Pitts v. State

WRIGHT, J. Appellant, Warren James Pitts, Jr., appeals from the November 30, 2010 decision of the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County, denying Pitts’s motion to dismiss the criminal charges pending against him in that court based upon a violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”), codified at Maryland Code (1999, 2008 Repl. Vol.) §§ 8-401 to 8-417 of the Correctional Services Article (“Corr. Servs.”). Subsequent to the court’s denial of his motion to dismiss, Pitts was tried in the circuit court on January 28, 2011.

Pursuant to an agreed statement of facts, the court found Pitts guilty of fourth degree burglary and theft of property valued at under $500. 1 Pitts was sentenced to a period of incarceration of ⁴⁸⁰ three years, with all but nine months suspended followed by one year of supervised probation. Pitts was released on bond pending the outcome of this appeal. In his timely appeal, Pitts raises a single question for our review: Is the Interstate Agreement on Detainers violated where the State withdraws a detainer but does not dismiss the underlying charges and does not bring the defendant to trial within the required 180-day period? We conclude that the State’s actions in the instant case constituted a violation of the provisions of the IAD.

Thus, the circuit court’s decision denying Pitts’s motion to dismiss the charges against him constituted an erroneous application of the statutory provisions of the IAD to the undisputed facts that were before the court. We shall, therefore, reverse the decision of the circuit court and vacate Pitts’s convictions. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The following facts are undisputed. In the early morning hours on March 19, 2002, police responded to an alarm at the Nike Factory Store in Queenstown, MD.

The store window appeared to have been broken with a screwdriver. Less than $800 in merchandise was missing. Pitts’s DNA was later determined to be consistent with blood left at the scene of the break-in. 2 On February 2, 2007, the State charged Pitts in Case No. 004M00014326 with second-degree burglary, theft of property valued at over $500, malicious destruction of property valued at over $500, and lesser offenses. At the time the Maryland charges were instituted, Pitts was incarcerated in the State of Virginia for offenses he had committed there.

On November 13, 2007, Pitts was officially advised that a detainer had been filed against him as a result of the charges pending in Queen Anne’s County, Maryland. ⁴⁸¹ On November 15, 2007, Pitts met with corrections officials in Virginia and elected to invoke his right to a speedy disposition of the Maryland charges under the IAD. On December 7, 2007, the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County received the appropriate documentation from Pitts informing them of his desire to be tried within 180 days as per the IAD. 3 On March 27, 2008, the State’s Attorney for Queen Anne’s County informed the Virginia Department of Corrections via letter that he had “decided not to extradite Mr. Pitts from Virginia” and requested that Pitts “be released from your custody in reference to our charges.” The Virginia Department of Corrections responded on April 3, 2008, informing the State’s Attorney that the detainer against Pitts had been removed. Pitts subsequently served the rest of his term of incarceration in Virginia. Almost immediately after his release, on June 30, 2010, Pitts was arrested in Queen Anne’s County pursuant to the warrant originally issued as a result of the charges in District Court Case No. 004M00014326.

On September 7, 2010, Pitts moved to dismiss the charges against him pursuant to the requirements of the IAD. On September 22, 2010, the State charged Pitts via criminal information with the same offenses from the 2007 indictment in Case No. 17-K-10-7553. Pitts’s attorney filed another motion to dismiss the charges on September 27, 2010. At oral argument on Pitts’s motion to dismiss, conducted on November 30, 2010, Pitts’s attorney asserted that the State of Maryland violated the IAD by failing to bring Pitts to trial within 180 days of his invocation of his rights.

The State responded by arguing that “the fact that the State withdrew the detainer, basically, stops the time period [under the IAD].” Pitts’s attorney countered that the State could not circumvent the IAD by removing the detainer against Pitts without dismissing the charges giving rise to the detainer. Pitts’s attorney further contended that Pitts suffered prejudice in ⁴⁸² that, due to the delay in prosecuting him in Maryland, there was no possibility that his Maryland sentence would be made concurrent to the sentence he served in Virginia. The circuit court denied Pitts’s motion to dismiss, stating: Well, I certainly don’t see the due process issues. He’s still got due process.

We are willing to try him if he just shows up. But in terms of the detainer issue, as I view it, its [sic] a detainer. It has to be a detainer, so, consequently, the timeframe that was involved here, did not run, so I’m going to deny the motion to dismiss for all the reasons stated by the State. As previously noted, Pitts was tried, convicted, and sentenced on January 28, 2011.

The instant appeal was timely filed on January 28, 2011. Additional facts will be provided as necessary to support the analysis of the issues. ANALYSIS The IAD is a congressionally sanctioned compact among forty-eight states, 4 the Federal Government, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands and the District of Columbia, with the purpose of establishing cooperative procedures to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of any untried charges, indictments, informations, or complaints that provide the basis for detainers lodged by another jurisdiction against a prisoner incarcerated in a member state. 5 Corr. Servs. § 8-403; See State v. Pair, 416 Md. 157, 161-62 , 5 A.3d 1090 (2010) (“In short, the purpose of the IAD is to facilitate speedy disposition of charges underlying detainers.”); Stone v. ⁴⁸³ State, 344 Md. 97, 106 , 685 A.2d 441 (1996) (“The purpose of the [Interstate Agreement on Detainers] is to encourage the expeditious disposition of charges and to establish cooperative procedures among member parties to facilitate such resolution.” (Citing United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 351 , 98 S.Ct. 1834 , 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978)); State v. Jefferson, 319 Md. 674, 679 , 574 A.2d 918 (1990)).

Underlying the official purpose of the IAD is the recognition that “charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation.” 6 Corr. ⁴⁸⁴ Servs. § 8-403. Timely resolution of outstanding claims also protects against “ ‘staleness and difficulty of proof.’ ” See Jefferson, 319 Md. at 685 , 574 A.2d 918 (quoting Clipper v. State, 295 Md. 303, 309 , 455 A.2d 973 (1983)). Article III of the IAD, codified in Maryland as Corr. Servs. § 8-405, “gives a prisoner incarcerated in one State the right to demand the speedy disposition of any untried indictment, information or complaint that is the basis of a detainer lodged against him by another State.” Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 718-19 , 105 S.Ct. 3401 , 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The present case involves Pitts’s request, pursuant to § 8-405, for a speedy disposition of the charges outstanding against him in Maryland during his period of incarceration in Virginia. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has summarized the procedures utilized to implement the IAD, stating: The interstate transfer process begins when the “receiving” state lodges a detainer with the warden “or other official” of the institution where the prisoner in question is currently imprisoned, in what is referred to as the custodial or “sending” state. See § 8-405(b). The warden or other authority in the sending state is then obligated to inform the inmate of the detainer’s source and contents, and of the inmate’s right, under the IAD, to request final disposition of the charges on which the detainer is based.

See § 8-405(c). To exercise the right of speedy disposition, the inmate must file a request for IAD relief with the warden, who must forward the request to appropriate authorities in the receiving state. See § 8-405(d). This document operates as a request by the prisoner for final disposition of all untried charges underlying the detainer and is deemed to be ⁴⁸⁵ a waiver of extradition.

See § 8-405(d); Mauro, 436 U.S. at 351 [ 98 S.Ct. 1834 ]. Once the receiving state receives the request, the IAD requires that jurisdiction to bring the prisoner to trial within 180 days, unless one of two provisions of the IAD is invoked. 7 ... If neither of these tolling provisions is properly invoked, then the receiving state’s failure to comply with the 180-day provision requires dismissal of the charges, with prejudice. See § 8-407(e).

Pair, 416 Md. at 162-64 , 5 A.3d 1090 (footnotes omitted). The requirement that the charges be dismissed with prejudice should the receiving state fail to bring the prisoner to trial within 180 days is statutorily mandated in Corr. Servs. § 8-407(c), providing “in the event that an action ... is not brought to trial within [the relevant period], the appropriate court ... shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.” See also Carchman, 473 U.S. at 730 , 105 S.Ct. 3401 (“Article III enables a prisoner to require the State lodging the detainer either to drop the charge and resulting detainer or to bring the prisoner to trial.”). Where the State is properly notified of the prisoner’s desire to resolve the charges expeditiously, “it is expected to see that the case is actually tried within the 180 days.” Dennett v. State, 19 Md.App. 376, 384 , 311 A.2d 437 (1973).

In the instant case, the State of Maryland duly informed the correctional institution where Pitts was incarcerated that there were charges pending against Pitts in Queen Anne’s County, Maryland. Pursuant to those charges, the State of Maryland requested that a detainer be placed in Pitts’s record. Pitts was informed of the detainer on November 12, 2007, and filed a timely and complete request to have the Maryland charges resolved within 180 days pursuant to the requirements of the IAD, which was received by the appropriate officials in Maryland on December 7, 2007. At the request of the State’s Attorney for Queen Anne’s County, the Virginia ⁴⁸⁶ Department of Corrections removed the detainer from Pitts’s record on or about April 3, 2008.

The charges against Pitts, however, remained active throughout the remainder of his incarceration in Virginia, and afterward, when he was arrested pursuant to the original 2007 warrant on June 30, 2010. Pitts asserts that the circuit court erred by failing to dismiss the charges against him due to the State’s failure to bring him to trial on the relevant charges within the 180-day time limit imposed by the IAD. Specifically, Pitts argues that the State’s withdrawal of the detainer was not a final disposition of the charges against him as required by Corr. Servs. § 8-405(a); and therefore, pursuant to Corr.

Servs. § 8-407(c), the charges should have been dismissed with prejudice. The State responds, asserting that by failing to appear at the motions hearing, Pitts waived his IAD claim. Addressing Pitts’s argument on the merits, the State contends that Maryland’s withdrawal of the detainer pending against Pitts was sufficient to “remove [Pitts] from the purview of the IAD,” and therefore, the circuit court properly denied Pitts’s motion to dismiss the charges against him. Whereas the facts before us are undisputed, we need only determine whether the circuit court correctly interpreted and applied the relevant provisions of the IAD.

Where a trial court’s determination requires the interpretation and application of Maryland’s constitutional, statutory or case law, we must determine whether the trial court’s legal conclusions are correct utilizing a de novo standard of review. See e.g. Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 535 , 907 A.2d 175 (2006). After a review of the published opinions of Maryland’s appellate courts, it appears that neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals has directly addressed in any previous decision, whether the voluntary withdrawal of the detainer is sufficient to eclipse a prisoner’s rights under the IAD where a prisoner has properly invoked his right to a speedy trial under the IAD.

Whereas “[t]he IAD is a congressionally sanctioned compact, and as a federal law is subject to federal construction,” Pair, 416 Md. at 168 , 5 A.3d 1090 (citing Cuyler v. ⁴⁸⁷ Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 442 , 101 S.Ct. 703 , 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981)), we would ordinarily defer to interpretations of the Act provided by the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, however, also has not expressly addressed the issue that is before us in the instant case. We shall, therefore, be guided by the express direction of the legislature, that the provisions of the IAD are to be “liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.” Corr. Servs. § 8-411; Pair, 416 Md. at 169 , 5 A.3d 1090 .

We understand that the IAD is comprehensive “and all of its parts have to be read together, in harmony, in order to carry out its dual purpose.” Boyd v. State, 51 Md.App. 197, 206 , 441 A.2d 1133 , aff'd, 294 Md. 103 , 447 A.2d 871 (1982). We further recognize the value in following the lead of other member States who have addressed similar issues to ensure that the IAD is interpreted consistently amongst the Courts of the member States. See Clipper, 295 Md. at 309 , 455 A.2d 973 (“[I]t is desirable that the party states be consistent in their interpretations of the IAD.”). We find the opinions of the Court of Appeals for Colorado and the Court of Appeals for Wisconsin to be persuasive.

In People v. Robertson, 56 P.3d 121 (Colo.Ct.App.2002), the State of Colorado lodged a detainer against a prisoner serving a sentence in Oregon. Id. at 122 . After the prisoner invoked his right to prompt disposition of the charges under the IAD, Colorado, on its own motion, withdrew the detainer because it was not prepared to go forward with a trial at that time. Id.

However, Colorado did not dismiss the underlying charges and, in fact, filed another detainer the day before the prisoner was to be released from his confinement in Oregon, more than 180 days after he had filed his request under the IAD. Id. In response to the prisoner’s motion to dismiss, Colorado argued that once the detainer was removed, the IAD ceased to apply, notwithstanding that the charges were not dismissed. Id. at 123 .

Upholding the trial court’s dismissal of the charges against the prisoner, the Colorado Court of Appeals first looked to the plain language of the IAD: ⁴⁸⁸ Section 24-60-501, art. 111(a) provides that once a detain-er “has been lodged” and the underlying complaint remains “pending,” defendant has a right to demand disposition within 180 days. The present perfect tense, “has been lodged” indicates that an event occurred in the past prior to other events and implies that once the event has occurred— here the lodging of the detainer—certain consequences result. In this case, defendant obtained the right to demand disposition of the charges. The statute does not require that the detainer remain pending, or that it continue to be lodged, only that it “has been lodged.” We conclude that the withdrawal of the detainer does not change the fact that a detainer “has been lodged.” Similarly, under § 24-60-501, art. 111(d), “any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all untried indictments, informations, or complaints on the basis of which detainers have been lodged against the prisoner.” Again, the IAD refers to detainers that “have been lodged,” indicating that a defendant’s request is not contingent on the detainer being currently in place.

Moreover, under this section, a defendant’s request for disposition is directed to the “untried indictments, informations, or complaints” and not the detainer. Hence, the prosecution’s withdrawal of the detainer by itself is not responsive to the request. Id. The Robertson Court distinguished United States v. Donaldson, 978 F.2d 381 (7th Cir.1992), cited by the State, noting that in Donaldson , the government not only withdrew the detainer but also dismissed the underlying charges against the prisoner without prejudice; thus, the Donaldson Court provided a “final disposition” of all of the outstanding charges; whereas in Robertson , the State failed to take any action to resolve the charges pending against the prisoner.

Id. at 123-24 .. The Robertson Court finally concluded that: to allow charges to remain pending despite a defendant’s request for speedy disposition, as occurred here, contravenes the explicit purpose of the IAD to “encourage the ⁴⁸⁹ expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints.” Section 24-60-501, art. I. Id. at 124 . Similarly, in State v. Tarrant, 321 Wis.2d 69 , 772 N.W.2d 750 (Wis.Ct.App.2009), the appealing prisoner invoked his rights under the IAD after Wisconsin filed an arrest warrant against him while he was serving a sentence in Kansas.

Id. at 752. Wisconsin then modified the warrant so that it would not operate as an interstate detainer. Id. When Tarrant later moved to dismiss the charges in Wisconsin for a violation of the IAD, the trial court concluded that the modification of the warrant rendered the IAD inapplicable.

Id. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “[ojnce a prisoner has properly requested a prompt and final disposition of pending criminal charges, the only