Quillens v. Moore

BATTAGLIA, J. In the case sub judice, Petitioner, Leefen Quillens, owned eight contiguous pieces of property in Baltimore City upon which he failed to pay real property taxes. At subsequent tax sales, Baltimore City was required to “buy in and hold” two of the properties pursuant to Section 14-824(a) of the Tax-Property Article, Maryland Code (1986, 2001 Repl.Vol.), 1 and Kathleen Parker purchased four of the properties pursuant to Section 14-817 of the Tax-Property Article, Maryland Code (1986, 2001 ReplVol.). 2 Certificates of sale, often times called tax certificates, were issued to both the City and Parker, reflecting that the properties were sold for the total amount of ¹⁰¹ taxes due on the property, including those secured by prior, void tax certificates. Both the City, in Cases No. 24-C-03-003229 and 24-C-03-003142, and Parker in Case No. 24-C-03-004785, filed complaints in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to foreclose Quillens’ right of redemption. 3 Quillens filed answers to the complaints, alleging that the tax sales were invalid because the tax certificates issued thereon purported to sell the properties for taxes secured by previously issued void tax certificates. Subsequently, Quillens moved to consolidate the cases against him with the Rapid Funding Corporation foreclosure case, ¹⁰² whieh was granted. 4 On August 30, 2005, the Circuit Court entered orders finding that the tax certificates issued to Parker, and consequently the tax sales thereon, were valid, and setting the redemption amount for the City properties.

From these orders, Quillens noted an appeal. Subsequently, the Circuit Court entered an order in the City cases foreclosing Quillens’ right of redemption, from which he filed an amended notice of appeal. The Court of Special Appeals dismissed the appeal in the Parker case and affirmed the Circuit Court’s foreclosure of Quillens’ right of redemption in the City cases. We granted Quillens’ petition for writ of certiorari, 5 which posed three questions for our review: 1.

Did the Court of Special Appeals err in determining that the notices of appeal from the trial court’s August '05 orders were premature? 2. Did the trial court and the Court of Special Appeals err by finding that certain tax sale certificates were valid even though each certificate recited a purchase price which includes amounts which were not taxes and for which liens do not attach to the pertinent property? 3. Did the Court of Special Appeals err (a) in determining that appellants were required to tender payment of taxes ¹⁰³ and (b) by finding as a fact that appellants indicted no interest in redeeming? Quillens v. Moore, 396 Md. 12 , 912 A.2d 648 (2006).

Because we hold that Quillens’ appeal in the Parker case was premature and that he was required to tender payment of the deficient taxes to challenge the tax sales, we affirm the Court of Special Appeals. To provide guidance to the Circuit Court when the Parker case is remanded, we address Quillens’ argument that the tax sales were invalid because the certificates issued thereon recited a purchase price including amounts which were included on previously issued invalid tax certificates. I. Introduction Quillens owned eight contiguous parcels of property in Baltimore City, located at 1128 and 1130 West North Avenue, and 2301, 2303, 2305, 2307, 2309, and 2311 McCulloh Street, at which he operated a car wash. In 1990, as security for a loan, a deed of trust on the properties was issued to Signet Bank/Maryland; the rights under the deed of trust were subsequently assigned to Rapid Funding.

Between 1994 and 2004, Quillens failed to pay some of the real property taxes on those parcels, 6 and the following six tax sales, relevant to this appeal, resulted: ¹⁰⁴ A. 2303 McCulloh Street (Ward 13, Section 08, Block 3)23, Lot 013) 2303 McCulloh Street was sold at a tax sale on May 15, 1995 to “TCA 96 L.P. & Sun Bank” for $643.34, the amount of deficient real property taxes, interest, and costs for Fiscal Year 1994. Subsequently, the property was sold at a tax sale on May 15, 2000; no third party bid upon the property, and the City bought into and held the property for $1,443.57, the amount of deficient real property taxes, interest, and costs due for Fiscal Years 1997, 1998, and 1999. In 2002, Parker purchased the property at a tax sale for $2,447.12, the amount of the unpaid real property taxes, interest, and costs for Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001, along with the amount secured by the void May 2000 tax certificate. B. 2305 McCulloh Street (Ward 13, Section 08, Block 3)23, Lot 01)) 2305 McCulloh Street was sold at a tax sale on May 17, 1999; no third party bid on the property, and the City bought into and held the property for $485.48, the amount of deficient real property taxes, interest, and costs due for Fiscal Years 1997 and 1998.

In 2002, Parker purchased the property at a tax sale for $1,642.51, the amount of unpaid real property taxes, interest, and costs for Fiscal Years 1999, 2000, and 2001, along with the amount secured by the void May 1999 tax certificate. ¹⁰⁵ C. 2307 McCulloh Street (Ward 13, Section 08, Block 3423, Lot 015) 2307 McCulloh Street was sold at a tax sale on May 13, 1996, to “FUNB as Custodian for FUNDCO” for $475.09, the amount of deficient real property taxes, interest, and costs for Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995. Subsequently, the property was sold at a tax sale on May 15, 2000; no third party bid on the property, and the City bought into and held the property for $570.23, the amount of deficient real property taxes, interest, and costs due for Fiscal Years 1997, 1998, and 1999. In 2002, Parker purchased the property at a tax sale for $1,155.73, the amount of real property taxes, interest, and costs owed for Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001, along with the amount secured by the void May 2000 tax certificate. D. 2309 McCulloh Street (Ward 13, Section 08, Block 3423, Lot 016) 2309 McCulloh Street was sold at a tax sale on May 15, 1995; no third party bid on the property, and the City bought into and held the property for $1,164.18, the amount of deficient real property taxes, interest, and costs for Fiscal Year 1994.

In 2000, at another tax sale, no third party bid on the property and the City bought into and held that property for $3,449.21, the real property taxes, interest, and costs owed for Fiscal Years 1998 and 1999 along with the amount secured by the void 1995 tax certificate. In 2002, Parker purchased the property at a tax sale for $5,069.44, the amount of real property taxes, interest, and costs owned for Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001, along with the amount secured by the void 2000 tax certificate. E. 2301 McCulloh Street (Ward 13, Section 08, Block 3423, Lot 012) 2301 McCulloh Street was sold at a tax sale on May 15, 1995; no third party bid on the property, and the City bought into and held the property for $4,114.70, the amount of deficient real property taxes, interest, and costs for Fiscal Years 1992, 1993, and 1994. In 2001, at another tax sale, no third ¹⁰⁶ party bid on the property, and the City bought into and held the property for $11,743.76, the amount of real property tax deficiencies, interest, and costs for Fiscal Years 1998, 1999, and 2000, along with the amount secured by the void May 1995 tax certificate.

F. 2311 McCulloh Street (Ward 13, Section 08, Block 3423, Lot 017) 2311 McCulloh Street was sold at a tax sale on May 15, 1995; no third party bid on the property, and the City bought into and held the property for $3,298.81, the amount of deficient real property taxes, interest, and costs for Fiscal Year 1994. In 2001, at another tax sale, no third party bid on the property, and the City bought into and held the property for $9,331.71, the amount of real property tax deficiencies, interest, and costs due for Fiscal Years 1998, 1999, and 2000, along with the amount secured by the void May 1995 tax certificate. Subsequent to the tax sales, both the City and Parker filed timely complaints in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to foreclose the right of redemption on the properties pursuant to Sections 14-833 and 14-835 of the Tax-Property Article, Maryland Code (1986, 2001 Repl.Vol.): 7 on May 2, 2003, the ¹⁰⁷ City filed complaints with respect to 2301 and 2311 McCulloh Street (Case No. 24-C-03-003229 and No. 24-C-03-003142); on July 3, 2003, Parker filed a complaint with respect to 2303, 2305, 2307, and 2309 McCulloh Street (Case No. 24-C-03-004785). Quillens filed answers to the complaints, alleging that the Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction because the tax certificates issued pursuant to the tax sales purported to sell the properties for taxes secured by previously issued void tax certificates.

On November 4, 2003, upon Quillens’ motion, the Circuit Court ordered that the Parker, City, Lee, and Nochumowitz cases be consolidated with the Rapid Funding case. On August 30, 2005, the Circuit Court issued an order that Parker’s tax certificates, and consequently the tax sales thereon, were valid. 8 The same day, the Circuit Court also issued ¹⁰⁸ orders setting the redemption amounts in the City cases: the properties located at 2301 and 2311 McCulloh Street could be redeemed for $22,184.85 and $18,025.69 respectively. 9 On ¹⁰⁹ September 21, 2005, Quillens noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals with respect to the August 30th orders. No further action was taken with respect to the Parker case, but on October 12, 2005, the Circuit Court entered a judgement foreclosing the right of redemption on the City properties from which Quillens noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Before the Court of Special Appeals, Quillens argued that the Circuit Court erred in finding that the tax sales were valid because the tax certificates issued thereon purported to sell the properties for taxes secured by previously issued void tax certificates. 10 Quillens also argued that the Circuit Court erred in foreclosing the right of redemption in the City cases after he had filed a notice of appeal.

Conversely, Parker and Baltimore City argued that the August 30, 2005 orders were not appealable, contending that they did not constitute final judgments because they did not ¹¹⁰ determine and conclude the actions to foreclose the rights of redemption. With respect to the amended notice of appeal filed September 21, 2005 in the City cases, the City argued that the original notice of appeal did not divest the Circuit Court of its jurisdiction to enter the order foreclosing the right of redemption in the City properties. Parker and the City also asserted that the tax sales were valid, and that the Circuit Court did not err in refusing to issue an injunction requiring them to present their claims as part of the mortgage foreclosure sale. The intermediate appellate court affirmed in a reported opinion.

Quillens v. Parker, 171 Md.App. 52 , 908 A.2d 674 (2006). With respect to the Parker case, the court concluded that Quillens’ appeal from the August 30, 2005 order establishing the validity of the tax certificates should be dismissed because it was not from a final judgment: There is no final judgment, because there is no judgment foreclosing the right of redemption. On August 25, 2005, the circuit court entered an order fixing the redemption amount for Lot 11A at $41,812.72, and set a per diem rate of interest. That order further provided “that if the said redemption amount is not paid within sixty (60) days of the date of this Order ... judgment shall be entered in favor of [the Lees] foreclosing the right of redemption in [Lot 11 A].” The action to foreclose the right of redemption has not been terminated, because the right to redeem continues until foreclosed.

Indeed, the order itself shows that it was not intended to be final. Id. at 59 , 908 A.2d at 678 . With respect to the City cases, the court found that the tax sales were valid and that Quillens was required to remit the unpaid property taxes in order to challenge the tax sales: The plain language of § 14-833(c) voids only the certificate issued to the holder, not the lien for the benefit of the public fisc in the amount of the indebtedness____ ¹¹¹ The first lien for real property taxes for the years of delinquency is not dependent on a valid tax sale certificate. The lien is created by statute.

TP § 14-804(a) provides that “[a]ll unpaid taxes on real property shall be, until paid, liens on the real property in respect to which they are imposed from the date they became or become payable.” (Emphasis added). TP § 14-805(a) provides: “From the date property tax on real property is due, liability for the tax and a 1st lien attaches to the real property in the amount of the property tax due on the real property.” The statutory definition of tax closes the circuit. “ ‘Tax’ means any tax, or charge of any kind due to the State or any of its political subdivisions ... that by law is a lien against the real property on which it is imposed or assessed.” For these reasons, the City held valid tax certificates on Lots 12 and 17 as to which the owner’s rights to redeem, for the amounts of all unpaid taxes and charges, as determined by the circuit court, properly have been foreclosed. Under the equitable maxim that “ ‘he who seeks equity must do equity,’ ” the rule of the Clarke line of cases is not available to appellants. Applying that maxim, the Court in Canaj [v. Baker and Division Phase III, 391 Md. 374 , 893 A.2d 1067 (2006) ] stated “that where it is admitted (or proven) that there are delinquent taxes due, in order to challenge the holding or ratification of the tax sale or to seek to vacate a judgment of the foreclosure of the equity of redemption, the taxpayer must first pay to the Collector or the certificate holder the total sum of the taxes, interest, penalties and expenses of the sale that are due.” In the instant matter, taxes remain unpaid on Lots 12 and 17.

Clearly, appellants’ position is that the unpaid taxes, as of the earlier tax sale, lost their first lien status and, thus, any priority, and became an unsecured debt when the certificate from the earlier sale expired. In addition to this admission of tax delinquency by the appellants, we have ¹¹² held in Part II, supra, that the taxes due at the earlier sale were properly brought forward and included in the redemption amount under the later tax sale certificate. Appellants have indicated no interest in redeeming. Appellants have not tendered payment of any of the unpaid taxes.

Under these circumstances, appellants have not “done equity” in their suggestion that the unpaid taxes be submitted as a claim, having no priority, in the mortgage foreclosure sale. Id. at 62-63, 67-68, 908 A.2d at 680, 682-83 (citations omitted).

II

Discussion In Scheve v. Shudder, Inc., 328 Md. 363 , 614 A.2d 582 (1992), we provided an overview of the tax sale process and the foreclosure of a right of redemption pursuant to the tax sale statute: 11 Title 14 of the Tax-Property article provides county governments a means of collecting property taxes that are in arrears. In Simms v. Scheve, 298 Md. 1 , 467 A.2d 499 (1983), we noted that, under the tax sale statute, “for a tax sale to be effective substantial compliance with the statute is required; [i]n this regard, the prescription of the statute is clear and simple.” We then described the basic steps of the tax sale process. We said that under the tax sale statute “[u]npaid taxes on real estate constitute a lien on that property. Generally, within two years from the date taxes become in arrears the jurisdiction’s collector must sell the land.

Notice of the proposed sale must be given to the owner at least thirty days before the property is advertised for sale and the owner is notified that if he does not pay the taxes within thirty days, the property will be sold. After the sale is properly advertised, the property is sold at public auction. ¹¹³ The purchaser of the property is given a certificate of sale which includes a description of the property, the amount for which the property was sold, and information as to the time in which an action to foreclose the owner’s right of redemption must be brought. The owner may redeem the property at any time until the right of redemption has been finally foreclosed by paying the required sum to the collector, who transfers the money to the purchaser in exchange for the tax sale certificate. [The statute] define[s] the purchaser’s ability to foreclose the right of redemption. These provisions are to be ‘liberally construed as remedial legislation to encourage the foreclosure of rights of redemption by suits in the [circuit] courts and for decreeing of marketable titles to property sold by the collector.’ The holder of the certificate of sale may file [a complaint] to foreclose the owner’s right of redemption after [six months] from the date of the sale....

The [complaint] must be filed within two years or the certificate is void. The owner may redeem the property at any time until the right of redemption has been finally foreclosed. The purchaser initiates the foreclosure proceeding in the [circuit] court by filing a [complaint] and attaching the certificate of sale issued by the collector.....” Id. at 369-70, 614 A.2d at 585-86 , quoting Simms, 298 Md. at 3-4 , 467 A.2d at 500 (citations omitted). If there are no third party purchasers to bid on the property at a tax sale, the governing body of the taxing authority “shall buy in and hold” the property, acquiring a tax certificate and the “same rights and remedies as other purchasers, including the right to foreclose the right of redemption.” Maryland Code (1986, 2001 RepLVol.), Section 14-824(a), (c), (d) of the Tax-Property Article.

Once a complaint to foreclose the right of redemption is filed, the property owner can “challenge ... the tax sale itself [or] ... the amount required to redeem.” Dawson v. Prince George’s County, 324 Md. 481, 488 , 597 A.2d 952, 955 (1991). Here, Quillens is challenging the validity of the tax sales to Parker and Baltimore City, asserting that the tax ¹¹⁴ certificates issued thereupon were invalid and consequently that the Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction. Quillens argues that the Court of Special Appeals erred in determining that the notice of appeal from the Circuit Court’s August 2005 orders was premature, contending that a decision validating the tax certificates or setting the redemption amount is immediately appealable. Quillens also argues that after his amended notice of appeal was filed on September 12, 2005, the Circuit Court was divested of its jurisdiction and could not enter its order foreclosing the right of redemption on the City properties.

Quillens also argues that the Court of Special Appeals erred in finding that he was required to tender payment for the deficient real property taxes in order to challenge the tax sales, alleging that the court misapplied Canaj, Inc. v. Baker, 391 Md. 374 , 893 A.2d 1067 (2006), which he contends only applies to parties seeking affirmative post-foreclosure relief in a court of general equity; rather, Quillens asserts that he is challenging the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. Quillens’ final contention is that the Court of Special Appeals erred in finding that the tax sales were valid because the tax certificates issued thereon included taxes secured by previously issued void tax certificates. Quillens suggests that if the City is required to buy into and hold property at a tax sale, and the City fails to transfer the tax certificate or foreclose the right of redemption while the certificate is valid, the unpaid taxes secured by the certificate are satisfied and cannot be collected in a subsequent tax sale. Conversely, Parker argues that the Court of Special Appeals correctly dismissed Quillens’ appeal in her case; she asserts that the court was correct because the appeal was not taken from a final judgment, which in the case of a tax lien foreclosure case, is the order foreclosing the right of redemption.

Likewise, the City contends that Quillens’ first notice of appeal was not timely because it did not result from a final judgment, and as such, it did not remove jurisdiction from the Circuit Court to enter the order foreclosing the right of redemption in the City properties. Parker and the City also argue that Quillens’ failure to pay the delinquent taxes prohib ¹¹⁵ its his right to challenge the tax sales under Canaj , and that the tax sales were valid because the unpaid taxes remained •liens on the properties after the prior tax certificates became void. Finality and Right to Appeal Quillens noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals in both the Parker and City cases on September 21, 2005. Subsequently, the Circuit Court issued an order foreclosing the right of redemption in the City properties on October 12, 2005, from which Quillens filed an amended notice of appeal.

Quillens asserts that the original notice of appeal filed was timely and that the Court of Special Appeals erred in dismissing his appeal in the Parker case. Further, with respect to the City cases, Quillens argues that the original notice of appeal divested the Circuit Court of jurisdiction to enter an order foreclosing the right of redemption for the City properties. It is well settled that the right of appeal is statutory. Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard County, 371 Md. 243, 247 , 808 A.2d 795, 797 (2002); Prince George’s County v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 358 Md. 166, 173 , 747 A.2d 647, 651 (2000); Gisriel v. Ocean City Elections Bd., 345 Md. 477, 489 , 693 A.2d 757, 763 (1997).

Section 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1974, 2001 Repl.Vol.), provides that “a party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court. The right of appeal exists from a final judgment entered by a court in the exercise of original, special, limited, statutory jurisdiction, unless in a particular case the right of appeal is expressly denied by law.” Thus, an appeal generally must be taken from a final judgment; the decision must be “so final as to determine and conclude rights involved, or deny the appellant means of further prosecuting or defending his rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding.” Cant v. Bartlett, 292 Md. 611, 614 , 440 A.2d 388, 389 (1982); Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Los Angeles Rams Football Co., 284 Md. 86, 91 , 394 A.2d 801, 804 (1978). ¹¹⁶ The final appealable order in a tax sale proceeding is the decree foreclosing the right of redemption. According to Section 14-844 of the Tax-Property Article, Maryland Code (1986, 2001 Repl.Vol.), entitled “Final Order,” “[a]fter the time limit set in the order of publication and in the summons expires, the court shall enter judgment foreclosing the right of redemption. An interlocutory order is not necessary.

The judgment is final and conclusive on the defendants.” (emphasis added). We explicated that the final order in a tax sale proceeding is the order foreclosing the right of redemption in Scheve v. Shudder, Inc., 328 Md. 363 , 614 A.2d 582 (1992), in which we referred to Section 14-844: In addition, our prior interpretation of the tax sale statute also indicates that no additional steps are required to enter a final judgment under § 14-844 beyond those set out in the text of the tax sale statute. The literal terms that the legislature used in § 14-844 do not encompass the Seheves’ suggested “second step.” A complaint under Title 14 must include the certificate of tax sale, an affidavit of a title search, and requests to serve process and for the court to issue an order of publication. After the purchaser files the complaint and meets all the tax sale statute’s requirements, § 14-844 provides that when the prerequisite time period expires, a time period set into motion only through filing the complaint, a judgment will be entered.

There is no mention of an additional prerequisite step of reaffirming the tax sale purchaser’s desire to proceed. Permitting a circuit court to enter a final order under § 14-844 after the time period set forth in the purchaser’s notice to the owner is true to both the statutory language and the policy of encouraging the foreclosure of redemptive rights at tax sales. Id. at 373-74, 614 A.2d at 587-88 (citations omitted). Quillens, nevertheless, argues that the August 30, 2005 orders establishing the validity of the tax certificates in the ¹¹⁷ Parker case and setting the redemption amounts for the City properties were appealable, citing Scheve v. McPherson, 44 Md.App. 398 , 408 A.2d 1071 (1979), and Kasdon v. Westbury, Inc., 259 Md. 222 , 269 A.2d 625 (1970), for the proposition that appeals are permitted in tax sale proceedings before there is a final judgment foreclosing the right of redemption.

In Scheve, purchasers at a tax sale filed a complaint to foreclose the right of redemption in twelve parcels of land. Two days before the deadline to redeem the property, the owners of one of the properties contacted the purchasers’ attorney and informed him that they intended to redeem one of the properties. The owners, however, failed to act to redeem the property, and the circuit court entered a final decree foreclosing the right of redemption in the property. Subsequently, the owners’ petition to set aside the foreclosure was granted, from which the purchasers appealed.

The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the purchasers could appeal the order reopening the judgment, noting that the order finally and conclusively determined the rights of the parties: The purpose and effect of striking the December decree, therefore, was to reinstate appellees’ right to redeem the property, a right that had been terminated by the stricken decree. The March order clearly represented a determination by the court that appellees were entitled to redeem the property, that that right should not be foreclosed, and that, if appellees followed the statutory procedure for redemption, they would be entitled to own and possess the property to the exclusion of appellants. The mere striking of the December decree, reviving a right of redemption that could then be exercised merely by paying the amounts fixed by the court, was the one and final act that adjudicated the rights of the parties and, save for appellate review, terminated the justiciable controversy among them. It therefore constituted a final and appeal-able order. ¹¹⁸ Scheve, 44 Md.App. at 403-04, 408 A.2d at 1075 .

Scheve is distinguishable from the case sub judice because in Scheve, the appeal was filed by certificate holders whose opportunity for appellate review of the striking of their judgment of foreclosure could have languished in a legal limbo were that order held to be interlocutory. In the instant case, Quillens appealed from the Circuit Court’s rejection of his jurisdictional defense, thus permitting the action to foreclose the right of redemption to proceed, which would constitute the final and appealable order in the Parker or City cases. In Kasdon , a tax sale purchaser of twelve parcels of land belonging to Westbury, Inc. filed twelve petitions to foreclose the rights of redemption on the properties, and the property owner filed a petition to redeem and fix the amount necessary for redemption. Subsequently, the purchaser filed an answer to the petition to fix costs necessary for redemption and requested a hearing, claiming that the redemption amount was approximately $400 per property.

Without notice to any party, the judge entered an order fixing the redemption amount at approximately $300 per property; the purchaser appealed the denial of his request for a hearing to set the redemption amount. Without specifically addressing any jurisdictional issue, we considered the merits of the appeal, noting that the trial judge erred in setting the redemption amount without conducting a hearing: There can be no doubt that Kasdon is entitled to be reimbursed for necessary title searches “for each property,” except that upon “proof that the search was unusually difficult ... (the court) may allow an amount not exceeding $25 for each search.” He is entitled, also, among other things, to be reimbursed for the “actual attorneys’s fee, not to exceed the sum of $100.” It hardly needs saying that the trial judge ought to hear what the certificate holder has to offer in this regard before fixing the amount. “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality ¹¹⁹ is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections____ The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information, ... and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance.” We made the further observation “that denying ... [the appellant] an opportunity to be heard was contrary to the provisions of Rule (7)(e)(l) of the Local Rules of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.” Kasdon, 259 Md. at 226-27 , 269 A.2d at 627-28 (citations omitted), quoting Madaio v. Madaio, 256 Md. 80, 83-84 , 259 A.2d 524, 527 (1969), quoting in turn Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 , 70 S.Ct. 652, 657 , 94 L.Ed. 865 , 873 (1950). Kasdon , however, also is distinguishable because in that case, the appeal was permitted after the trial court set the redemption amount and the property owner indicated his intention to redeem, so that there was no further action for the trial court to take; ergo, finality.

Furthermore, the Circuit Court’s August 30, 2005 order in the Parker case contained an express provision stating that Parker could proceed with the case and obtain a final judgment foreclosing the right of redemption after submission of an affidavit of compliance with the statute. The orders filed in the City cases also stated that the City was permitted to proceed with foreclosure if the properties were not redeemed within thirty days of the orders. In this regard, we have held that when a trial court order does not intend to finally dispose of the case with an order, the order does not constitute an appealable final judgment. See Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 311 Md. 278 , 533 A.2d 1303 (1987), in which we considered whether an order granting summary judgment in favor of the employer in a wrongful discharge action, but with an express provision allowing the employee thirty days in which to file an amended complaint, was appealable, and we iterated that the appeal from the order granting summary judgment was pre ¹²⁰ mature because the order also contained a provision permitting the employee to file an amended complaint: If the circuit court’s order of January 14, 1987, had not contained the provision for leave to file an amended complaint within thirty days, the January 14th order would have been final and appealable.

Nevertheless, the express provision for amendment shows that the January 14th order granting summary judgment was not intended to finally dispose of the case; thus the order was not final and appealable. Id. at 281 , 533 A.2d at 1305 (emphasis added). Thus, we hold that the Circuit Court’s August 30, 2005 orders establishing the validity of the tax sale certificates in the Parker case and setting the redemption amount in the City cases were not appealable final