Randall v. State

LEAHY, J. In 2009, Alma Matthews Lynch—a Montgomery County, Maryland resident—passed away, leaving a will devising, among other things, real property located in Arizona to the beneficiaries of her residuary estate. As designated under the will, the Register of Wills for Montgomery County appointed Ms. Lynch’s niece, Appellant Crystal Hayslett Randall, and Ms. Lynch’s partner, Clifton Terry, as co-personal representatives of the estate. These appointments proved ill-fated. Appellant, an Arizona resident, sold the Arizona property, failed to account for the sale within the Maryland Estate, and took the lion’s share of the proceeds for herself.

A Montgomery County grand jury indicted Appellant for embezzlement and theft on July 21, 2011. The following day, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County issued a bench warrant. The Sheriffs Office entered the warrant into a national database, but efforts to confirm Appellant’s address in Arizona delayed her arrest until December 7, 2012. After several failed attempts to fight her extradition to Maryland, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss alleging denial of her right to a speedy trial.

The circuit court denied that motion after holding a hearing. Additionally, before trial and then during her motion for acquittal, Appellant challenged the State of Maryland’s jurisdiction to prosecute the charges filed against her, contending that jurisdiction existed in Arizona ⁵²⁹ where the alleged crime occurred. The circuit court denied the motion for acquittal, concluding that Appellant had a duty to account for the proceeds to the Maryland estate and that the effect of the crime was felt in Maryland. At the close of her trial on August 14, 2013, the jury convicted Appellant of both charges, and Appellant was sentenced to a total of ten years with all but 18 months suspended.

In her timely appeal, Appellant presents three questions for our review: I. “Did the Circuit Court err in denying Ms. Randall’s motion to dismiss for failure to provide a speedy trial?” II. “Do the courts of the State of Maryland have territorial jurisdiction to prosecute alleged theft and embezzlement offenses when all of the acts comprising the elements [of] those offenses occurred, if at all, in Arizona?” III. “Did the Circuit Court err in permitting Linda Hawkins, the Deputy Register of Wills, to testify to the practices and procedures of the Montgomery County Register] of Wills, when those practices and procedures are based on the Regist[er]’s interpretation of legal rules and requirements?” We conclude that the circuit court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds because the State of Maryland engaged in a reasonably diligent attempt to locate Appellant in Arizona and bring her to trial. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 , 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). Appellant—cloaked in authority issued by the State of Maryland as personal representative of the estate—had a duty to report the proceeds from the sale of the Arizona property in Maryland, and therefore, we hold that the State of Maryland possessed territorial jurisdiction to prosecute the crimes against Appellant under the “duty to account” theory espoused in Wright v. State, 339 Md. 399 , 663 A.2d 590 (1995). Finally, we hold that even if the court erred in admitting the testimony of Ms. Hawkins as improper expert testimony by a lay witness, that error was harmless because ⁵³⁰ her testimony, although relevant to the issue of jurisdiction and the general administration of an estate, was not relevant to proving the charges Appellant was facing and was not otherwise prejudicial.

We affirm the judgments of the circuit court. BACKGROUND Appellant stood trial before a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on August 12-14, 2013, charged with embezzlement (fraudulent misappropriation by a fiduciary) and theft of property with a value of at least $10,000.00 but less than $100,000.00. The testimony and evidence presented at trial reflected the following. A. Ms. Lynch’s Last Will and Testament Alma Matthews Lynch, a resident of Montgomery County, Maryland, executed her last will and testament on July 10, 2009.

She designated Clifton Terry, her lifetime partner, and Appellant, her niece and a realtor by profession, as the co-personal representatives of her estate. After bequeathing certain property to various individuals, Ms. Lynch directed that her residuary estate be devised accordingly: All of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate and property of every nature, whether real, personal or mixed, wheresoever situate, of which I may die seized or possessed or to which I may in anywise be entitled at the time of my death, after allowance or payment therefrom of all estate, succession, legacy or inheritance taxes and charges of every description, I give, devise and bequeath as follows: A. THIRTY-FIVE PERCENT (35%) to the then surviving descendants of my sister, NADEAN M. HAYSLETT, who survive me for thirty (30) days, per stirpes. B. FIFTEEN PERCENT (15%) to my friend, CLIFTON W. TERRY, if he survives me for thirty (30) days. ⁵³¹ C. The then remainder to my sister, NADEAN M. HAYSLETT, if she survive me for thirty (30) days. In the event that she does not so survive me, distribution shall be made in accordance with paragraph A of this Item.

The residuary estate included real property that Ms. Lynch owned in Arizona, located at 1342 West Coral Reef Drive in the town of Gilbert, Maricopa County (hereinafter “Arizona property”). Her family members were familiar with this residence, as they would gather at this home for Christmas. Several months after executing her will, Ms. Lynch passed away on September 14, 2009. On September 23, 2009, the Register of Wills for Montgomery County, Maryland, issued an administrative probate order admitting Ms. Lynch’s will dated July 10, 2009, into probate and appointing Appellant and Mr. Terry as personal representatives of the estate.

That same day, a “List of Interested Persons” under Ms. Lynch’s estate, totaling 20 individuals, was filed with the Maryland Register of Wills. Appellant and Mr. Terry thereafter filed the “First Account” 1 of the estate for the period of September 14, 2009, through July 30, 2010, which reflected the value of the total estate at $763,761.99. This account did not include the value of the Arizona property, 2 although it identified ⁵³² expenses relating to the Arizona property that would be covered by the estate. On September 1, 2010, notice that the First Account was filed was sent to all Interested Persons pursuant to E.T. § 7-501.

B. Concealing the Sale For over a decade, Appellant had been a resident of Gilbert, Arizona, where the Arizona property was located and also where her parents resided. Accordingly, Mr. Terry and Appellant agreed it only made sense for Appellant, a realtor by profession, to handle the sale of the Arizona property. Appellant retained an Arizona attorney on behalf of the estate, who, on November 3, 2009, filed a certified copy of a letter of administration issued by the State of Maryland in the Superi- or Court of Arizona in and for the County of Maricopa. 3 The letter was filed pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated § 14—4204, 4 to declare Appellant and Mr. Terry’s proof of authority to administer the estate’s Arizona property. Although both Mr. Terry and Appellant signed the listing agreement for the home at the outset, only Appellant served as the listing agent for the Arizona property.

It took some time for the property to sell after it was put on the market, but on December 21, 2010, Appellant was able to sell the property for $220,000.00. After closing costs and satisfaction of a mortgage held by Wells Fargo on the property, the ⁵³³ remaining proceeds totaled $90,960.30. As listing agent, Appellant received a $7,325 commission. 5 As requested by the title company at settlement, on December 21st Appellant also filed an “estate tax affidavit.” The affidavit, dated December 17 and sworn before a notary on December 20, was filed with the Official Records of Maricopa County Recorder in Arizona. Appellant avowed that “all debts owed by the Decedent at the time of death, all claims against the estate, all estate expenses, including costs of administration ... have been paid in full.” She further attested that “the estate of the Decedent was valued at $12,000 so the estate was less than the exemption provided under federal estate tax law and the Arizona statutes relating to estate taxes, and, therefore, no taxes were due.” Bank records reflect that on the day of settlement, all proceeds from the sale—$90,960.30—were wire-transferred to M & I Bank in Arizona and deposited into a checking account that Appellant had previously opened in the “name of Alma M. Lynch Estate, Crystal L. Hayslett, personal representative[.]” Mr. Terry testified at trial that he was unaware Appellant had opened this account.

Appellant was the only person authorized to conduct transactions relating to this account, and she immediately made two withdrawals: one in the amount of $74,734.88 and another for $1,000.00. With the larger withdrawal, Appellant purchased certified checks and then issued two certified checks to herself in amounts of $64,000.00 and $1,000, 6 and three certified checks to three beneficiaries under the will in the amounts of $4,855.00, $1,817.44, and $1,757.44. She also withdrew $1,280.00 in cash. After bank fees were ⁵³⁴ withdrawn, at the end of the day on December 21st, only $15,255.67 remained in the account.

The next day, on December 22, 2010, Appellant made two additional transactions on the account: she transferred $1,502.44 to a minor beneficiary’s trust account and $1,302.44 to an account owned by Appellant, leaving a balance of $12,450.79. On December 24, Appellant issued one check to the wife of one of the beneficiaries in the amount of $2,430.83, leaving a balance of $10,019.96 after bank fees. Finally, on December 30, just nine days after the settlement date, Appellant made one final withdrawal in the amount of $10,019.96 to herself, leaving the balance of the account at $0. 7 On December 24, 2010, Appellant wrote a letter to the beneficiaries under the Lynch will, including Mr. Terry, notifying them that she was resigning from her role as personal representative. She formally submitted her resignation to the Arizona court on January 14, 2011.

C. Looking for Answers Mr. Terry testified at trial that he had no knowledge that Appellant had sold the property until he reviewed the Wells Fargo mortgage balance and was advised by the bank that the property had been sold and the mortgage satisfied. Mr. Terry mailed Appellant a letter, dated December 30, 2010, advising that he had been informed that the loan had been paid off and “request[ed] that [she] apprise [him] of the full details of the sale and/or payoff transaction conducted with the bank at the earliest opportunity.” He also testified that he tried to contact Appellant via phone and e-mail seeking answers, but was unsuccessful. Finally he received an e-mail from Appellant on January 15, 2011, although the e-mail did not make any mention of the sale of the home. Instead, the e ⁵³⁵ mail included attachments for invoices related to the carrying costs of the home, totaling approximately $650.00.

In the email, Appellant informed Mr. Terry, “This is all I have written out of all estate accounts that you do not have documentation on.” Mr. Terry testified that, as one of the beneficiaries under the will, he did not receive any fraction of the proceeds from the sale, and the distributions that were, in fact, made to a few of the 20 beneficiaries were not executed pursuant to the dictates of the will. 8 Appellant’s sister, Annette Hayslett, who was also a beneficiary, testified that she neither received notification that the Arizona home was sold nor any distributions from the sale proceeds. Linda Hawkins, Chief Deputy of the Montgomery County Register of Wills, was called to testify at trial on behalf of the State. She explained that she had reviewed the probate file, and that the Maryland estate had allotted $33,243.35 in expenses to the Arizona property during the probate process. She did not see any report of sale regarding the Arizona property before December 2012 (the time of Appellant’s eventual arrest).

D. The State’s Investigation In February, 2011, Mr. Terry contacted the State’s Attorney’s Office for Montgomery County to report his concerns about Appellant’s sale of the Arizona property. David Newcomer, Chief Investigator for the State’s Attorney’s Office for Montgomery County, conducted the ensuing investigation. He testified at trial that he contacted the Maricopa County Superior Court in Arizona for a complete copy of all documents filed by Appellant with the court. The copy of the file ⁵³⁶ that he received was admitted into evidence and included the following documents: a Proof of Authority, State of Maryland Letters of Administration, and a notification of Appellant’s resignation as personal representative. 9 Mr. Newcomer’s investigation uncovered Appellant’s activities after the M & I account was emptied and closed.

A search of the Maricopa County land records revealed that about a week after Appellant drained the checking account, on January 7, 2011, the trustee on a deed of trust on the property located at 1985 Bahama Drive, Gilbert, Arizona, filed a “notice of trustee’s sale”, notifying Appellant that the bank would be foreclosing on the property for default on a loan. Appellant had owned the property since 2002, and she listed 1985 Bahama Drive as her address on the documents filed along with the Proof of Authority in the Maricopa County Court. Appellant’s property was ultimately sold on April 8, 2011. Meanwhile, by a warranty deed created on January 5, 2011 and recorded on January 20, 2011, Appellant and her husband purchased another property located at 2613 East Jessica Lane, Phoenix, Arizona for the sale price of $60,000.00.

The transaction was a full-cash purchase without financing. It was not until about two years following the sale of the Arizona property, on December 13, 2012, that Mr. Terry, acting as the sole personal representative, filed in the Orphan’s Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, the Revised Second and Final Account of Ms. Lynch’s estate for the period of July 30, 2010 through May 31, 2011. The public docket history of Ms. Lynch’s estate available with the Register of Wills, although not introduced at trial, reflects that in the intervening two years, various actions were conducted regarding the estate, including various claims by creditors, exceptions filed to the first final account, and disputes regarding attorney’s fees. The final account documented the distribu ⁵³⁷ tions made to the beneficiaries of Ms. Lynch’s estate after expenses and taxes were paid.

Because the proceeds from the sale were never remitted to the Maryland estate, the final account did not reflect the sale of the Arizona property or the proceeds therefrom. E. Appellant’s Case at Trial The State concluded its case after presenting testimony from Mr. Terry, the co-personal representative, Mr. Newcomer, the State’s investigator, Annette Hayslett, Appellant’s sister, and Ms. Hawkins, the Deputy Register of Wills. Appellant moved for judgment of acquittal. She claimed a lack of evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the State of Maryland possessed jurisdiction to prosecute Appellant or (2) Appellant possessed the requisite intent to commit the crimes alleged.

Appellant’s defense at trial was that she retained the funds by innocent misunderstanding, believing she was entitled to the funds from her work as personal representative and in closing Ms. Lynch’s company, Source Staffing. The court denied the motion, but reserved its ruling on jurisdiction until the close of all evidence. Appellant called two witnesses on her behalf. First, Dena Feeney, the attorney who assisted in the Maryland estate administration, 10 testified that she advised Appellant to consult with an Arizona attorney for handling the Arizona property, but did not have personal knowledge regarding what was done in Arizona thereafter.

She advised both Mr. Terry and Appellant that it would be “possible” but not easy to close the Maryland estate before the Arizona property was sold. Con-well Akers, the director of operations at Source Staffing, Ms. Lynch’s company, also testified very briefly that Ms. Lynch introduced both Mr. Terry and Appellant to the staff members before her death with the intention that they would run and sell the company after she passed. ⁵³⁸ At the close of all evidence, Appellant renewed her motion for acquittal. The court denied the motion, and as to the jurisdictional issue, relied on Wright v. State, 339 Md. 399 , 663 A.2d 590 (1995), discussed infra, because “the Wright principle kicks in where the duty to account would authorize jurisdiction within the State of Maryland.” (Italics added). On August 14, 2013, the jury convicted Appellant of theft of property having a value of at least $10,000 but less than $100,000 and embezzlement (misappropriation by a fiduciary).

On October 17, 2013, the circuit court imposed a 10-year sentence for theft and a concurrent five-year sentence for embezzlement, with all but 18 months suspended, and credit for time served. The court also ordered that upon Appellant’s release from incarceration, Appellant will be placed on supervised probation for five years with conditions, including restitution. Appellant noted a timely appeal on October 21, 2013 within 30 days of sentencing. We include additional facts in the discussion relevant to the issues there examined.

DISCUSSION I. Speedy Trial Appellant contends that the circuit court erred in denying her motion to dismiss for violation of her constitutional right to a speedy trial. When reviewing a circuit court’s judgment on a motion to dismiss claiming deprivation of the right to a speedy trial, “we make our own independent constitutional analysis.” Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211, 220 , 792 A.2d 1160 (2002) (citing State v. Bailey, 319 Md. 392, 415 , 572 A.2d 544 , cert. denied, 498 U.S. 841 , 111 S.Ct. 118 , 112 L.Ed.2d 87 (1990)). “We perform a de novo constitutional appraisal in light of the particular facts of the case at hand; in so doing, we accept a lower court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.” Id. at 221 , 792 A.2d 1160 (citations omitted). ⁵³⁹ Appellant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to provide a speedy trial on May 10, 2013. The State filed an opposition on May 29, 2013, and Appellant filed a reply on June 4, 2013, attaching, among other items, an affidavit in which she attested to her correct address and the prejudice caused by the delay of her trial. On June 6, 2013, the circuit court held a hearing on Appellant’s motion to dismiss, and the testimony and evidence presented reflected the following.

David Newcomer testified that during the investigation he conducted in 2011, he attempted to notify Appellant of the complaint and ensuing investigation by mailing “a letter, we call a target letter[,]” via certified mail to four possible Arizona addresses for Appellant. 11 All of these letters were returned as undeliverable or unclaimed. Thereafter, on July 21, 2011, a Montgomery County grand jury indicted Appellant, and on the following day the circuit court issued a bench warrant for Appellant’s arrest. Roughly a week after the indictment was returned, Mr. Newcomer went to the Montgomery County Sheriffs Office Warrant and Fugitive Section and shared all the information gathered during his investigation. On August 1, 2011, the Montgomery County Sheriffs Office—which oversees more than 2,000 active warrants—entered the warrant into the National Criminal Information Center (“NCIC”), 12 a 24-hour system accessible to law en ⁵⁴⁰ forcement officers across the country.

The warrant was also entered into MILES, a state system, on August 1, 2011, and into E-Justice, a local system, on January 26, 2011. The Montgomery County Sheriffs Office does not have the authority to arrest an individual outside of Maryland. On August 2, 2011, the Office faxed a copy of the warrant and all of Appellant’s identifying information to the Maricopa County Sheriffs Office in Arizona listing the address of 2613 E. Jessica Lane, Phoenix, AZ 85040. Mr. Newcomer testified that after several months the warrant had not been served, so he checked NCIC and re-conducted background checks.

Unfortunately, this did not reveal any new information. Then, about three to four times over a period of eight or nine months, Mr. Newcomer conducted additional background checks and contacted the Arizona Motor Vehicle Administration to see if there was any new address for Appellant. In late October 2012, while conducting another check, Mr. Newcomer received information that Appellant updated her cell phone plan using an address at 729 North Octocello Lane in Gilbert, Arizona. He forwarded this information to the fugitive unit in the Montgomery County Sheriffs Office.

This address was listed as Appellant’s parents’ house on the Sheriffs Office’s work-up sheet. On December 6, 2012, Sergeant Strawderman with the Montgomery County Sheriffs Office called the Phoenix City Police Department to follow up on the warrant. A Phoenix police officer said they would attempt service on Appellant’s Jessica Lane address. Sergeant Strawderman also spoke with an officer from the Gilbert County Police Department, who advised that their Department would attempt service on the ⁵⁴¹ Octocello Lane address in Gilbert.

That same day, Sergeant Strawderman faxed another copy of Appellant’s warrant to the Phoenix Police Department. On December 7, 2012, the Police Department in Arizona executed the warrant and arrested Appellant at the 2631 East Jessica Lane address. Appellant was released on bond from the warrant for about three months before attending an extradition hearing in Arizona. Further details surrounding this hearing are not in the record before this Court. 13 The State also proffered to the court at her first appearance, and the record likewise reflects, that she filed a habeas proceeding in Arizona as well.

Though again, the record does not contain any more details about this proceeding. On February 4, 2013, the Governor of Arizona issued an extradition warrant commanding the local Arizona County Sheriffs Office to deliver Appellant to the Montgomery County Sheriffs Office. On March 7, 2013, deputies from the Montgomery County Sheriffs Office traveled to Arizona to apprehend and arrest Appellant. After Appellant was extradited to Maryland the following day, 14 she made an initial appearance in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County on March 8, 2013 at which time the court set Appellant’s bond at $10,000 cash surety.

She posted the bond and was released from commitment on March 13, 2013. Appellant’s trial began on August 12, 2013. 15 ⁵⁴² The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantee an accused’s right to a speedy trial. 16 Divver v. State, 356 Md. 379, 387-88 , 739 A.2d 71 (1999). The Court of Appeals applies the constitutional analysis articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529-30 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), when reviewing a speedy-trial challenge under the Sixth Amendment and Article 21. Glover, 368 Md. at 222-21 , 792 A.2d 1160 (citing Divver, 356 Md. at 388 , 739 A.2d 71 ).

In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529-30 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the Supreme Court recognized that the right to a speedy trial is different from any other right enshrined in the Constitution because it protects not just the individual who is accused, but also the community at large. Id. at 519-20 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 . Justice Powell, writing for the Court, observed that the inability of courts to provide prompt trials can have significant impacts on society. For example, delays between arrest and trial increase pretrial detention costs, give persons released on bond opportunities to commit other crimes or escape justice, and can have detrimental effects on rehabilitation.

Id. at 520 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 . Moreover, ⁵⁴³ deprivation of the right may actually work to the accused’s advantage: Delay is not an uncommon defense tactic. As the time between the commission of the crime and trial lengthens, witnesses may become unavailable or their memories may fade. If the witnesses support the prosecution, its case will be weakened, sometimes seriously so.

And it is the prosecution which carries the burden of proof. Thus, unlike the right to counsel or the right to be free from compelled self-incrimination, deprivation of the right to speedy trial does not per se prejudice the accused’s ability to defend himself. Id. at 521 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 . The Supreme Court rejected inflexible approaches to determining when the right is violated, and instructed that “any inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case.” Id. at 522 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 (citing Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 , 25 S.Ct. 573 , 49 L.Ed. 950 (1905)).

The Court adopted a balancing approach wherein “the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed.” Id. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182 . The factors that should be balanced in making a speedy trial determination include the “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” Id. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 . None of these factors are sufficient alone to establish deprivation of the right to a speedy trial; instead, they “must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” Id. at 533 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 . Courts must “engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process” while maintaining “full recognition that the accused’s interest in a speedy trial is specifically affirmed in the Constitution.” Id.

We turn to our consideration of the Barker factors. 1. Length of Delay The “length of delay” factor is “a term of art that serves two separate and distinct functions in a speedy trial analysis.” Ratchford v. State, 141 Md.App. 354, 358 , 785 A.2d ⁵⁴⁴ 826 (2001). First, “it identifies the threshold that must be crossed before further analysis is called for[,]” marking “the minimal point” of constitutional dimension. Id.

A lengthy post-indictment, pretrial delay is presumptively prejudicial and requires scrutiny under the Barker constitutional analysis. Doggett, supra, 505 U.S. at 651-52 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 . Once the delay triggers the four-factored analysis, we view the length of delay on its merits as a distinct inquiry, which is heavily impacted by the other factors. Ratchford, 141 Md.App. at 359-60 , 785 A.2d 826 .

But, unless the delay crosses the line from ordinary delay to presumptively prejudicial delay, “there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 . “[T]he length of delay is measured from the day of arrest or filing of the indictment, information, or other formal charges to the date of trial.” Divver, 356 Md. at 388-89 , 739 A.2d 71 (citing State v. Gee, 298 Md. 565, 569 , 471 A.2d 712 , cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1244 , 104 S.Ct. 3519 , 82 L.Ed.2d 827 (1984)). In the case at bar, the circuit court found that the 17-month delay from the indictment to the arrest weighed against the State. 17 The filing of the indictment on July 21, 2011 triggered the speedy-trial clock in this case, and the delay from this date to Appellant’s trial on August 12, 2013 was 2 years and 22 days. We conclude delay was of the magnitude to trigger review under Barker . Indeed, “[t]he ⁵⁴⁵ Court of Appeals has consistently held ... that a delay of more than one year and fourteen days is ‘presumptively prejudicial’ and requires balancing the remaining factors.” Lloyd v. State, 207 Md.App. 322, 328 , 52 A.3d 161 (2012) (citing Glover v. State, 368 Md. 211, 223 , 792 A.2d 1160 (2002)), cert. denied, 430 Md. 12 , 59 A.3d 507 (2013).

On its merits, the State concedes, and we agree, that the delay of nearly 25 months clearly weighs in favor of Appellant. However, as noted above, the gravity of this weight in the final balancing is heavily influenced by the other Barker factors, particularly the “reason” for the delay; “[i]t may gain weight or it may lose weight because of circumstances that have nothing to do with the mere ticking of the clock.” Ratchford, 141 Md.App. at 359 , 785 A.2d 826 . 2. Reason for Delay It is commonsensical that when analyzing the State’s reasons for the delay, the amount of weight that should be assigned to this factor in favor of either the State or the accused depends on the particular reason given. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 .

The Supreme Court has observed that the spectrum ranges from diligent prosecution to bad-faith delay, and along this spectrum, “official negligence in bringing an accused to trial occupies the middle ground.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656-57 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 ; accord State v. Lawless, 13 Md.App. 220, 237-40 , 283 A.2d 160 (1971) (describing the “gradations” of culpability of state conduct). A government’s deliberate attempt to delay trial and impede the defense weighs heavily against the government, whereas negligence by the government should weigh less heavily, although “the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than the defendant.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 . Accordingly, we review the reasons for delay in this case. i. Period from July 21, 2011 through December 7, 2012 This time period—the most questionable one—spanned from the filing of the indictment to Appellant’s arrest, accru ⁵⁴⁶ ing a delay of one year, four months and 16 days. 18 Appellant argues that “[t]he perfunctory actions taken by the State in this case do not reflect any serious effort to secure [Appellant’s] presence at trial,” and that the State “washed its hands” of its duty to arrest Appellant.

In other words, Appellant does not argue that the State affirmatively acted in bad faith, but rather, that the State acted negligently through inaction. It is certainly true that although a defendant cannot avoid apprehension, he or she “has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty[.]” Barker, 407 U.S. at 527 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 (footnote omitted). In executing this duty, the State must act with “reasonable diligence.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 ; see also In re Thomas, 372 Md. 50, 75 , 811 A.2d 310 (2002) (“[T]here is an obligation of the State to at least attempt, in a reasonable manner, to locate alleged delinquents.”). Yet, so long as the State acts with reasonable diligence, and absent any specific prejudice to the defense’s case, a speedy trial claim fails “however great the delay.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 .

The testimony and evidence reflected that pre-indictment notices sent via certified mail to four addresses for Appellant were returned as undeliverable or unclaimed. Following the indictment, the Montgomery County Sheriffs Office entered the warrant into the NCIC on August 2, 2011, and faxed a copy of the warrant to the Arizona Sheriffs Office. The Montgomery County Sheriffs office made no contact with Appellant or the Arizona Sheriffs Office for 16 months; however, the state investigator periodically reviewed NCIC, conducted background checks, and contacted the Arizona Vehicle Administration to locate any new addresses for Appellant. In October 2012, the investigator received information that Appellant renewed her cell phone contract registered at a different Arizona address that he did not have and relayed this ⁵⁴⁷ information to the Sheriffs Office.

Two months later, in December 2012, the Sheriffs Office contacted two separate Arizona Sheriffs Offices, and both advised that they would attempt to serve the warrant, and the next day, Appellant was arrested in Arizona. Based on this evidence, the circuit court found that “the primary reason for the delay is the fact that defendant lived out of state in Arizona, and that Maryland authorities really had no control over her whatsoever, they had no ability to arrest her directly. They really had no certain[t]y of where she lived or her location.” The court further found that the investigator ran checks every few months to see if anything was “popping up on her.” Based on this, the court concluded that the reason for the delay was not attributable to the State. We are not persuaded that the circuit court’s findings were clearly erroneous or that the State’s actions were legally insufficient to satisfy the State’s obligation to procure Appellant with “reasonable diligence” based on the facts and circumstances of this case.

Although Appellant was ultimately arrested at the address listed on the original warrant, this is not a case in which the State was apathetic about information which it knew was accurate. See In re Thomas J., 132 Md.App. 396, 407 , 752 A.2d 699 (2000) (“ ‘When the State sits idly by and does nothing with the information available to it, it cannot claim that it made a good faith effort to locate the defendant.’ ” (quoting State v. Hunnel, 52 Wash.App. 380 , 760 P.2d 947, 947 (1988))), aff'd, 372 Md. 50 , 811 A.2d 310 (2002). The court credited the investigator’s testimony that the prior mailings were returned unclaimed and undeliverable. The State claimed, and the circuit court apparently found persuasive, that this aroused uncertainty regarding whether the addresses on file for Appellant were correct.

Moreover, the State also did not fail to investigate this ambiguity; the investigator checked NCIC, conducted background checks, and contacted the Arizona motor vehicle administration for a new address. Cf. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652-53 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 (“For six years, the Government’s investigators made no serious effort to test their progressively more questionable ⁵⁴⁸ assumption that [the defendant] was living abroad, and, had they done so, they could have found him within minutes. While the Government’s lethargy may have reflected no more than [the defendant’s] relative unimportance in the world of drug trafficking, it was still findable negligence, and the finding stands.”).

Appellant attempts to analogize to two other cases. The first, United States v. Mendoza, 530 F.3d 758 (9th Cir.2008), involved an IRS investigation of the defendant for underre-porting his income. The IRS attempted to serve the defendant via his attorney with a grand jury subpoena for hand-print and fingerprint exemplars, but the attorney no longer represented him. Id. at 761 .

An IRS agent then called the defendant’s wife, who relayed that the defendant moved to the Philippines and provided contact information for his family there. Id. The IRS had two successful communications via phone with the defendant while he was in the Philippines. Id.

Thereafter, the defendant was indicted, and his warrant was entered into the law enforcement database. Id. at 762 . However, by the time the defendant returned to the United States, and was arrested relatively soon thereafter, eight years had passed since the indictment was filed. Id.

The district court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, and the defendant was ultimately convicted. Id. On appeal before the Ninth Circuit, the court held that “[t]he government has ‘some obligation’ to pursue a defendant and bring him to trial.” Id. at 762-63 (citing United States v. Sandoval, 990 F.2d 481, 485 (9th Cir.1993)). Although “the government is not required ‘to make heroic efforts to apprehend a defendant who is purposefully avoiding apprehension!,]’ ” the court explained, the government must make a “serious effort” to find the defendant if the defendant is not avoiding detection or else the government will be considered negligent.

Id. at 763 (citations omitted). The court concluded that despite having the defendant’s relatives’ and spouse’s contact information, the IRS agent made no effort to notify the defendant of the indictment and noted that there was no evidence that the defendant was keeping his whereabouts ⁵⁴⁹ unknown. Id. The record was “silent as to any efforts by the government to apprehend [the defendant] beyond merely entering [the defendant’s] warrant in the law enforcement database.” Id. at 764. “[T]he government was required to make some effort to notify [the defendant] of the indictment, or otherwise continue to actively attempt to bring him to trial, or else risk that [the defendant] would remain abroad while the constitutional speedy-trial clock ticked.” Id. at 763.

Accordingly, the court determined that the government’s negligence caused the delay, thereby weighing the “reason for delay” factor against the State. Id. The court ultimately remanded and ordered that the defendant’s indictment be dismissed. Id. at 765.

The instant case is distinguishable for several reasons. First, the defendant in Mendoza was located in a foreign country, and instead of initiating international extradition procedures, the IRS simply entered a warrant into a database so that the defendant would be detained if he returned to the United States. As a result, there was no other sovereign with the authority or intention of apprehending the defendant, and the only way the defendant would be apprehended—absent any knowledge of the indictment—was if he elected to return to the United States on his own. Here, Appellant was residing in a different state, and the warrant entered into NCIC bestowed upon Arizona both the authority and responsibility to apprehend Appellant.

In Mendoza , eight years had elapsed before the defendant was arrested, compared to the 16/6 months between Appellant’s indictment in Maryland and her subsequent arrest in Arizona. Second, in Mendoza , the IRS agent had successfully contacted the defendant and his family members previously on more than one occasion about the case. Here, the State had never successfully communicated with Appellant. Instead, the State attempted to send pre-indictment notifications to all four of Appellant’s known addresses, and those letters were returned as undeliverable and unclaimed.

Third, the IRS agent in Mendoza did not take any action after inputting the warrant. Here, after entering the warrant into NCIC, the State ⁵⁵⁰ was skeptical of Appellant’s address, and regardless of whether the State’s skepticism was mistaken, the State proactively followed-up by conducting background checks and contacting the Arizona motor vehicle administration. Appellant also relies on In re Thomas J., supra, 132 Md. App. 396 , 752 A.2d 699 (2000). In that case, the juvenile-defendant was arrested for attempted armed robbery and related offenses, but was released the next day.

Id. at 400-01, 752 A.2d 699 . A delinquency petition was then filed, and although summonses were mailed to the defendant at his address, the defendant did not appear for his arraignment hearing. Id. at 401 , 752 A.2d 699 . Two additional sets of summonses were returned by the Sheriffs Office as “unable to contact” and by the Post Office as “moved left no address.” Id.

It later came to light that the defendant had moved to another residence in the same county. Id. The court then issued a writ for body attachment, and when the defendant was never apprehended, the court held writ review hearings annually for the next three years. Id. at 402 , 752 A.2d 699 .

The defendant was finally served with the writ three years and two months after his arrest and moved to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, which the circuit court denied. Id. On appeal, we reversed. Regarding the State’s reason for the delay, we held that “[a]lthough we recognize that the State probably could have located [the defendant] and could have issued the writ of body attachment earlier, rather than allow it to remain outstanding for years, we do not find this case to be deliberate and knowing inaction, but rather, ‘less-than-diligent’ action.’ ” Id. at 405-06 , 752 A.2d 699 .

Indeed, we acknowledged that “[h]ad the State attempted to find [the defendant], it probably could have found him within minutes” and that the defendant had been openly living in the same county in which the incident occurred and was not deliberately attempting to delay proceedings. Id. at 406-07 , 752 A.2d 699 . We therefore held that “the fault of the State, if any, was minimal,” and weighed that factor against the State, but not heavily. Id. at 406-07 , 752 A.2d 699 .

It was only when we balanced all factors together that we concluded they weighed against the ⁵⁵¹ State and that the delinquency petition should have been dismissed. Id. at 412 , 752 A.2d 699 . Again, the instant case is distinguishable. In re Thomas involved a defendant who moved to a new residence in the same Maryland county, and the State had several uncomplicated options to locate the defendant, but failed to take them.

In the instant case, Appellant was in another state, beyond the arresting authority of the Montgomery County Sheriffs Office. And, unlike the “less-than-diligent” action by state officials in In re Thomas, the state officials here engaged in ongoing follow-up measures to locate Appellant’s whereabouts. We acknowledge Appellant’s argument that the State could have contacted the Arizona Sheriffs Office sooner, but we are also cognizant of the fact that the Montgomery County’s Sheriffs Office handles over 2,000 outstanding warrants at any given time, 19 and what is constitutionally required is reasonable diligence, not perfection. We are satisfied, as was the circuit court, that the State engaged in a “reasonably diligent” attempt to apprehend Appellant given the facts presented in this case.

We conclude that while the time period of delay is attributable to the State, this factor weighs only slightly in favor of Appellant. ii. Period from December 7, 2012 to March 8, 2013 This time period spanned from Appellant’s arrest to her extradition to Maryland, accruing a delay of three months. During this period, Appellant fought extradition to Maryland. Although it is was entirely within her right to fight extradition, it belies any fierce desire for a speedy trial.

We find this period to be attributable to Appellant and weighs slightly in favor of the State. ii. Period from March 8, 2013 to August 12, 2013 This time period spanned from Appellant’s extradition to Maryland to the first day of Appellant’s trial, accruing a delay ⁵⁵² of five months. Appellant does not argue that any impropriety occurred during this time, as this period involved the natural progression from arrest to trial. This time period is attributable to neither party, so we assign this timeframe neutral weight. 3.

Assertion of Speedy Trial Right “Often the strength and timeliness of a defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right indicate whether the delay has been lengthy and whether the defendant begins to experience prejudice from that delay.” Glover, supra, 368 Md. at 228 , 792 A.2d 1160 (citations omitted); see also Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 (“Whether and how a defendant asserts his right is closely related to the other factors[,]” as “[t]he strength of his efforts will be affected by the length of the delay, to some extent by the reason for the delay, and most particularly by the personal prejudice, which is not always readily identifiable, that he experiences.”). The State emphasizes that Appellant fought extradition in Arizona for three months after her arrest on December 7, 2012, and despite appearing before the circuit court twice after she was returned to Maryland in March 2013, she did not assert her right to a speedy trial until May. The circuit court found this to be relevant in its ruling, finding that Appellant was aware of a potential violation of her right to speedy trial five months before she asserted her right. Although it is true that Appellant waited five months to assert her rights upon learning of the indictment, three of those months were spent challenging extradition, which was within her right to do, and defense counsel proffered that she was unrepresented by counsel at the time.

We do not consider Appellant’s failure to assert her speedy trial right at that time, to be particularly influential to our analysis. Upon Appellant’s extradition to Maryland, she appeared before the circuit court on March 8, 2013 for a bond hearing and March 15 for a scheduling hearing, but did not assert her speedy-trial right until May 10, 2013. Because Appellant was mostly ⁵⁵³ unrepresented during this period of time, we accord neutral weight overall to the strength and timeliness of Appellant’s assertion of her right. 4. Prejudice As to prejudice, a court should consider if the delay impacted the three interests that the right to speedy trial was designed to protect: “(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 .

Appellant does not argue oppressive pre-trial incarceration or heightened anxiety or concern, nor could she based on the record. The only interest at issue in the instant case, the last, is also the most significant “because the inability of a defendant to adequately prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.” Id. This Court explained Maryland’s approach to determining prejudice and the allocation of burdens in State v. Lawless: Traditionally, three approaches have been used to arrive at a determination of prejudice. One approach is that it is incumbent upon the accused to make a showing of actual prejudice or at least a strong possibility of prejudice resulting to him or to his defense from the delay.

Another approach is that prejudice will be conclusively presumed and necessarily follows from long delay. The middle position, and that used in this State, is that a certain quantitative and qualitative degree of delay gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of prejudice and will shift the burden of going forward with the evidence from the accused to the State. Before that critical point is reached, there rests upon the accused, as the moving party, the burden of persuading the hearing judge either (1) that he has suffered actual prejudice, in cases where he has made no demand for a speedy trial, or (2) that he has suffered the strong possibility of prejudice, in cases where he has made a demand for a speedy trial. Once that critical point has been ⁵⁵⁴ reached, however, the presumption of prejudice arises and the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to the State.

That critical point on the delay scale where the presumption arises and where the burden shifts has been denominated the point of ‘substantial’ delay. To rebut the presumption, the State must persuade the hearing judge that the accused suffered no serious prejudice beyond that resulting from ordinary and inevitable delay. 13 Md.App. 220, 232-33 , 283 A.2d 160 (1971) (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes omitted); accord In re Thomas J., supra, 132 Md.App. at 412 , 752 A.2d 699 (citing Lawless in the context of applying the Barker analysis to hold that the burden shifted to the State due to the three-year delay); Wilson & Green v. State, 34 Md.App. 294 , 299 n. 3, 367 A.2d 970 (1976) (citing Lawless in the context of the Barker analysis to hold that the burden shifted to the State), cert. denied, 280 Md. 730 , 280 Md. 735 (1977). Thus, not every accused must present an affirmative demonstration of prejudice to prove a denial of the right to a speedy trial. Davidson v. State, 87 Md.App. 105, 115 , 589 A.2d 114 (1991) (citing Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 , 94 S.Ct. 188 , 38 L.Ed.2d 183 (1973)).

This is so because “time’s erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony ‘can rarely be shown.’ ” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ). Instead, courts are left to “recognize that excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify.” Id. The Supreme Court has clarified, however, that presumptive prejudice alone cannot establish a speedy-trial violation; “it is a part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of the delay.” Id. at 656 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315 , 106 S.Ct. 648 , 88 L.Ed.2d 640 (1986)). Here, although the length of the delay was sufficient to trigger the Barker factors, the issue is whether the qualitative (reasons behind the delay) and quantitative (length) degree of the delay was sufficient to warrant a presumption of prejudice requiring the burden to shift onto the State to prove there was ⁵⁵⁵ no prejudice. 20 We consider State v. Lawless to be instructive on this point.

There we held that the defendant was not denied his speedy-trial right despite the lapse of 18 months from his indictment to his arraignment. 13 Md.App. at 243 , 283 A.2d 160 . During this time period, the defendant was being transferred to and from various correctional entities. Id. at 240 , 283 A.2d 160 . The State unsuccessfully attempted to serve the defendant with two summonses, but finally succeeded on its third try.

Id. We did not characterize the reason for the delay in that case as a bad-faith omission or unpardonable neglect, but as “inadvertent inaction” or “less-than-diligent action,” ultimately finding any fault on the State’s behalf to be minimal. Id. at 239-40 , 283 A.2d 160 . We also concluded that although the defendant claimed a lapse in memory, there was no significant evidence of other prejudice.

Id. at 242-43 , 283 A.2d 160 . Notably, we explained that “the mere running of the calendar will not be viewed in isolation and has little significance divorced from the questions of motivation for delay and prejudice, which are, respectively, its cause and its effect.” Id. at 237 , 283 A.2d 160 . Based on the minimal value that we assigned to the “reason for delay” and “prejudice” factors, we concluded that the 18-month delay was not substantial and, therefore, the presumption of prejudice did not arise, leaving the burden of proving prejudice on the defendant. Id. at 243 , 283 A.2d 160 .

We reach a similar conclusion here. In considering the approximate delay of 25 months in this case, there is an inherent possibility—especially given the nature of the crime ⁵⁵⁶ in this case—that documents may have been lost and memory may have faded during the delay, and we take this into account. We also must keep in mind, however, that the only delay potentially attributable to the State was the 16)6 months between the indictment and the arrest. As in Lawless , the delay in this case did not flow from bad-faith or inexcusable neglect, and the prejudice is not patent; instead, we concluded above that the State’s pursuit of Appellant was made with reasonable diligence based on its uncertainty regarding Appellant’s whereabouts.

Because the State’s actions were excusable and involved minimal negligence at worst, we do not consider the delay to be “substantial” so to give rise to a presumption of prejudice shifting the burden to the State. As the Supreme Court has stated, so long as the State acts with reasonable diligence, and absent any specific prejudice to the defense’s case, a speedy trial claim fails “however great the delay.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 . Appellant attempted to submit an affidavit to show prejudice at the hearing on Appellant’s motion to dismiss. 21 The State moved to strike Appellant’s affidavit as “self-serving hearsay” and opposed the admissibility of the affidavit at the hearing because Appellant was not present to be cross-examined. 22 Appellant defended the admissibility of the affidavit on the ground that the substance of the first fourteen paragraphs are “of public record” and that the attached authenticated documents cannot be challenged on the grounds of accuracy and authenticity (i.e. the driver’s license). Although the court declined to strike the affidavit from the pleading, as it is not improper to file affidavits with a pleading, the court refused to admit the affidavit into evidence as inadmissible hearsay. ⁵⁵⁷ On appeal, Appellant argues that the affidavit was admissible under the residual hearsay exception pursuant to Maryland Rule 5—803(b)(24), under which the availability of the declarant is not required.

As highlighted by the State, this argument was not raised below. “[W]hen evidence is inadmissible on its face and admissible only for a limited purpose or under some theory, the proponent must also explain to the court how the evidence is admissible and why it should be received.” In re Adoption/Guardianship Nos. CAA 92-10852, 92-10853 in Circuit Court for Prince George’s Cnty., 103 Md.App. 1, 33 , 651 A.2d 891 (1994) (citing Ali v. State, 314 Md. 295, 305-07 , 550 A.2d 925 (1988) and McLain, Maryland Evidence, § 103.17, 103.20 (1987)). Here, the affidavit constituted hearsay, and Appellant failed to argue the residuary exception below. Appellant maintains, however, that although she did not explicitly cite the residuary exception, her arguments in favor of admissibility demonstrated substantive qualifications of the affidavit under that exception. This argument, however, would require circuit courts to ascertain whether arguments were relevant to the factors of the residuary exception, then sua sponte determine whether the residuary exception should be applied, absent such an argument by counsel, and then, as it must, engage in a detailed analysis on the record before admitting the evidence under that exception on its own volition.

See State v. Walker, 345 Md. 293, 296 , 691 A.2d 1341 (1997) (explaining that a court must consider six conditions before admitting evidence under the residual exception). We decline to sanction this argument and impose such an obligation on trial courts. The court did not err in excluding the affidavit. Based on the foregoing, and taking into account both the State’s actions and the natural impact that passage of time has on a case, we accord the prejudice factor neutral weight. 5.

Balancing After balancing all of the facts and circumstances in accordance with the four Barker factors, we conclude that Appel ⁵⁵⁸ lant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated. Although the delay totaled approximately 25 months, only 16/6 of those months were potentially attributable to the State. The circuit court found that the State’s inability to procure Appellant in that timeframe was largely due to her residence in Arizona and the apparent uncertainty surrounding Appellant’s specific whereabouts in Arizona. Weighing the particular circumstances of this case, namely a delay caused largely by the failure of the Maricopa County Sheriffs Office to serve the warrant in Arizona followed by Appellant’s own efforts to fight extradition, coupled with the lack of demonstrated prejudice in this case, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss.

As reflected above, the length of the delay, in the first of its two very distinct functions, was sufficient to trigger the full Barker analysis. Beyond that, balanced against the other three Barker factors, the delay did not weigh sufficiently in favor of Appellant, who, the record suggests, did not want a speedy trial as much as she wanted to be denied a speedy trial.

II

Territorial Jurisdiction The murky bogs of criminal jurisdiction are ideal for the cultivation of Socratic dialogues but often perilous to the sound administration of justice. Wright v. State, 339 Md. 399, 406 , 663 A.2d 590 (1995) (Raker, J.). Appellant challenges the circuit court’s jurisdiction over the theft and embezzlement charges brought against her. Appellant argues that Maryland courts lack territorial jurisdiction over her alleged crimes because all of the elements comprising each offense occurred, if at all, in Arizona.

Appellant rejects the “duty to account” theory of territorial jurisdiction, arguing that a personal representative of a Maryland estate is under no duty to account for real property located outside of Maryland (hereinafter “foreign real property”) to the Maryland probate estate. Appellant further argues that ⁵⁵⁹ Maryland courts did not obtain jurisdiction on the ground that the alleged crimes may have impacted a Maryland resident. The State counters that Appellant did, in fact, have a duty to account for the proceeds of the sale of the Arizona property in Maryland and that Appellant had a duty, as personal representative, to the beneficiaries of the Maryland estate. 23 Each circuit court in Maryland “has full common-law and equity powers and jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases within its county, and all the additional powers and jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution and by law, except where by law jurisdiction has been limited or conferred exclusively upon another tribunal.” Md.Code (1973, 2013 RepLVol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”) § 1-501. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to Maryland through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a ... trial, by an impartial jury of the State ... wherein the crime shall have been committed.” This provision founds the concept of “territorial