Piquette v. Stevens

WENNER, Judge. The genesis of this appeal is a judgment entered by the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County in favor of appel-lee/cross-appellant, Seth Herman Stevens (Stevens). Appellant/cross-appellee is Frederick W. Piquette (Piquette). On appeal, Piquette presents us with the following questions, which we have rephrased for clarity: 1 I. As a matter of law, does a bicyclist who fails to come to a complete stop at a stop sign while attempting to make a right turn onto the boulevard, assume the risk of being struck by a vehicle making a left turn off of the boulevard?

II

Is it an abuse of discretion for a trial judge to rule that plaintiff assumed the risk as a matter of law after ⁵⁹⁶ the jury had returned a verdict that plaintiff had not assumed the risk?

III

Is it reversible error to rule that plaintiff assumed the risk as a matter of law while simultaneously ruling that plaintiff was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law?

IV

Is it an abuse of discretion for a trial judge to order a new trial based upon vaguely defined conduct of counsel and conduct of the jury not reflected in the record? On cross-appeal, Stevens presents us with the following question: V. Can the cross-appellee recover compensation for medical expenses incurred by the United States Government after the Government has compromised and settled its claim for those same expenses? As we shall respond to questions I., IV., and V. in the negative, we shall vacate the judgment and remand the case to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County for a new trial. Nevertheless, we shall consider the remaining issues to assist the trial court in conducting the new trial.

Facts The tragic event that precipitated this appeal occurred on 30 April 1993. On that day, Piquette, a Naval Academy Midshipman First Class, was riding his bicycle in preparation for an impending triathlon. Near the intersection of Crowns-ville and Chesterfield Roads, in Anne Arundel County, Pi-quette collided with a pick-up truck driven by Stevens, and owned by Stevens’s employer, T.M. Branzell & Sons, Inc. (Branzell). Piquette was severely injured in the collision, and was transported by helicopter to the Maryland Shock Trauma Center.

There is a “T” shaped intersection where Crownsville and Chesterfield Roads meet. The flow of traffic entering Crownsville Road is controlled by a stop sign on Chesterfield Road. Piquette was traveling eastbound on Chesterfield Road. When he arrived at the intersection, he made a right turn onto ⁵⁹⁷ Crownsville Road, intending to proceed in a southerly direction and proceeded approximately seven feet in a southerly direction.

Stevens was traveling northbound on Crownsville Road. When Stevens attempted to make a left turn onto westbound Chesterfield Road the collision occurred. In other words, both parties were making, or just had made, turns when the collision occurred. It is undisputed that Piquette did not make a complete stop before he began to turn right onto Crownsville Road.

There is some dispute as to the manner in which Stevens began to turn left onto Chesterfield Road just prior to the collision. Crownsville Road consists of two lanes, separated by a double yellow line. Several witnesses testified at trial that Stevens began his left hand turn onto westbound Chesterfield Road before the broken double yellow line on Crownsville Road. In effect, this placed Stevens’s truck in the southbound lane of Crownsville Road when he began to turn left onto Chesterfield Road.

Piquette incurred medical expenses exceeding Seventy Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000). Since Piquette was a student at the Naval Academy, his past and future medical expenses were assumed by the United States Government (the government). The government sought to recover these expenses pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1095 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651 — 2653 (Medical Care Recovery Act)(the Act). Although the government had agreed that counsel for Piquette would also pursue its claim, its claim was ultimately settled directly with Stevens’s insurer.

Piquette then filed a complaint, seeking to recover damages from both Stevens and Branzell. When his claim against Branzell was dismissed, only Stevens remained as defendant. Prior to trial, Piquette filed a motion in limine seeking to present his medical expenses to the jury as damages. The motion was granted.

Ultimately, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Piquette for $759,500. Stevens then filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), or in the alternative, for a new ⁵⁹⁸ trial, or to revise the judgment. The motion for JNOV was granted on the ground that Piquette had assumed the risk as a matter of law. In addition, the trial court granted Stevens’s motion for a new trial.

This appeal followed. I. We now turn to the first issue presented by Piquette: whether, as a matter of law, Piquette assumed the risk of being struck by Stevens’s truck by making a right turn onto Crownsville Road without making a complete stop. As we begin, we believe it would be useful to set forth the standard of review when considering whether a motion for JNOV was properly granted. “A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict tests the legal sufficiency of the evidence and is reviewed under the same standard as a motion for judgment made during trial.” Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins.

Co. v. Tufts, 118 Md.App. 180, 190 , 702 A.2d 422 (1997), cert. denied, 349 Md. 104 , 707 A.2d 89 (1998). “In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment in a jury trial, we must conduct the same analysis as the trial court, viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Id. at 189 , 702 A.2d 422 . Moreover, “we must assume the truth of all credible evidence and all inferences of fact reasonably deductible from the evidence----” Id. at 190 , 702 A.2d 422 . “If there exists any legally competent evidence, however slight, from which the jury could have found as it did, we must affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.” Id. at 191 , 702 A.2d 422 . Conversely, we must reverse the trial court’s grant of the motion if there exists any legally competent evidence from which the jury could have found as it did. As we have said, the trial court granted Stevens’s motion for a JNOV because it concluded that Piquette had, as a matter of law, assumed the risk in making a right turn onto Crownsville Road without making a complete stop at the stop sign facing him.

The Court of Appeals has defined assump ⁵⁹⁹ tion of the risk as “an intentional and voluntary exposure to a known danger and, therefore, consent on the part of the plaintiff to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him and to take his chances from harm from a particular risk.” Rogers v. Frush, 257 Md. 233, 243 , 262 A.2d 549 (1970). As Chief Judge Bell has observed for the Court in ADM Partnership v. Martin, 348 Md. 84, 90-91 , 702 A.2d 730 (1997), “In Maryland, it is well settled that in order to establish the defense of assumption of risk, the defendant must show that the plaintiff: (1) had knowledge of the risk of the danger; (2) appreciated that risk; and (3) voluntarily confronted the risk of danger.” “In determining whether a plaintiff had knowledge and appreciation of the risk, an objective standard must be applied and a plaintiff will not be heard to say that he did not comprehend a risk which must have been obvious to him.” Id. at 91 , 702 A.2d 730 (quoting Gibson v. Beaver, 245 Md. 418, 421 , 226 A.2d 273 (1967)). Ordinarily, whether a plaintiff has assumed a risk is a question for the trier of facts. Chalmers v. Willis, 247 Md. 379, 385 , 231 A.2d 70 (1967). “On the other hand, when it is clear that a person of normal intelligence in the position of the plaintiff must have understood the danger, the issue is for the court.” Schroyer v. McNeal, 323 Md. 275, 283-84 , 592 A.2d 1119 (1991).

Here, we believe the trial court improperly granted Stevens’s motion for a JNOV on the ground that Piquette had, as a matter of law, assumed the risk of making a right turn onto Crownsville Road without coming to a complete stop at the stop sign facing him. We shall explain. There was ample evidence before the jury for it to determine, as it obviously did, that Piquette did not assume the risk. We must keep in mind, however, that we must view all of the evidence and the inferences fairly deducible therefrom in a light most favorable to Piquette.

According to several witnesses, following the collision, Stevens’s truck came to rest in the southbound lane of Crownsville Road. According to an accident reconstruction expert presented by Piquette, Stevens had begun to make a left turn before the broken yellow lines ⁶⁰⁰ on Crownsville Road, placing him in Piquette’s lane of travel when the collision occurred. According to Piquette, before he began to make a right turn onto Crownsville Road, he saw a vehicle “coming from my right to my left on Crownsville Road.” Despite this, Piquette did not make a complete stop, but rolled through the stop sign facing him, 2 and made a right turn onto Crownsville Road. 3 Thus, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Piquette did not believe himself to be in danger from the approaching vehicle when, without coming to a complete stop, he began his right turn onto Crownsville Road. Hence, there was ample evidence for the jury to conclude that Piquette had not assumed a risk in making this turn.

As we also said, whether a person has assumed a risk is ordinarily one for the trier of facts. Chalmers at 385, 231 A.2d 70 . Consequently, had the trial court concluded that Piquette, as a matter of law, had assumed the risk in making a right turn onto Crownsville Road, it should not have submitted the issue to the jury. Under such circumstances, the issue is for the court.

Schroyer, 323 Md. at 283-84 , 592 A.2d 1119 . According to the evidence we have recounted, it was not at all clear that Piquette, certainly a person of normal intelligence, would have anticipated the risk of danger that ensued from his not making a complete stop at the stop sign before making a right turn onto Crownsville Road. Put another way, we do not believe Piquette had clear knowledge of, or appreciated the risk that, by not making a complete stop before making a right turn onto Crownsville Road, he would assume the risk of colliding with a vehicle traveling northbound on Crownsville Road. As the Court of Appeals put it in ADM Partnership , for assumption of the risk to apply, it is necessary for the defendant to show that the plaintiff had knowledge of the risk; appreciation of the risk; and voluntarily ⁶⁰¹ confronted the risk.

Id. at 90-91 , 702 A.2d 730 . Since Piquette had no knowledge or appreciation of such a risk, we fail to see how he could have voluntarily confronted it. Consequently, he could not have, as a matter of law, assumed the risk. Thus, we believe Stevens’s motion for a JNOV was not properly granted.

II

We must now determine whether it was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to grant Stevens’s motion for a new trial. In Piquette’s view, the trial court abused its discretion because it granted Stevens a new trial based on rather vague “conduct of counsel” that may have influenced the jury’s verdict. In granting Stevens’s motion for a new trial, the trial court said, “If ever there was a case that this Court believed was not fairly presented to this jury, and confused the jury, it was this case.” In response to question IV., we need look no further than Buck v. Cam’s Broadloom Rugs, Inc., 328 Md. 51 , 612 A.2d 1294 (1992), where the Court of Appeals said: [T]he breadth of a trial judge’s discretion to grant or deny a new trial is not fixed and immutable; rather, it will expand or contract depending upon the nature of the factors being considered, and the extent to which the exercise of that discretion depends