Prince George's County v. Barron

Powers, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. “It is settled law in this state that no appeal will lie from a consent decree.” The law had long been settled when the Court of Appeals said what we have quoted, in Mercantile Trust Co. v. Schloss, 165 Md. 18, 24 , 166 A. 599 (1933). It cited Miller’s Equity Procedure, § 363, Ward v. Hollins, 14 Md. 158, 168 (1859) and Emersonian Apts. v. Taylor, 132 Md. 209, 214 , 103 A. 423 (1918). No case has expressed any doubt about the validity of the rule — any doubt that arises goes to the question of whether the decree was in fact entered by consent. That is the way ³⁵⁰ the question arose in Mercantile, supra, where the Court, in disposing of a motion to dismiss the appeal, said, at 25: “There is nothing on the face of the decree or contained in it that shows it to be a consent decree. * * * The basis for the contention of its being a consent decree is the correspondence between counsel * * *.

After careful examination of this correspondence, we are unwilling to say that the decree, as signed, was that agreed to by all of the parties * * The Court went on to say: “The safer and better practice, and the one, in our opinion, which should be followed, is to have the chancellor state in the decree that it was passed by consent, or the consent of the parties indorsed thereon. This is the rule laid down by Mr. Miller in his work on Equity Procedure, and has received the sanction of this court in the case of Williams v. Williams, 7 Gill, 302, 305 . Such a rule is positive and definite, affording uncontrovertible evidence of the consent, and obviating any contention on motions to dismiss on such ground; neither does it impose any hardship upon the parties.” The appeal in this case was taken by Prince George’s County, Maryland, the defendant below, from a decree entered on 12 June 1973 by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County in a suit brought against the county by Howard L. Barron and others. The record was timely received in this Court, and within 10 days thereafter, Maryland Rule 1036 c, appellees filed a motion to dismiss the appeal because not allowed by law.

Maryland Rule 1035 b (1). Appellant filed an answer, and we directed that the motion be set for oral argument in advance of argument on the merits. Maryland Rule 1037. We heard arguments on 29 October 1973 and the same day filed an order dismissing the appeal. ³⁵¹ We now give our reasons.