Pilkington v. Pilkington, II

Leahy, J. Nicole Pilkington (Appellant) challenges the Circuit Court for Harford County’s jurisdiction to issue the underlying order awarding sole legal and primary physical custody of her child ⁵⁶⁵ R.P., to her former husband, Roman Pilkington, II (Appellee). Ms. Pilkington is a citizen and current resident of Germany. Mr. Pilkington is a Sergeant in the United States Army, and the transience of his residences in that service underlies the issues at the crux of this case. The parties met in 2003 in Germany where they got married and became the parents of R.P. During the time the married couple lived in Germany, Ms. Pilkington also gave birth to B.P., who, it was later determined, was not the biological child of Mr. Pilkington.

The parties moved to Colorado, where they divorced two years later and entered into a court-ordered custody plan for R.P., awarding Ms. Pilkington primary physical custody. 1 After another three years, Mr. Pilkington moved to Maryland, where he currently resides. In 2014, Ms. Pilkington took B.P. and R.P. to Germany for a month-long vacation, and then decided unilaterally to stay in Germany and enroll both children in school there, in violation of the Colorado court’s custody order for R.P. Nineteen months later, when Ms. Pilkington allowed R.P. and his sister to visit his father in Maryland, Mr. Pilkington sought judicial intervention. He filed two emergency custody petitions in the Circuit Court for Harford County for R.P. and B.P. At the emergency custody hearing, Ms. Pilkington appeared through counsel and challenged the court’s jurisdiction under the Maryland Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“Maryland UCCJEA” or “Act”), Maryland Code (1984, 2012 Repl. Vol.), Family Law (“FL”) § 9.5-101 et seq.

The court decided it could exercise jurisdiction under the Act, but ordered Mr. Pilkington to return the children to Germany until the court could conduct a full trial. Once the children were back in Germany, Ms. Pilkington broke off all ⁵⁶⁶ communications and did not participate in any further court proceedings preceding this appeal. In response, the circuit court determined that Ms. Pilkington’s behavior was inconsistent with R.P.’s best interest and awarded sole legal and primary custody of R.P. to Mr. Pilkington. Ms. Pilkington presents the following issues: 1) “Whether the lower court erred when it modified custody without subject matter jurisdiction.” 2) “Whether the lower court erred and violated the Mother’s due process rights and fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody and control of her son in violation of the United States Constitution, the Maryland Declaration of Rights and Maryland statutory and case authority when it failed to provide the Mother notice and an opportunity to be heard.” 3) “Whether the lower court erred and violated the Mother’s due process rights and fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody and control of her son when it exceeded the authority afforded it by the Maryland Rules.” 4) “Whether the lower court abused its discretion when it modified and changed custody without holding a hearing and without any factual findings.” We hold that the circuit court in this case exceeded the jurisdictional restraints imposed under the Maryland UC-CJEA by entering an order that modified a foreign jurisdiction’s existing custody order when Maryland was not the child’s home state and there was no other jurisdictional basis to modify an existing order under FL § 9.5-203.

We, therefore, must vacate the circuit court’s order and remand the case with instructions that the court limit itself to the authority contained in the Maryland UCCJEA’s enforcement subtitle. BACKGROUND A. The Marriage and Divorce Mr. Pilkington met Ms. Pilkington, a German national, while he was stationed with the United States Army in Schweinfurt, ⁵⁶⁷ Germany. On May 23, 2003, the couple married in Niederw-errn, Bavaria, Germany, where they lived until December 2008 when the Army transferred Mr. Pilkington to Colorado Springs, Colorado. During their marriage and while the couple still resided in Germany, Ms. Pilkington gave birth to two children: B.P., bom in 2004, and R.P., born in 2006.

The couple remained married until October 28, 2010, at which point they obtained a Decree of Dissolution of Marriage (“Colorado Order”) in the District Court for El Paso County, Colorado. A paternity test at the time of the parents’ divorce proved that Mr. Pilkington is not B.P.’s biological father, although her birth certificate identifies him as the father, R.P. is Mr. Pilkington’s biological son. The Colorado Order incorporated a parenting plan for R.P., which set child support, provided Ms. Pilkington with primary physical custody of R.P., and granted Mr. Pilkington weekend visitation during the school year and a total of 170 overnights per year. 2 The Colorado Order also required that either parent wishing to relocate the child must “file a Motion with the Court ... and obtain court permission to relocate, unless the parties have submitted to the Court a written agreement/stipulation[.]” B. Custody, Visitation & the Underlying Dispute After the Pilkingtons lived separately in Colorado for almost three years, the Army transferred Mr. Pilkington from Colorado Springs to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, in October of 2013. The children remained in Colorado with Ms. Pilkington from October until their school’s Christmas break, at which point they traveled to Maryland to spend the holiday with Mr. Pilkington.

Then, at Ms. Pilkington’s request, Mr. Pilkington provided Ms. Pilkington with written permission allowing her to take the children to visit her family in Germa ⁵⁶⁸ ny from January 25, 2014 to February 20, 2014. 3 Once in Germany, Ms. Pilkington decided unilaterally to remain there with the children and enroll them in a German primary school. She did not ask Mr. Pilkington for a joint stipulation to amend the parental plan, nor did she seek the Colorado court’s permission to relocate the children pursuant to the Colorado Order. That summer, Mr. Pilkington travelled to Germany to visit the children. He returned to Maryland two weeks later without having sought a court order to enforce his custody rights.

A year passed before Mr. Pilkington would see the children again. At no point in the meantime did Mr. Pilkington file a motion in any court for the children’s return. The following summer, with Ms. Pilkington’s permission, Mr. Pilkington flew to Germany to pick up the children to bring them to Maryland from June 29, 2015, until September 11, 2015, at which point they were to return to Germany. When the time came for the children to return to Germany, Mr. Pilkington took the children only as far as Philadelphia International Airport.

Once at the airport, Mr. Pilkington claims the children were upset to leave him so he took them back to Maryland where he enrolled them in school. C. The Emergency Custody Hearing Ten days after the children were supposed to fly back to Germany, Mr. Pilkington, through counsel, sent Ms. Pilking-ton notice electronically, advising her that he would be filing an “Ex Parte Petition for Emergency Custody in the Circuit Court for Harford County on September 24th, 2015 at 8:30 a.m.” Two days later, Mr. Pilkington again sent Ms. Pilkington and her Maryland counsel notice of the action and certification of service—this time by both email and regular mail. Then, on September 24, 2015, Mr. Pilkington filed his petition for temporary custody of R.P. and a corresponding affidavit in compliance with the requirements for a petition to enforce ⁵⁶⁹ child custody determination. 4 Mr. Pilkington brought his petitions pursuant to FL §§ 9.5-204 and 9.5-304, as well as § 9.5-303, and filed his affidavit of compliance pursuant to § 9.5-308 of the same title. Mr. Pilkington’s complaint alleged that Ms. Pilkington kept the children in Germany in disregard of the Colorado Order, depriving Mr. Pilkington of his rights therein.

Mr. Pilkington asked the court “to issue a temporary order enforcing the visitation schedule made by the Colorado court until such time that the foreign judgment can be registered in Maryland, and order that [he] be awarded primary physical custody of [R.P.] on a pendente lite basis.” Mr. Pilkington only sought custody pendente lite because, he reasoned, that if granted, “Maryland [would] become the ‘home state’ of [the children] in December 2015. 5 That same day, the circuit court held an emergency custody hearing. As an initial matter at the hearing, Ms. Pilkington appeared through counsel and questioned the court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case under the Maryland UCCJEA. The court observed: “If [the children] had gone from Colorado to Maryland, I would agree one hundred percent that you are in the wrong court. Since they had that year span or year plus over in Germany, then under the [Maryland UCCJEA] there really isn’t any state in this country that has clear, pure six month jurisdiction.” Mr. Pilking-ton’s counsel acknowledged the home state issue, noting: “Due to the home state issue of six months, I was going to file that in December when that time comes.” Ultimately the court found that it had jurisdiction: Under the [Maryland UCCJEA]—once again, if we didn’t have that little intercession in Germany for over a year, ⁵⁷⁰ clearly we wouldn’t [have jurisdiction] and I would tell you all to pack your bags and go see beautiful Colorado. ...

But we do have that. So, if you look at what state in the union has any [jurisdiction], there is really no longer one that is clear. We look at the contacts with this state and at this point in time you still have two states fighting for it, one is Colorado under a continuing jurisdiction aspect and it is their Order, et cetera, but nobody has been there for over a year. Nobody has been here for long.

The end of June and three months is all we have. So, it isn’t terrific contact, but it certainly seems to beat anybody else in the USA. So, I’m not concerned on a jurisdictional aspect. After hearing proffers from each parties’ counsel but no testimony, the court ordered Mr. Pilkington to surrender both children’s passports and ordered that, pending trial, the children should return to their mother in Germany, with R.P. to return to Maryland for his entire Christmas vacation at Ms. Pilkington’s expense.

At Mr. Pilkington’s request, the court agreed to include in its order a requirement that Ms. Pilking-ton return the children for trial, and if not, the court would “have the trial without her.” The court’s orders, however, do not explicitly include this mandate. The Office of the Family Law Case Coordinator for the circuit court mailed the parties’ respective counsel copies of the Order for Referral on October 14, 2015, ordering the Office of Family Court Services: 1) To evaluate each party’s ability to meet the child(ren)’s needs; 2) To evaluate each party’s ability to make decisions which prioritize the needs of the child(ren); 3) To evaluate each party’s ability to co-parent; 4) To evaluate each party’s attitude toward the child(ren)’s relationship with the other party; 5) To evaluate the child(ren)’s adjustment to the current living arrangement; ⁵⁷¹ 6) To evaluate the child(ren)’s past and present relationship with each party; 7) To help the parties implement and develop a visitation schedule and to reduce the dates and times to writing; 8) Should there be a decrease or increase in visitation; 9) Should there be a change in custody if a parent moves out of the state. 10) To update the prior evaluation. The referral order also directed that: [T]he Evaluator shall spend a maximum of four sessions in the evaluation of the parties and the child or children, and that the parties to this proceeding shall cooperate with the Evaluator in the scheduling of appointments, and if in the judgment of the Evaluator either party shall fail to cooperate in the scheduling of appointments, then the Evaluator shall notify the Court of this fact; and [T]hat the Evaluator shall have the right to terminate th[e] referral if the Evaluator deems the referral inappropriate or the parties fail to cooperate. Such termination shall be made by sending written notice of that fact to the Court[.] A hearing was scheduled for December 29, 2015, and the Evaluator along with the parties and their respective attorneys were directed to appear.

D. The Second Custody Hearing On October 19, 2015, Mr. Pilkington mailed Ms. Pilkington two Writs of Summons, seeking a written response to his complaints filed in the Ex Parte Emergency Petition for Custody and Third Party Complaint for Custody. The court held a hearing with the evaluator on December 29, 2015. Ms. Pilkington did not attend the hearing and the evaluator testified that Ms. Pilkington “had no contact via e-mail, letter or phone with this evaluator since October the 16th of 2015[,]” despite “[n]umerous attempts ... with no response.” She also failed to return R.P. to his father for Christmas vacation, contrary to the court’s September 24, 2015 order. ⁵⁷² After the evaluator entered her report at the December 29, 2015 hearing, Mr. Pilkington’s counsel asked the court: [E]ither by way of enrolling the Colorado Court Order or this Court issuing its own Order that we get a Custody Order in place in Maryland. At that point I think [Mr. Pilkington] could take that to law enforcement and file charges against her and then proceed to go to Germany with the aid of law enforcement and show her the Court Order and hopefully bring back the kid.

In the interim, because there is no Court Order in Maryland in place right now, I would ask at the very least that the Court issue a Show Cause Order so that can be served on her prior to or in advance of the Pretrial Conference, because we have a Pretrial Conference February the 14th so that I can serve her with that and then if she is not going to cooperate at that point issue a Body Attachment. The court responded: All right. I’m inclined to simply make a recommendation that [Mr. Pilkington] be granted custody of the child. I mean, he is playing by the rules and [Ms. Pilkington’s] not.

I don’t see any reason why we want to keep putting rules or making an Order for her that she is not going to obey. ... I’m a Magistrate, I’m not a Judge, but I’m going to make a recommendation. And it probably won’t be signed [by the circuit court] until you get to that Pretrial [February 14, 2016] because I expect [Ms. Pilkington] will take Exceptions, but at least then a judge has got some idea what I think should be done and maybe if they agree with me they will continue it. If they don’t, they will fashion some other remedy.

But it is clear to mean—I mean, to me in the list of factors as to what makes a good custodial parent, the biggest one is which parent will best facilitate a relationship with the other parent. It is clear to me that [Ms. Pilkington] is not willing to do that in any shape. [Mr.] Pilkington on the other hand has played by the rules and he is willing to ⁵⁷³ try to keep some kind of relationship going. He has been duped twice I would say and the Court has been duped once that if the kids get to Germany she will let him come back. She’s not gonna [let R.P. come back] without some intervention.

So, that is what I’m going to recommend. The next day, December 30, 2015, the presiding magistrate issued his report and recommendation, recommending that “[Mr. Pilkington] be granted Sole Legal and Primary Physical Custody of [R.P.]” The magistrate’s report offered the following analysis: At this time it seems very clear that [Ms. Pilkington] has no intention of honoring any Maryland Court Order regarding Custody. It is her apparent intention to completely isolate [Mr. Pilkington] from [R.P.] This Magistrate considers [Ms. Pilkington’s] action in this matter to be extremely detrimental to the father-son relationship between [Mr. Pilkington] and [R.P.] [Ms. Pilkington’s] actions are definitely not in the Minor Child’s best interest. In this case [Mr. Pilkington] has played by the rules and [Ms. Pilkington] has completely ignored them.

The Magistrate believes that [Mr. Pilkington] will continue to facilitate a relationship between [R.P.] and [Ms. Pilkington] if [R.P.] is in his Custody. It is obvious that the reverse of this belief is not true. Based on the above the Magistrate finds that it is in [R.P.]’s best interest that [Mr. Pilkington] be granted his Sole Legal and Primary Physical Custody. Visitation between [R.P.] and [Ms. Pilkington] should be worked out after [Ms. Pilkington] agrees to participate in these Court proceedings.

The notice accompanying the report and recommendation explained the procedures for filing exceptions to the magistrate’s recommendation and warned the parties that “[a]ny matter not specifically set forth in [an] exception[ ] is waived unless the Court finds that justice requires otherwise[,]” and that “[t]he Court may dismiss the exceptions of a party who ⁵⁷⁴ has not complied with [Maryland Rule 9-208].” The court mailed both its report and recommendation and the corresponding notice to both parties. Mr. Pilkington’s counsel also mailed Ms. Pilkington a copy by restricted delivery. Ms. Pilkington did not respond or file any exceptions. On January 12, 2016, the Circuit Court for Harford County adopted the Magistrate’s recommendation, issuing an order that stated simply: “Ordered that [Mr. Pilkington] be granted Sole Legal and Primary Physical Custody of [R.P.]” Ms. Pilkington noted her timely appeal. 6 H-l DISCUSSION A. Appeal of Interlocutory Order There is no final judgment in the present case, 7 yet we retain appellate jurisdiction for the following reason.

On September 24, 2015, Mr. Pilkington filed two separate complaints for custody in the Circuit Court for Harford County—one for custody of R.P. and one for custody of B.P. These two cases apparently were consolidated because, as described supra, the September 24, 2015 custody hearing addressed the custody of both children, and, further, both cases bear the docket number of 12-C-15-2714. On January 13, 2016, the circuit court entered an order granting “Sole Legal and Primary Physical Custody” of R.P. to Mr. Pilkington; however, this order did not address the custody of B.P. Apparently confused as to the legal effect of this order, Mr. Pilkington’s counsel sent the court a letter on January 21, 2016, seeking clarification as to whether the court’s “January ⁵⁷⁵ 2016 Order is to be given effect on a pendente lite basis, or if it is a final judgment,” and asking permission to “appear by phone at the pre-trial conference on February 11, 2016.” The court granted the request and held a discussion telephonically off the record. The docket then notes “Custody order previously signed. Court to close file[,]” thereby confirming that the January 13, 2016 custody order was final as to R.P. The docket notes that the case was closed on February 12, 2016.

We indisputably have appellate jurisdiction over the order granting sole legal and primary physical custody of R.P. to Mr. Pilkington under Maryland Code (1973, 2013 Repl. Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”), § 12-303(x) which grants a party a right to appeal from an interlocutory order “[d]epriving a parent, grandparent, or natural guardian of the care and custody of his child, or changing the terms of such an order[.]” See Cabrera v. Mercado, 230 Md.App. 37, 70 , 146 A.3d 567 . Ms. Pilkington’s February 16, 2016 notice of appeal effected a valid interlocutory appeal. 8 B. The Maryland UCCJEA 1. The Goals and Principles Underlying Maryland’s UCCJEA In 2004, Maryland adopted the Maryland UCCJEA to govern child custody actions. 9 This Court has long-recognized that the legislature adopted the Maryland UCCJEA’s predecessor, the Maryland Uniform Custody Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJA”), “to ‘deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain custody awards.’ ” Cronin v. Camilleri, ⁵⁷⁶ 101 Md.App. 699, 710 , 648 A.2d 694 (1994) (quoting FL § 9-202(5)).

In Malik, we observed: “The Prefatory Note to the U.C.C.J.A. notes a growing public concern over the fact that thousands of children are shifted from state to state and from one family to another each year while their parents or other persons battle over their custody in courts of various states. Snatching children has become all too commonplace in our mobile society. Possession of the child has historically given one an enormous tactical advantage.” Malik v. Malik, 99 Md.App. 521, 530 , 638 A.2d 1184 (1994) (quoting John F. Fader, II & Richard P. Gilbert, Maryland Family Law 167 (1990)); see also In re Kaela C., 394 Md. 432, 453 , 906 A.2d 915 (2006) (citations omitted) (“The [UCCJA] was promulgated ... to address ... the rampant kidnap[p]ing of children by parents looking to relitigate custody determinations in a more favorable forum, a tactic known as ‘seize and run.’ ”). In fact, this Court has explained that “[t]he ‘home state’ provision,” in particular: was introduced to provide protection for a parent who remains in the home state after the other parent has taken the child away.

In enacting [this] provision, the drafters of the act were attempting to mitigate the advantage enjoyed by the party who has physical possession of the child. Jeff Atkinson, Modern Child Custody Practice § 3.12,192 (1986). The Commissioners’ Note to the [UCCJA] § 3 states: “The main objective [of the six month home state window] is to protect a parent who has been left by his spouse taking the child along[.]” Malik, 99 Md.App. at 529 , 638 A.2d 1184 . Courts around the country—including this Court—characterize a parent’s taking of a child as “reprehensible conduct.” Malik, 99 Md.App. at 532-33 , 638 A.2d 1184 .

With this in mind, the Court of Appeals has cautioned Maryland courts to avoid perversely incentivizing parents to use unlawful means to secure custody: ⁵⁷⁷ “The resolution of cases must not provide incentives for those likely to take the law into their own hands. Thus, those who obtain custody of children unlawfully, ... must be deterred. Society may not reward, except at its peril, the lawless because the passage of time has made correction inexpedient.” In re Adoption No. 10087 in Circuit Court for Montgomery Cnty., 324 Md. 394, 410-11 , 597 A.2d 456 (1991) (quoting Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543 , 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 , 356 N.E.2d 277, 284 (N.Y. 1976)). This Court has echoed that sentiment when construing Maryland’s jurisdiction under the Maryland UCCJEA.

In Malik we recognized: “It is difficult to quarrel with the proposition that ‘[t]he effect of assuming jurisdiction to determine child custody after there has been a wrongful taking or detention may be the encouragement of child snatching.’ ” 99 Md.App. at 531 , 638 A.2d 1184 (citations and quotations omitted). Worse yet, the further the parent flees or more surreptitiously they behave, the more likely they are to achieve the six-month threshold. Then in 1997, the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”) promulgated the model UCCJEA (“Model UCCJEA” or “Model Act”) “to revise the UCCJA in order to coincide with federal enactments[, such as the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act,] and to resolve the consequent thirty years of conflicting case law caused by states’ various enactments of the UCCJA.” Friedetzky v. Hsia, 223 Md.App. 723, 734 , 117 A.3d 660 (2015). The Model Act perpetuates the UCCJA’s objectives of deterring parents from removing their children from a jurisdiction without consent.

See, e.g., Cabrera, 230 Md.App. at 74 , 146 A.3d 567 (quoting Model Act, § 101 cmt., 9 U.L.A. Part 1A, at 657 (1997) (hereinafter “9 U.L.A.”) (“A chief function of the [Model UCCJEA] is to ‘deter abductions of children.’ ”)). The NCCUSL’s comments to the Model UCCJEA suggest that courts interpret the Model Act “according to its purposes, which are to:” (1) Avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with the courts of other States and in matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the shifting of chil ⁵⁷⁸ dren from State to State with harmful effects on their well-being; (2) Promote cooperation with the courts of other States to the end that a custody decree is rendered in that State which can best decide the case in the interest of the child; (3) Discourage the use of the interstate system for continuing controversies over child custody; (4) Deter abductions of children; (5) Avoid litigation of custody decisions of other States in this State; (6) Facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other States. 9 U.L.A. § 101 cmt. (1997) (emphasis added). 2. Jurisdiction under the Act The Maryland UCCJEA instructs us to decide child custody cases in the child’s best interest and with an eye toward disincentivizing the unlawful movement of children across state borders, see 9 U.L.A. § 101 cmt., and to effectuate these ends, the Act imposes limits on the courts’ traditional subject matter jurisdiction to issue orders affecting a resident-parent’s custody rights.

See, e.g., FL §§ 9.5-201, 9.5-203, 9.5-207, 9.5-208; see also Harris v. Melnick, 314 Md. 539, 548 , 552 A.2d 38 (1989) (quoting Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and Continuing Jurisdiction Under the UCCJA, 14 Fam. L. Q. 203, 213-14 (1981) (“[Concurrent jurisdiction in several states to modify an existing custody judgment was a major cause of parental resort to kidnapping to gain a more favorable judgment in a new forum.”)). The Maryland UCCJEA’s key jurisdictional provisions are enumerated in FL §§ 9.5-201—9.5-204. These provisions control when a state confronted with a custody action may exercise initial jurisdiction, FL § 9,5-201; exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, FL § 9.5-202; jurisdiction to modify an existing custody order, FL § 9.5-203; and temporary emergency jurisdiction, FL § 9.5-204. ⁵⁷⁹ The Maryland UCCJEA’s jurisdictional rules restrict a state’s subject matter jurisdiction even more severely when, as here, another state has previously issued a custody order.

The Act prohibits concurrent jurisdiction between two states to limit the occurrence of different states creating competing custody awards. Melnick, 314 Md. at 550 , 552 A.2d 38 (citations and quotations omitted) (“The rule is clear and simple. There can be no concurrent jurisdiction and no jurisdictional conflict between two states.”). Additionally, the Maryland UCCJEA discourages states from exercising jurisdiction when they are not the most convenient forum, FL § 9.5-207; or, when a parent has engaged in “unjustifiable conduct.” FL § 9.5-208.

Just as the authority to make an initial custody determination is exclusive to a single state, only a single state may possess authority to modify an existing custody determination. See Melnick, 314 Md. at 551-52 , 552 A.2d 38 . 3. Applying The Maryland Act At first glance, this case presents a seeming conflict between the Maryland UCCJEA’s purpose of protecting parents from the unjustifiable taking of their children and the jurisdictional limitation the Act employs to accomplish that purpose. The circuit court here determined that Ms. Pilkington’s continued behavior dictated that the cessation of her custody rights was in R.P.’s best interest, and awarded Mr. Pilkington, a Maryland resident, full legal custody of R.P. Ms. Pilkington now challenges the circuit court’s authority to issue that order, arguing that the Maryland UCCJEA bars Maryland from exercising subject matter jurisdiction to protect the custody rights of a Maryland resident.

We recognize that allowing Ms. Pilkington to challenge the underlying order can be viewed as rewarding her attempts to deceive her co-parent and evade the rule of law. The Maryland UCCJEA’s very purpose is to prevent parents from obtaining favorable custody decisions by unilaterally moving their child to a new jurisdiction, and now Ms. Pilkington relies on the statute’s home state provision meant to prohibit such conduct. But our role is to say what the law is. “In deciding ⁵⁸⁰ this case, we must not succumb to. the allure of bad facts for their tendency to create bad law.” Espina v. Jackson, 442 Md. 311, 317 , 112 A.3d 442 (2015); of. Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Rights of Children and the Crisis in Custody Litigation: Modification of Custody In and Out of State, 46 U. Colo.

L. Rev. 495 , 503 (1975) [hereinafter “Bodenheimer II”] (“There are, to be sure, some hard cases under the [Model UCCJEA] which will tax to the utmost a court’s ability to apply the [Model Act].”). In construing the Maryland UCCJEA’s jurisdictional provisions, we recognize that our discretion to interpret statutes is not unbound and that “[t]he cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intentions of the legislature.” Rockwood Cas. Ins. Co. v. Uninsured Employers’ Fund, 385 Md. 99, 108 , 867 A.2d 1026 (2005) (citation omitted). “If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and every day meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written.” Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 261 , 647 A.2d 1204 (1994).

Our goal is to give statutes their “most reasonable interpretation, in accord with logic and common sense, and to avoid a construction not otherwise evident by the words actually used.” Greco v. State, 347 Md. 423, 429 , 701 A.2d 419 (1997). C. Maryland’s Jurisdiction over R.P. Our primary obligation is to determine whether Maryland has jurisdiction over this custody dispute. Malik, 99 Md.App. at 526 , 638 A.2d 1184 (citation omitted) (“When presented with a jurisdictional conflict in a child custody case, the court must ... FIRST ... ascertain whether it has jurisdiction.”).

The Maryland judiciary may only exercise its authority in cases over which it has both personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Himes Associates, Ltd. v. Anderson, 178 Md.App. 504, 526 , 943 A.2d 30 (2008); Lewis v. Murshid, 147 Md.App. 199, 202-03 , 807 A.2d 1170 (2002). Personal jurisdiction is not at issue in the instant action because the father resides in Maryland and the mother appeared by counsel to ⁵⁸¹ contest the action without objecting to the court’s personal jurisdiction, thus waiving her right to do so on appeal. See Md. Rule 2-322(a); Md. Rule 8—131(a); McCormick v. St. Francis de Sales Church, 219 Md. 422, 429 , 149 A.2d 768 (1959) (holding that a party’s general appearance waives the right to contest the court’s lack of personal jurisdiction).

We proceed then to appraise subject matter jurisdiction. The statutory authority for the court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over this action was not specified in the circuit court’s ruling from the bench at the September 24, 2015 emergency hearing; or the court’s order following that hearing; or the magistrate’s December 30, 2015 report and recommendation; or the circuit court’s custody order dated January 13, 2016. Consequently, it is what Mr. Pilkington pleaded and what the parties discussed during their colloquies with the court that drive our examination of the following provisions of the Maryland UCCJEA: (1) temporary emergency jurisdiction under FL § 9.5-204; (2) exclusive jurisdiction to modify a custody order under FL § 9.5-203; and (3) the duty to enforce a sister state’s valid custody order and visitation schedule under FL §§ 9.5-303, 9.5-304. We review de novo whether a trial court interpreted a jurisdictional statute correctly.

Cabrera, 230 Md.App. at 79-81 , 146 A.3d 567 . 1. Temporary Emergency Jurisdiction Mr. Pilkington’s emergency custody motion first asked the circuit court to assume jurisdiction under FL § 9.5-204(a), which permits a court to exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction over a custody action “if the child is present in this State and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.” Id. Mr. Pilkington urged the court to exercise temporary jurisdiction to uphold the Maryland UCCJEA’s policies. He argued that the circumstances warranted temporary emergency relief, alleging that a German official had previously questioned the legality of R.P. ⁵⁸² remaining in Germany for a period longer than 120 days on an American passport and that allowing him to return to Germany would subject him to unnecessary detention by German customs officials.

Ms. Pilkington responds that the circuit court could not have premised its relief on FL § 9.5-204, because its order was not temporally limited and because that subsection requires the lower court to communicate its order with the home state immediately. The Maryland UCCJEA considers an emergency to include “mistreatment or abuse.” FL § 9.5-204. This Court has explained that this