Reyes v. Prince George's County

Murphy, C. J., andEldridge, J., concurring in the judgment: We concur in the judgment affirming the decree, but not in the holding of the majority that the case is dismissible as being collusive. Digges, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Murphy, C. J., and Eldridge, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment at page 308 infra. While this suit appears from the record to be only a mundane challenge by appellant-taxpayers to the proposed issuance and sale of revenue bonds by appellee Prince George’s County, and the intended loan of the bond proceeds to appellee Washington National Arena Limited Partnership, it raises, by the circumstances of its initiation and prosecution, questions of far greater concern, at least to this Court, than those actually presented by the parties for our determination.

We defer for the moment a fuller statement of the facts relevant to the merits of the case, addressing first the question whether the suit is collusive. We conclude that, although it is indeed dismissible on that ground, we are not constitutionally bound to dismiss it and, under the circumstances present here, decline to do so; in addition, we establish with this case specific conditions and procedures under which, in the discretion of the court, actions of sufficient public concern, involving a governmental body, or an agency or official thereof, may be adjudicated despite their collusive nature. I. Jurisdictional Considerations In response to interrogation by members of this Court at oral argument, counsel for the first time since inception of ²⁸³ these proceedings disclosed, in effect, that this suit was initiated by appellee Washington National Arena solely to satisfy The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, a prospective bond purchaser, as to the legality of bonds being issued to refinance the arena’s existing indebtedness. From counsel’s statements, it appears that the arena, a nongovernmental business entity, engaged and compensated counsel for then-unselected nominal plaintiffs, and through that counsel obtained the services of the plaintiff-appellants to sue itself in order to secure an opinion of this Court concerning the validity of the proposed bond issue.

On that account, we can only conclude that the suit is a collusive one, not involving the “ ‘actual antagonistic assertion of rights’ to be adjudicated — a safeguard essential to the integrity of the judicial process ....” United States v. Johnson, 319 U. S. 302, 305 , 63 S. Ct. 1075 , 87 L. Ed. 1413 (1943). Consequently, it is plain that the adjudication below may be set aside and the cause dismissed without entering judgment on the merits. We begin by pointing out what is known to every student of our judicial process: that the American system of adjudication from its inception has been grounded on the principle that adversary presentation of issues actually in dispute between the parties to the suit plays a vital and essential role in attaining justice. See Neef & Nagel, The Adversary Nature of the American Legal System from a Historical Perspective, 20 N.Y.L.F. 123, 123-126 (1974).

It should be obvious to all that this role is undermined when a defendant selects a plaintiff to sue him, and is further eroded when, in addition, that party pays the counsel fees for his phantom adversary. While we do not question the sincerity of the statement of appellants’ counsel here that they were “prepared to ... take the appellees to the mat on the case,” there is nonetheless no guarantee in this or any other action that the cause will be prosecuted antagonistically and with the vigor that can be assumed when counsel is paid and directed by his own client. Who can say what subtle psychological influences might be at work — even if counsel is instructed to oppose his employer to the ²⁸⁴ fullest — when the attorney knows that his employer, having a very substantial financial interest at stake, actually desires a result opposite that which the attorney is to advocate? Since such matters may be impossible of proof in an individual case, and since the appearance of and opportunity for the frustration of justice will always be present where attorneys’ fees not subject to court approval are paid by an opposing party, the payment by the appellee of fees for both his own counsel and that of his illusory antagonist must perforce be deemed collusive.

Our research reveals only one Maryland case relevant to the question of collusive suits in the context presented here. In Fitzjarrell v. Boyd, 123 Md. 497, 503 , 91 A. 547, 548 (1914), this Court, in finding a negligence action by a guest against the owner of an automobile neither collusive nor fictitious, 1 observed that: If the real and primary object of the suit is to redress the grievance of the plaintiff and there is an actual controversy, involving real and substantial rights between the parties to the record, the suit [will] not be dismissed. It is only when the sole object of the suit is to affect third parties and when the interest of the parties to the suit is not adverse and when there is no real and substantial controversy between those who appear as adverse parties, that the principles [regarding collusive and fictitious suits] apply. [2] ²⁸⁵ Those incidents establishing the collusiveness of a suit are clearly present in this case. Implicit in counsel’s statements at oral argument is the fact that the arena selected its adversary; thus, the “real and primary object of the suit” is not to redress any grievance of the plaintiff.

Certainly the interests of the parties cannot be truly adverse where the private-party defendant pays counsel fees for both parties. Although of course not binding upon them, it seems plain that the true object of this suit is to affect third parties: that is, by the precedential effect of a hoped-for decision by this Court upholding the validity of the act authorizing the bond sale, to discourage any future attack by others on the legality of the bonds, and by that tactic encourage their purchase by The Equitable Life Assurance Society. If this action, with the maneuvering that gave birth to it, is not collusive, it is difficult for us to envision one that is. Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are in accord with this conclusion.

United States v. Johnson, supra, 319 U. S. at 304-05 (suit in which one of the parties has dominated conduct of the litigation by payment of the fees of both is collusive because in no real sense adversary, and judgment will not be allowed to stand); Gardner v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 131 U. S. ciii , ciii-civ (app.), 21 L. Ed. 141 (1873) (“it cannot be admitted that one party to a suit can pay the fees of counsel on both sides . . . without being held to have such control over both the preparation and argument of the cause, as to make the suit merely collusive”); see Chamberlain v. Cleveland, 66 U. S. (1 Black) 419 , 17 L. Ed. 93 (1862); Lord v. Veazie, 49 U. S. (8 How.) 251 , 12 L. Ed. 1067 (1850); cf. Chicago & G.T.R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339 , 12 S. Ct. 400 , 36 L. Ed. 176 (1892). Although we have no doubt that presentation of the issues by the appellants’ counsel in this case was as vigorous as could be desired, this Court ordinarily does not sit to make such assessments of counsel’s conduct of a suit, and we must, for the reasons we have pointed out, conclude that selection of counsel and payment of his fees by an opposing party is always equivalent to dominating the conduct of the litigation.

That is not to say, of course, that an action in ²⁸⁶ which the fees of counsel for both sides must ultimately be paid from public funds, as where the opposing parties are a municipal corporation and one of its officers, is a collusive proceeding, “since the common source of such payment does not give one party control over the preparation and argument of the cause.” City and County of San Francisco v. Boyd, 22 Cal. 2d 685 , 140 P. 2d 666, 670 (1943). But this remains true only so long as there is an actual controversy between the parties. 3 See id. In a case involving private parties, however, payment of counsel fees for an adversary cannot help but give the paying party control over the case, whether or not exercised in the particular instance, for “[h]e who pays the piper can call the tune.” A Collection of English Proverbs (J. Ray ed. 1670). We think there is no question, then, that the suit here is appropriately characterized as a collusive one, lacking on its face the “safeguard essential to the integrity of the judicial process” — adverseness between the parties.

United States v. Johnson, supra, 319 U. S. at 305 . Properly concerned as we are that questions brought before us for decision are presented with “that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court[s] so largely [depend] for illumination of difficult constitutional questions,” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 , 82 S. Ct. 691 , 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), we are at the same time acutely aware that there are occasions upon which a refusal to adjudicate issues not arising in the context heretofore deemed prerequisite to the exercise of the court’s decisional responsibilities may have extremely deleterious consequences — as, for example, where a crucial city bond issue simply will not be underwritten absent a judicial determination establishing its legality. The practical necessity for an adjudication, and the absence of parties ²⁸⁷ with an interest in the matter sufficient tc induce them to pay the substantial costs involved in making the appropriate challenge, lead inevitably to precisely the sort of activity which occurred here—the selection of a dummy plaintiff and the payment of his counsel fees by the only truly interested party, the defendant arena — in short, a collusive suit born of the practicalities and complexities, particularly financial ones, of a democratic society in the twentieth century. Having given careful thought to the issues involved — the collusion that we should not tolerate and the necessities that we cannot ignore — this Court with this case establishes new procedures under which actions of a narrowly defined class may be adjudicated despite their collusive characteristics, and by which the competing considerations we have mentioned may be reconciled consistent with the mandates of the Maryland Constitution, the integrity of the judicial decisional process, and our prior case law.

In concluding that the precise rubrics we delineate presently are an appropriate resolution of the dilemma typified by the posture of the parties to this case, we are required to consider and resolve a number of preliminary issues. The most substantial of these is whether the adversary relationship long required between the parties to a suit, which is undermined when it is collusive, is mandated by our Constitution or simply by the decisions of this Court rendered to protect the probity of the adjudicatory process. As the reader may by now surmise, we find the requirement to be a decisional one, and it is to an explication of the backdrop and rationale which produce this conclusion that we first turn. We begin our discussion by observing preliminarily that we do not here, nor could we, decide a nonjusticiable issue.

A prerequisite to the adjudication of any action under the procedures we detail below is its cognizability under the Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Md. Code (1974 & 1976 Cum. Supp.), §§ 3-401 to -415 of the Courts Article, and in this context we recently had occasion to observe that a court has no right to make a determination in declaratory judgment cases in which no justiciable issue is ²⁸⁸ presented. Harford County v. Schultz, 280 Md. 77, 86 , 371 A. 2d 428, 432-33 (1977); see Board v. Attorney General, 246 Md. 417, 426-27 , 229 A. 2d 388, 393 (1967). We have adopted, as the definition of a justiciable issue or controversy, that given in 1 W. Anderson, Actions for Declaratory Judgments 67 (2d ed. 1951): “A controversy is justiciable when there are interested parties asserting adverse claims upon a state of facts which must have accrued wherein a legal decision is sought or demanded.” See Harford County v. Schultz, supra at 81 [430]; Hamilton v. McAuliffe, 277 Md. 336, 340 , 353 A. 2d 634, 637 (1976); Patuxent Co. v. Commissioners, 212 Md. 543, 548 , 129 A. 2d 847, 849 (1957).

Since adverse claims are asserted here upon a state of facts which has accrued — plaintiffs seeking, and defendants opposing, an injunction forbidding the proposed issuance and sale of bonds and a declaration that the statute empowering the county to issue them is a special law violative of the Maryland Constitution and that their sale would not be for a public purpose — the only additional requisite for the existence of a justiciable controversy is that the parties asserting the adverse claims be “interested.” We think the sole intendment of this requirement is that the plaintiff have standing to seek the declaration, since any person entitled to invoke the judicial process in a particular instance has, by virtue of that entitlement, already been defined to be an interested party. 4 Because there can be no question but that any taxpayer in Prince George’s County would be entitled to seek the relief sought here, see James v. Anderson, 281 Md. 137, 141-42 , 377 A. 2d 865, 867-68 (1977); Citizens P. & H. Ass’n v. County ²⁸⁹ Exec., 273 Md. 333, 339-41 , 329 A. 2d 681, 684-86 (1974).—a taxpayer challenging a bond issue has the “concrete interest” required by section 3-409 of the statute, cf. Pr. George’s Co. v. Md.-Nat’l Cap., 269 Md. 202, 208-09 , 306 A. 2d 223, 227-28 , cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1068 (1973) — the case is a justiciable one under the Declaratory Judgments Act. 5 Nonetheless, though the case is on its face justiciable, it is, as we have already established, collusive because, among other reasons, counsel fees were paid by an opposing party. On that account this action is, beyond all reasonable dispute, dismissible. Are we, however, because of the failure of true, as opposed to technical, adverseness between the parties, constitutionally bound to dismiss the suit in conformity with the principle oft-repeated in our cases that “courts will not decide moot or abstract questions, or, in the absence of constitutional mandate, render advisory opinions”?

Harford County v. Schultz, supra, 280 Md. at 80 , 371 A. 2d at 429 (quoting Hammond v. Lancaster, 194 Md. 462, 471-72 , 71 A. 2d 474, 478 (1950)). Having concluded that this Court is not so bound, we proceed to a discussion of the case law and constitutional principles which permit the decision we announce in this case. As noted in our earlier discussion of collusion, Maryland precedent in the area is sparse and, on the question whether a collusive case must be dismissed, non-existent. Nor is the federal precedent entirely illuminating on the point.

Where the parties participate in such a manner that no real controversy exists, the action has been termed “an abuse which courts of justice have always reprehended, and treated as a punishable contempt of court.” Lord v. Veazie, 49 U. S. (8 How.) 251, 255 , 12 L. Ed. 1067 (1850); see Chamberlain v. Cleveland, 66 U. S. (1 Black) 419 , 17 L. Ed. 93 (1862). And in United States v. Johnson, supra, 319 U. S. at ²⁹⁰ 304 , it was observed that a court may not safely proceed to judgment in the absence of a genuine adversary issue, particularly where passing on the constitutionality of legislative action; the Court, after noting that antagonism was an essential element in maintaining the integrity of the judicial process, stated: Whenever in the course of litigation such a defect in the proceedings is brought to the court’s attention, it may set aside any adjudication thus procured and dismiss the cause without entering judgment on the merits.

It is the court’s duty to do so where ... the public interest has been placed at hazard by the amenities of parties to a suit conducted under the domination of only one of them. [Id. at 305 (emphasis added).] Professor Wright in his treatise on the federal courts suggests that application of the rule against collusive suits has not been rigid, maintaining that “some of the most famous constitutional decisions have come in what now seem to have been collusive cases.” C. A. Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 12, at 40 (3d ed. 1976). Even were the federal courts bound, as a constitutional matter, to dismiss a collusive suit, the same result would not be mandated under the Maryland Constitution since, unlike the United States Constitution, it contains no express language limiting the judicial power to “cases” or “controversies.” U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2. 6 Since we are unable to draw any direct conclusions from the case law on collusive suits, and since such actions are so akin to moot cases, in that adverse interests of the litigants are not immediately at stake in either instance, we turn to an examination of the constitutional basis vel non of the ²⁹¹ mootness doctrine. 7 If this Court were prohibited by our Constitution from rendering an opinion in a moot case, a like principle would undoubtedly apply to the adjudication of collusive suits, since the same infirmity — lack of a genuine controversy between the parties before the court at the time of the adjudication — infects both types of cases. 8 In Lloyd v. Supervisors of Elections, 206 Md. 36, 43 , 111 A. 2d 379, 382 (1954), this Court specifically indicated that it was not deciding whether our practice of dismissing appeals moot as to the parties was due to a constitutional lack of power or was simply the application of a rule of decision, though it noted three cases in which the Court had not followed the principle requiring the dismissal of moot cases and had cited no authority for its actions. 9 We again left the question open ²⁹² in Bd. of Public Welfare v. Myers, 224 Md. 246, 251 , 167 A. 2d 765, 768 (1961). As Judge Hammond pointed out for the Court in Lloyd , while dismissal of moot cases has been grounded at times on constitutional limitations of power, “[u]sually ... courts accept as a rule of decision governing the exercise of jurisdiction, that a case which is moot will not be decided.” 206 Md. at 42 , 111 A. 2d at 381 .

The Lloyd opinion further indicated that this Court has apparently treated the question, for the most part, as a rule of decision. Id. Today we definitively close the door left ajar in Lloyd and Myers and hold, in accord with our actual past practice, that we are inhibited from rendering a decision in a moot case only by our own adherence to the “settled rule which governs the deliberation and adjudications of courts generally, namely, that they do not sit to decide abstract questions of law,” Lloyd v. Supervisors of Elections, supra at 42 [381], and not by any constitutional prohibition. In so deciding, we bring the unstated theory supporting a number of our past decisions, see note 9 supra, into congruence with our actual practice in deciding such cases, without trenching on the constitutionally-imposed limitations on our jurisdiction, to which we shall shortly advert.

This Court in Lloyd , while recognizing that we have never addressed the question directly, noted authorities apparently contrary to the proposition that we have always treated the dismissal of moot cases as a decisional rather than a constitutional question. The principal case suggesting ²⁹³ otherwise, the language of which has been frequently quoted in subsequent opinions, is Hammond v. Lancaster, 194 Md. 462, 471-72 , 71 A. 2d 474, 478 (1950), where, as has already been indicated, we observed that courts will not decide moot or abstract questions, “or, in the absence of constitutional mandate, render advisory opinions.” Initially, we observe that the rendition of an advisory opinion is often said to be the result of deciding a case which is moot as to the parties before the court. Thus, in Price v. Cohen, 206 Md. 45, 48 , 109 A. 2d 920, 921 (1954), decided on the same day as Lloyd , we explained that in Lloyd , where the case was moot when it reached this Court, we had held that the Court should not give a decision on the matter presented, even assuming that the Court possessed the power to do so, because the question was not of such general public interest nor so likely to reoccur with such frequency as to call for an advisory opinion. See Tanner v. McKeldin, 202 Md. 569, 580-81 , 97 A. 2d 449, 454 (1953) (suit for declaratory relief which did not allege actual justiciable controversy in effect prayed for advisory opinions which the court properly refused); cf. 1 C.J.S. Actions § 19, at 1059 (1936) (action is fictitious or collusive, and cannot be maintained, where its real object is to procure an advisory opinion of the court without an actual contest) (citing cases).

Thus where the term “advisory opinion” is used in that sense —- an opinion rendered in a judicial proceeding, but which cannot be actually effectuated as to the parties before the court (as where the case is moot, or where the court expresses its views despite its dismissal of the appeal on jurisdictional grounds) 10 — the same principle must apply as applies to the decision in a moot case, that is, the rendition of an opinion is not constitutionally prohibited. We think that, when our predecessors in Hammond indicated that the Court would not, absent constitutional ²⁹⁴ mandate, render an advisory opinion, 11 they referred to “advisory opinion” in an entirely different and very specific sense — “an answer given by the justices of a state’s highest court acting in their individual capacities, at the request of a coordinate branch of government, to a legal question regarding a matter pending before the requesting authority.” Comment, The State Advisory Opinion in Perspective, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 81 , 81 (1975). 12 There is no doubt whatever that this Court is constitutionally prohibited from rendering an advisory opinion of this nature — the legislature could not require or authorize it by statute nor could this Court determine to render such an opinion were one simply requested of us by either the legislature or the executive. 13 Our inability to render such an opinion flows from two constitutional limitations on our jurisdiction. One of these is that our jurisdiction is solely appellate. Section 14 of Article IV of the Maryland Constitution provides that the “jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals shall be co-extensive with the limits of the State and such as now is or may ²⁹⁵ hereafter be prescribed by law.” And we have long held that, since the Court had, under former Constitutions, appellate jurisdiction only, our jurisdiction under the present Constitution remains so confined, Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor, 276 Md. 36, 40 , 343 A. 2d 521, 524 (1975); Sevinskey v. Wagus, 76 Md. 335, 336 , 25 A. 468, 468-69 (1892); hence the legislature cannot confer original jurisdiction upon this Court.

Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor, supra at 41 [524]; Board v. Attorney General, 246 Md. 417, 427 , 229 A. 2d 388, 393 (1967); Sevinskey v. Wagus, supra. That being so, clearly we cannot be required to give an advisory opinion at the request of the legislature or executive, since “the exercise of appellate jurisdiction requires a prior action by some judicial authority, or the prior exercise of judicial power. . . .” Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor, supra at 43 [525]; neither, of course, can we undertake to do so of our own accord. The other constitutional limitation which prohibits this Court, or indeed any Maryland court, from rendering such an opinion to the legislature or executive flows from Article 8 of our Declaration of Rights, which mandates that the powers of the three departments of government be “forever separate and distinct.” We have many times stated that Article 8 prohibits the courts from performing nonjudicial functions. E.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor, supra at 46 [527]; Cromwell v. Jackson, 188 Md. 8, 13 , 52 A. 2d 79, 82 (1947).

Moreover, we have said that “all judicial authority is only such as is provided for by Article 4 of the Maryland Constitution, and it has been decided that only judicial functions can be exercised which find their authority in that Article. . . .” Dep’t of Nat. Res. v. Linchester, 274 Md. 211, 223 , 334 A. 2d 514, 522 (1975) (quoting Dal Maso v. County Commrs., 182 Md. 200, 205 , 34 A. 2d 464, 466 (1943)). We find nothing in Article IV which could be construed to authorize the rendering of this type of advisory opinion, and we think there can be no doubt that the giving of such an opinion is in fact a nonjudicial function. Our predecessors long ago pointed out that “[i]t is of the very essence of a judicial function . . . that it shall be a proceeding between parties.” ²⁹⁶ Robey v. Prince George’s County, 92 Md. 150, 162 , 48 A. 48, 50 (1900).

For other authority to the effect that the giving of such opinions is not the exercise of a judicial function, see Opinion of the Justices of Supreme Court, 314 A. 2d 419, 420 (Del. 1973); In re Opinion of the Justices, 115 Vt. 524 , 64 A. 2d 169, 171, 172 (1949); In re Elliott, 74 Wash. 2d 600 , 446 P. 2d 347, 355 (1968) (en banc); Stevens, Advisory Opinions —- Present Status and an Evaluation, 34 Wash. L. Rev. 1 , 9 (1959) (citing cases); Comment, The State Advisory Opinion in Perspective, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 81 , 82 (1975) (citing cases); Comment, The Advisory Opinion and the United States Supreme Court, 5 Fordham L. Rev. 94 , 103 (1936). If more support for this proposition were desired, one need only consider some of the generally recognized indicia of judicial power, which include: the power to make a final rather than an initial determination, the power to make binding judgments, the power to affect the personal or property rights of private persons, the exercise of power formerly held by a court, and the fashioning of remedies which are judicial in nature. See County Council v. Investors Funding, 270 Md. 403, 436 , 312 A. 2d 225, 243 (1973).

None of these inhere in the rendition of such an advisory opinion. We think that the constitutional limitations we have just described are those to which the Court in Hammond referred when it indicated that advisory opinions would not be rendered without constitutional mandate. 14 It is apparent to us that those limitations are not applicable to prevent our decision in a moot case where the requisite extraordinary circumstances exist. 15 The decision of any such case would obviously not contravene the requirement that we exercise only appellate jurisdiction; neither do we believe that it can ²⁹⁷ fairly be said that such a decision is outside the judicial role. Certainly it is a function that could not be performed by another branch of government. See Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co., 131 Md. 265, 282 , 101 A. 710, 715 (1917), cited in Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor, supra, 276 Md. at 45-46 , 343 A. 2d at 526 (to make a function judicial it must be “the exercise of discretion and judgment within the subdivision of the sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or, at least, which does not belong to the legislative or executive department”).

We are loath to conclude that, simply because a judgment of this Court can no longer affect the rights of the parties who have brought the dispute before us for adjudication, it is necessarily beyond the judicial function without regard to the public importance of the issues, the likelihood of recurrence, and other similar factors. Particularly where a controversy is live when appealed to this Court and the opposing positions are vigorously presented, so that the action is clearly suitable for resolution through the judicial process, in the absence of a clear constitutional prohibition, either express or reasonably implied, we decline to infer that it may never be judicially resolved. We emphasize, however, that we will exercise this authority only in rare instances which demonstrate the most compelling of circumstances. Only one other case was cited by the Lloyd Court to support the possibility that the decision of a moot case might be impermissible for constitutional reasons, and we will dispose of it with a brief discussion.

In State v. Shields, 49 Md. 301 (1878), the Court dismissed an appeal by the State after acquittal of the defendant in a criminal case; review was requested of exceptions taken by the State to various rulings of the trial court admitting testimony offered by the accused. Since the verdict would have to stand whether the court’s rulings were correct or not, this Court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the verdict discharged the defendant; he was thus no party to the appeal and there was no cause before the court. Id. at 305 . We agree with our predecessors’ conclusion that adjudication in this case was beyond their constitutional power.

Decision in such a ²⁹⁸ situation would be virtually indistinguishable (other than for the manner of making the request) from the rendition of an advisory opinion in the classic sense — an opinion in answer to a question of law from the executive branch (the State’s Attorney) “which question is not related to nor concerned with a case or controversy in actual litigation at the time, and which does not involve private rights.” Stevens, Advisory Opinions — Present Status and an Evaluation, 34 Wash. L. Rev. 1 , 2-3 (1959) (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). To have delivered an opinion in Shields would in truth have been the exercise of a nonjudicial function, since the essence of that function, as we have pointed out, is that there be a proceeding between parties, Robey v. Prince George’s County, 92 Md. 150, 162 , 48 A. 48, 50 (1900), and there was only one party before this Court in Shields . 16 Finding nothing in either Hammond or Shields to be to the contrary, we conclude there is no constitutional bar to our rendering an “advisory opinion” as that term is loosely used 17 to refer to the decision of a case in which, because the ²⁹⁹ action is either moot or collusive, there is no actual controversy between the parties before the court. See Price v. Cohen, 206 Md. 45, 48 , 109 A. 2d 920, 921 (1954) (suggesting that where case is moot, decision on matter presented would be an advisory opinion); Golden Gate Bridge and Highway Dist. v. Felt, 214 Cal. 308 , 5 P. 2d 585, 589 (1931) (referring to a collusive proceeding as an attempt to secure an advisory opinion); 1 C.J.S. Actions § 19, at 1059 (1936) (action is collusive where real object is to procure an advisory opinion without an actual contest).

Just as this Court has heretofore occasionally found it prudent to render decisions in cases moot as to the parties where the appropriate circumstances appear, see cases