Robey v. State

⁴⁵¹ HARRELL, J. We decide in this case whether a restitution order, entered against an adult defendant in excess of $10,000, violates the limitations on restitution orders found in Maryland Code (2001), Criminal Procedure Article, § ll-604(b) (hereinafter “Crim. Proc.”). 1 Because we conclude that the relevant statutory limit is applicable only to child defendants, child respondents, 2 and their parents, we hold that a restitution order entered against an adult defendant is not subject to the $10,000 statutory ceiling. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On 27 August 2003, Wallace Jerome Robey was convicted in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County of second-degree assault and reckless endangerment. The Circuit Court sentenced Robey to three years imprisonment, all of which was suspended, and ordered restitution 3 in an amount to be deter ⁴⁵² mined in a separate hearing.

Based on medical bills and correspondence with the victim, Jesse McCoy, the Maryland Division of Parole and Probation recommended the figure of $42,260.75. On 21 November 2003, during the restitution hearing, the Circuit Court imposed on Robey an obligation to pay $42,342.74 4 in restitution to McCoy. Robey appealed his conviction and sentence to the Court of Special Appeals. He did not prevail.

He subsequently challenged the amount of the restitution order in the Circuit Court with a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence. The limited ground of his motion was that Crim. Proc., § ll-604(b) prohibits a restitution order in an amount exceeding $10,000. The Circuit Court denied Robey’s motion and Robey filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

Before that court could hear the appeal, we issued a writ of certiorari, on our own motion, to consider Robey’s contention that the $10,000 statutory limit on restitution orders applies to adult defendants as well as child defendants and respondents and their parents. We hold that it does not.

II

DISCUSSION At the time restitution was ordered against Robey, Crim. Proc., § ll-604(b) provided: “A judgment of restitution for $10,000 issued under Part I of this subtitle is the absolute limit for all acts arising out of a single incident and is the absolute limit against one child, the child’s parent, or both.” Robey posits that § 11—604(b) should be parsed and read so that $10,000 is the absolute limit on the amount of a restitution order: (1) for all acts arising out of a single incident, and (2) against one respondent child, the child’s parent, or both. By this construction, Robey argues that the $10,000 limit is ⁴⁵³ applicable to adults under parsed clause (1) of § ll-604(b). As support for his construction, Robey points out that the subtitle dealing with restitution deals with both criminal and juvenile proceedings and that § 11-604 itself contains no language limiting its scope to matters involving only children.

He further states that the use of “and” in § ll-604(b) serves to divide the subsection into two distinct clauses: one addressing all matters, and the other addressing matters involving only children. The State contends, however, that the plain language of § ll-604(b), as confirmed by the surrounding context and the statute’s legislative history, makes clear that the $10,000 limit on restitution orders is applicable “only to actions wherein the defendant is a child who is charged as an adult in circuit court, or a child respondent in juvenile court, and the restitution payer is the child, the child’s parent, or both.” A. The Plain Language of § ll-604(b) Confronting us is the familiar task of statutory interpretation, the central canons of which are well-settled. It is patent that “the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.” Mayor & Town Council of Oakland v. Mayor & Town Council of Mountain Lake Park, 392 Md. 301, 316 , 896 A.2d 1036, 1045 (2006); Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223 , 858 A.2d 484, 487 (2004); Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003). This endeavor invariably commences (and frequently ends) with an evaluation of the plain language of the statute in question.

Twine v. State, 395 Md. 539, 550 , 910 A.2d 1132, 1138 (2006); Deville, 383 Md. at 223, 858 A.2d at 487 . If the plain language is unambiguous, that is, it is not susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, we typically cease the inquest into the Legislature’s intent and apply the statute accordingly. Twine, 395 Md. at 550 , 910 A.2d at 1138 ; Mayor & Town Council of Oakland, 392 Md. at 316 , 896 A.2d at 1045 ; Stearman v. State Farm, Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co., 381 Md. 436 , 448 n. 8, 849 A.2d 539 , 546 n. 8 (2004) (quoting Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35 , 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995)); Taylor v. Nations- ⁴⁵⁴ Bank, N.A., 365 Md. 166, 181 , 776 A.2d 645, 654 (2001). In construing statutes, we steadfastly refuse to employ “ ‘forced or subtle interpretations [of a statute] that limit or extend its application.’ ” Kushell v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 385 Md. 563, 576-77 , 870 A.2d 186, 193 (2005) (quoting Price, 378 Md. at 387 , 835 A.2d at 1226 ); Taylor, 365 Md. at 181 , 776 A.2d at 654 ; Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Md. v. Dir. of Fin., 343 Md. 567, 579 , 683 A.2d 512, 517 (1996); Condon v. State-Univ. of Md., 332 Md. 481, 491 , 632 A.2d 753, 758 (1993) (quoting Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins.

Co., 308 Md. 69, 73 , 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986)); Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 546 , 380 A.2d 49, 54 (1977). Occasionally we see fit to examine extrinsic sources of legislative intent merely as a check of our reading of a statute’s plain language. Stanley v. State, 390 Md. 175, 185 , 887 A.2d 1078, 1084 (2005) (citing Design Kitchen & Baths v. Lagos, 388 Md. 718, 730 , 882 A.2d 817, 824 (2005); State v. Glass, 386 Md. 401, 411 , 872 A.2d 729, 735 (2005); and Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128 , 756 A.2d 987, 991 (2000)); Coleman, 281 Md. at 546 , 380 A.2d at 54 ; Chesapeake Amusements, Inc. v. Riddle, 363 Md. 16, 29 , 766 A.2d 1036, 1042-43 (2001); Morris v. Prince George’s County, 319 Md. 597, 604 , 573 A.2d 1346, 1349 (1990). In such instances, we may find useful the context of a statute, the overall statutory scheme, and archival legislative history of relevant enactments.

Mayor & Town Council of Oakland, 392 Md. at 316-17 , 896 A.2d at 1045 ; Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance v. Mullan, 381 Md. 157, 168-69 , 848 A.2d 642, 649 (2004); Md. Green Party v. Md. Bd. of Elections, 377 Md. 127, 178-79 , 832 A.2d 214, 244 (2003); Mid-Atl. Power Supply Ass’n v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 361 Md. 196, 204 , 760 A.2d 1087, 1091 (2000); Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Bell Atl.-Md., Inc., 346 Md. 160, 178 , 695 A.2d 171, 180 (1997).

Upon a plain reading of the statute, we find the language of § ll-604(b) unambiguous. It is evident to us that the language of subsection (b) contemplates application to a “child, the child’s parent, or both” and no other classes of individuals subject to restitution. Robey’s attempt to parse the language of § ll-604(b) in order to manufacture a shelter for adult ⁴⁵⁵ restitution obligors is without merit. The subsection is devoid of any mention of adult defendants or, in fact, any adult not a parent of a child restitution obligor.

Further, it is not apparent at all that the use of the typically conjunctive term “and” in § ll-604(b) was meant to divide the subsection into two separate classes of individuals: one relating to all acts (by adults and children alike) arising out of a single incident, and the other relating to only children and/or their parents. First, the term “and” ordinarily is not read in the disjunctive as Robey wishes, but rather as “[a] conjunction connecting words or phrases expressing the idea that the latter is to be added to or taken along with the first,” Little Store, Inc. v. State, 295 Md. 158 , 163 n. 4, 453 A.2d 1215 , 1218 n. 4 (1983) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 79 (5th ed.1979)), such that the “incident” language is inextricably linked to the “per child and/or parent” language. Second, Robey’s interpretation renders impermissibly superfluous the latter half of the subsection, the “per child and/or parent” language. Mayor & Town Council of Oakland, 392 Md. at 316 , 896 A.2d at 1045 ; Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 243, 292 , 884 A.2d 1171, 1200 (2005); Smack v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 378 Md. 298, 305 , 835 A.2d 1175, 1179 (2003).

As the State argues persuasively, “[i]f, in fact, the $10,000 limit applies to ‘all acts arising out of a single incident’ regardless of the defendant’s age, then any separate reference to a limit against ‘a child, the child’s parent, or both’ is unnecessary.” It is a more reasonable interpretation of § ll-604(b) that the reference to “a child, the child’s parent, or both” was meant to apply to the entire subsection to the exclusion of any other classes of persons. An inspection of the two surrounding subsections that complete § 11-604 confirms that the thrust of the entire statute, including the $10,000 limit on a restitution order, is directed towards child offenders. Subsection (a) sets forth, as a general proposition, that children, their parents, or both may be ordered to pay restitution. Subsection (c) addresses the need to provide parents “a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present evidence” before a court may order restitution ⁴⁵⁶ against parents of child defendants or respondents.

This context, which focuses exclusively on the operation of restitution in the realm of matters involving children, without any mention of adult defendants, confirms the propriety of our conclusion that § ll-604(b) does not have any application to adult defendants. Most telling, however, is the legislative history of the version of Crim. Proc., § 11-604 in force when the restitution order against Robey was entered. During code revision, 5 § 11—604(b) was created and derived from Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 807(a)(3), 6 which dealt solely with restitution in cases involving child defendants and respondents. ⁴⁵⁷ 7 The Revisor’s Note accompanying § 11-604, which we view here as a persuasive aid to statutory interpretation, Comptroller v. Blanton, 390 Md. 528, 538 , 890 A.2d 279, 285 (2006), indicates that the