Raimondi v. State

Singley, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Raimondi, convicted at a jury trial in the Criminal Court of Baltimore of attempting to bribe a member of the General Assembly in contravention of Code (1957, 1967 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 23, appealed to the Court of ²³⁰ Special Appeals, which affirmed the judgment, Raimondi v. State, 12 Md. App. 322 , 278 A. 2d 664 (1971). We granted certiorari in order that we might consider whether the trial court erred when it permitted transcripts of electronic recordings to be taken into the jury room.

The transcripts were of four recorded conversations between Raimondi and State Senator John J. Bishop, Jr., of Baltimore County. One conversation took place in Senator Bishop’s car and one in Raimondi’s office. The other two were telephone conversations. Although the recordings were intelligible, when played back on the same device which had recorded them they were at times nearly inaudible.

For this reason the State had typewritten transcripts made of each recording. When the tapes were played back in the courtroom, each juror was given a copy of the transcripts in order to follow the recording more closely. At the end of the State’s case, the transcripts were admitted in evidence and parts of them were read to the jury and referred to during argument, in each instance over Raimondi’s objection. At the conclusion of the case, the jury was permitted to take the transcripts to the jury room, again over Raimondi’s objection.

It is not contended that the transcripts are inaccurate, or that the conversations which were recorded did not take place. Raimondi argues that the trial court erred in permitting the transcripts to go to the jury room because the action was not sanctioned by Maryland Rule 558 and because the jury’s possession of the transcripts unduly emphasized their content, with consequent prejudice to the defendant. Rule 757 makes Rule 558 applicable to criminal cases. Rule 558 provides, in part: “a.

In Court’s Discretion. Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them into the jury room such of the pleadings, granted prayers or written instruc ²³¹ tions, and exhibits which have been received in evidence, as the court may deem necessary for a proper consideration of the case. (Emphasis supplied) “b. As of Right — Notes.

The jury may also take with them notes of the testimony or other proceedings taken by themselves but none taken by any other person. * * Sic “d. Exception. A deposition may not be taken into the jury room, except by agreement of all parties and with consent of the court.” Raimondi argues that the transcripts were either notes taken by another person, excluded by Rule 558 b or should be likened to a deposition, which could not be taken to the jury room under Rule 558 d without his consent. What these arguments overlook is that the transcripts were neither the. notes of another nor depositions, but exhibits, which Rule 558 a permits to be taken to the jury room, in the discretion of the trial judge.

Raimondi finds comfort in the broad-brush language found in two early cases, Ingalls v. Crouch, 35 Md. 296, 298 (1872) and Moore v. McDonald, 68 Md. 321, 333 , 12 A. 117 (1888). The first held that permitting the jury to take into the jury room the plaintiffs’ affidavit filed in support of their declaration was reversible error. In Moore v. McDonald, a caveat case, our predecessors noted that the original will under attack could be taken into the jury room only with the consent of the parties, and not as a matter of right. Raimondi’s argument that Rule 558 did little more than enunciate our prior case law is