Prince George's Cnty. v. Thurston

Prince George’s County v. Robert E. Thurston Jr., et al., No. 63, September Term, 2021. Opinion by Getty, C.J. CHARTER FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY — COUNCILMANIC DISTRICTS — REDISTRICTING COMMISSION PLAN The Court of Appeals held that Article III, § 305 of the Charter for Prince George’s County (“Charter”) requires the Prince George’s County Council (“Council”), if it chooses to adopt the plan of the redistricting commission, to do so by resolution upon notice and public hearing. That provision does not authorize the Council to change the redistricting commission’s proposal and enact an alternative redistricting plan by resolution. For the Council to enact a councilmanic districting plan different from the plan proposed by the redistricting commission, the Council must use a “bill” to pass a “law,” subject to presentment to the County Executive and executive veto.

Accordingly, where the Prince George’s County 2021 Redistricting Commission (“2021 Commission”) transmitted its redistricting plan and report to the Council on September 1, 2021 and the Council failed to pass a law changing the 2021 Commission’s proposal, the 2021 Commission’s plan became effective by operation of law on November 30, 2021. Circuit Court for Prince George’s County Case No. CAL22-01728 Argued: March 4, 2022 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 63 September Term, 2021 PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY v. ROBERT E. THURSTON JR., ET AL. *Getty, C.J. Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, McDonald, Robert N. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) JJ. Opinion by Getty, C.J. Filed: July 13, 2022 *Getty, C.J., now a Senior Judge, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal active member of this Court; after being recalled Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. pursuant to Md. Const., Art. IV, § 3A, he also 2022-07-18 11:53-04:00 participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion.

Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk A “resolution,” in the legislative context, can mean many things. In the halls of the United States Congress, there exist three forms of resolutions: joint, concurrent, and simple.1 On State Circle in Annapolis, the Maryland General Assembly employs resolutions in similar fashion: joint resolution, simple resolution, and resolution.2 Each of these legislative tools serve a distinct purpose ranging from expressing appreciation or congratulation to embracing matters of substance and public policy. In Prince George’s County, there exists only one kind: a “resolution,” defined in the Charter for Prince George’s County (“Charter”) to “mean a measure adopted by the [Prince George’s County] Council having the force and effect of law but of a temporary or administrative character.” Art. X, § 1017(c). In this case, as we shall explain, the Prince George’s County Council (“Council”) appointed the Prince George’s County 2021 Redistricting Commission (“2021 Commission”) to prepare and propose a councilmanic redistricting plan following receipt of the 2020 federal decennial census data.

The 2021 Commission transmitted its proposed plan and report to the Council on September 1, 2021. The Council, after considering the 2021 Commission’s plan, attempted to enact an alternative redistricting 1 See Bills & Resolutions, United States House of Representatives, https://www.house.gov/the-house-explained/the-legislative-process/bills-resolutions, archived at https://perma.cc/5UTD-9T5H; Types of Legislation, United States Senate, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/leg_laws_acts.htm, archived at https://perma.cc/G8X8-D5VL. 2 See Maryland House Rule 25, Regular Session 2022; Senate of Maryland Rule 25, Regular Session 2022. plan using a resolution. See CR-123-2021 (“Council Resolution 123”).3 Robert E. Thurston, Jr. and others (“Respondents”) challenged Council Resolution 123 in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. The circuit court invalidated the measure and Prince George’s County (“County”) noted an appeal.

We hold that, for the Council to enact a councilmanic districting plan different from the plan proposed by the appointed redistricting commission, Article III, § 305 of the Charter requires the Council to use a “bill” and pass a “law.” The Council is prohibited from enacting an alternative redistricting plan by resolution. Therefore, because the Council passed no other law changing the 2021 Commission’s proposal, the 2021 Commission’s plan became effective by operation of law on November 30, 2021. BACKGROUND A. Charter for Prince George’s County Pursuant to Article XI-A of the Constitution of Maryland (the “Home Rule Amendment”), the citizens of Prince George’s County adopted a charter form of government in November 1970.4 Md. Const. art. XI-A, § 2 (“The General Assembly shall 3 Throughout this Opinion, we shall refer to various bills and resolutions passed by the Council.

Our citations conform to the numbering conventions used by the Council: “Every bill and resolution shall be consecutively numbered beginning with CB-1-(year) for Council bills and CR-1-(year) for Council resolutions.” Rule 10.3, Bills and Resolution Numbers, Rules of Procedure for the Prince George’s County Council (July 2020), (“Rules of Procedure”) at 12, https://pgccouncil.us/DocumentCenter/View/5503/County-Council- Rules-of-Procedure?bidId=, archived at https://perma.cc/EMJ2-PK8J. 4 When Prince George’s County adopted a charter form of government in 1970, it became the sixth Maryland county to do so, following Montgomery (1948), Baltimore (1956), Anne Arundel (1964), Wicomico (1964), and Howard (1968). In the years since 1970, five 2 by public general law provide a grant of express powers for such County or Counties as may thereafter form a charter under the provisions of this Article.”). The Charter is divided into twelve articles, each of which addresses a different aspect of County government. Article III governs the legislative branch—the Council.

The Council is composed of eleven members, nine of whom are elected from geographic districts, and two of whom serve as at-large members. Prince George’s County Charter, Art. III, §§ 301; 304. 1. General Provisions The Council “shall enact no law except by bill.” Prince George’s County Charter, Art. III, § 317. A “bill,” as defined in the Charter, “mean[s] any measure introduced in the Council for legislative action.” Id. at Art. X, § 1017(a).

The Charter also refers to a “bill” that has been enacted in conformance with the Charter as either an “act,” “ordinance,” “public local law,” or “legislative act.” Id. at Art. X, § 1017(b). By contrast, a “resolution” is defined as “a measure adopted by the Council having the force and effect of law but of a temporary or administrative character.” Id. at Art. X, § 1017(c). The Charter defines “law” as including all acts, public local laws, ordinances, and other legislative acts of the Council, all ordinances and resolutions of the County Commissioners not hereby or hereafter amended or repealed, and all public general laws and public local laws of the General Assembly in effect from time to time other Maryland counties have adopted a charter form of government: Harford (1972), Talbot (1973), Dorchester (2002), Cecil (2012), and Frederick (2014). 3 after the adoption of this Charter, whenever such construction would be reasonable. Id. at Art. X, § 1017(d). 2.

Redistricting Procedure Every ten years, following the release of the federal decennial census data, the councilmanic districts are redrawn. When councilmanic redistricting coincides with Maryland’s quadrennial election in the second year of a decade—for example, 2022—the geographic districts remain in effect for three full county election cycles—2022, 2026, and 2030. Following the 2020 decennial census, and after “COVID-19-related delays,” the United States Census Bureau released the results to the fifty states on August 12, 2021.5 In Prince George’s County, this new census data provided the basis for redistricting in this case. Article III, § 305 of the Charter6 sets out a redistricting procedure by which councilmanic districts are redrawn to be “compact, contiguous, and equal in population.” By February 1 of the year before redistricting becomes effective, the Council must appoint a “commission on redistricting.” Art. III, § 305.

The central committee of each political party that polled at least fifteen percent of the total vote cast in the preceding regular Council election may propose five names to the Council for appointment to the redistricting 5 2020 Census Timeline of Important Milestones, United States Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-census/decade/2020/planning- management/release/timeline.html, archived at https://perma.cc/6GCF-DSET. 6 All references to “§ 305” are to Article III, § 305 of the Charter, unless otherwise indicated. 4 commission. Id. The redistricting commission is then composed of two members from each list and one additional member appointed by the Council to serve as chairman. Id.

By September 1 of the year before redistricting becomes effective, the redistricting commission “shall prepare, publish, and make available a plan of Council districts and shall present that plan, together with a report explaining it, to the Council.” Prince George’s County Charter, Art. III, § 305. After the Council receives the redistricting commission’s plan, it must hold a public hearing. Id. The public hearing must occur no less than fifteen calendar days, and no more than thirty calendar days, after the Council receives the plan.

Id. “If the Council passes no other law changing the proposal, then the plan, as submitted, shall become law, as of the last day of November, as an act of the Council, subject to Sections 320 and 321 of [the] Charter.” Prince George’s County Charter, Art. III, § 305. In 2012, the citizens of Prince George’s County ratified an amendment to § 305, adding a single sentence to the conclusion of § 305: “Such law shall be adopted by resolution of the County Council upon notice and public hearing.” Id.; see CB-55-2012. B. Prince George’s County Council 2022 Redistricting In the Council election immediately preceding the regular election, only the Democratic Party polled at least fifteen percent of the total vote cast. Therefore, in accordance with § 305, only one central committee—the Prince George’s County Democratic Central Committee (“Democratic Central Committee”)—proposed a list of 5 names to be considered for appointment to the 2021 Commission.7 The Democratic Central Committee proposed a list of five names to the Council.

By resolution on January 28, 2021, the Council appointed three individuals to the 2021 Commission—David C. Harrington and Dr. Charlene Dukes, from the Democratic Central Committee’s list, and Rev. James J. Robinson as Chair. See CR-006-2021, at 1; App’x A. The 2021 Commission conducted eleven public meetings, held two public hearings, gathered public input using electronic outreach efforts, and created a redistricting website that contained information on the redistricting process, timelines, agendas, meeting minutes, census data, public comments, briefings, preliminary plan proposals, and final plan proposals. See CR-123-2021, at 1–2. On September 1, 2021, the 2021 Commission transmitted its redistricting plan and accompanying report (“2021 Commission Plan and Report”) to the Council.

See Plan and Report, Prince George’s County 2021 Redistricting Commission, https://pgccouncil.us/DocumentCenter/View/6648/2021-Redistricting- Commission-Report, archived at https://perma.cc/7854-45YM. The Council considered the 2021 Commission Plan and Report during a public hearing on September 28, 2021. See CR-123-2021, at 2. Following the public hearing, on October 12 and October 14, 2021, the Council conducted public work sessions to consider the 2021 Commission Plan and Report and create an alternative redistricting plan.

See id. 7 Because only the Democratic party polled fifteen percent of the total vote cast in the preceding election, the commission consisted of three members instead of five. If any other party polled fifteen percent or more of the total vote cast in the preceding election, that party would also have submitted to the Council a slate of names to be considered for appointment, from which two individuals would have been appointed to the redistricting commission. 6 The Council, sitting as the Committee of the Whole,8 received and favorably voted its alternative plan out of committee on October 14, 2021. See id. The Council amended the alternative plan on October 19, 2021 and introduced the same plan in two forms: CB-115-2021 (“Council Bill 115”) and Council Resolution 123.

As reflected in the Council’s October 19, 2021 Meeting Minutes, “[t]he Chair announced that [Council Bill 115] was removed from the agenda as not necessary due to the introduction of [Council Resolution 123.]” The Council took no further action on Council Bill 115. After a public hearing on November 16, 2021, the Council adopted Council Resolution 123 by a six-to-three vote. Council Resolution 123 directed the Clerk of the Council to transmit a copy of the councilmanic districting plan contained therein to the Prince George’s County Board of Elections. C. Proceedings in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County Respondents sought a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the use of Council Resolution 123 by filing a complaint titled “(Emergency) Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Writ of Mandamus and for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunctive Relief” in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County on January 24, 2022. 8 The Council, pursuant to the County Council Rules of Procedure, operates by self- imposed committee system.

Committee System, Prince George’s County Council, https://pgccouncil.us/189/Committee-System, archived at https://perma.cc/F96H-KWBJ. Under this system, “[a]t the time of presentation of a bill or at the introduction of a resolution, the Chair may refer the matter to [a] standing committee[] or to the Council sitting as a Committee of the Whole.” Id. 7 The circuit court set the matter for a hearing on the Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) on January 28, 2022 (“January 28 Hearing”). At the outset of the hearing, counsel for the County made clear that the County did not dispute Respondents’ factual allegations as described in the Complaint. Accordingly, the circuit court converted the January 28 Hearing from one concerning the TRO to a trial on the merits and the parties’ arguments focused on the legal question of whether the Council’s actions violated § 305.

Following the January 28 Hearing, the circuit court issued an Order of Court and Declaratory Judgment on January 31, 2022 (“January 31 Order”). The circuit court declared Council Resolution 123 ineffective “to the extent it[] . . . serve[d] as a ‘law changing the [2021 Commission’s plan]’”; because the Council did not pass any other law changing the 2021 Commission’s plan, the circuit court determined that “the [2021] Commission’s plan became law on November 30, 2021[.]” Further, the January 31 Order: (1) “permanently enjoined [the County] from acting upon, implementing, or otherwise presenting the redistricting plan in [Council Resolution 123] to any entity charged with acting upon or implementing the County’s redistricting plan”; (2) required that the County “immediately withdraw the redistricting plan in [Council Resolution 123] and submit the [2021] Commission’s plan to all entities charged with acting upon or implementing the County’s redistricting plan”; and (3) required that the County “immediately cease and desist any publication of the redistricting plan in [Council Resolution 123] or otherwise withdraw the plan in [Council Resolution 123] from public view to the extent practicable and within its control[.]” 8 D. Appeal The County noted an appeal of the circuit court’s January 31 Order on February 1, 2022. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland docketed the appeal on February 3, 2022. While pending in that court, the County filed in this Court a petition for writ of certiorari, which posed the following question: Is a Resolution, having the force and effect of law, a valid measure to adopt a decennial County Redistricting Plan?

This Court granted the petition on February 11, 2022, established an expedited briefing schedule, and heard oral argument on March 4, 2022.9 Prince George’s Cty. v. Thurston, 477 Md. 383 (2022). By per curiam order issued March 7, 2022, this Court affirmed the circuit court’s January 31 Order in all respects and further ordered that the redistricting plan prepared by the [2021] Commission and submitted to the Council on September 1, 2021, which became effective by operation of law under Section 305 of the Charter for Prince George’s County on November 30, 2021, shall be used for all purposes in acting upon or implementing the County’s redistricting plan[.] Prince George’s Cty. v. Thurston, 477 Md. 629 (2022). This Opinion explains our rationale. 9 The County filed an “Emergency Motion for Expedited Consideration and Relief of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari” on February 8, 2022 (the “Emergency Motion”). Respondents filed an “Answer to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Request for Summary Affirmance” and “Response to [Prince George’s County’s] Motion to Expedite” on February 9, 2022.

The Court’s February 11 Order granting certiorari granted in part and denied in part the County’s Emergency Motion, denied the County’s request for a stay of the circuit court’s January 31 Order, and denied Respondents’ request for a summary affirmance. 9 STANDARD OF REVIEW The underlying facts of this case are not at issue. During the proceedings in the circuit court, counsel for the County did not challenge the factual basis alleged in the complaint and the parties limited argument to the legal interpretation of § 305. The circuit court found in its January 31 Order that “the operative facts are not in dispute.” We agree. The issue before this Court—the interpretation of § 305—is a question of law, which we review de novo.

Johnson v. State, 467 Md. 362, 371 (2020) (citation omitted). We give no deference to the circuit court in determining whether its declaratory judgment is correct as a matter of law. Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 432 Md. 292, 311 (2013) (citing Atkinson v. Anne Arundel Cty., 428 Md. 723, 741 (2012)). DISCUSSION A county charter is often likened to a local constitution.

See, e.g., Save Our Streets v. Mitchell, 357 Md. 237, 248 (2000) (collecting cases); Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp., 287 Md. 595, 606 (1980) (alterations in Cheeks omitted) (“‘A charter’ . . . is, in effect, a local constitution[,] which forms the framework for the organization of the local government[.]”). As Chief Judge Robert C. Murphy once put it, writing for the Court in Cheeks, “[i]t is the organic, the fundamental law, establishing basic principles governing relationships between the government and the people, and among the various governmental branches and bodies.” 287 Md. at 607 . With this in mind, we turn to the County’s foundational document: the Charter. 10 A. Interpreting Article III, § 305 of the Charter for Prince George’s County The canons of construction used to interpret statutory language apply with equal force to the interpretation of a charter provision. Cherry v. Mayor & City Council of Balt.

City, 475 Md. 565, 598 (2021) (citation omitted) (“We construe local ordinances and charters under the same canons of statutory construction as we apply to statutes.”). The Court’s primary objective is to ascertain the purpose and intent of the charter’s framers. Berry v. Queen, 469 Md. 674, 687 (2020); O’Connor v. Balt. Cty., 382 Md. 102, 113 (2004).

Because we assume that the framers express their intent in the text of the charter, we principally focus on the plain language of the challenged provision as the “primary source of legislative intent.” O’Connor, 382 Md. at 113 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Neal v. Balt. City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 467 Md. 399, 415 (2020) (citation omitted); Cherry, 475 Md. at 598 . To discern legislative intent, we first assign the words of the charter provision their “ordinary and natural meaning.” 120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor & City Council of Balt.

City, 413 Md. 309, 331 (2010) (quoting O’Connor, 382 Md. at 113 ). This Court “will not ‘divine a legislative intention contrary to the plain language’” of the charter provision “or judicially insert language to impose exceptions, limitations[,] or restrictions” not evident in the plain language. O’Connor, 382 Md. at 113 (quoting Langston v. Langston, 366 Md. 490, 515 (2001)). The specific provision at issue must be read in the context of the charter and in relation to other charter provisions. 120 W. Fayette St., LLLP, 413 Md. at 331 (citation omitted); Howard Rsch. & Dev.

Corp. v. Concerned Citizens for Columbia Concept, 297 11 Md. 357 , 364 (1983). We seek “to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.” Neal, 467 Md. at 415 (quoting Brown v. State, 454 Md. 546, 551 (2017)). 1. Plain Language Abiding by these canons, we begin with the plain language of § 305. Our focus concerns the concluding portion of § 305, which addresses what occurs after the Council receives a redistricting proposal from the redistricting commission.

The provision, as it exists today, provides in pertinent part: If the Council passes no other law changing the proposal, then the plan, as submitted, shall become law, as of the last day of November, as an act of the Council, subject to Sections 320[10] and 321[11] of this Charter. Such law shall be adopted by resolution of the County Council upon notice and public hearing. Art. III, § 305. 10 Article III, § 320, which requires the Council publish all laws and Charter amendments, states in full: “The Council shall cause all laws and all amendments to this Charter to be published promptly following their enactment as provided by law. Such laws and Charter amendments shall also be made available to the public at reasonable prices to be fixed by the Council.” 11 Article III, § 321, which requires the Council to periodically compile and codify all laws in effect, states in full: At intervals not greater than every four years, the Council shall compile and codify all laws of the County in effect at such times.

Each such codification shall be submitted to the Council, and, if adopted by law, shall be known as the “Prince George’s County Code.” Such code shall be published with an index and such appropriate notes, citations, annotations, and appendices as the Council may determine. At least annually the Council shall prepare and publish a Supplement to the County Code of laws. 12 The County contends that the circuit court’s interpretation of § 305 runs afoul of basic tenets of statutory interpretation. In the County’s view, § 305 should be reconciled and harmonized with Article X, § 1017—the Charter provision that defines terms such as “bill,” “act,” “resolution,” “enactment,” and “law.” The purported failure to do so, the County asserts, led the circuit court to err in two ways: first, by declining to read the Charter as a whole, instead narrowly focusing on the challenged provision; and second, by failing to interpret the Charter such that “no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.” Neal, 467 Md. at 415 (citation omitted). The County argues that if the Council intends to enact an alternative redistricting plan different from that submitted by the redistricting commission, the last sentence of § 305 requires the Council to do so “by resolution upon notice and public hearing.” Respondents counter that § 305, read plainly in conformity with the canons of statutory interpretation and common grammatical principles, leads to a different result.

Under Respondents’ reading, “such law” in the final sentence of § 305 refers to “the plan, as submitted” by a redistricting commission and not an “other law” passed by the Council to change a redistricting commission’s proposal. Urging us to reach this conclusion, Respondents point to the “last preced[ent] antecedent rule,” which finds support in Board of Supervisors of Elections v. Weiss, 217 Md. 133 (1958). There, this Court relied on an intermediate appellate court decision from California for the proposition that the word “‘[s]uch’ is a relative adjective referring back to and identifying something previously spoken of. It naturally, by grammatical usage, 13 refers to the last precedent antecedent.” Id. at 138 (quoting In re Wallace’s Est., 219 P.2d 910, 913 (Cal.

Dist. Ct. App. 1950)). Black’s Law Dictionary describes this principle as the “rule of the last antecedent”: “[t]he doctrine that a pronoun, relative pronoun, or relative adjective generally refers to the nearest reasonable antecedent.” Rule of the Last Antecedent, Black’s Law Dictionary 1598 (11th ed. 2019).12 Defined another way, the rule of the last antecedent is “[a]n interpretive principle by which a court determines that qualifying words or phrases modify the words or phrases immediately preceding them and not words or phrases more remote, unless the extension is necessary from the context or the spirit of the entire writing.” Id. We find this canon instructive; it elucidates the common understanding of the challenged provision.

The words “[s]uch law” refer to the immediately-preceding antecedent “law” contained in the previous sentence: “shall become law.” Art. III, § 305. That “law” is easily identifiable; it is “the plan, as submitted” by the redistricting commission. Id. We reject the County’s argument that “such law” hopscotches over the natural antecedent and somehow refers to the “other law” clause, permitting the Council to change the plan of the redistricting commission. 12 The rule of the last antecedent often invokes the related “nearest-reasonable-referent canon.” Black’s Law Dictionary explains: “‘last antecedent’ denotes a noun or noun phrase referred to by a pronoun or relative pronoun—since grammatically speaking, only pronouns are said to have antecedents.” Rule of the Last Antecedent, Black’s Law Dictionary 1598 (11th ed. 2019). “But in modern practice, and despite the misnomer, it is common to refer to the rule of the last antecedent when what is actually meant is the nearest-reasonable-referent canon.” Id.

(emphasis in original). 14 Put conversely, once the redistricting commission prepares and transmits its plan and report to the Council, the Council is authorized to pass an “other law” changing the proposal. In the absence of the Council passing an “other law,” the plan submitted by the redistricting commission “become[s] law . . . as an act of the Council . . . .” Art. III, § 305. When this occurs—either because the Council supports the plan proposed by the redistricting commission or the Council fails to pass a law changing the proposal by the deadline established in § 305—the Council must “adopt[] by resolution” the redistricting commission’s plan “upon notice and public hearing.” Id. The use of a resolution in this manner is for precisely the reason explained by Respondents—the formal adoption of a resolution creates a public record memorializing the “act of the Council.” It avoids the problem encountered in 1991 and 2001, before the Council amended § 305 to its present version.

A search of the Council’s “Legislative/Zoning Information System” for the years 1991 and 2001 only returns results for the resolutions used to appoint members of the redistricting commission for that year. See CR-8-1991; CR-5-2001. In both of those years, the Council did not pass a law changing the redistricting commission’s plan and the proposal became law. However, because the Council never took legislative action on the redistricting commission’s plan, no record exists of the plan becoming law in either year.

In all, the plain language of § 305 requires the Council, if it chooses to adopt the plan of the redistricting commission, to do so by resolution upon notice and public hearing. The plain language does not require—or even authorize—the Council to enact an alternative redistricting plan by resolution. 15 2. What’s in a Name? “What’s in a name? That which we call a rose [b]y any other name would smell as sweet.” Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Scene II, lines 43–44.

Counsel for the County invoked this famed literary reference at oral argument to suggest that the Charter’s broad definition of the term “bill” does not limit “what [a] bill is,” and could encompass a resolution as a law changing the redistricting commission’s proposal. The County’s position on this point is untenable. For the Council to enact an alternative redistricting plan, it had to pass a “law,” which begins as a “bill.”13 We agree with the circuit court that “a resolution, while having the effect of law, is not a substitute for a law.” The Charter establishes a procedure for the enactment of legislation and provides in pertinent part that “[t]he Council shall enact no law except by bill.” Art. III, § 317. A “bill,” is “any measure introduced in the Council for legislative action”; whereas a “resolution,” is “a measure adopted by the Council having the force and effect of law but of a temporary or administrative character.” Art. X, § 1017(a); (c) (emphasis added).

The difference between these legislative tools is borne out in prior decisions of this Court. Describing the difference between an “ordinance,” a term encompassed in the definition of 13 The County points to Article X, § 1017(d), which defines “law,” as “including all . . . resolutions of the County Commissioners . . . .” This hardly supports the County’s position. The County emphasizes the word “resolutions” but seemingly ignores “of the County Commissioners.” Read as drafted, the term “law” in the Charter incorporates resolutions of the County Commissioners—the legislative body predating the Council— not resolutions of the Council. 16 “bill,” and “resolution”—in the context of the Howard County Charter, which substantively mirrors the definitional provisions contained in the Charter implicated here—we explained: A resolution “ordinarily denotes something less solemn or formal than, or not rising to the dignity of, an ordinance.” A resolution passed by a legislative body “deals with matters of a