Reynolds v. State

DAVIS, Judge. On January 28, 1999, appellant Troy William Reynolds was convicted at a bench trial in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County for possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance (Count One) and possession of a controlled dangerous substance (Count Two). On March 24, 1998, appellant was arrested by Anne Arundel County Police, pursuant to two outstanding warrants in appellant’s name in Prince George’s County. Subsequent to the arrest, appellant ³¹⁰ was searched, whereupon nineteen baggies of what was suspected to be cocaine were discovered in his pants pocket.

Appellant was subsequently charged on June 6, 1998 by criminal information with the above offenses. On August 13, 1998, appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized based on an illegal stop. A hearing was conducted on December 21,1998 and the motion was denied. On January 28,1999, appellant requested a reconsideration of the motion to suppress, which was denied, and a bench trial proceeded on a not guilty statement of facts.

Appellant was convicted and the court merged Count Two into Count One. Subsequently, he was sentenced on March 23, 1999 to five years in prison with credit for four days served, with the remainder of the sentence suspended, and four years supervised probation. On this appeal, we are presented with one question, which we rephrase as follows: Did the trial court err when it denied appellant’s motion to suppress evidence based on his Fourth Amendment protections against unlawful search and seizure? We answer the question in the affirmative and, accordingly, reverse the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND This appeal focuses on the events leading to appellant’s arrest on March 24, 1998 on Meade Circle Road in the Meade Village neighborhood in Anne Arundel County. Appellant asserts that his initial detention by police that day was an unlawful seizure and violated his protections against unlawful search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. At approximately 3:30 p.m., two uniformed officers — Detective Thomas Coleman and Officer McNamara— entered Meade Circle Road in Meade Village in Severn, Maryland, in their marked patrol vehicle. The officers observed a group of approximately ten individuals gathered on one of the street corners.

One of the individuals yelled “five- ³¹¹ 0” 1 and the group immediately began to disperse. Appellant continued to walk at a normal pace and the police pulled their vehicle along the sidewalk on which appellant was walking, exited the car, and approached him. Maurice Wilson, a friend of appellant and a witness at the suppression hearing, was initially walking along with appellant but, once the police stopped their vehicle, he continued in a different direction while still remaining in the area. The officers asked appellant his name and his date of birth to which he truthfully replied.

Although what occurred next is disputed by the officers and witnesses who testified for appellant regarding how long appellant was detained and at what point he was handcuffed, we consider, upon our review of the denial of the motion to suppress, only that version of the testimony in the light most favorable to the State and accepted by the motions judge. That version, as presented through the testimony of Detective Coleman, was that, after appellant stated his name and date of birth in response to the questions asked, the officers proceeded to radio in the information to check if any outstanding warrants existed in appellant’s name. Detective Coleman testified at the suppression hearing that it was only after they received information that there were warrants outstanding against appellant from Prince George’s County that he was handcuffed. Subsequent to his arrest on the warrants, the police conducted a search of appellant and recovered two baggies, both of which contained other baggies, four in one bag, and fifteen in the other, of what was later to be identified as crack cocaine.

Appellant was charged and eventually convicted of possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance and possession of a controlled dangerous substance. He was sentenced to five years in prison, all of which was suspended except for four days served that were credited, and four years of supervised probation. Appellant then filed this timely appeal. ³¹² DISCUSSION Introduction Reduced to its simplest terms, the issues in this ease require us to answer two questions: 1) Was the initial encounter between Troy William Reynolds and the two law enforcement officers, Detective Thomas Coleman and Officer McNamara, a consensual accosting or a stop unsupported by reasonable articulable suspicion? 2) During the five minute detention of appellant, do the circumstances, when subjected to an objective standard, indicate that a reasonable person would have felt free to leave and end the encounter? See Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 367 , 735 A.2d 491 (1999).

As court decisions — particularly decisions emanating from the Supreme Court — have considered Fourth Amendment implications attendant to police-citizen confrontations in public places, the thread running throughout these decisions is that lawfulness of the encounter turns on the reasonableness of the actions of law enforcement officials, which must be evaluated according to the alternative which is minimally invasive of personal liberties, yet permits officers to carry out their sworn duties when the facts, which have come to their attention through legitimate means, demonstrate the commission of a criminal act or acts. The Fourth Amendment is not implicated, however, when a citizen, in the absence of a show of coercive authority, consents to answer questions put to him or her by police officers. Because of the manner in which appellant and the State have framed the issues on this appeal, we believe our discussion, infra, will more graphically demonstrate what constitutes an accosting and its constitutionally permissible scope when contrasted with more intrusive police actions. Recent decisions pronouncing the constitutionally sanctioned bases for an on-the-street stop have severely limited the right of law enforcement officials to engage in arbitrary stops except when the intrusion is minimal; random stops focusing on a particular suspect as the criminal agent of some as yet undiscovered crime continue to be disfavored. ³¹³ STANDARD OF REVIEW In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress under Maryland Rule 4-252, we look only to the record of the suppression hearing and do not consider the record of the trial (or proceeding adjudicating the merits, i.e., agreed statement of facts).

Graham v. State, 119 Md.App. 444 , 705 A.2d 82 (1998) (quoting Trusty v. State, 308 Md. 658 , 521 A.2d 749 (1987)); see also Gamble v. State, 318 Md. 120, 125 , 567 A.2d 95 (1989); Herod v. State, 311 Md. 288, 290 , 534 A.2d 362 (1987); Jackson v. State, 52 Md.App. 327 , 332 n. 5, 449 A.2d 438 , cert. denied, 294 Md. 652 (1982). In considering the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, we extend great deference to the fact-finding of the suppression hearing judge with respect to determining the credibility of the wit nesses and to weighing and determining first-level facts. Perkins v. State, 83 Md.App. 341, 346 , 574 A.2d 356 (1990). When conflicting evidence is presented, we accept the facts as found by the hearing judge unless it is shown that his or her findings are clearly erroneous.

Graham, 119 Md.App. at 449 , 705 A.2d 82 (citing Riddick v. State, 319 Md. 180, 183 , 571 A.2d 1239 (1990)). As to the ultimate conclusion, however, we must make our own independent constitutional appraisal by reviewing the law and applying it to the facts of the case. Lawson v. State, 120 Md.App. 610, 614 , 707 A.2d 947 (1998); Graham, 119 Md.App. at 450 , 705 A.2d 82 (citing Riddick, 319 Md. at 183 , 571 A.2d 1239 ; Perkins, 83 Md.App. at 346 , 574 A.2d 356 ). In determining whether a seizure of the person took place, we look to the totality of the circumstances of the initial encounter between appellant and the police.

Ferris, 355 Md. at 376 , 735 A.2d 491 . We review the trial court’s factual findings in the light most favorable to the State, and review these findings for clear error, but we review the legal conclusions de novo. Id. at 368, 735 A.2d 491 . THE ISSUES AS FRAMED BY APPELLANT AND STATE Relying on our decision in Lawson v. State, 120 Md.App. 610 , 707 A.2d 947 (1998), for the proposition that the initial ³¹⁴ detention in the case at hand constituted a seizure of the person rather than an accosting, appellant asserts that “the discovery of facts subsequent to the stop cannot overcome the illegality of a stop that commenced without sufficient probable cause to justify the stop and subsequent detention.” Id. at 618 , 707 A.2d 947 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).

In responding to the State’s argument that the encounter between the police and appellant was consensual, Reynolds is constrained to engage in an analysis that distinguishes between a voluntary interaction and what constitutes a seizure of the person. Such an analysis necessarily involves a discussion of controlling authorities that consider Fourth Amendment implications of “Terry stop” cases, including recent decisions in which the Court of Appeals and this Court have articulated the “second stop” principle. Appellant’s argument need not extend beyond a discussion of the circumstances under which a consensual encounter is transformed into a constitutionally impermissible seizure in view of the State’s candidness in acknowledging that the encounter did not support a Terry stop. In other words, the State’s concession that no basis exists to justify a Terry stop and our concurrence, upon our independent constitutional appraisal, in the legal efficacy of that concession relieves appellant of the task of responding to or countering any argument that there was any legal basis for the detention of appellant other than that it was consensual.

Indeed, the State offered no evidence at the suppression hearing or at argument before us that the stop in this case was a Terry stop. Detective Coleman recounted his reason for stopping appellant and the circumstances attendant thereto: [DETECTIVE COLEMAN]: We pulled near 1813 — Circle when we saw [appellant], who wasn’t familiar to me. I’ve worked that area for seven years, and I wasn’t familiar with him. So we got out.

We pulled over, and Officer McNamara and myself walked over to him on the sidewalk and asked him what his name was and, you know, ³¹⁵ who he was here [to] see. Kind of just general information. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Now, what, if anything, was he doing at that time for you to stop him? [DETECTIVE COLEMAN]: Like I said, I wasn’t familiar [with] who he was. I worked that area the whole time. Wasn’t familiar, he walked away from the crowd.

So we just pulled over and asked him, you know, who he was, what he was doing here, where he was from. That kind of — just basic information. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Just basic information. But there was no reason for you to do that, was there? [DETECTIVE COLEMAN]: It’s my job. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Except you just hadn’t seen him before, is that right? I mean, you didn’t know [who] he was? [DETECTIVE COLEMAN]: Correct. * * * [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: What, if anything, was [appellant] doing when you first came in contact with that crowd and him, who was in the crowd?

What, if anything, was he doing that would cause you to stop him? [DETECTIVE COLEMAN]: It was just the fact that I didn’t — they were standing on the corner. I didn’t know him. I wasn’t familar [sic] with him. I knew unless he was someone new that had moved in the area, I didn’t know who he was.

Neither in the above excerpt nor anywhere else in his testimony did Detective Coleman express any fear for his safety or articulate facts that would constitute reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. The court, upon its review of the evidence at the suppression hearing, concluded: [Appellant] says he was put against the fence. He [sic] witness said they just told him, “Go stand over there.” And ³¹⁶ that is a significant difference. It is also different in terms of the description of what was said about Tony Harold passed between the witnesses.

So I find from that conflict in their testimony and the rest of the circumstances it appears it was a reasonable accosting, it was not an arrest, not a detention. And that the police acted reasonable [sic] to arrest [appellant] only when they received confirmation over the radio that there was that warrant [sic] out for him. Citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991), the State asserts, in its brief, “In this case, the encounter did not implicate the Fourth Amendment” because a seizure of the person only occurs when “an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, restrains the liberty of a citizen.” At oral argument before us, the State was questioned with great vigor about its position, vis-a-vis appellant’s asserted fruit of the poisonous tree taint on the seizure of the illegal contraband should we conclude that the initial stop was illegal. The State was specifically asked by the Court, “Can an illegal stop ripen into a legal arrest which will support seizure of the baggies of cocaine if probable cause is developed during an illegal detention?” The State maintained that the initial confrontation in this case was consensual and constituted nothing more than an accosting, which lasted until the officers received information regarding the outstanding warrants, 2 at which time they had probable cause to effect an arrest.

The corollary was that the State acknowledged, in argument before us, that, if the initial encounter was an illegal stop unsupported by articulable suspicion, the warrants would not have been discovered and the probable cause upon which the arrest was based would not have been developed, nor the contraband recovered. In support of its position that the stop was an ³¹⁷ accosting, the State points to the testimony of Detective Coleman that the encounter with appellant prior to the discovery of the outstanding warrants lasted only five — possibly ten minutes. The State also relies on Detective Coleman’s testimony that appellant was not handcuffed until after the information was received regarding the outstanding warrants. The following excerpt more precisely represents what Detective Coleman said about the time lapse: [DETECTIVE COLEMAN]: I don’t recall the specific time on this incident.

They have 20 minutes to respond. Once they tell us initially, our — when our teletype operator, our dispatcher tells us that there is an outstanding warrant in the computer, then Prince George[’]s County has 20 minutes to respond back and tell us yeah or nay. They want it or they don’t want it, it’s a good warrant or it’s not a good warrant. But I don’t recall the specific time on this one. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Were you waiting on that information as to whether or not there was [an] outstanding warrant for 10 — for five minutes? [DETECTIVE COLEMAN]: I would say probably about five minutes. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: It could have been 10 minutes? [DETECTIVE COLEMAN]: It could have been 10. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: As a matter of fact, it could have been as much as 15 to 20 minutes, couldn’t it? [DETECTIVE COLEMAN]: I don’t recall.

I would recall if it was too long, if it was unusually long. Most times they’re pretty quick about that. Within 10 minutes is normally the rule, that they’re within 10. [APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: So he was just standing there waiting until [sic] verified your call? Appellant’s appellate counsel, in his brief as well as during oral argument, relied exclusively on the testimony offered by appellant and the witnesses called on his behalf.

They related at trial that, after appellant told Detective Coleman his name, ³¹⁸ the detective ordered him to “get over to a fence.” A critical difference in the testimony of appellant’s witnesses and Detective Coleman was that appellant and Wilson aver that Detective Coleman handcuffed appellant immediately after he was unable to produce identification and, significantly, before the discovery of the two outstanding Prince George’s County bench warrants. Additionally, appellant testified that his detention lasted fifteen to twenty minutes. We remind appellant’s counsel that, as we noted supra, on appeal from a suppression hearing, we defer to the factual findings and the resolution of issues of credibility made by the judge who presided at the suppression hearing. Thus, our determination of the legality, vel non, of the initial stop and when, in fact, the actual arrest occurred, must be based on the facts as found by the suppression judge.

The Court of Appeals observed in Jones v. State, 343 Md. 448, 457-58 , 682 A.2d 248 (1996): When the question is whether a constitutional right, such as, as [sic] here, a defendant’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, has been violated, the reviewing court makes its own independent constitutional appraisal, by reviewing the law and applying it to the peculiar facts of the particular case. When the facts are in dispute, deference is paid to the trial court, that is, its findings of fact are accepted unless they are clearly erroneous. In making the latter determination, the [C]ourt must give “due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” When the motion to suppress has been denied, the only relevant facts “are ... those produced at the suppression hearing, ... which are most favorable to the State as the prevailing party on the motion.” On the other hand, when the motion is granted, the evidence produced at the suppression hearing must be considered in the light most favorable to the defendant. (Emphasis added; citations omitted). ³¹⁹ As the Jones Court continued: Determining the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced at trial are not matters entrusted to the appellate courts.

Credibility is defined as “worthiness of belief; that quality in a witness which renders his [or her] evidence worthy of belief.” Credibility is also defined as “the quality or power of inspiring belief.” Id. at 465 , 682 A.2d 248 (citations omitted). Appellant, then, was detained five minutes and was handcuffed after receipt of the information regarding the outstanding warrants. 3 MINIMIZATION OF GOVERNMENTAL INTRUSION As we previously mentioned, we believe a delineation of the position of an accosting as it relates to governmental invasions is helpful in explicating its role in investigative confrontations. At the outset, an accosting, which from the totality of the circumstances can be objectively demonstrated to be consensual, is not a governmental invasion at all. Because the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not to eliminate all contact between the police and the citizenry, but only to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials, encounters which do not involve such arbitrary and oppressive interference are not subjected to constitutional review.

It is only at the point in time when an encounter is no longer consensual, resulting in an involuntary detention, that a Fourth Amendment analysis is required. Whether a Fourth Amendment constitutional analysis addresses the lawfulness of ³²⁰ a warrantless search or arrest by State agents, at one end of the spectrum, or the requirements for an applicant seeking a warrant to conduct a wiretap to uncover suspected criminal activity, at the other end of the spectrum, the overarching principle, as we observed in Graham, 119 Md.App. at 458 , 705 A.2d 82 (quoting Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 , 117 S.Ct. 882 , 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997)), is: We reversed, explaining that “[t]he touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion,’ ” and that reasonableness “depends ‘on a balance between the public interest and the individual[’]s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.’ ” Stated otherwise, no invasion of the individual’s right to be free from arbitrary interference from law officers is constitutionally tolerated absent a demonstrated public interest involved, in which case, it can be said that the intrusion is no longer arbitrary. The touchstone of such an analysis is that a more intrusive governmental action requires a demonstrably more substantial legal basis in order to pass constitutional muster. We hasten to point out, however, that, notwithstanding the principle that a minimally intrusive governmental action will more likely be viewed as reasonable when subjected to a Fourth Amendment analysis, law enforcement authorities are not obligated to use the least intrusive means available to verify or dispel their suspicions that the law is being violated.

State v. Lemmon, 318 Md. 365, 378 , 568 A.2d 48 (1990). As the Court of Appeals explained in Lemmon : The reasonableness of the officer’s decision to stop a suspect does not turn on the availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques. Such a rule would unduly hamper the police’s ability to make swift on-the-spot decisions ... and it would require courts to “indulge in ‘unrealistic second-guessing.’ ” Id. at 378 , 568 A.2d 48 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 , 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). ³²¹ We begin with the proposition that a pedestrian, who has committed no criminal act, has the unfettered right to freedom of movement on a public street without interference from law enforcement officers. In descending order of intrusiveness, these are the requirements for there to be a constitutionally sanctioned interference from law enforcement officers: Stop, Search, or Arrest, Pursuant to a Warrant— Extreme governmental intrusion resulting in possible loss of liberty in addition to temporary restriction of movement— permitted because, in addition to facts tending to establish that a crime has been committed and suspect is criminal agent, neutral arbiter, magistrate, or judge with legal knowledge superior to officer has reviewed facts and indicated opinion that they constitute probable cause.

Warrantless Stop, Search, or Arrest — Extreme governmental intrusion resulting in possible loss of liberty in addition to temporary restriction of movement — -permitted because of the exigency of a felony having been committed or a misdemeanor being committed in officer’s presence, i.e., because of the ability to personally verify the commission of the offense. Stop, Pursuant to Terry v. Ohio — Less intrusive governmental action resulting initially in temporary restriction of movement — permitted when officer observes suspicious activity indicating criminal activity afoot; bases include officer’s experience, knowledge of suspect’s criminal history, high crime area; officer may conduct limited “pat-down” of outer garments to detect weapons when officer has apprehension for his or her safety. Accosting — Only minimally intrusive governmental action resulting in no restriction of movement — permitted as long as inquiry involves no show of authority and objective circumstances indicate a reasonable person would feel free to leave. See Ferris, 355 Md. at 374 n. 5, 735 A.2d 491 (citing Commonwealth v. Sierra, 555 Pa. 170 , 723 A.2d 644 (1999) (setting ³²² forth three tiers of interaction between a citizen and the police)).

ACCOSTING Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged (1986), defines “accosting” as: to approach and speak to; speak to without having first been spoken to; to confront, usu[ally] in a somewhat challenging or defensive way; to address abruptly (as in a chance meeting) and usu[ally] with a certain degree of impetuosity or boldness;.... A consensual encounter, on the other hand, has been defined as: simply the voluntary cooperation of a private citizen in response to non-coercive questioning by a law enforcement official. Because an individual is free to leave during such an encounter, he [or she] is not “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir., 1990); see also United States v. Johnson, 910 F.2d 1506, 1508 (7th Cir., 1990).

Although judicial decisions speak in terms of a “mere accosting” being a non-constitutional event, an “accosting” references only the actions of the police without respect to the response of the person accosted. An accosting may continue to be a non-constitutional event if: 1) the citizen consents to answer questions or otherwise cooperates and 2) that consent is not the result of physical force or a show of authority by police signaling that compliance with the requests of law enforcement officers is required. Thus, notwithstanding federal and State decisions that hold an “accosting” is a non-constitutional event, it ceases to be so when the circumstances demonstrate that the purported consensual response of the citizen is the product of coercion. Typically, an accosting occurs when police officers approach a citizen and ask for information, usually one’s name, ³²³ address, date of birth, destination, point of origin, and contents of luggage or vehicle.

To be sure, the principal investigative technique in law enforcement is the so-called “field interview.” Virtually all such interviews conducted during the course of an officer’s duties are done for the purpose of gathering information to ferret out criminal offenses or to elicit from witnesses facts relative to a criminal event or an ongoing investigation. We certainly recognize an officer’s right — indeed, his or her responsibility' — to conduct inquiries regarding criminal activity. Simply put, that is what they do. It is only when police “indicate that compliance with their requests is required by means of physical force or show of authority” that the gears of the Fourth Amendment are engaged., Stanberry v. State, 343 Md. 720, 730 , 684 A.2d 823 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1210 , 117 S.Ct. 1692 , 137 L.Ed.2d 819 (1997).

When the officer suspects the person interviewed of having committed a crime and makes a general inquiry, decisions predating the requirement that a stop be based on a reasonable particularized articulable suspicion have held that an admission in response to the general inquiry may provide the basis of a further detention or arrest. In Cornish v. State, 215 Md. 64 , 137 A.2d 170 (1957), the Court of Appeals explained: “One is not arrested when he [or she] is approached by a police officer and merely questioned as to his [or her] identity and actions. This amounts to no more than an accosting.” In another case, a plainclothes police officer told appellant, as he alighted from an automobile, “I want those lottery tickets you have on you,” to which appellant replied, “There they are in my coat pocket. Take them.” Blager v. State, 162 Md. 664 , 161 A. 1 (1932).

The Court held that the subsequent arrest was lawful because Blager’s admission amounted to commission of a misdemeanor in the presence of the officer. Had he “been passive and silent when confronted with the sergeant’s implied accusation,” said the court, “he would have been immune from any police interference until a warrant had ³²⁴ been procured.” Id. at 666 , 161 A. 1 . To like effect, see Robinson v. State, 200 Md. 128 , 88 A.2d 310 (1952). These earlier decisions involve non-custodial admissions, in response to accusatory inquiries, which provided the basis for probable cause and, as we noted, supra, they predate decisions requiring that a stop be based on reasonable articulable suspicion.

An accosting as a viable investigatory technique survives the strictures of Terry v. Ohio, supra, and Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 , 88 S.Ct. 1889 , 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968), so long as the circumstances, viewed against an objective standard, indicate that the encounter is consensual and that a reasonable person would feel free to end the encounter and simply walk away. A survey of State and federal decisions that discuss whether an accosting implicates the Fourth Amendment is instructive. In Jones v. State, 319 Md. 279 , 572 A.2d 169 (1990), Jones had been riding his ten-speed bicycle at approximately 3:20 in the morning, when the police officer observed him carrying clothes across his shoulders that appeared to be on hangers. Because of recent burglaries in the area, and because Jones was proceeding from the direction of a dry cleaning establishment six blocks away, the officer hailed him, stating, “Hey, could you come here” or “Hold on a minute.” As Jones alighted from the bicycle, the officer testified that he noticed a bulge in Jones’s jacket pocket and, after patting him down, retrieved a twenty-five caliber pistol.

A search of a grocery bag in Jones’s possession, revealed fourteen capsules containing cocaine, a quantity of marijuana, one pack of rolling paper, and a billfold containing five small vials of cocaine. We affirmed the trial court’s conviction in an unreported opinion, characterizing the initial encounter as a “mere accosting,” not within the protection of the Fourth Amendment. We had reasoned that Jones was free to disregard Officer Brown’s salutation and continue on his way because “there were no signs of force or weapons used to effectuate the stop and because Jones stopped voluntarily in a cooperative and polite manner, no seizure of Jones had occurred.” Jones, 319 Md. at ³²⁵ 282, 572 A.2d 169 . Concluding that the officer admitted he had no knowledge of any specific crimes having been committed during the early morning hours nor of any burglaries having occurred in the area that night, the Court of Appeals held, “Mere hunches are insufficient to justify the stop of a citizen riding a bicycle on a public street.” Continued the Court, “We said that tenuous facts constituting a ‘reasonable suspicion’ would be perilously close to entitling a policeman [or policewoman] ‘to seize and search every person whom he [or she] sees on the street.’ ” Id. at 288 , 572 A.2d 169 (quoting Anderson v. State, 282 Md. 701, 707 , 387 A.2d 281 (1978) (quoting Sibron, 392 U.S. at 64 , 88 S.Ct. 1889 )).

Citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983), the Jones Court discussed the nature of a voluntary stop: Law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him [or her] if he [or she] is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him [or her] if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in criminal prosecution his [or her] voluntary answer to such questions. Nor would the fact that the officer identified himself [or herself] as a police officer, without more, convert the encounter into a seizure requiring some level of objective justification. The person approached, need not answer any questions put to him [or her]; indeed, he [or she] may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his [or her] way. He [or she] may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable objective grounds for doing so, and his [or her] refusal to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those grounds.

Jones, 319 Md. at 284 , 572 A.2d 169 (emphasis added). The Jones Court, quoting Terry v. Ohio, supra, reiterated the standard announced by the Supreme Court in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980), as to what distinguishes a seizure from an accosting. It is only when the police “by some means of ³²⁶ physical force or show of authority detain an individual, thereby restraining the person’s liberty,” that a seizure occurs. The Court of Appeals, in Jones, continued: In 1980, the Supreme Court in Mendenhall described the extent of the restraint on a person’s freedom of movement which distinguishes the seizure of a person from a mere accosting.

No seizure occurs when an individual to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away. 446 U.S. at 554 , 100 S.Ct. at 1877 , 64 L.Ed.2d at 509 . Under these circumstances, Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, explained that a person has not been seized if there is no restraint on the person’s freedom of movement. The person may disregard the questions put forth by the police officer and continue on his [or her] way. Jones, 319 Md. at 283 , 572 A.2d 169 (emphasis added).

In Lemmon, supra, three Baltimore City policemen received a tip from a dispatcher, who did not know the source of the information, that “some narcotics transaction was going on” in the 2400 block of Kermit Court in Baltimore City. As they approached that location, two of the officers alighted from their vehicle and saw a black male, the appellant, talking to another black male. The appellant began to walk away when the officers were approximately twenty-five feet from him and his companion and, when one of the officers identified himself as a police officer, “Lemmon took off running.” After a chase in which Lemmon avoided a police car driven by the third police officer, one of the pursuing officers saw him pull a “medicine-type vial” out of his jacket pocket and attempt to force it through a chain linked fence, the vial bouncing off and falling to the ground. After a continued chase, the officers cornered Lemmon and ordered him to the ground.

The narrow question presented in Lemmon , in light of Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 , 109 S.Ct. 1378 , 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989), was whether the State was correct in interpreting Brower to hold that “no seizure takes place until the restraining effect of a police command actually occurs, i.e., when the person is within the police ³²⁷ officer’s physical control.” For purposes of the discussion of the issues in the case at hand, the Court of Appeals, in Lemmon , reaffirmed its earlier holdings in Watkins v. State, 288 Md. 597 , 420 A.2d 270 (1980), and Anderson v. State, supra, in which it referred to the “bedrock constitutional law” pertaining to search and seizure announced in Terry v. Ohio: “ ‘whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his [or her] freedom to walk away, he has “seized” that person [within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment].’ ” Id. at 376, 568 A.2d 48 . Pertinent to our discussion in the case at hand regarding when facts warranting a stop must come to the officer’s attention, the Court said: The Court observed [in Terry ] that[,] “whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his [or her] freedom to walk away, he [or she] has ‘seized’ that person” [within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment], We said in Anderson [, 282 Md.] at 704-705, 387 A.2d 281 (citations omitted): The central inquiry is “the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” In determining whether the intrusion was justified at its inception, “the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” The reasonableness of an intrusion is to be assessed against an objective standard' — whether “the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.” Lemmon, 318 Md. at 376 , 568 A.2d 48 (emphasis added). In a case in which Maryland State Police, assigned to drug interdiction at the Maryland House, removed an unclaimed bag belonging to a passenger who had not reboarded the Greyhound bus, the Court of Appeals, in primarily focusing on ³²⁸ the issue of whether the bag had been abandoned, said in Stanberry, 343 Md. at 742 , 684 A.2d 823 : [L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him [or her] if he [or she] is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him [or her] if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his [or her] voluntary answers to such questions.... ... Thus, police may approach private citizens and ask questions or ask for identification without individualized suspicion or probable cause, provided the encounter is consensual ____ Id.

(quoting Royer, 460 U.S. at 497 , 103 S.Ct. at 1324 (citations omitted) (citing Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 559 , 100 S.Ct. at 1879-80 )). In a case in which two Baltimore City Police Detectives observed a suspect carrying two portable radios shortly after a Realistic brand radio, a ring, and watch had been stolen from an apartment in the same block in which they were cruising, we said, in affirming the motions court’s denial of appellant’s motion to suppress in Martin v. State, 51 Md.App. 142, 147-49 , 442 A.2d 191 (1982): While the Supreme Court in Terry held that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his [or her] freedom to walk away he has seized the person, the Court noting the “rich diversity” of police-citizen encounters also observed: “Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen [or policewomen] and citizens involve ‘seizures’ of persons. Only when the officer by means of physical force or show of authority has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may it be concluded that a seizure has occurred.” ... See United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62, 67 (D.C.Cir. 1977) where the Court, in reliance on the above-quoted language from Terry observed: But police-citizen communications which take place under circumstances in which the citizen’s [“]freedom to walk ³²⁹ awayf’] is not limited by anything other than his [or her] desire to cooperate do not amount to [“]seizures[”] of the person, and consequently may be initiated without a reasonable, articulable suspicion, much less probable cause.

We adhere to the view that a person is [“]seized[”] only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his [or her] freedom of movement is restrained. Only when such restraint is imposed is there any foundation whatever for invoking constitutional safeguards. The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not to eliminate all contact between the police and the citizenry, but [“]to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals.... As long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that person’s liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require some particularized and objective justification.

(Citations omitted.) In a more recent decision, Lawson v. State, supra, a Frederick County Police Officer was patrolling the area of an apartment complex at approximately 7:45 in the evening when he drove past appellant in a legally parked vehicle in an area known for high drug activity. After circling the complex, he noticed that the vehicle, bearing West Virginia tags, had not moved; as he drove up behind it, the vehicle began to back up whereupon the officer activated his emergency lights to “cause the vehicle to stop.” Id. at 613, 707 A.2d 947 . In response to the officer’s question as to why he was there, Lawson replied that his car had overheated, at which time the officer attempted to verify the appellant’s story by ordering him to start his vehicle, thereby allowing the officer to check the heat gauge, which did not indicate that the car had overheated. At this point, the officer ordered the appellant ³³⁰ out of the car and administered a field sobriety test because he had noticed the odor of alcohol.

As a result of the test, the officer concluded that Lawson was under the influence of alcohol, resulting in his prosecution and conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol. In holding that the activation of the officer’s vehicle’s emergency lights constituted a stop unsupported by sufficient reasonable articulable suspicion, we observed: Ordinarily, approaching a parked vehicle to question occupants about their identity and actions is a mere accosting and not a seizure.... But, it is more than a mere accosting when the police attempt to detain a suspect for questioning through the use of police power and the suspect submits. The approach then becomes a seizure and must be justified by a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.

Lawson, 120 Md.App. at 614 , 707 A.2d 947 (citations omitted). Significantly, we noted in Lawson, 120 Md.App. at 615 , 707 A.2d 947 , that California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 , 111 S.Ct. 1547 , 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991), clarified that Mendenhall establishes that the test for existence of a “show of authority” is an objective one determined by whether the officer’s words and actions would have conveyed to the citizen that his or her freedom of movement was being restricted, rather than the citizen’s perception. As Reynolds points out, Judge Sonner, writing for this Court, also opined that the discovery of facts subsequent to the stop cannot overcome a stop that started without enough to justify detention, adding that our analysis begins and ends at the point of constitutional seizure. Id. at 618 , 707 A.2d 947 (citing Terry v. Ohio, supra).

In Ferris , a Maryland State Trooper, operating a laser speed gun on an interstate in Western Maryland, clocked the vehicle driven by Ferris at ninety-two miles per hour. He activated his emergency lights and stopped the vehicle and asked the driver, Ferris, to produce his driver’s license and registration. According to the trooper, he noticed that Ferris’s eyes were bloodshot, that he appeared “a little nervous, a ³³¹ little fidgety.” During the time that the trooper returned to his patrol ear and requested a driver’s license and outstanding warrant check, he noticed that Ferris and his passenger were “moving around and looking back toward him quite frequently.” As the trooper was writing the citation, a deputy sheriff arrived and parked ten feet behind the trooper’s vehicle, activating his