a result of the above convictions. Appellant’s sole ground for relief was that his guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary.

Appellant waived a hearing on the petitions, and on October 18, 2003, the circuit court entered orders denying the petitions without explanation, which is the basis for the present appeal to this Court. In their briefs, the parties advise us that, subsequent to the filing of the petitions, appellant was convicted in federal court. The briefs are silent with respect to sentencing. Parties’ Contentions Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his three petitions for writ of error coram nobis because appellant was entitled to challenge his convictions through a coram nobis proceeding and, furthermore, his guilty pleas and plea 'of nolo contendere were not knowing and voluntary. ⁶⁷⁷ Appellant also alleged that he faced substantial collateral consequences if convicted in federal court, as his sentence would be enhanced in the federal court proceeding under the federal sentencing guidelines 4 .

The State counters that the trial court properly denied appellant’s petitions because appellant waived the claims on which he sought coram nobis relief, there were no intervening changes in the law that would warrant relief, and there were no compelling circumstances that would warrant relief. Discussion A petition for writ of error coram nobis provides a remedy for a person who is not incarcerated and not on parole or probation, who is faced with a significant collateral consequence of his or her conviction, and who can legitimately challenge the conviction on constitutional or fundamental grounds. Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52, 78 , 760 A.2d 647 (2000). Historically, a writ of error coram nobis was directed to a court for review of its own judgment, predicated on alleged errors of fact.

Black’s Law Dictionary 362 (8th ed.2004). This practice served “to bring before the court facts which were not brought into issue at the trial of the case, and which were material to the validity and regularity of the proceedings, and which, if known by the court, would have prevented the judgment.” Skok, 361 Md. at 68 , 760 A.2d 647 (quoting Madison v. State, 205 Md. 425, 432 , 109 A.2d 96 (1954) (citations omitted)). In other words, the writ provided a remedy in situations “in which the supposed error inhere[d] in facts not actually in issue under the pleadings at the trial, and unknown to the court when the judgment was entered, but which, if known, would have prevented the judgment.” Id. at 69, 760 A.2d 647 (quoting Keane v. State, 164 Md. 685, 692 , 166 A. 410 (1933)). ⁶⁷⁸ In Skok v. State, the Court of Appeals expanded the scope of coram nobis relief to include errors of law, stating that a person who meets the requirements for coram nobis relief “should be able to file a motion for coram nobis relief regardless of whether the alleged infirmity in the conviction is considered an error of fact or an error of law.” Id. at 78, 760 A.2d 647 ; see also United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 , 74 S.Ct. 247 , 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954). Although the Skok decision served to broaden the scope for relief, the Court emphasized that such relief is “subject to several important qualifications.” Id.

Particularly, in order for a petitioner to obtain coram nobis relief, whether on the basis of error of fact or error of law, the burden of proof is on the petitioner to show that the grounds for challenging the criminal conviction are of a constitutional, jurisdictional, or fundamental character; that the petitioner is suffering or facing significant collateral consequences from the conviction; and that there is no other statutory or common law remedy then available. Id. at 78-80 , 760 A.2d 647 . Additionally, one is not entitled to challenge, a criminal conviction in a coram nobis proceeding when an issue has been finally litigated in a prior proceeding, and there are no intervening changes in the applicable law or controlling case law. Id. at 80 , 760 A.2d 647 .

In the present case, appellant’s allegations are sufficient to legitimately challenge each of the convictions on constitutional grounds. In Skok , the Court made it clear that “one of the issues which could be raised [in a coram nobis proceeding] was the voluntariness of a plea in a criminal case.” Id. at 68 , 760 A.2d 647 . Additionally, “courts have consistently held that the scope of a coram nobis proceeding encompasses issues concerning the voluntariness of a guilty or nolo contendere plea, and whether the record shows that such plea was understanding^ and voluntarily made.... ” Pitt v. State, 144 Md.App. 49, 62 , 796 A.2d 129 (2002)(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Skok, 361 Md. at 80-81 , 760 A.2d 647 ). In the present case, each of appellant’s petitions for relief alleged that his guilty pleas and plea of nolo contendere were entered into in violation of constitutional standards and in violation of ⁶⁷⁹ Maryland Rule 4-242 because they were not entered into knowingly and voluntarily.

Maryland Rule 4-242 provides: (c) Plea of guilty. The court may accept a plea of guilty only after it determines, upon an examination of the defendant on the record and in open court ... that (1) the defendant is pleading voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea; and (2) there is a factual basis for the plea.... (d) Plea of nolo contendere. A defendant may plead nolo contendere only with the consent of court.

The court may require the defendant or counsel to provide information it deems necessary to enable it to determine whether or not it will consent. The court may accept the plea only after it determines, upon an examination of the defendant on the record in open court conducted by the court, the State’s Attorney, the attorney for the defendant, or any combination thereof, that the defendant is pleading voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.... This rule expressly and unambiguously indicates that, “[b]e-fore the trial court may accept a guilty plea, it must determine on the record that the defendant understands the nature of the charges and the consequences of the plea, that the plea is a voluntary one, and that a factual basis supports the plea,” Pitt, 144 Md.App. at 63-64 , 796 A.2d 129 (citations omitted); see also State v. Hicks, 139 Md.App. 1, 11 , 773 A.2d 1056 (2001) (citing James v. State, 242 Md. 424, 428 , 219 A.2d 17 (1966) (holding that, for a guilty plea to be valid, the circumstances must show a voluntary desire on the part of the accused to plead guilty, with an intelligent understanding of the nature of the offense and the possible consequences of such a plea)). Furthermore, because of the “conclusive nature of a guilty plea,” Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 143 , 395 A.2d 464, 471 (1978), and “ ‘[o]ut of just consideration for persons accused of crime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding of the consequences.’ ” Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 , 82 S.Ct. 510 , 7 L.Ed.2d ⁶⁸⁰ 473 (1962) (quoting Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 , 47 S.Ct. 582 , 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927)). “Moreover, the courts have regularly held that violations of rules similar to Maryland Rule 4-242, which are designed to insure that guilty and nolo contendere pleas are voluntary, constitute a basis for coram nobis relief.” Skok, 361 Md. at 81 , 760 A.2d 647 .

These requirements, which are necessary to ensure compliance with constitutional guarantees, comport with the requirements enunciated by the Supreme Court in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). In Boykin v. Alabama, the petitioner was convicted of robbery and sentenced to death after pleading guilty to five indictments. The Court, after reviewing the record, held that there was reversible error because the record did not disclose that the defendant had knowingly and voluntarily entered his pleas of guilty. In so holding, the Court recognized that “[s]everal federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial,” including “the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth ... the right to trial by jury ... [and] the right to confront one’s accusers.” Id. at 243 , 395 U.S. 238 (citations omitted).

Reasoning that “[a] plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction,” the Court concluded that “[admissibility of a confession must be based on a reliable determination on the voluntariness issue....” Id. at 242 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 (citations omitted). Appellant’s petitions indicate that his pleas were entered into neither knowingly nor voluntarily in accordance with Maryland Rule 2-242 or the mandates of Boykin v. Alabama. Appellant attached a transcript of the circuit court proceeding to each of his petitions. On April 4, 1996, appellant appeared before the circuit court in case No. CA951438X.

In pertinent part, the following colloquy occurred: COURT: What’s he, how does he plead here? ⁶⁸¹ DEFENSE COUNSEL: Well, this is the thing. The offer on the table is pleading to the theft, pleading the gun and it will be time served. However, and this is pursuant to conversations as late as today, Mr. Parker is ready to plead to the theft but says no to the gun. COURT: He says nolo contendere to the gun?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: That might work. COURT: How does he plead to the theft? DEFENSE COUNSEL: Guilty. COURT: We’re halfway home.

Now, let’s pretend he’s Vice President Agnew, how does he plead to the gun? DEFENSE COUNSEL: I’ll ask him. COURT: What the hell does he know? He doesn’t know anything.

Don’t ask him. Tell him. Get him out of here. He wants to go home.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yeah, he’ll take that, Your Honor. COURT: Take what? DEFENSE COUNSEL: Nolo contendere. COURT: I’ll accept that plea.

There is no finding in count two. He’s found guilty in count one. He’s given 30 days credit for time served and waive his costs. Waiver of costs and we’ll roll him out of here.

In this exchange, it is evident that the trial court did not meet the standard set forth in rule 4-242 or Boykin . There is nothing to indicate that appellant was made aware of the charges against him or of the consequences of a guilty plea. There is also no indication that the plea was entered into voluntarily. In fact, quite contrarily, the court suggests that because appellant “doesn’t know anything,” he should simply be told how to plead.

On November 30, 1998, appellant appeared before the court in case No. CA982263J, and the following occurred: COURT: CA982515J, Maurice Parker. How does he plead? Count one, Madam Clerk. CLERK: Your Honor, here’s another one.

I didn’t have it, under Natalie’s, 148. ⁶⁸² COURT: 982263. How long has he been locked up, Tom? How long have you been locked up, Parker? APPELLANT: July 6th.

COURT: How does he plead in 2263 to stealing his boss’ pistol? DEFENSE COUNSEL: Guilty, Your Honor. COURT: How does he plead in 2515 to driving without insurance? DEFENSE COUNSEL: Guilty, Your Honor.

COURT: Which is count one, Madam Clerk. In 2515 he gets probation before judgment unpapered and unsupervised over the objection of the State for a period of six months. In 2263 he gets 90 days credit for time served. Waive his costs in both cases.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Thank you, Your Honor. Aside from the court’s inquiry of appellant as to how long he had been incarcerated, there is no indication that either the court, defense counsel, or the State’s Attorney addressed appellant. There is nothing to suggest that appellant understood the ramifications of a guilty plea, what consequences he could face, or that there were sufficient facts to provide a basis for a guilty plea. On October 28, 1999, appellant’s counsel appeared before the court in case No. CA992410A, without appellant, and the following transpired: COURT: CA992410A, Maurice Parker.

He’s doing 18 months. That’s why he’s not here. DEFENSE COUNSEL: That’s