Prince George's Cty. v. Mayor and City of Laurel

Finan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission (Commission) was created in 1927 by Chapter 448 of the Laws of the General Assembly for that year. The law created a district, known then as the Maryland-Washington Metropolitan District, in the ¹⁷⁴ Maryland suburban area contiguous to Washington, D. C., and included in that district approximately all of what is now enclosed by the Capital Beltway in Montgomery and Prince George’s counties. Throughout the years, exclusive authority for parks, planning, and zoning within this ..district was vested in the Commission and the Boards of County Commissioners of the two Maryland counties.

In 1939,- the park and planning functions in the district were separated, and the Maryland-Washington Regional District (Regional District) was created as the planning and zoning district. Between 1931 and 1965, the Maryland General Assembly expanded the Regional District on some ten occasions, so that it now includes all of Montgomery County and Prince George’s County except for the Town of Laurel, Maryland. Also, in Montgomery County a few older municipalities were granted planning and zoning authority by the Legislature, notably Rockville and Gaithersburg. On April 1, 1968, Laurel (one of therappellees in this appeal) annexed approximately 498 acres of land, and approved certain zoning classifications for this area.

At the time of the annexation and rezoning, the property in question was part of, and was situated within, the borders of the Regional District. Laurel’s actions were the source of some dismay to the Board of County Commissioners for Prince George’s County and the Commission (appellants), both of which refused to give any recognition to the attempted rezoning. The appellees then sought a declaratory judgment as to Laurel’s right to rezone the land in controversy. The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County (Loveless, J.) rendered an opinion and decree, holding (1) that the Town of Laurel has exclusive planning and zoning authority over the annexed property and that neither of. the appellants has such authority, (2) that the appellants retained jurisdiction and power over the acreage in question , as to building regulations, subdivision ¹⁷⁵ approval, street names and house numbers, and (3) that Chapter 373 of the Laws of 1965, which repealed and reenacted Chapter 484 of the Laws of 1961 (which had expanded the Regional District to include the disputed acreage) was unconstitutional as violative of Article XI-E, section 1, of the Maryland Constitution.

We affirm that portion of the lower court’s opinion which relates to the authority of the Town of Laurel, the Commission and the Board of County Commissioners for Prince George’s County, and reverse that portion treating upon the constitutionality of Chapter 373 of the Laws of 1965. Before reaching the merits of this case there is in limine a question which must be answered arising from the following interesting sequence of events. After the filing of briefs by all parties to this action Walter H. Maloney, Jr., Esq., County Attorney for Prince George’s County, Maryland, a body corporate and politic, successor to the Board of County Commissioners for Prince George’s County, Maryland, filed a line of dismissal on March 29, 1971, as to Prince George’s County. On April 1, 1971, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as to the County.

Thereafter, on April 5, 1971, the appellees moved to dismiss the entire appeal on the premise that the issues presented were moot in the light of the dismissal of the appeal by Prince George’s County. On April 8, 1971, this Court heard oral argument of the remaining parties on the motion to dismiss, as well as on the merits of the appeal. On April 20, 1971, Lionel Lockhart, Esq., purportedly acting as special counsel to the County Council for Prince George’s County, moved to strike the line of dismissal. Thereafter, on the 23rd day of April, 1971, this Court ordered that the line of dismissal filed by Mr. Maloney, as County Attorney, be stricken and that Prince George’s County be reinstated as a party to the appeal.

Subsequently, Prince George’s County, through Mr. Maloney, filed opposition to the motion to strike the line of dismissal, but this was filed after the line of dismissal had been struck and Prince George’s ¹⁷⁶ County reinstated as a party. The theory behind Mr. Maloney’s action is that with Prince George’s County no longer a party to the suit, the Commission has no authority or standing to continue with this appeal. As we see it, there is no need for this Court to determine in this case whether or not Prince George’s County, Maryland, a body corporate and politic, should, or should not be a party to this suit or whether the County Council of Prince George’s County has, or does not have, the authority to countermand Mr. Maloney’s actions; for the simple reason that on the strength of Planning Commission v. McCaw, 246 Md. 662 , 229 A. 2d 584 (1967), we are of the opinion that the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission, in its own right, has sufficient interest in this action to maintain the continuation of the appeal. In Planning Commission v. McCaw, wherein the standing of the Commission’s capacity to sue was challenged, Judge Oppenheimer, writing for the Court, stated: “The threshold question, raised by the appellee’s motion to dismiss, is whether the Commission has standing to appeal.

The appellee contends that the Commission is not a party, within the requirement of Code (1957) Article 5, section 6, because it has not shown a direct interest in the subject matter of the litigation. That section of the Code provides that any party may appeal from any final decree entered by a court of equity. Under it, appeals are permitted by parties of record and also persons who were directly interested in the subject matter of the suit. See First Union Savings & Loan v. Bottom, 232 Md. 292, 295 , 193 A. 2d 49 (1963), and cases therein cited.

The test of standing here involved is broader than that involved in zoning cases, where ordinarily an appeal from a decision of the administrative agency can only be taken by an aggrieved party who not only has a specific ¹⁷⁷ interest or property right affected but is personally and specially affected in a way different from the effect upon the public generally. Jahnigen v. Staley, 245 Md. 130 , 225 A. 2d 277 (1967); Alvey v. Hedin, 243 Md. 334, 339 , 221 A. 2d 62 (1966); Dubay v. Crane, 240 Md. 180, 185 , 213 A. 2d 487 (1965), and cases therein cited. * * *. “Under explicit statutory provisions, the Commission is a representative of the public in matters such as are here involved. It is empowered to make general plans for the physical development of the District and in doing so, is expressly made the representative of the State. Code of Public Local Laws of Prince George’s County, sections 59-68, 59-69 (1963). * * 246 Md. 669 -670.

Accordingly, recognizing the authority of the Commission to continue with this appeal, we shall consider the merits of the case. Statutory Interpretation The first of the appellants’ objections to the lower court’s ruling centers around the interpretation of Article 23A of the Maryland Code entitled “Corporations— Municipal,” and a discussion of the pertinent provisions of that Article would be appropriate at this juncture of the opinion. In 1954, Article XI-E of the Maryland Constitution, known as the Municipal Home Rule Amendment, was enacted by the General Assembly and ratified by the voters. The following year, Chapter 423 of the Laws of 1955 was enacted to implement Article XI-E and to provide a method for home rule for municipalities.

This statute was codified as Sections 9 through 43 of Article 23A of the Code. In 1955, Section 9(c) of Article 23A read as follows: “(c) Limitations on charter amendments.— ¹⁷⁸ No municipal corporation which is subject to the provisions of said Article 11E shall so amend its charter or exercise its powers of annexation, incorporation or repeal of charter as to affect or impair in any respect the powers relating to sanitation, including sewer, water and similar facilities, and zoning, of the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission or of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission.” Maryland Code (1951 Ed.), Art. 23A, § 9(c) (1955 Supp.). The portion of Section 19 of Article 23A (subtitled “Annexation”) which is pertinent to this decision read as follows in 1955: “ (p) Exercise of planning and zoning jurisdiction in certain areas not authorized.—The powers granted to municipal corporations by Article 11E of the Constitution, by this Article, and by Article 66B (of the Code), shall not be deemed to authorize any municipal corporation, either through procedures under this subheading or other changes in its charter, to exercise planning (including subdivision control) and zoning jurisdiction or power within any political subdivision in which such planning and zoning jurisdiction or power, or either, is exercised by any State, regional or county agency or authority.” Code (1951 Ed.), Art. 23A, § 19(p) (1955 Supp.). It is clear that in 1955 the Legislature intended that no municipal corporations were to exercise powers of annexation, zoning, or planning in such a manner as to interfere with the powers on jurisdiction of the Commission or “any State, regional or county agency or authority.” Two years later, Chapter 197 of the Laws of 1957 was enacted.

This chapter repealed and re-enacted Section ¹⁷⁹ 9(c) and Section 19 (p) of Article 23A, and added the following identical exception to each section: “Except that where any area is annexed to a municipality authorized to have and having then a planning and zoning authority, the said municipality shall have exclusive jurisdiction over planning and zoning within the area annexed; provided that nothing in this exception shall be construed or interpreted to grant planning and zoning authority to a municipality not authorized to exercise such authority at the time of such annexation.” Code (1966 Repl. Vol.), Art. 23A, §§ 9 (c), 19 (p). A reading of sections 9(c) and 19 (p) as they were originally enacted, coupled with the amendment added to each section in 1957, indicates that the Legislature intended to protect the zoning rights of municipalities having a planning and zoning authority and to extend their jurisdiction into areas which the municipality annexed or had authority to annex. In fact, section 9(c), as finally re-enacted in 1957, specifically mentions the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission and indicates that a qualified municipality (i.e., one “authorized to have and having then a planning and zoning authority”) which annexed property within the Regional District “shall have exclusive jurisdiction over planning and zoning within the area annexed.” 1 Were these the only pertinent sections of the Code, they would appear to answer the question before us and summarily dispose of the appellants’ contention that the City of Laurel had no power or authority to zone in the annexed territory.

However, the appellants claim that two other sections ¹⁸⁰ of Article 23A sustain their position, namely section 9 (a) and section 2. The pertinent portion of section 9(a) reads: “* * * The term [municipal corporation] is not to include any special tax area or district, sanitary district, park or planning district, soil conservation district or other public agency exercising specific powers within a defined area but which does not exercise general municipal functions and the term is not to include the mayor and city council of Baltimore. Nothing herein contained, shall be construed to confer upon any municipal corporation, as herein defined, located toithin any such tax area or district, the power by incorporation, charter amendment, annexation or otherwise to exercise or perform, divest or duplicate, within its corporate limits any of the special powers or duties theretofore conferred upon the board, commission, authority or public corporation * * (Emphasis supplied.) Code (1966 Repl. Vol.), Art. 23A, § 9 (a).

The appellants correctly point out that this section, first enacted in 1955 with the original portions of sections 9(c) and 19 (p), has never been repealed and remains in effect today. However, it lends little support to their position. The section limits the powers of municipal corporations “located within any such tax area or district” and Laurel is specifically excluded from the Regional District. 2 Whatever limitations are to be found in section 9(a) of Article 23A do not restrict Laurel’s right to exercise planning and zoning authority within its corporate boundaries. A more interesting argument is presented with regard to section 2 of Article 23A.

The appellants contend that this section acts as a limitation on all of Article 23A ¹⁸¹ and prohibits Laurel from rezoning the disputed property. Section 2 was enacted as Chapter 731 of the Laws of 1947, as follows: “The legislative body of every incorporated municipality in this State, except Baltimore City * * * shall have general power to pass such ordinances not contrary to the public general or public local laws and the Constitution of Maryland as they may deem necessary * * *; but nothing in this article shall be construed to authorize the legislative body of any incorpo<rated municipality to pass any ordinance which is inconsistent or in conflict with any ordinance, rule or regulation passed, ordained or adopted by the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission and the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission * * (Emphasis supplied.) Code (1966 Repl. Vol.), Art. 23A, §2. Inasmuch as this section has not been repealed, it is still in effect, and the appellants urge that it is yet another bar to Laurel’s actions.

We cannot agree. A reading of Article 23A as a whole and a study of its legislative history both militate against such a conclusion. The title to Chapter 731 of the Laws of 1947 (Article 23A, § 2) indicates that it was “to relate, generally, to the powers, duties and rights of municipal corporations in this State.” (Emphasis supplied.) And, the statute included the general terms and restrictions quoted above. Immediately after that section, came the following: “In addition to, but not in substitution of, the powers which have been, or may hereafter be, granted to it, such legislative body [of an incorporated municipality] also shall have the following express ordinance-making powers: “(30) Zoning.—To provide reasonable zon ¹⁸² ing regulations subject to the referendum of the voters at regular or special elections.” Code (1966 Repl.

Vol.), Art. 23A, § 2. In 1947, Article 23A consisted solely of what is now Sections 1 through 5 of the Article. A fair reading of the statute as it existed then indicates that municipalities were to be given a general power to pass ordinances, including reasonable zoning regulations, as long as those ordinances were not inconsistent with or in conflict with any ruling of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission. Eight years later, Sections 9 through 43 of Article 23A were enacted, providing for statutory municipal home rule and dealing more specifically in Section 9(a) and the original portions of Sections 9 (c) and 19 (p) with conflicts between municipalities and larger governmental agencies such as are presented in this appeal.

Again in 1957, as we have previously noted, the Legislature addressed itself even more precisely to the particular question presented, and granted pre-eminence in planning and zoning to certain municipalities (e.g. Laurel) over areas which they might annex. It is a primary rule of statutory construction that implied repeals of statutes are not favored, and will be found only when absolutely necessary because a later statute is so inconsistent with, or repugnant to, an earlier one that the two cannot stand together. City of Bowie v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, 249 Md. 611, 618 , 241 A. 2d 396 (1968).

It is equally well settled that where two provisions of an act appear to be inconsistent or contradictory, all parts of the statute must be read together in an effort to reconcile and harmonize them, if possible. Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Board v. Bowman, 249 Md. 705, 709 , 241 A. 2d 714 (1968) ; McConihe v. Comptroller, 246 Md. 271, 275 , 228 A. 2d 432 (1967); Maryland Industrial Development Financing Authority v. Meadow-Croft, 243 Md. 515, 521 , 221 A. 2d 632 (1966). And, where there is both general and spe ¹⁸³ cific language in a statute, the general language may be controlled by