Raras v. State

¹⁴¹ PAUL E. ALPERT, Judge, Retired, Specially Assigned. A jury in the Circuit Court for Howard County convicted Emilia Domingo Raras, the appellant, of first degree murder and solicitation to commit first degree murder in the contract killing of her daughter-in-law. 1 The court imposed concurrent prison sentences of life without possibility of parole for the murder conviction and life for the solicitation conviction. ISSUES In this appeal, appellant argues, in essence, that I. The trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress her pre-trial statement to police, in that the statement was (i) taken in violation of Miranda 2 , (ii) involuntary, and (iii) the fruit of the interrogation of another suspect conducted in violation of Miranda, and II. The trial court erred by failing to adequately clarify its instruction on first degree murder in response to a question by the jury.

We find no merit in either of these arguments and affirm the judgments of the trial court. FACTS On November 14, 1998, someone broke into the Howard County home of Sara Jane Williamson Raras and brutally stabbed her to death. At the time, the victim was married to but separated from appellant’s son, Lorenzo Raras (“Lorenzo”). The couple had a 16 month old son, who was not in the house when the murder was committed.

Police had no real leads in the case until the following summer, when an inmate of the Baltimore County Detention Center, Edison George, informed a Baltimore County police ¹⁴² detective that another inmate, Ardale Tickles, had confessed to committing a murder. At the detective’s suggestion, George agreed to initiate another conversation with Tickles regarding the murder and to surreptitiously tape record that conversation. The Baltimore County police detective shared the tape recording with a Howard County police detective, Nathan Rettig, who linked Tickles’ comments to the unsolved murder of Sara Raras. On August 24,1999, Detective Rettig arrested Tickles at the Baltimore County Detention Center and transported him to a Howard County police station for interrogation.

Because the only factual disputes on appeal concern the denial of the motion to suppress, our recitation of the facts from this point on is based entirely on the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion. The parties stipulated at the hearing that, at the start of the interrogation, Tickles invoked his rights to remain silent and to counsel. On the advice of an assistant State’s Attorney, however, Detective Rettig continued to interrogate Tickles. Tickles thereafter made comments that incriminated himself and appellant.

Detective Rettig immediately prepared an application for a statement of charges against appellant and obtained a warrant for her arrest. The warrant was executed that same day by Howard County Police Detectives Ellsworth Jones, Vickie Shaffer, and others. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Detective Jones testified that appellant was arrested at her home in Baltimore County at about 2:20 PM on August 24, 1999. At the time, appellant was 63 years old.

She was babysitting her grandson — the victim’s son. Detective Jones stated that he handcuffed appellant and drove her to a police station in Howard County. During the ride, appellant asked about her grandson. Detective Jones told her that another officer, Detective Shaffer, was making arrangements for the child.

Detective Jones informed appellant that the police had obtained evidence against her and that she was being charged with conspiracy and solicitation to ¹⁴³ commit murder. According to the detective, appellant said something to the effect of “I couldn’t have done that.” The detective then told appellant that she would be advised of her rights when they reached the station, and instructed her not to say anything further. Detective Jones recalled telling appellant that he “didn’t want to hear her lying....” He advised her to “focus her attention on the future of her grandchild.” The detective remarked that the officers needed to find out if anyone else was involved in the murder. In particular, they wanted to know if Lorenzo was involved because, if he was, the grandson could not be returned to him.

Upon arriving at the station at 3:00 to 3:15 PM, Detective Jones placed appellant in an interview room and removed her handcuffs. The detective left appellant alone in the room for five to ten minutes, then he and Detective Glen Case joined her. One of the officers placed a photograph of Tickles on the table, and Detective Jones began what he described as “[Haying the foundation” for an interview. 3 He informed appellant that the police knew that Tickles had killed the victim and that appellant had hired him. He reiterated that appellant was being charged with conspiracy and solicitation to commit murder.

Detective Jones further reiterated that he wanted to know whether appellant’s son Lorenzo was involved. The detective stated that, if Lorenzo was involved, appellant’s grandson would not be returned to him. Appellant indicated that she wanted to speak with an attorney. Through questioning, Detective Case established that appellant was sober and understood the English language. 4 ¹⁴⁴ Appellant indicated that she was diabetic and had not taken her medication that day but did not require it at that time.

Detective Case then fully advised appellant of her right to counsel and her right to remain silent, and at 3:30 PM appellant filled out and signed an advice of rights form, indicating that she would not waive her rights. Detective Jones instructed appellant not to say anything further. 5 After the advice of rights form was completed, Detective Jones reiterated that the police knew about Tickles and had enough evidence to charge appellant with conspiracy and solicitation to commit murder. Detective Case then placed on the table a photograph of the victim’s body at the crime scene 6 , and stated to appellant: “This is what your money paid for.” Appellant glanced at the photo and immediately turned her head away. Detective Case then picked up the photo and left the room.

Appellant asked Detective Jones if she could call her family to let them know where she was. Detective Jones informed appellant that she could not do so at that time “[b]ecause the investigation was ongoing, interviews were still being made, a wiretap was attempting to be obtained; and a phone call I would have no control over would possibly hurt the investigation, so it was not to be allowed.” The detective then left the interview room to arrange for the processing of appellant. Detective Jones returned to the interview room with Detective Diana Peters at 3:45 PM. Appellant was again handcuffed, and the two detectives walked with her to the booking area.

Detective Jones testified that appellant “asked about the ¹⁴⁵ process of getting a lawyer.” He recalled that he “explained to her that she was going to be processed now, fingerprinted, photographed and placed into a cell; that she would more than likely be able to obtain a lawyer but I couldn’t allow her to make any phone calls now because there was an ongoing investigation, and that eventually she would be allowed to make a phone call.... ” Another police officer who overheard the conversation between Detective Jones and appellant testified that Detective Jones made clear to appellant that “she would be given a phone call, but not right at that moment, but somewhere later in the processing time, she would be allowed a phone call.” According to Detective Jones, Detective Peters, and the other officer who overheard the conversation, appellant informed Detective Jones that she wanted to speak with him to “clarify” something regarding the charges. Detective Jones told appellant that he could not speak with her because she had invoked her right to counsel. Appellant continued to insist that she wanted to talk, and Detective Jones suggested that she go into a cell and think about it more. Appellant declined to do so and repeated her request, so Detective Jones finally agreed to talk.

Detectives Jones and Peters went back to the interview room with appellant. 7 Detective Jones recounted that appellant had earlier invoked her right to counsel, that he had been prepared to begin booking procedures, but that appellant had asked to speak with him. The transcript of the audio tape of the discussion reflects that Detective Jones and appellant further recounted what had happened in the booking area as follows: DET E. JONES NOW I TOOK YOU BACK TO THE CELL TO PUT YOU IN THE CELL. AND YOU ASKED ME ABOUT A LAWYER. ABOUT WHAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES WERE.

AND I TOLD YOU THAT I ¹⁴⁶ WILL NOT HIRE A LAWYER FOR YOU. I WILL NOT CALL A LAWYER FOR YOU. THAT THAT IS YOUR OBLIGATION TO DO THAT. THAT I WOULD PUT YOU IN A CELL AND EVENTUALLY YOU CAN GET A PUBLIC DEFENDER.

YOU CAN DO WHATEVER YOU WANT. BUT I’M NOT DOING THAT FOR YOU. EMILIA RARAS UM HM. DET E. JONES AT THAT POINT YOU TOLD ME THAT THERE WAS SOME THINGS THAT YOU WANTED TO TELL ME.

EMILIA RARAS THAT THERE WAS. DET E. JONES AND THAT I WASN’T, I TOLD YOU THAT I DID NOT WANT TO SPEAK WITH YOU ABOUT THIS. BECAUSE YOU WERE ASKING FOR AN ATTORNEY. IT’S YOUR OBLIGATION TO TALK TO ME IF YOU WANT TO TALK TO ME BUT I’M GONNA PUT YOU IN A CELL.

IS THIS TRUE? WHAT WE HAD DISCUSSED? EMILIA RARAS IT’S TRUE. DET E. JONES SO AFTER WE DID THAT, YOU SAID THAT YOU STILL WANTED TO CLEAR UP A COUPLE OF THINGS.

EMILIA RARAS UM HM. DET E. JONES THAT YOU WANTED TO TELL ME SOME THINGS. NOW, I REPEATEDLY TOLD YOU THIS AND I WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT YOU UNDERSTAND THIS. YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO A LAWYER.

I DON’T WANT TO INTERFERE WITH THAT. I DON’T WANT TO TELL YOU YOU CAN’T GET ONE. I’M TELLING YOU THAT YOU CAN HAVE ONE. BUT THAT I’M NOT GONNA HIRE HIM FOR YOU.

AND WHAT I’M GONNA DO IS TAKE YOU BACK. YOU’RE GONNA, AND I TOLD YOU THAT NO MATTER WHAT YOU TELL ME TODAY, NO MATTER WHAT IT IS, YOU’RE GETTING CHARGED TODAY. WITH THOSE TWO CHARGES THAT I TOLD YOU. EMILIA RARAS UM HM. ¹⁴⁷ DET E. JONES ...

YOU COULD SIT HERE AND TALK TO ME IF YOU WANT. OR I’LL TAKE, I’LL DO WHAT WE TOLD YOU BEFORE. I’LL TAKE YOU BACK. WHERE, WHERE WE JUST WERE.

EMILIA RARAS UM HM. DET E. JONES PUT YOU IN A CELL. THEY’LL FINGERPRINT YOU IN A LITTLE BIT. PHOTOGRAPH YOU.

WE’LL LET YOU CALL YOUR FAMILY OR WHOEVER IT IS THAT YOU CHOOSE TO CALL. EMILIA RARAS UM HM. DET E. JONES BUT THAT, YOU KNOW, IT’S YOUR CHOICE. YOU’RE THE ONE TELLING ME YOU WANT TO TALK TO ME.

YOU CAN CHOOSE TO TELL ME A LITTLE BIT. EMILIA RARAS I’LL TELL YOU EVERYTHING. DET E. JONES YOU COULD, WELL, OR YOU COULD CHOOSE TO TELL ME IT ALL. I’M LEAVING THAT UP TO YOU.

BUT BECAUSE YOU ASKED TO TALK TO ME AGAIN, I’M GONNA READ YOU THESE RIGHTS AGAIN. IF YOU WANT TO TALK TO ME NOW, THEN WE’LL GO AHEAD THROUGH THIS AND YOU CAN SAY YOU WANT TO TALK TO ME. YOU CAN PICK AND CHOOSE WHATEVER QUESTIONS YOU WANT TO ANSWER. YOU DON’T HAVE TO ANSWER ALL OF THEM.

YOU CAN TELL ME THE SAME THING YOU’VE TOLD ME BEFORE. AND I’LL TAKE YOU BACK. JUST LIKE WE JUST DID. AND YOU CAN SIT DOWN BACK THERE AND ONCE THEY FINISH ALL THE PROCESSING, UM, YOU’LL GO BEFORE THE COMMISSIONER.

BUT I’M LEAVING THIS CHOICE TO YOU. I WANT TO MAKE IT PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT I DON’T WANT TO INTERFERE WITH YOUR RIGHTS. IF YOU WANT TO TALK TO ME THAT’S GREAT. BECAUSE OBVIOUSLY I WANT TO KNOW EVERYTHING THAT HAP ¹⁴⁸ PENED.

BUT, UM, THAT’S YOUR CHOICE. OKAY? YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? YES OR NO?

YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? IT’S YOUR CHOICE. EMILIA RARAS I UNDERSTAND.... The transcript of the interview further reflects that Detective Jones gave appellant a copy of the statement of charges.

Appellant expressed her belief that the charges of conspiracy and solicitation to commit murder were too “strong,” and indicated a desire to clarify her role in the matter. Detective Jones reiterated to appellant that he would not allow her to call her family yet because the investigation was still underway. He volunteered that appellant’s grandson was with an officer at the “advocacy center,” which is “a house with kids toys and everything.” Detective Jones explained to appellant that the officer at the advocacy center would call appellant’s son, Lorenzo, as soon as Lorenzo got home from work “to come pick up the child.” After ascertaining that appellant did not yet need her diabetes medication, Detective Jones again advised appellant of her rights. Detective Jones again stated that he would not contact a lawyer for appellant and that she would have to do so herself.

In response to appellant’s inquiry, the detective explained that she would be given information on how to contact the Office of the Public Defender when she went before the Commissioner. At 4:45 PM, appellant signed another advice of rights form, this time waiving her rights to counsel and to remain silent. Appellant indicated that she would make some clarifications and would answer some questions, but might decline to answer other questions until after she had consulted an attorney. Appellant proceeded to describe to the detectives her relationship with the victim.

She described several occasions on which the victim had treated her with disrespect, and stated that during one argument the victim actually spat in her face. Appellant admitted that she discussed the spitting incident with several co-workers at the nursing home where she was employed as a nurse. She asked them what they would do if ¹⁴⁹ they were her. One of those co-workers was Ardale Tickles.

The transcript of the interview reflects that, at that point, the following transpired: EMILIA RARAS ... AND I’LL NOT SAY ANYTHING MORE ON THAT. BECAUSE IT’S A LONG AND TEDIOUS PROCESS OF TEACHING. DET E. JONES THAT YOU NEED TO DO?

EMILIA RARAS YES DET E. JONES OKAY EMILIA RARAS THIS IS THE THING. VERY WELL. THAT’S THE OPTION I WANT TO ASK MY LAWYER. DET E. JONES OKAY.

SO YOU WANT TO STOP NOW. EMILIA RARAS I WANT TO STOP FROM THAT POINT. BECAUSE I MIGHT BE SAYING SOMETHING; YOU KNOW MY LANGUAGE IS DIFFERENT. DET E. JONES OKAY.

EMILIA RARAS MY ENGLISH, MY ENGLISH IS DIFFERENT. THAT’S WHY I’M TRYING TO YOU TO CLARIFY. DET E. JONES OKAY. ALL RIGHT.

UM, DID, UM, IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE THAT YOU WANT TO TELL ME? EMILIA RARAS. NOTHING MORE I WANT TO TELL YOU. THAT THAT IS NOT COMPLETELY RIGHT. 8 DET E. JONES UM HM.

WHAT DO YOU MEAN? EMILIA RARAS THE ONE IN THE PAPER. DET E. JONES THE CONSPIRACY PART? EMILIA RARAS YES. ¹⁵⁰ DET E. JONES DO YOU KNOW WHAT CONSPIRACY MEANS?

EMILIA RARAS WHAT? Detective Jones explained that, under the circumstances, conspiracy “MEANS THAT YOU AND SOMEONE ELSE DISCUSSED HOW OR WHAT IT IS THAT YOU WANTED TO DO TO HAVE SOMEONE KILLED.” Appellant stated: “I DON’T KNOW, I DON’T KNOW HOW TO PLAN A MURDER BECAUSE I AM NOT USED TO THAT.” The detective responded: “BUT BEFORE WE GO, YOU SAID YOU DIDN’T WANT TO TALK ABOUT THAT PART ANYWAY, SO I DON’T WANT TO GO INTO THAT.” Detective Jones changed the subject. He reminded appellant that she did not have to answer his questions, then asked her if Lorenzo was involved. Appellant responded in the negative.

The detective also asked appellant where she got the money that she paid to Tickles, and appellant responded that it was her own money. Detective Peters then questioned appellant as follows: DET D. PETERS YOU DON’T HAVE TO ANSWER THIS IF YOU DON’T WANT TO. BUT DID YOU KNOW HOW HE WAS GOING TO KILL HER? EMILIA RARAS NO.

NO. DET D. PETERS SO YOU KNOW THAT HE WAS GONNA DO IT BUT YOU DIDN’T KNOW EXACTLY? EMILIA RARAS IN FACT, I THOUGHT HE’S NOT GOING TO KILL HER. KILL HER.

BECAUSE HE TOLD ME HE IS JUST GOING TO STONE THE HOUSE. YOU KNOW. AS A REVENGE. FOR ME.

Shortly thereafter, appellant asked and was permitted to use the restroom. Afterward, she was offered food but declined it. Detective Jones assured appellant that someone would ask Lorenzo to bring her her diabetes medication so that she would have it when she needed it. Questioning then continued, with Detective Jones reminding appellant: “IF YOU DON’T WANT TO TALK TO ME ¹⁵¹ ABOUT A CERTAIN THING JUST TELL ME NO.” In response to the detectives questions, appellant admitted, inter alia, that she described the victim to Tickles and gave Tickles the victim’s address.

She acknowledged that she made two payments: one of $300 or $400 and another of $2,000. The interview concluded at about 6:50 PM, and appellant was then permitted to telephone her son. The trial court rejected appellant’s motion to suppress her statement. In a 25-page “Memorandum and Order,” the court determined that the police had properly complied with Miranda.

It acknowledged: There are certainly legitimate questions raised by the defense about the invoking of the grandchild’s situation and the use of the gruesome crime scene photo of Sara Raras. These were obviously designed to have an effect on Mrs. Raras.... The court pointed out that these incidents occurred before or during the first interview. Appellant subsequently reinitiated discussion with the police and was re-advised of her rights, and the court was satisfied that the statement made during the second interview was “free of ... taint.” Inter alia, the court determined that, in making her statement, appellant was not motivated by “concern about her grandson’s safety or welfare, or by shock or remorse engendered by the photograph.” Nor did the police mislead appellant or coerce her statement by failing to provide immediate access to an attorney.

The court further rejected appellant’s suggestion that her statement should be suppressed because it was the fruit of the interrogation of Tickles which, as the State concedes, was conducted in violation of Miranda. The court opined that “the Defendant is asking this Court to plow new ground and transplant the ‘poisonous tree’ doctrine from the Fourth to the Fifth Amendment----” It determined that there is “no basis in current law or in constitutional necessity to do so.” ¹⁵² DISCUSSION I Motion to Suppress As the Court of Appeals recently summarized, an appellate court’s review of the propriety of the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence is limited to the record developed at the motions hearing____[W]e consider only those relevant facts produced at the suppression hearing that are most favorable to the State as the prevailing party on the motion____Although we make our own independent constitutional appraisal of whether a constitutional right has been violated, we will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous---- Wengert v. State, 364 Md. 76, 84 , 771 A.2d 389 (2001). See also Marr v. State, 134 Md.App. 152, 163 , 759 A.2d 327 (2000), cert. denied, 362 Md. 623 , 766 A.2d 147 (2001). (i) —Violation of Miranda as to Appellant— In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court held: [T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.

By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be ¹⁵³ used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.

If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned. (Emphasis added; footnote omitted.) In Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 , 120 S.Ct. 2326 , 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000), the Supreme Court clarified that the Miranda rights are rooted in the United States Constitution; in particular, they are based on the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

See also Md. Declaration of Rights arts. 22 and 24. If formal charges have been filed, “[t]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel[, which] attaches only at the initiation of adversary criminal proceedings” is also implicated. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 456 , 94 S.Ct. 2357 , 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974). See also Md. Declaration of Rights art. 21.

See generally Webster v. State, 299 Md. 581, 591-98 , 474 A.2d 1305 (1984). Appellant does not dispute that she was properly advised of her rights to counsel and to remain silent pursuant to Miranda . She suggests that, because she invoked both rights during the first interview, any statement she made thereafter was automatically inadmissible. Appellant herself admitted at the suppression hearing, however, that she asked Detective Jones after the first interview if she could speak with him in order to clarify certain matters.

The uncontroverted evidence establishes, moreover, that at the start of the second interview appellant signed an advice of rights form ¹⁵⁴ waiving her Miranda rights. It is beyond dispute that police may reinitiate discussion with a suspect who has invoked his or her right to remain silent if a significant period of time has elapsed and if the police have re-advised the suspect of his or her rights. See Michigan v. Mosley, 428 U.S. 96 , 106-07, 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975)(plurality opinion); Manno v. State, 96 Md.App. 22, 42 , 623 A.2d 677 (1993); Latimer v. State, 49 Md.App. 586, 589 , 433 A.2d 1234 (1981). In addition, police may question a suspect who has invoked his or her right to counsel if it was the suspect who reinitiated discussion of ■the offense.

See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); Johnson v. State, 348 Md. 337, 349-50 , 703 A.2d 1267 (1998). Appellant further contends that her statement should be suppressed because of Miranda violations committed during the second interview. As we indicated in our recitation of the relevant facts, appellant stated several times during the second interview that she wanted to talk with an attorney before discussing certain matters. She now argues that each such statement was an invocation of her rights to counsel and to remain silent, and that the interview therefore should have been terminated.

In making this argument, appellant ignores that the testimony at the suppression hearing and the transcript of the second interview establishes that appellant insisted on speaking with Detective Jones before consulting with an attorney. Detective Jones repeatedly told appellant that he could not talk with her because she had invoked her right to counsel. When the detective finally acquiesced, he made clear to appellant that she could pick and choose which questions she wanted to answer. Appellant made clear that she wanted to do just that.

Appellant directs us to no authority that would suggest that, when a suspect expresses a desire to remain silent about certain matters having to do with the offenses until consulting an attorney, the police may not talk to her about any matter having to do with the offenses. To the ¹⁵⁵ contrary, “[a] defendant may express an unwillingness to discuss certain subjects without indicating a desire to terminate an interrogation already in progress.” Vermont v. Bacon, 163 Vt. 279 , 658 A.2d 54, 66 (1995) (suspect’s hesitation during interrogation to name accomplice was not invocation of right to remain silent). See also Massachusetts v. Roberts, 407 Mass. 731 , 555 N.E.2d 588, 590 (1990) (suspect’s refusal to answer some but not all questions was not invocation of right to remain silent); California v. Silva, 45 Cal.3d 604 , 247 Cal.Rptr. 573 , 754 P.2d 1070, 1083 (1988) (suspect’s assertion that he did not “want to talk about” particular matter was not invocation of right to counsel as to all matters); Michigan v. Spencer, 154 Mich.App. 6 , 397 N.W.2d 525, 528 (1986) (suspect’s assertion that he wanted to limit his answers was not invocation of his right remain silent). Nothing in the transcript suggests that appellant unequivocally and unambiguously requested counsel during the second interview, moreover.

In Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 , the Supreme Court explained that [[Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel “requires at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of desire for the assistance of an attorney.” ... But if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning. (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) The Davis Court went on to comment: Of course, when a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal statement it will often be good police practice for the interviewing officers to clarify whether or not he actually wants an attorney----Clarifying questions help protect the rights of the suspect by ensuring that he gets an attorney if he wants one, and will minimize the chance of a confession being suppressed due to subsequent judicial second-guessing as to the meaning of the suspect’s statement regarding ¹⁵⁶ counsel. But we decline to adopt a rule requiring officers to ask clarifying questions.

If the suspect’s statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him. Id. at 461-62 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 . The Court summarized: To recapitulate: We held in Miranda that a suspect is entitled to the assistance of counsel during custodial interrogation even though the Constitution does not provide for such assistance. We held in Edwards that if the suspect invokes the right to counsel at any time, the police must immediately cease questioning him until an attorney is present.

But we are unwilling to create a third layer of prophylaxis to prevent police questioning when the suspect might want a lawyer. Unless the suspect actually requests an attorney, questioning may continue. Id. at 462, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (emphasis in original). As the trial court insightfully summarized in its “Memorandum and Order,” appellant had indicated that there may be areas or subjects that she would talk about, and ones that she preferred not to or wished to talk to counsel about.

The police officers here, and particularly Detective Jones, had had numerous discussions with her and had seen her change her mind, most notably in insisting on seeking to “clarify something” after just previously terminating the interview. In such a circumstance and context, the statements by Ms. Raras do not necessarily communicate to a reasonable police officer with the background with Ms. Raras that these officers had, that she was taking a firm position free of any ambiguities or equivocations either as to remaining totally silent or being desirous of counsel before continuing any discussion. Even from a textual analysis, the ambiguities and potential equivocations are clear. Ms. Raras states: “And I’ll not say anything more on that.

Because it’s a long and tedious process of teaching.” What is the “that” she is referring to? Discussions with Tickles or something broader or narrower? Is she stopping because she does not want to incriminate ¹⁵⁷ herself or simply because the process is a “long and tedious process of teaching”? And then when she states shortly thereafter: “This is the thing.

Very well. That’s the option I want to ask my lawyer.” Again, what is the “thing” referenced? What “option” is she referring to? Is it only one area that she wants to discuss with her lawyer?

As Ms. Raras proceeds, she says, “I want to stop from that point. Because I