Proctor v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

GREENE, Judge. We have before us questions of law certified by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Md.Code (1973, 2006 RepLVol.), § § 12-601 to 12-613 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and Maryland Rule 8-305. The District Court has asked us to determine whether ⁶⁹⁸ the waiver of sovereign immunity provision contained in Md. Code (1984, 2009 RepLVol.), § 12-104(a)(l) of the State Government Article applies to the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”), notwithstanding the broad waiver of sovereign immunity provision contained in § 80 of the WMATA Compact. We shall hold that § 12-104 of the State Government Article does not apply to actions filed against WMATA.

The District Court also has asked us to determine whether the cap on noneconomic damages contained in Md.Code (1973, 2006 RepLVol.), § ll-108(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article or our decision in Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24 , 660 A.2d 423 (1995), applies to civil actions filed against WMATA in light of the broad waiver of sovereign immunity contained in § 80 of the WMATA Compact. We shall hold that both § ll-108(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and our holding in Oaks apply to actions against WMATA. We adopt the facts of the case as set forth by the District Court in its Memorandum Opinion dated April 6, 2009: On April 9, 2008, Sylvester Proctor was seriously injured when his motorcycle and a Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (‘WMATA”) Metrobus collided at the intersection of Martin Luther King Highway and Parliament Place in Lanham, Maryland. Mr. Proctor and his wife Gloria (“Plaintiffs”) filed their complaint for negligence and loss of consortium in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland, on July 30, 2008.

The complaint seeks $7 million in damages, in addition to costs. Defendant WMATA removed the complaint to [the District Court for the District of Maryland] on September 4, 2008. On February 19, 2009, WMATA made an offer of judgment of $400,000 to Plaintiffs, which they rejected. Based upon the decision of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in Wash.

Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Deschamps, 183 Md.App. 279, 297 , 961 A.2d 591, 601 (2008), which applied a cap on damages in actions involving the State (of which WMATA was held to be a unit), WMATA moved for summary judgment on March 18, 2009. WMATA contended ⁶⁹⁹ that, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, it had made an offer of the maximum amount of recovery allowable under the damages cap, Md.Code Ann., State Gov’t § 12-104 (West 2009), which Plaintiffs rejected, thereby divesting [the District Court] of jurisdiction over the case.... The outcome of WMATA’s motion for summary judgment turns on (1) whether it is a “unit” of the state when suit is brought against it in, or removed to, federal court such that the $200,000 cap on liability contained in the Maryland Tort Claims Act should apply; and (2) whether the Maryland cap on non-economic damages applies.

As to the first issue, state and federal courts in Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia have rendered inconsistent interpretations of this provision of Maryland’s waiver of sovereign immunity. As it is axiomatic that the sovereign state may not be sued absent its express consent, this Court will accordingly defer to the Court of Appeals of Maryland for resolution of these important questions. In light of the inconsistency in the interpretations of state and federal courts on this issue, the District Court certified the following questions of law to this Court: 1. Does the phrase “in a court of the State” contained in § 12-104(a)(1) of the State Government Article of the Maryland Code apply to civil actions originally filed in or removed to a United States District Court? 2.

Do the terms “its units” contained in § 12-104(a)(l) of the State Government Article of the Maryland Code apply to the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”) in light of the broad waiver of sovereign immunity contained in § 80 of the WMATA Compact, such that civil actions filed against WMATA are not subject to the $200,000 cap for an incident or occurrence? 3. Does the Maryland statutory cap on noneconomic damages contained in § ll-108(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code apply to civil actions filed against WMATA in light of the broad waiver of ⁷⁰⁰ sovereign immunity contained in § 80 of the WMATA Compact? 4. Does Maryland decisional law, specifically Oak[s] v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35 [, 660 A.2d 423 ] (1995), apply to preclude a recovery by both spouses for a loss of consortium claim brought against WMATA in light of the broad waiver of sovereign immunity contained in § 80 of the WMATA Compact? Md.Code (1973, 2006 RepLVol.), § 12-604 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article states that “[t]he Court of Appeals ... may reformulate a question of law certified to it.” Accordingly, we shall combine Questions One and Two into a single question: Does the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in Md.Code (1984, 2009 ReplVol.), § 12-104(a)(l) of the State Government Article, apply to WMATA, in light of the broad waiver of sovereign immunity contained in § 80 of the WMATA Compact?

Power to Answer Before we may answer the questions certified by the District Court, we must address the issue of this Court’s power to answer the certified questions pursuant to Md.Code (1973, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 12-603 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Section 12-603 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article states: Power to answer. The Court of Appeals of this State may answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the United States ... if the answer may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court and there is no controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision, or statute of this State. (Emphasis added.) WMATA challenged this Court’s jurisdiction to respond to the certified questions in this case, arguing that the Court of Special Appeals’ decision in WMATA v. Deschamps, 183 Md.App. 279 , 961 A.2d 591 (2008), discussed in detail infra, is a “controlling appellate decision” as contem ⁷⁰¹ plated by § 12-603 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.

WMATA contends in this Court that our opinions and opinions of the Court of Special Appeals are “controlling appellate decisions.” WMATA points out that, when the Legislature amended the existing certification statute and adopted the revised Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Chapter 344 of the Acts of 1996, the wording of the statute changed from “controlling precedent in the Court of Appeals of this State” to “controlling appellate decision.” This change, in WMATA’s view, demonstrates the Legislature’s intent to prevent this Court from accepting certified questions when the Court of Special Appeals has spoken on the issue. WMATA acknowledged at oral argument that, although this Court is the final arbiter of Maryland law, controversies must come before the Court of Appeals in a manner in which this Court has proper jurisdiction, which is lacking in this case. According to WMATA, the District Court’s reticence about the approach taken by the Court of Special Appeals in Deschampa, 183 Md.App. 279 , 961 A.2d 591 , is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on this Court. WMATA also asserted at oral argument that, should this Court answer the certified questions, it will somehow undermine the precedential value of decisions of the Court of Special Appeals in the state’s trial courts.

Proctor argues that, because there is no decision from this Court as the final arbiter on Maryland law, there is no controlling appellate decision on the issue presented with regard to the certified questions. According to Proctor, the Legislature’s amendment to Maryland’s Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, Chapter 344 of the Acts of 1996, was undertaken in an effort to bring the statute in line with the national model statute, which sought to bring uniformity to procedures governing certified questions. Proctor cites the Floor Report and the Bill Analysis of House Bill 1450, which point to the revisions in question, as examples of non-substantive changes made to clarify the statutory language. Proctor further maintains that the proper consideration of what is a ⁷⁰² “controlling appellate decision” is a determination of whether the decision is controlling with regard to the federal courts, not Maryland state trial courts.

The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation “is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.” UMMSC v. Waldt, 411 Md. 207, 223 , 983 A.2d 112, 122 (2009) (quoting Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443 , 903 A.2d 388, 395 (2006)). The plain language of the statute provides the best insight into the Legislature’s intent. See id. In this case, the question turns on the proper interpretation of the phrase “controlling appellate decision.” This Court previously analyzed the language of § 12-603 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article in Piselli v. 75th Street Medical, 371 Md. 188 , 808 A.2d 508, 515-16 (2002).

In Piselli , we considered a challenge to this Court’s authority to answer a certified question, first by examining the language of § 12-603 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. We said: The reference to there being no appellate decision or enactments of this State indicates that our authority under § 12-603 is limited to questions of non-federal Maryland law. Such interpretation is also indicated by the use of the word controlling. This Court’s decisions on questions of federal law are obviously not “controlling” with regard to federal courts or courts of other states____ Moreover, the report of the House Judiciary Committee on House Bill 1450, which became Ch. 344 of the Acts of 1996, contained in the file of the Department of Legislative Reference, indicates that, except for certain changes expressly enumerated by the Committee, the new version of the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act was intended to be substantively the same as the former version.... [T]he purpose of the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Acts is to obtain authoritative decisions concerning the law of a particular state ... in order to assist federal courts ... and state appellate courts in other states in their decision making processes. ⁷⁰³ Piselli, 371 Md. at 201-02 , 808 A.2d at 515 (emphasis in original).

Although Piselli does not address the issue in the present case directly, it is significant with respect to three points: 1) although the wording of § 12-603 changed from “controlling precedent in the Court of Appeals of this State” to “controlling appellate decision,” Piselli points out that the change was not intended to be substantive; 2) in the context of answering certified questions, this Court’s decisions on questions of state law are controlling, however, this Court’s decisions on questions of federal law are not controlling; and 3) this Court’s purpose in answering certified questions is to render an authoritative decision to assist the federal court or other state appellate court in their decision making process. Id. Certainly, the Court of Special Appeals speaks with authority on Maryland law. Its decisions, whether in unreported opinions as the law of the case or in reported opinions as precedent, must be followed by Maryland courts and administrative tribunals, in the absence of contrary decisions rendered by this Court.

The effect of this Court’s decisions or the Court of Special Appeals’ decisions on Maryland courts and administrative tribunals is not, however, the relevant analysis when considering the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, § 12-603 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Rather, as Piselli suggests, the relevant analysis is the effect of this Court’s decisions, as the final arbiter of Maryland law, on the decision making process in federal courts and courts of other states. In Assicurazioni Generali, S.p.A. v. Neil, 160 F.3d 997, 1002 (1998), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit analyzed the extent to which its interpretation of Maryland law is influenced by the decisions of Maryland appellate courts. If ... [a] holding were contained in a state statute or a decision of the state’s highest court, the Maryland Court of Appeals, we would, absent extraordinary circumstances, be required to follow it.

It is axiomatic that in determining ⁷⁰⁴ state law a federal court must look first and foremost to the law of the state’s highest court, giving appropriate effect to all its implications.... Only when this inquiry proves unenlightening ... should a federal court seek guidance from an intermediate state court. When seeking such guidance we defer to a decision of the state’s intermediate appellate court to a lesser degree than we do to a decision of the state’s highest court. Nevertheless, we do defer____ Thus, a federal court must “present” persuasive data when it chooses to ignore a decision of a state intermediate appellate court that is directly on point.

What a federal court, sitting in diversity, cannot do is simply substitute its judgment for that of the state court. Thus, when determining Maryland law, federal courts will look first to this Court, as the final arbiter of Maryland law. If this Court has not spoken on the issue, “an intermediate appellate state court ... is a datum for ascertaining state law which is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.” Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 , 87 S.Ct. 1776, 1782 , 18 L.Ed.2d 886, 893 (1967) (quoting West v. A.T. & T Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 , 61 S.Ct. 179, 183 , 85 L.Ed. 139 (1940)) (emphasis in original). The decisions of intermediate appellate courts “should be ‘attributed some weight ... [but] the decision [is] not controlling ...’ where the highest court of the State has not spoken on the point.” Id.

(quoting King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 333 U.S. 153, 160-61 , 68 S.Ct. 488, 492 , 92 L.Ed. 608 (1948)). Assicurazioni Generali, 160 F.3d at 1002 , and Bosch, 387 U.S. at 465 , 87 S.Ct. at 1782 , 18 L.Ed.2d at 893 , demonstrate that even if this Court were prohibited from answering the certified questions, the District Court could doubt the Court of Special Appeals’ decision in Deschamps as long as the federal court explained convincingly why it surmised that this Court might rule differently. As we discuss infra, the ⁷⁰⁵ Court of Special Appeals reached a different result in Deschamps, 183 Md.App. at 298-99 , 961 A.2d at 602-03 , from the federal courts upon considering the same issue and from the Supreme Court of Virginia upon considering a similar issue. The decisions of courts in Virginia and the District of Columbia have particular significance in this case because WMATA is a multi-jurisdiction agency governed by a compact to which Virginia and the District of Columbia are parties.

Accordingly, the decisions of courts in Virginia and the District of Columbia are highly persuasive regarding matters related to WMATA. Because the rationale of Deschamps, 183 Md.App. at 298-99 , 961 A.2d at 602-03 , is inconsistent with the reasoning of other courts from the other two WMATA-related jurisdictions, the District Court, quite reasonably in our view, had reservations about whether Deschamps was decided correctly. Further, the parties in Deschamps did not seek review in this Court. The fact that this Court did not have the opportunity to review the Court of Special Appeals’ reasoning in Deschamps strengthens the notion that Deschamps should not be deemed a “controlling authority” for purposes of the certification statute.

The purpose of the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions Act is “to promote the widest possible use of the certification process in order to promote judicial economy and the proper application of [Marylandj’s law in a foreign forum.” Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act § 3 cmt. (1995) (emphasis added). “Certification is a wonderful device for getting foreign law interpreted correctly ... [Certification helps to achieve uniformity and should be used more often.” Richman & Reynolds, Understanding Conflict of Laws § 62[e] (3d ed. 2002). By permitting this Court to address questions of Maryland law that are unsettled, uncertain, or otherwise controversial in light of cases decided by other courts, certification “removes the need for judicial guesswork” on the part of the federal courts. Richman & Reynolds, supra, § 105.

Depriving this Court of jurisdiction over certified questions that it has not addressed in favor of decisions of the Court of Special Appeals, particularly in a case where the ⁷⁰⁶ correctness of the intermediate appellate court’s decision is rationally placed in doubt, fails to promote the “widest possible use” of the certification process. As the District Court noted in the Certification Order: There is considerable uncertainty as to the status of Maryland law as evidenced by the inability of the judges of the United States District Courts for the District of Maryland and the District of Columbia, the Supreme Court of Virginia, and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals to reach a single conclusion with respect to WMATA’s waiver of sovereign immunity as it relates to state statutory liability caps. This Court has reservations concerning the approach taken by Maryland’s intermediate appellate court in Deschamps , which appears to narrow the broad waiver of sovereign immunity contained in § 80 of the WMATA Compact, and the impact of this discordant interpretation as compared to the approaches taken by the Supreme Court of Virginia and two United States District Courts sitting in Maryland and the District of Columbia. Thus, it is a question that is most appropriately answered by Maryland’s highest court, a court that has never addressed the issue, rather than an individual United States District Judge.

(Emphasis added.) The present case, in which the District Court expressed uncertainty as to the proper interpretation of Maryland law, typifies the situation contemplated by the drafters of the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act. It is illogical to interpret the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act in a way that prohibits this Court from answering the District Court’s questions, contravening the statute’s purpose. “ We avoid a construction of the statute that is unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense.’ ” Board of Ed. v. Zimmer-Rubert, 409 Md. 200, 215 , 973 A.2d 233, 242 (2009) (quoting Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 573 , 911 A.2d 427, 432 (2006) (internal citations omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude that § 12-603 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article permits this Court to answer the certified questions, despite the fact that the Court of Special ⁷⁰⁷ Appeals has spoken on the subject matter in a reported opinion. Questions One and Two (Reformulated): Does the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in § 12-104(a)(l) of the State Government Article of the Maryland Code apply to WMATA, in light of the broad waiver of sovereign immunity contained in § 80 of the WMATA Compact?

WMATA is a multi-jurisdiction agency established by an interstate compact between the State of Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the District of Columbia (“the WMATA Compact”), the purpose of which is to plan, develop, finance, and operate a unified regional public transit system serving the greater Washington, D.C. area. Md.Code (1977, 2008 RepLVol.), § 10-204(2) of the Transportation Article. The General Assembly approved the WMATA Compact in 1965. Chapter 869 of the Laws of 1965.

Currently, the Compact is codified in Md.Code (1977, 2008 RepLVol.), § 10-204 of the Transportation Article. Washington, D.C., Virginia, and the United States Congress, Pub.L. No. 89-774, 80 Stat. 1324 (Nov. 6, 1966), also approved the Compact. The District of Columbia and Virginia codified the Compact, respectively, in D.C.Code § 9-1107.01 (2001) and Va.Code, Compacts §§ 56-529 to 56-530 (2001). Although the WMATA Compact is codified as state law, interpretation of the terms of the Compact is a question of federal law.

See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438 , 101 S.Ct. 703, 707 , 66 L.Ed.2d 641, 648 (1981) (“Because congressional consent transforms an interstate compact ... into a law of the United States, ... the construction of an interstate agreement sanctioned by Congress under the Compact Clause presents a federal question.”). To answer the District Court’s question, we will first consider whether WMATA, an inter-jurisdictional compact agency, is entitled to the same sovereign immunity as a unit of the State of Maryland. Next, we shall consider the extent to which the Maryland General Assembly has waived the State’s sovereign immunity pursuant to the WMATA Compact and ⁷⁰⁸ the Maryland Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”). Finally, we shall analyze the interplay between the waivers of immunity contained in the WMATA Compact and the MTCA, and determine whether the provisions of the MTCA have been incorporated into WMATA as part of the substantive tort law of Maryland.

Unlike ordinary state agencies, inter-jurisdictional compact agencies such as WMATA do not enjoy sovereign immunity “absent some ‘good reason to believe’ that immunity was intended to be conferred upon them.” Smith v. WMATA 290 F.3d 201 , 206 (4th Cir.2002) (internal citation omitted). If a state intends to confer its sovereign immunity onto an agency created under the Compact Clause, such as WMATA, the state must make its intent clear when structuring the agency. Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 43-44 , 115 S.Ct. 394, 402 , 130 L.Ed.2d 245, 257 (1994). In the case of WMATA, the State of Maryland and the other signatory parties made their intent to confer sovereign immunity upon WMATA clear in the language of the Compact.

Section 4 of the WMATA Compact specifically states that the signatories create WMATA “as an instrumentality and agency of each of the signatory parties.” 4. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. There is hereby created, as an instrumentality and agency of each of the signatory parties hereto, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority which shall be a body corporate and politic, and which shall have the powers and duties granted herein and such additional powers as may hereafter be conferred upon it pursuant to law. Md.Code (1977, 2008 RepLVol.), § 10-204(4) of the Transportation Article (emphasis added); see also Lizzi v. Alexander, 255 F.3d 128, 132 (4th Cir.2001) (“WMATA is a state agency, subject to all the benefits and liabilities of a state itself, including sovereign immunity.

It does not matter that WMA-TA was created by an interstate compact, as opposed to being an agency of one state alone.” (internal citation omitted)); Morris v. WMATA 781 F.2d 218, 219 (D.C.Cir.1986) (“WMA- ⁷⁰⁹ TA’s sovereign immunity exists because the signatories have successfully conferred their respective sovereign immunities upon it.”); Lizzi v. WMATA, 156 Md.App. 1, 9 , 845 A.2d 60, 65 (2003); Maxwell v. Washington Transit, 98 Md.App. 502, 514 , 633 A.2d 924, 929 (1993) (“It is clear that each of the three signatories attempted to confer its sovereign immunity upon WMATA. We think they succeeded .... ” (internal citations omitted)); Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Briggs, 255 Va. 309 , 497 S.E.2d 139, 141 (1998).

By designating that WMATA is “an instrumentality and agency” of each signatory, the signatories have demonstrated their intent to grant to WMA-TA the same privileges the signatory grants to its other instrumentalities or agencies, including sovereign immunity. Thus, WMATA generally is accorded the same sovereign immunity as any other agency of the State of Maryland. “In Maryland, this Court has ‘long applied the doctrine of sovereign immunity in actions against the State.’ ” Zimmer-Rubert, 409 Md. at 211 , 973 A.2d at 239 (quoting ARA Health v. Dept. of Public Safely, 344 Md. 85, 91 , 685 A.2d 435, 438 (1996)). Sovereign immunity “is applicable not only to the State itself, but also to its agencies and instrumentalities, unless the General Assembly has waived the immunity either directly or by necessary implication.” Katz v. Washington Sub. San.

Comm’n, 284 Md. 503, 507-08 , 397 A.2d 1027, 1030 (1979). If the State chooses, by legislative action, to waive its sovereign immunity, this Court strictly construes the waiver in favor of the State. Zimmer-Rubert, 409 Md. at 212 , 973 A.2d at 240 (“As such, ‘[w]hile the General Assembly may waive sovereign immunity either directly or by necessary implication, this Court has emphasized that the dilution of the doctrine should not be accomplished by ‘judicial fiat.’ ’ ”) (quoting ARA Health, 344 Md. at 92 , 685 A.2d at 438 (quoting Dep't of Natural Resources v. Welsh, 308 Md. 54, 59 , 521 A.2d 313, 315 (1986))); Lizzi, 156 Md.App. at 9 , 845 A.2d at 65 . Section 80 of the WMATA Compact makes a limited waiver of WMATA’s sovereign immunity to actions in tort and contract. 80.

Liability for contracts and torts. ⁷¹⁰ The Authority shall be hable for its contracts and for its torts and those of its directors, officers, employees and agents committed in the conduct of any proprietary function, in accordance with the law of the applicable signatory (including rules on conflict of laws), but shall not be hable for any torts occurring in the performance of a governmental function. The exclusive remedy for such breach of contracts and torts for which the Authority shall be liable, as herein provided, shall be by suit against the Authority. Nothing contained in this title shall be construed as a waiver by the District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia and the counties and cities within the zone of any immunity from suit. Md.Code (1977, 2008 RepLVol.), § 10-204(80) of the Transportation Article.

The waiver of sovereign immunity contained in § 10-204(80) of the Transportation Article is read in conjunction with Md.Code (1977, 2008 RepLVol.), § 10-204(81) of the Transportation Article. 81. Jurisdiction of the courts. The United States District Courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the courts of Maryland, Virginia and the District of Columbia, of all actions brought by or against the Authority---- Any such action initiated in a State or District of Columbia court shall be removable to the appropriate United States District Court.... Id.

Thus, the notable features of WMATA’s waiver of sovereign immunity are: 1) WMATA waives its sovereign immunity for torts arising out of proprietary functions, while retaining its immunity for torts arising out of governmental functions; 2) the exclusive remedy is a suit against WMATA, and suits against the State or local governments of the signatories are expressly prohibited; 3) the substance of the claim shall be governed by State law or the law of the District of Columbia; and 4) WMATA waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court. The General Assembly enacted the Maryland Tort Claims Act, Chapter 298 of the Laws of 1981, sixteen years after ⁷¹¹ approving the WMATA Compact. The purpose of the MTCA is to ensure that an individual who is injured by the tortious conduct of the State or state employees has a remedy for his or her injury. See Md.Code (1984, 2009 RepLVol.), § 12-102 of the State Government Article (“This subtitle shall be construed broadly to ensure that injured parties have a remedy.”); Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 496 , 632 A.2d 753, 758 (1993).

Before the General Assembly enacted the MTCA “the State and its agencies could not be sued unless the General Assembly authorized suit and enabled State agencies to obtain funds necessary to satisfy judgments.” Condon, 332 Md. at 492 , 632 A.2d at 758 ; Riviera v. PG County Health Dep’t, 102 Md.App. 456, 467 , 649 A.2d 1212, 1217 (1994); see Board v. John K. Ruff, Inc., 278 Md. 580 , 366 A.2d 360 (1976) (discussing the limited waiver of sovereign immunity for actions against community colleges); University of Maryland v. Maas, 173 Md. 554 , 197 A. 123 (1938) (discussing statutes permitting suits against the University of Maryland). For example, the General Assembly has waived the sovereign immunity of agencies of the State, or bodies that are considered to be part of the State for purposes of sovereign immunity, such as WMATA, by statute, on an individual basis. E.g., Md.Code (1973, 2006 RepLVol.), § 5-518 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (waiving sovereign immunity of county school boards, which, although they are local agencies, are considered part of the State for purposes of sovereign immunity); Md.Code (1977, 2008 RepLVol.), § 7-702 of the Transportation Article (waiving sovereign immunity of the Maryland Transportation Administration). In light of the existing waivers of sovereign immunity for specific instrumentalities or agencies of the State, the Legislature, upon enacting the MTCA, elected to limit its scope.

The General Assembly outlined the scope of the MTCA in Md. Code (1984, 2009 RepLVol.), § 12-103 of the State Government Article: 12-103. Scope of subtitle. This subtitle does not: (1) limit any other law that: ⁷¹² (1) waives the sovereign immunity of the State or the units of the State government in tort; or (ii) authorizes the State or its units to have insurance for tortious conduct; (2) waive any right or defense of the State or its units, officials, or employees in an action in a court of the United States or any other state, including any defense that is available under the 11th Amendment to the United States Constitution; or (3) apply to or waive any immunity of a bicounty unit, county, municipal corporation, or other political subdivision or any unit, official, or employee of any of those agencies or subdivisions. (Emphasis added.) Section 12—103(l)(i) of the State Government Article demonstrates that the Legislature intended that the MTCA serve as a “gap-filler” to waive the immunity of State agencies in tort when no other statute expressly waived the agency’s immunity.

If such a statute is in place, the Legislature expressly stated that the MTCA shall not affect the existing waiver. The Legislature then enacted a general waiver of immunity to tort actions against any agency for which there was no specific statute addressing waiver. The general waiver of immunity is contained in Md.Code (1984, 2009 Repl.Vol.), § 12-104 of the State Government Article. 12-104. Waiver of immunity.

(a) In general.—(1) Subject to the exclusions and limitations in this subtitle and notwithstanding any other provision of law, the immunity of the State and of its units is waived as to a tort action, in a court of the State, to the extent provided under paragraph (2) of this subsection. (2) The liability of the State and its units may not exceed $200,000 to a single claimant for injuries arising from a single incident or occurrence. (b) Exclusions and limitations.—Immunity is not waived under this section as described under § 5-522(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. ⁷¹³ (c) Payment of claims exceeding coverage.—(1) The Treasurer may pay from the State Insurance Trust Fund all or part of that portion of a tort claim which exceeds the limitation on liability established under subsection (a)(2) of this section under the following conditions: Md.Code (1973, 2006 RepLVol.), § 5-522(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article states that § 12-104 of the State Government Article retains the State’s immunity from, inter alia, punitive damages, interest before judgment, and “[a] claim by an individual arising from a single incident or occurrence that exceeds $200,000.” 1 In summary, the notable features of the MTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity are: 1) the State waives its sovereign immunity to all tort actions, arising out of governmental, proprietary, or other functions, unless specifically excluded by § 5-522(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article; 2) the exclusive remedy for recovery is to file a claim with the Treasurer pursuant to Md.Code (1984, 2009 Repl.Vol.), §§ 12-106 to 12-107 of the State Government Article,