Patton v. Wells Fargo Financial Maryland, Inc.

McDonald, j. This case concerns a loan contract by which a consumer financed the purchase of an automobile over time. The car dealer assigned the contract to a financial services company. Before the loan was paid off, the consumer stopped making payments.

As a result, the assignee of the loan contract repossessed and sold the automobile to recover some of the money owed under the contract. The consumer brought suit, alleging that the repossession and sale of the car did not comply with the Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Law (“CLEC”), a Maryland statute that governed the loan contract. The Circuit Court dismissed the lawsuit, apparently finding that the consumer’s statutory claims were untimely by applying a one-year statute of limitations from the Maryland Equal Credit Opportunity Act. The Circuit Court also dismissed a related contract claim apparently on the ground that the requirements of CLEC were not incorporated into the contract as to the assignee.

We hold that the appropriate statute of limitations for an action alleging a violation of CLEC can be found in CLEC itself — in particular, such an action may not be brought more than six months after the loan is satisfied. We also hold that the loan contract in this case adequately incorporated CLEC ⁸⁸ as part of the contractual obligations, that the assignee voluntarily accepted that provision in taking the assignment, and that a contract claim may be asserted against the assignee. Accordingly, we reverse. I. Background A. Closed End Credit As a general rule, “closed end credit” denotes a loan or extension of credit in which the borrower receives the benefit of the proceeds of the loan immediately and repays the principal, together with interest and other charges, in the future, usually in installments. 1 Closed end credit is sometimes contrasted to revolving — or “open end” — credit arrangements, like credit cards, in which the borrower is able to use credit to buy goods or secure loans on a continuing basis so long as the outstanding balance does not exceed a specified limit. 2 See Maryland Code, Commercial Law Article (“CL”), § 12-1001(d) (defining “closed end credit” as “the extension of credit by a credit grantor to a borrower under an arrangement or agreement which is not a revolving credit plan ... ”).

A major category of closed end credit involves loans to individuals to finance the purchase of motor vehicles. 3 In Maryland, when the purchase of a motor vehicle is financed by an installment sale, the lender may elect for the contract to be governed by either of two statutes found in Title 12 of the Commercial Law Article of the Maryland Code: the Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Law, Maryland Code, ⁸⁹ Commercial Law Article, § 12-1001 et seq. (“CLEC”), or the Maryland Retail Installment Sales Act, Maryland Code, Commercial Law Article, § 12-601 et seq. (“RISA”). If the lender elects CLEC, it is to do so by written election in the loan contract.

CL § 12-1013.1(a)(2); see also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Roberson, 420 Md. 649 , 658 n. 8, 25 A.3d 110 (2011). This case concerns a loan contract governed by CLEC. B. CLEC CLEC provides certain protections to consumer borrowers 4 in transactions involving closed end credit. Among other things, CLEC sets limits on the rate of interest, as well as other fees, that may be charged by a lender — referred to as a “credit grantor” in the statute. 5 See CL §§ 12-1003, 12-1005.

The statute confers on a consumer borrower the right to prepay the loan in full at any time without penalty. CL § 12-1009. If a consumer borrower is in default on a loan, the credit grantor may repossess the collateral for the loan, but must follow certain procedures in doing so. CL § 12-1021.

In particular, once the lender has taken possession of the collateral, it must advise the borrower of the borrower’s right to redeem the property, the location of the property, the rights of the borrower with respect to resale of the property, ⁹⁰ and the borrower’s potential liability for a deficiency. CL § 12 — 1021(e). The lender may charge the borrower the “actual and reasonable expenses of retaking and storing the property” only if the lender provides the borrower with advance notice of the repossession. CL § 12-1021(c), (h)(3).

The statute allows the creditor to sell the collateral at private sale or public sale. CL § 12-1021Q. In the case of a private sale, it requires the lender to provide an accounting to the borrower, including specified information. CL § 12 — 1021(j)(2); see also Gardner v. Ally Financial, Inc., 430 Md. 515, 523-33 , 61 A.3d 817 (2013).

The statute also contains other authorizations and protections not pertinent to this case. The statute provides various remedies to a borrower if the lender fails to comply with CLEC. For example, in some circumstances, the lender may be limited to collecting the principal of the loan and prohibited from collecting interest and other charges. CL § 12-1018(a)(2).

A knowing violation of the statute may result in the lender forfeiting three times the amount of any interest, fees, and charges in excess of those allowed by CLEC. CL § 12-1018(b). The statute provides that, if a lender fails to observe various requirements concerning repossession and notice, the lender is not entitled to a deficiency judgment for the unpaid balance of the loan. CL § 12-1021(k)(4).

The statute also confers certain administrative regulatory powers on the Commissioner of Financial Regulation and provides a criminal penalty for willful violations of the statute. CL § 12-1015 through § 12-1018.1. The statute specifies that the phrase “credit grantor” includes an assignee. CL § 12-1001(g)(2)(iii).

Thus, an entity that receives an assignment of a loan contract governed by CLEC from the originator of the loan is also subject to the requirements of CLEC. C. Ms. Patton Finances the Purchase of a New Car The complaint, including attachments, that initiated this case in the Circuit Court alleged the following facts: ⁹¹ In 2005, Appellant Carolyn Delorise Patton purchased a new Chevrolet Malibu from Fox Chevrolet, Inc. (“Fox Chevrolet”), a car dealership located in Maryland. Ms. Patton entered into a retail installment sales contract with Fox Chevrolet to finance the purchase. The contract was set forth on a standard form that contained the terms of the contract and blanks for the names of the parties and various monetary amounts specific to the transaction.

Under that contract, Ms. Patton agreed to make monthly payments, covering principal in the amount of $22,095.74 and interest in the amount of $14,098.66 (calculated at a rate of 17.9%), over a six-year period. In addition, Ms. Patton gave Fox Chevrolet a security interest in the car to secure payment of the amount owed. The contract also recited various consequences if Ms. Patton failed to make the scheduled payments, including repossession of the car by the lender, acceleration of the obligation to pay the principal, and assessment of collection costs. In a section entitled “Applicable Law,” the contract form stated that “Federal law and Maryland law and specifically Subtitle 10 of Title 12 of the Commercial Article of the Maryland Code apply to this Contract.” As noted above, subtitle 10 of Title 12 of the Commercial Law Article is the formal designation of CLEC.

The bottom of the contract form contained a space for assignment of the contract by the seller. The form also contained a notice in boldface print that stated that “Any holder of this consumer credit contract is subject to all claims and defenses which the debtor could assert against the seller of goods or services obtained pursuant hereto or with the proceeds hereof. Recovery hereunder by the debtor shall not exceed amounts paid by the debtor hereunder.” 6 ⁹² After the sale of the car to Ms. Patton, Fox Chevrolet assigned the loan contract to Appellee Wells Fargo Financial Maryland, Inc. (“Wells Fargo Financial”). D. Ms. Patton Fails to Make Payments; Repossession and Sale of the Car In 2007, Ms. Patton stopped making the monthly payments required by the contract.

In November 2007, Wells Fargo Financial repossessed the car. It immediately notified her of the repossession and of the date that the car would be sold at a private sale if she did not make the payments necessary to redeem it. Ms. Patton did not make the required payment and Wells Fargo Financial proceeded with the sale. In January 2008, it informed Ms. Patton of the sale and also noted that she still owed a deficiency of $13,227.28.

E. Ms. Patton’s Lawsuit On March 5, 2010, more than two years after she had been notified that Wells Fargo Financial had sold the car at a private sale, Ms. Patton sued Wells Fargo Financial 7 in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, alleging various violations of CLEC in connection with the repossession and sale of the car. 8 Her complaint had seven counts: 9 The first three counts alleged specific violations of CLEC— in particular, of CL § 12-1021 — in the repossession and sale of ⁹³ the car. The first count alleged that, after Wells Fargo Financial repossessed the car, it did not provide her with a written notice stating “the rights of the consumer borrower to redeem the vehicle, and the amount payable by it; the rights of the consumer borrower as to a resale, and his liability for a deficiency; and the exact location where the vehicle is stored and the address where any payment is to be made,” as required by CL § 12 — 1021(e), and instead only sent a notice stating the location where the car was being stored. The second count alleged that Wells Fargo Financial had violated CLEC by charging Ms. Patton for the cost of repossessing her car because it had not provided her with an advance notice of the repossession, contrary to CL § 12-1021(c) & (h)(3). The third count alleged that Wells Fargo Financial had failed to provide Ms. Patton with a “full accounting” after it disposed of her vehicle at a private sale, including “the purchaser’s name, address, and business address; the number of bids received; and any statement as to the condition of the vehicle at the time of repossession,” in violation of CL § 12-1021GX2).

The fourth count alleged that the provisions of CLEC had “become a part of the [loan] contract just as if the parties expressly included the CLEC provisions in their credit contracts” and that, as a result of the violations of CLEC identified in the first three counts, Wells Fargo Financial was liable for breach of contract. The fifth count was brought under the Declaratory Judgments Act 10 and sought a declaration that Wells Fargo Financial was precluded from seeking a deficiency judgment against Ms. Patton as a result of the alleged CLEC violations. The sixth count asserted that Wells Fargo Financial had been unjustly enriched as a result of its CLEC violations and sought restitution of any funds paid toward the deficiency ⁹⁴ balance, interest, fees, and other costs claimed by Wells Fargo Financial. The seventh count alleged that Wells Fargo Financial’s failure to comply with CLEC and its assertion that Ms. Patton owed a deficiency balance constituted unfair and deceptive trade practices, in violation of the Consumer Protection Act. 11 F. Dismissal of Complaint and Appeal Wells Fargo Financial moved to dismiss Ms. Patton’s complaint.

After a hearing on the motion, the Circuit Court entered an order dated October 8, 2010, dismissing all counts of the complaint. The court dismissed four counts — the first three counts alleging violations of CLEC and the fourth count alleging breach of contract — with prejudice, but gave Ms. Patton leave to amend the three remaining counts of the complaint. Although the court did not issue a written opinion, it appears that the court agreed with Wells Fargo Financial that the CLEC claims were untimely and that Ms. Patton’s complaint did not state a cause of action for breach of contract. Ms. Patton filed a notice of appeal.

The Court of Special Appeals dismissed Ms. Patton’s appeal -without prejudice, on the ground that Circuit Court’s judgment was not a final, appealable order. Wells Fargo Financial then moved in the Circuit Court for dismissal of the remaining counts of the complaint with prejudice, on the ground that Ms. Patton had failed to amend those claims within the requisite period of time — a motion that Ms. Patton did not oppose so that a final judgment could be entered. The Circuit Court complied on March 30, 2012, and Ms. Patton refiled her notice of appeal. On December 14, 2012, prior to a hearing or decision by the Court of Special Appeals, we issued a writ of certiorari on our own initiative. ⁹⁵ II.

Discussion In her appeal, Ms. Patton contests the Circuit Court’s rulings on the timeliness of her claims under CLEC and the adequacy of her breach of contract claim. We consider first the appropriate statute of limitations for a claim brought by a consumer borrower against a credit grantor for violation of CLEC to determine whether Ms. Patton’s claims alleging violations of CLEC were timely. We next consider whether the requirements of CLEC become part of the contractual obligations incorporated in a contract regulated by CLEC, such that a violation of CLEC also constitutes a breach of contract. A. Standard of Review In deciding a motion to dismiss a complaint, a circuit court assumes the truth of the complaint’s factual allegations, and any reasonable inferences, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Bobo v. State, 346 Md. 706, 708 , 697 A.2d 1371 (1997). In reviewing the dismissal of a complaint, an appellate court applies the same standard and assesses whether that decision was legally correct. See Reichs Ford Rd. Joint Venture v. State Roads Comm'n, 388 Md. 500, 509 , 880 A.2d 307 , 312 (2005) (citing Adamson v. Corr.

Med. Servs., 359 Md. 238, 246 , 753 A.2d 501 (2000)). The appellate court accords no special deference to the circuit court’s legal conclusions. B. Statute of Limitations for Violation of CLEC More than two years elapsed between the repossession and sale of Ms. Patton’s car and the filing of the complaint that initiated this case.

Wells Fargo Financial argues that CL § 12-707(g), a section of the Maryland Equal Credit Opportunity Act that states a one-year period of limitations, is the appropriate statute of limitations for actions brought under provisions of the Commercial Law Article, including CLEC. By contrast, Ms. Patton points to CL § 12-1019, a section of CLEC that states that “[a]n action for violation of this subti tle” — i.e., CLEC — “may not be brought more than 6 months after the loan is satisfied.” Unsurprisingly perhaps, under ⁹⁶ Wells Fargo Financial’s theory, Ms. Patton’s claims under CLEC are time-barred; under Ms. Patton’s theory, they are timely. We discuss each party’s suggested statute of limitations in turn. 1. CL § 12-707(g) Wells Fargo Financial urges us to apply the following limitations provision: An action under this title may be brought in any district court or circuit court, depending upon the amount in controversy, within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation.

CL § 12-707(g) (emphasis added). This provision appears in the Maryland Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Maryland Code, Commercial Law Article, § 12-701 et seq., which comprises subtitle 7 of .Title 12 of the Commercial Law Article, a statute that is quite distinct from CLEC and the other eleven subtitles of Title 12. That statute, patterned after an analogous federal law, 12 prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, marital status, race, color, religion, national origin, or age in the extension of credit. It does not regulate the substantive terms of an installment sale, the repossession and sale of collateral when a borrower defaults, or the conditions under which a lender can seek a deficiency judgment against the borrower.

There is no allegation in this case that Wells Fargo Financial violated the Maryland Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Nevertheless, according to Wells Fargo Financial, the plain language of this provision means that it states the period of limitations for any action that could be brought for violation of “this title” — i.e., Title 12 of the Commercial Law Article. Wells Fargo Financial is correct that, as a literal matter, the language of CL § 12-707(g) would appear to apply to all of the statutory schemes contained in Title 12, even those, like CLEC, contained in other subtitles. But the “plain meaning” ⁹⁷ of a statute can only be assessed in the context in which it appears.

Building Materials Corp. v. Board of Education of Baltimore County, 428 Md. 572, 585 , 53 A.3d 347 (2012). In that regard, it is notable that other subtitles of Title 12, including CLEC, contain various other statutes of limitations. 13 Neither CL § 12-707(g) nor these other statutes acknowledge each other. Considered in that light, the purview of CL § 12-707(g) is ambiguous. Resolution of Ambiguity in Statutes “[W]here a statute is plainly susceptible [to] more than one meaning and thus contains an ambiguity, courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment.” Kaczorowski v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513 , 525 A.2d 628 (1987) (internal citations omitted).

Where, as here, there appears to be ambiguity or “uncertain meaning” in a statute, the Court “may and often must consider other ‘external manifestations’ or ‘persuasive evidence,’ including a bill’s title and function paragraphs, ... its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation, and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal....” 309 Md. at 515 , 525 A.2d 628 . Courts are not limited “to the words of the statute as they are printed in the Annotated Code.” Id. at 514-15 , 525 A.2d 628 . In fact, as this Court noted in Kaczorowski , “[t]he circumstances of the enactment of particular legislation may persuade a court that [the legislature] did not intend words of common meaning to have this literal effect.” Id. at 514 , 525 A.2d 628 (internal citations omitted). This process allows courts to discern “that construction which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or ⁹⁸ one which is inconsistent with common sense.” Id.

(internal citation omitted). In Kaczorowski itself, the Court considered whether a local development agency, which owed its existence to a particular statute, had inadvertently become defunct because the General Assembly, in the course of a legislative effort to enhance the financing capabilities of such agencies, had repealed certain parts of the agency’s enabling act and a “savings clause by its plain wording [did] not save it.” 309 Md. at 511 , 525 A.2d 628 . The Court concluded that the General Assembly had made a “patent drafting error” that frustrated the legislative goal of the statute and that the courts should not give effect to it. Id. at 520 , 525 A.2d 628 .

Accordingly, we review the legislative history of CL § 12-707(g) to resolve the ambiguity of its application. Legislative History of CL § 12-707(g) In 1975, one year after the passage of the similar federal law, 14 the General Assembly passed the Maryland Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Chapter 753, Laws of Maryland 1975 codified at CL § 12-701 et seq. (1975 & 1975 Supp.), finding that “there is a need to insure that the various financial institutions and other persons and firms engaged in the extension of credit exercise their responsibility to make credit available with fairness, impartiality, and without discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status.... ” CL § 12-702(a). The stated purpose of the new subtitle 7 of Title 12 of the Commercial Law Article was “to require that financial institutions and other persons and firms engaged in the extension of credit do not deny credit solely on the basis of sex or marital status.” CL § 12-702(b). 15 ⁹⁹ Although it contained a section describing a creditor’s civil liability for violating the statute, see CL § 12-707 (1975 Supp.), the original version of the Maryland Equal Credit Opportunity Act did not contain a specific statute of limitations for actions under that provision.

In 1976, the General Assembly amended the Act to increase the potential damages that could be awarded for a violation of the Act and, at the same time, added a period of limitations for such actions. Chapter 723, Laws of Maryland 1976. The title of the bill stated that it was “For the purpose of increasing the damages for violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act; and generally relating to civil liabilities for violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.” House Bill 1038 (1976) (emphasis added). Notwithstanding that the title of the bill related the bill only to the Maryland Equal Credit Opportunity Act and that references to “this subtitle” (ie., the Maryland Equal Credit Opportunity Act) in the existing damages provision indicated the limited nature of the bill, the new limitations provision in the bill referred to “this title” — literally, the entire Title 12 of the Commercial Law Article.

It is clear that both the 1975 enactment of the Maryland Equal Credit Opportunity Act and its 1976 amendment were intended to ensure that creditors were prohibited from engaging in discriminatory practices when extending credit, and that consumer borrowers had a remedy if creditors did engage in such practices. It is also clear that the law was modeled on its federal analog. Documents in the bill file for the 1976 bill that added the limitations provision indicate that the General Assembly sought to conform the Maryland statute to the provisions of the civil liability section of the Federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act. 16 In particular, the bill file for House Bill 1038 (1976) ¹⁰⁰ contains a copy of the civil liability section of the Federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act that had been passed in 1974, Pub. Law 93-495 (1974) as codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(g) (1974), now codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f) (2014).

A handwritten note in the same file reads: “Conforms to Fed Equal Credit Opor. Act.” The fact that these documents are found in the Maryland bill file is “strong evidence” of the General. Assembly’s intention that confirms an inference that could be drawn from the similarity of text and purpose. See Johnson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 430 Md. 368, 388 , 61 A.3d 33 (2013).

None of the materials in the legislative file suggest that the scope of the new limitations provision was to be broader than the statute to which it was added. The copy of the federal legislation in the bill file also provides a clue as to how the bill came to refer to “this title” in CL § 12-707(g). As with CL § 12-707(g), the limitations provision of the federal bill appears in a final subsection (g) of the liability section of the law. Notably, the federal Act uses the word “this title” to describe itself, in subsection (g) as elsewhere.

In the original 1975 iteration of the Maryland statute, CL § 12-707 concerned damages and an exception from liability for a violation of the Maryland Equal Credit Opportunity Act and referenced the Act correctly as “this subtitle.” In the 1976 amendment those provisions were elaborated, but the only entirely new addition to the statute was the one-year period of limitations provision in new subsection (g), evidently inspired by the identical federal limitations provision. It is apparent that the drafters of the 1976 amendment made a “patent drafting error” when they imported the federal limitations provision from subsection (g) of the federal statute into a new subsection (g) of the Maryland statute, but ¹⁰¹ failed to substitute “this subtitle” for “this title” in the limitations provision, as they had done in the damages provisions of the original CL § 12-707 in the 1975 legislation (and preserved in the 1976 amendments of those provisions). Other considerations also counsel in favor of limiting the purview of CL § 12-707(g) to the Maryland Equal Credit Opportunity Act. As noted above, Title 12 of the Commercial Law Article contains other statutes of limitations.

If CL § 12-707(g) were to be applied to the entirety of Title 12, it would sow confusion throughout Title 12 of the Commercial Law Article, particularly in those subtitles that contain statutes of limitations. The result would be not unlike placing conflicting traffic signals at an intersection. Finally, if Wells Fargo is correct that CL § 12-707(g) applies universally in Title 12, a number of prior decisions concerning other subtitles of Title 12 have been wrongly decided in not taking account of CL § 12-707(g). See, e.g., Master Financial, Inc. v. Crowder, 409 Md. 51 , 972 A.2d 864 (2009) (determining statute of limitations for action brought under subtitle 4 of Title 12 without discussing CL § 12-707(g)).

Although the “plain meaning” of CL § 12-707(g) may lead to a conclusion that it applies to the entirety of Title 12 of the Commercial Law Article, including an action for violation of CLEC, the legislative history of the Maryland Equal Credit Opportunity Act indicates otherwise. As in Kaczorowski , the statutory conundrum is the product of a “patent drafting error” that leads to an “absurd result.” Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 520 , 525 A.2d 628 . In our view, CL § 12-707(g) was intended to apply solely to actions based on violations of the Maryland Equal Credit Opportunity Act and does not apply to an action for a violation of CLEC. 2. CL § 12-1019 Statute and Case Law As noted earlier, CL § 12-1019 is part of CLEC and provides that “an action for violation of this subtitle may not be brought more than 6 months after the loan is satisfied.” This Court, and others, have acknowledged that CL § 12-1019 ¹⁰² states the period of limitations for an action alleging a violation of CLEC.

In particular, in Master Financial v. Crowder, 409 Md. 51, 66 , 972 A.2d 864 (2009), this Court listed examples of statutes that contained a “specific period of limitations for enforcement of the statute” and identified CL § 12-1019 as a limitations period “requiring that [a] civil action for violation of Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Act be filed no later than six months after loan is satisfied.” In Green v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 152 Md.App. 32, 53 , 828 A.2d 821 (2003), the Court of Special Appeals, in passing, described CL § 12-1019 as setting forth a “condition precedent to suit” — an apt description for a statute of limitations. 17 See also White v. Bank of America, N.A., 2012 WL 1067657 , ¹ at ⁸ (D.Md. March 27, 2012) (noting that “CLEC does have a statute of limitations, which requires that suit be brought no more than ‘six months after the loan is satisfied’”) (internal citation and footnote omitted). Bediako Wells Fargo Financial argues that CL § 12-1019 does not state the limitations period for an action alleging a violation of CLEC, relying on a recent federal district court decision. Bediako v. American Honda Finance Corp., 850 F.Supp.2d 574 (D.Md.2012), aff'd on other grounds, 537 Fed.Appx. 183 (4th Cir.2013). 18 We have reviewed the analysis of the federal district court in Bediako and find it to be flawed. ¹⁰³ The court in Bediako based its analysis largely on a statement by this Court in Scott v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 345 Md. 251, 254 , 691 A.2d 1320 (1997) that “CLEC does not contain a statute of limitations.” But, once again, context is key. Scott did not involve a suit alleging a violation of CLEC.

Rather, it was an action brought by a lender against a borrower for a deficiency. Indeed, the Court specifically noted that the borrower “does not contend that the requirements of CLEC were not followed.” 345 Md. at 255 , 691 A.2d 1320 . Thus, that case did not involve “[a]n action for violation of this subtitle” (ie., CLEC) and the limitations period set forth in CL § 12-1019 was not pertinent. The Court in Scott was correct when it determined that CLEC does not itself contain a limitations period for a deficiency action by a lender against a borrower.

Id. at 254-55 , 691 A.2d 1320 . In the absence of a statutory limitations period, this Court had to decide in Scott whether the four-year limitations period of the Sales Article of the Uniform Commercial Code (Title 2 of the Commercial Law Article) or the general three-year period of limitations (Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, § 5-101) was the more appropriate limitations period to apply for a deficiency action. Id. at 252, 691 A.2d 1320 . The Court ultimately reasoned that the four-year period of limitations in the Sales Article was the more apt period, for reasons not relevant to our case.

Id. at 262 , 691 A.2d 1320 . The Bediako court also looked to adoption of the four-year period of limitations in Scott for a deficiency action as another basis for declining to apply CL § 12-1019 for actions alleging a violation of CLEC. The Bediako court reasoned that it would be “absurd and outrageous” if a creditor had only four years to seek a deficiency judgment, but the borrower had what the court viewed as a potentially much longer period ¹⁰⁴ under CL § 12-1019 — “six months after the loan is satisfied” — to bring an action against the lender for violation of CLEC. 850 F.Supp.2d at 579 . In reaching the conclusion that CL § 12-1019 does not state the