Richardson v. State

Morton, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant, Gordon Lee Richardson, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County of rape, committing a perverted sex act and burglary. He was sentenced by Judge Ralph W. Powers to serve twenty years on the rape conviction, five years on the perverted sex act conviction and twenty years on the burglary conviction, the latter two sentences to run concurrently with the sentence for rape. The victim, who was twenty-four years of age, unmarried and living alone in an apartment dwelling, testified that shortly prior to 6:00 a.m. on December 16, 1967, she awakened to find a man in her room, whom she identified at the trial as the appellant.

She immediately screamed. He then approached her, placed his hand over her mouth and “started pulling down my pajama bottoms, and I started fighting him and he hit me several times.” He then got on the bed, placed his mouth “in my vagina” whereupon the victim hit the appellant on his head with a bowling tenpin which she had beside her bed. According to the victim, “I started screaming because I realized I didn’t knock him out and I was scared.” The appellant then “got up and went to the bathroom and got a towel and was washing his head with it because it was bleeding. And he came back and I was trying to talk him into leaving * * He then went to the front door “and I thought he was leaving, and then he said, ‘Oh, no.’ And then he came back.” In response to the question what happened then, the victim replied: “He raped me.” Thereafter the appel ⁴⁵⁰ lant left the apartment and the victim ran to the next door apartment and reported what had occurred to her neighbor.

The victim further testified that entrance to her apartment was gained through a window, the front door being locked. A police officer testified that earlier that morning, between 4:00 a.m. and 4:15 a.m., he observed the appellant “tiptoeing away from a lighted bathroom window” of a building in the vicinity of the apartment occupied by the victim; that he took him into custody and was driving him to the police station in a police car when he decided to release the appellant because he was not certain what charge to place against him. A police Sergeant testified, out of the presence of the jury, that at 1:00 p.m. on December 16, 1967, he went to the appellant's home; advised him that he was under arrest for rape and burglary; placed handcuffs upon him; and escorted him to the police cruiser. There he read to the appellant from a card (which was introduced in evidence) 1 the so-called Miranda warnings.

The Sergeant stated that after reading the “identification side” of the card to the appellant, he started reading the ⁴⁵¹ other side (waiver) and “as I came to the point, ‘Do you understand and know what you are doing?’ instead of answering in the affirmative or the negative he said, T did not rape that girl. She gave in to me voluntarily.’ ” The Sergeant stated that about forty minutes later, after the appellant had been taken to the police station: “I again read the card to him. He repeated—I said, ‘Do you understand your rights and what I have just explained to you ?’ And he said he did. I said, ‘Are you willing to make a statement without a lawyer present at this time?’ And he said, T do want to have an attorney appointed to me.’ However —■ he didn’t say however.

He said, ‘I do want an attorney, but my story will be the same. I did not rape the girl.’ And then he reiterated what he told me previously.” As indicated above, the foregoing testimony was given out of the presence of the jury and the trial judge, after hearing extended argument, concluded that “there is no indication that the statement made was anything other than entirely voluntary.” In this appeal, the appellant first contends that it was error to admit the statement since “there was no showing by the State that prior to his making said statement he was advised that he was entitled to have an attorney appointed for him if he could not afford one.” He apparently bases this argument on the fact that the “Miranda card” which was introduced into evidence, without objection, was not sent to this Court with the record of the proceedings below. However, the record has been properly corrected; the card is now a part of the record before us; and it is clear that the card, which was read to the appellant on two separate occasions, contained the warning: “If you cannot afford a lawyer one will be appointed for you before a statement is taken if you wish.” It is apparent, therefore, that the complaint of the appellant in this respect is without substance. It is next