Parker v. State

³⁷ WEANT, Judge. Based on an agreed statement of facts, the Circuit Court for Baltimore convicted the appellant, Gregory Parker, of attempted robbery, Md.Ann.Code, art. 27, § 486 (1982). Both sides agreed that the crime occurred at 9:45 a.m. on 11 March 1983 and that Parker was born at 12:50 p.m. on 11 March 1965. Based on his reasoning that he did not become eighteen years old until the anniversary of the precise hour and moment of his birth, appellant argues that, absent waiver, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction.

Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 3-807(a) (1980). See Franklin v. State, 264 Md. 62 , 285 A.2d 616 (1972). Rejecting this contention, we affirm appellant’s conviction. I. Initially we note appellant’s Statement of the Case recites that Parker “was charged with attempted armed robbery.” If this were accurate, we would need to go no further than Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 3-804 which provides: (d) The [juvenile] court does not have jurisdiction over: (4) A child 16 years or older alleged to have committed the crime of robbery with a dangerous or deadly weapon or attempted robbery with a dangerous or deadly weapon, as well as all other charges against the child arising out of the same incident,____ Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 3-804(d)(4) (1980 & Supp. 1982).

The charge against appellant, however, was attempted robbery. The statement of facts tendered at trial explicitly stated that “[n]o weapon was displayed.” Unless jurisdiction has been waived, a person subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court may not be prosecuted for a criminal offense committed before he reached eighteen years of age. Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 3-804(a) (1980). A “child” is defined as a person under the age of eighteen.

Id., § 3-801(d). The age of the person at the time the alleged delinquent act was committed controls the determination of jurisdiction. Id., § 3-805(a); In ³⁸ re Davis, 17 Md.App. 98 , 299 A.2d 856 (1973). A child who has reached his eighteenth birthday at the time of the crime may be prosecuted as an adult.

Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App. 497 , 287 A.2d 299 , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1025 , 93 S.Ct. 467 , 34 L.Ed. 317 (1972). Hence, the question posed by appellant in the case sub judice: Was he eighteen years old at the time he committed the offense? In the absence of legislative proscription, common law precepts continue. Md.Decl.Rights, art. 5; Jackson v. Jackson, 15 Md.App. 615 , 292 A.2d 145 (1972).

Harkening back to the English case of Herbert v. Turball (1663) 1 Keble 589, 83 Eng.Reprint 1129, 1 Sid. 162, 82 Eng. Reprint 1033, it is well-established that the law will not recognize fractions of a day. It appears that the rationale for this precept is expressed in the words of William Blackstone, Esquire, when he said: “In the space of a day all of the twenty four hours are usually reckoned; the law generally rejecting all fractions of a day, in order to avoid disputes.” 2 Bl.Com. 141. See generally, Annot. 5 A.L.R.2d 1143 (1949).

Although exceptions to this common law principle do occur, e.g., in cases involving priorities of deeds or liens recorded on the same day, such exceptions are not generally applied in criminal proceedings. Taking a chronological leap forward to this century, our own court systems have recognized the viability of the English rule in situations strikingly similar to that present in the case at bar. In State v. Brown, 443 S.W.2d 805 (Mo.1969) (en banc), the Supreme Court of Missouri rejected a defendant’s claim that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to convict him. Although appellant admitted that he committed the crime alleged (assault with intent to