Prioleau v. State

BARBERA, Judge. We consider in this appeal whether the phrase “What’s up, Maurice?,” when uttered by a police officer to an arrestee, is interrogation or its functional equivalent as those terms are understood in the parlance of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. ²² 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and its progeny. For the reasons that follow, we hold that words “What’s up, Maurice?” were merely a greeting, given the circumstances in which they were spoken. The officer’s words did not constitute formal interrogation, nor were they spoken under circumstances that the officer should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the arrestee.

The arrestee’s statement that came on the heels of the officer’s greeting was therefore not the product of custodial interrogation. The case has its genesis in charges brought against Maurice Darryl Prioleau, appellant, alleging his involvement in an operation to distribute cocaine on the streets of Baltimore City. Appellant, having been found guilty of the crimes of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and related offenses, presents two issues for our review: (1) whether the motion court erred in denying the motion to suppress the statement; and (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS The Motion to Suppress The hearing held on appellant’s motion to suppress his statement to the police produced the following evidence. On March 28, 2005, Baltimore City Police Detective Timothy Stach and his partner Officer Jenkins were conducting a covert surveillance of the 1600 block of Regester Street. Det. Stach testified that, at about 6:00 p.m., he observed an Acura automobile pull to the curb.

An individual, whom the detective recognized as Maurice Prioleau, appellant, got out of the Acura and jogged to 1614 Regester Street. Det. Stach watched as appellant took out a clear plastic bag and tossed it onto the front steps of the house at that address. Det.

Stach was using 10 by 50 binoculars at the time and could see small vials inside the plastic bag. The detective opined at the hearing as an expert in the packaging, distribution, and ²³ identification of controlled dangerous substances that the bag contained cocaine. Det. Stach saw appellant walk around the corner at the end of the block.

The detective then saw a man, later identified as Keith Evans, walk up to the house at 1614 Regester Street to retrieve the bag. Det. Stach watched Evans distribute the contents of the bag to several individuals who had followed him. Those individuals walked away after the transactions.

Evans continued to pace Regester Street, distributing items from the bag to individuals who approached him. Appellant appeared and walked with Evans south on Regester Street toward Federal Street. Appellant turned onto Federal Street, while Evans continued to distribute the contents of the bag to additional individuals along Regester Street. Det.

Stach recalled that, at about 4:20 p.m., 1 appellant returned. He entered 1610 Regester Street, and, after one minute, emerged with another bag of suspected cocaine. Appellant gave the bag to Evans, who resumed his routine of strolling back and forth on Regester Street, engaging in “hand-to-hand transactions” with individuals who approached. Det.

Stach alerted Officer D avid Crites, who was at the police station, that he believed he was witnessing “narcotics activity,” and appellant and Evans were “working in tandem.” Officer Crites responded to the scene, driving a marked police vehicle. Officer Crites saw Evans walking northbound toward the house at 1608 Regester Street and handing off the bag to an unknown person at that address. Officer Crites arrested Evans. Det.

Stach and Officer Jenkins emerged from their undercover observation position and joined Officer Crites. Det. Stach instructed Officer Crites to “go get [appellant].” ²⁴ Det. Stach then escorted Evans into the house at 1610 Regester Street.

The detective testified that there were numerous torn clear plastic bags on the floor, indicating drug activity in the house. Meanwhile, Officer Crites located appellant, arrested him, and placed him in the cruiser. Officer Crites then drove to the front of 1610 Regester Street and removed appellant from the vehicle. Appellant was reluctant to move, so Officer Crites employed a “wrist lock” and walked appellant up to the entrance of the house.

As Officer Crites appeared at the front door of 1610 Regester Street with appellant, Det. Stach was standing there. He said to appellant: “What’s up, Maurice?” Appellant then said: “I’m not going in that house. I’ve never been in that house.” Det.

Stach testified that his words to appellant were “not a question on anything that has to do with illegal activity.” He stated, moreover, that appellant appeared very agitated and nervous when he “blurted out” those words. Det. Stach acknowledged that appellant was under arrest by the time he was brought to the house. He was not sure whether appellant had been given his Miranda warnings.

Inside 1610 Regester Street, the police recovered a handgun with live rounds in it and three plastic bags containing 25 clear vials of cocaine, all of which had been stashed above the ceiling tiles. The police searched appellant incident to his arrest and recovered $210.00. Appellant moved to suppress the statement. 2 The court denied the motion, reasoning that the “comments made by Det. Stach amounted to merely an exchange of greetings,” and appellant’s statement was simply a blurt not covered by Miranda . ²⁵ The Trial Appellant was tried on charges of distribution of cocaine, possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, several conspiracy charges, and possession of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense.

Det. Stach was accepted at trial as an expert in “the area of recognition of narcotics, packagingU distribution and also the manner in which the organizations operate in the streets in Baltimore City specifically having to do with cocaine[.]” He testified about his knowledge of drug distribution organizations in Baltimore City. He explained that those organizations typically include a “stash location,” where the majority of the drugs are housed, and involve more than one member, each of whom has a specific role in the operation. Det.

Stach also testified about his observations, by use of 10 by 50 binoculars from a covert position 80 yards away, of appellant and Evans on the 1600 block of Regester Street. Det. Stach’s testimony was essentially the same as his testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress. Det.

Stach testified that he saw appellant drop a bag of what he believed to be cocaine in front of 1614 Regester Street, then go into 1610 Regester Street. Det. Stach saw Evans pick up the bag that appellant had dropped and distribute its contents to individuals who approached him. After that, appellant met Evans in front of 1610 Regester Street.

Appellant went into that building and, upon exiting it, handed Evans a clear plastic bag of suspected narcotics. Evans resumed dealing. The detective testified that the police arrested appellant and Evans later that evening and recovered bags of cocaine and a loaded gun from 1610 Regester Street. Officer Jenkins, who had conducted the surveillance with Det.

Stach, testified about his observations of appellant and Evans. Because his observations were -without the benefit of binoculars, his testimony was limited to describing the comings and goings of the two men. Officer Crites also testified about appellant’s arrest. He recounted that appellant became “very aggressive” when he ²⁶ was removed in handcuffs from the marked cruiser in front of 1610 Regester Street.

Officer Crites testified that, at that point, appellant said “I’m not going in there. I wasn’t around here. You didn’t see me in that house.” Officer Crites used a “control technique” to force appellant’s entry into the house. After the State rested, the defense moved for a judgment of acquittal.

The trial court denied the motion. The defense put on a brief case, offering the testimony of appellant’s sister, and the State offered one witness in rebuttal. Defense counsel renewed the motion for judgment of acquittal, submitting on all counts. The court denied the motion.

The jury acquitted appellant of the charges of distribution of cocaine, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense and rendered no verdict on the charge of possession of cocaine. The jury found appellant guilty of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, and conspiracy to possess cocaine. The court imposed a single sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment, the first ten of which are to be served without the possibility of parole. DISCUSSION I. Appellant argues that the court erred in denying the motion to suppress his statement to Det.

Stach. He maintains that the statement was the product of custodial interrogation that was not preceded by the warnings and waiver required by Miranda . The State responds that the detective’s question “What’s up, Maurice?” was neither interrogation nor its functional equivalent. Consequently, the State argues, appellant’s statement that followed the question was a blurt, not subject to suppression.

We agree with the State. We evaluate this issue by considering only the evidence that was introduced at the suppression hearing. Blake v. State, 381 Md. 218, 230 , 849 A.2d 410 (2004), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 546 U.S. 72 , 126 S.Ct. 602 , 163 ²⁷ L.Ed.2d 406 (2005). We view that evidence in the light most favorable to the party that prevails on the motion, in this case, the State.

See State v. Rucker, 374 Md. 199, 207 , 821 A.2d 439 (2003). We review the court’s findings of fact for clear error. Id. The Supreme Court held in Miranda that “the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” 384 U.S. at 444 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 .

Miranda warnings are required only when a suspect is in custody and subject to interrogation. Id. The State does not dispute that appellant was in custody. The issue before us is therefore limited to whether Det.

Stach’s salutation to appellant constitutes interrogation or its functional equivalent. Interrogation, for Miranda purposes, is not limited to “police interrogation practices that involve express questioning[.]” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298-99 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). The Supreme Court recognized in Innis that such an approach to interrogation would be inconsistent with the