Price v. Cohen

Collins, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from an order directing the issuance of a writ of mandamus. On April 22, 1954, the appellee filed in the Superior Court of Baltimore City a petition alleging that he had been Building Inspection Engineer of Baltimore City since 1947, that his present term expires on July 1, 1955, and that he had conscientiously and scrupulously fulfilled the duties of that office. He further alleged that the défendant and appellant here, Arthur B. Price, was the President of the City Council of Baltimore, and, during the illness of Mayor Thomas D’Alesandro, Jr., acted as ex-officio Mayor of Baltimore City.

On April 20, 1954, upon orders of the appellant, he was suspended without pay from his office of Building Inspection Engineer of ⁴⁷ Baltimore City aforesaid and such suspension was without legal power or authority. He prayed that a writ of mandamus be issued directing the appellant to rescind and withdraw his order and that he be restored to his office. After answer filed a hearing was held by the trial judge. No testimony was taken at the hearing which was confined to the question of law, to wit: “Has the Mayor of Baltimore City the power, under Section 12 of the City Charter, to suspend an appointed City Official, who has served more than six months of his term, pending proceedings to remove him for cause?” The trial judge found that under the Baltimore City Charter the appellant had no such power.

On May 14, 1954, a writ of mandamus was issued granting the relief prayed. On May 18th the appellant filed an appeal to this Court. The appellant here contends that he had the power to so suspend the appellee. Subsequent to the appeal to this Court, the Mayor, Thomas D’Alesandro, Jr., resumed his office.

After a hearing, he ordered on September 27, 1954, that the suspension of the appellee be cancelled, the charges against him be dismissed, and that he immediately resume the duties of his office. As a result the appellee has resumed the duties of said office and has been fully paid by the City of Baltimore all salary which accrued to him during the period of his suspension. The appellee has filed a motion in this Court to dismiss the appellant’s appeal for the reason that the case has now become moot. The appellant admits here that the legality of appellee’s suspension is moot, but contends that the matter is one of such public importance that this Court should give an advisory opinion on the question here