Robinson v. State

MURPHY, J. In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, a jury convicted Juanita Robinson, Petitioner, of first degree murder and related offenses, including use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. The State’s evidence, which was sufficient to establish that she committed those offenses on March 31, 2007, included testimony about three statements that Petitioner gave to investigating officers. The Circuit Court denied ⁶⁰⁶ Petitioner’s pretrial motion for suppression of those statements, and that ruling was affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals in an unreported opinion. Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of certiorari in which she presented two questions for our review: 1.

DID COURTS BELOW ERR IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT IN “CUSTODY” FOR PURPOSES OF THE RULES OF MIRANDA V. ARIZONA [, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)] WHERE PETITIONER, SUSPECTED IN A MURDER, WAS PLACED IN [A] POLICE SQUAD CAR WITH BAGS ON HER HANDS TO PRESERVE EVIDENCE, AND SUBSEQUENTLY PLACED FOR SEVERAL HOURS IN A “HOLDING CELL”? 2. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ITS RESPONSES TO TWO NOTES FROM THE JURY IN A MANNER WHICH INTERFERED WITH THE JURY’S AUTHORITY TO DRAW REASONABLE AND EXCULPATORY INFERENCES FROM THE EVIDENCE? According to the State, Petitioner’s questions should be rephrased as follows: 1. DID THE SUPPRESSION COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDE THAT ROBINSON WAS NOT IN CUSTODY FOR PURPOSES OF MIRANDA WHEN SHE MADE HER FIRST TWO STATEMENTS TO POLICE AND, REGARDLESS, TO THE EXTENT ANY ERROR OCCURRED, WAS IT HARMLESS IN LIGHT OF ROBINSON’S LATER STATEMENT MADE AFTER SHE WAS ADVISED OF AND WAIVED HER RIGHTS UNDER MIRANDA? 2.

SHOULD THIS COURT REFUSE TO DISTURB THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS’ DECISION TO DECLINE TO REVIEW FOR PLAIN ERROR THE TRIAL COURT’S ANSWERS TO TWO NOTES FROM THE JURY? For the reasons that follow, we shall answer “yes” to Petitioner’s first question and “no” to the State’s first ques ⁶⁰⁷ tion. As a result of these answers, the parties’ second questions are moot. We shall therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, and direct that Court to (1) vacate the judgments of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, and (2) remand for a new trial during which only the first of Petitioner’s three statements will be admissible during the State’s case-in-chief.

Background The opinion of the Court of Special Appeals included the following factual summary: On March 31, 2007, police were called to 6622 Knottwood Court in Baltimore City in response to a shooting. Upon arrival at 2:34 p.m., officers found Andre McBride near death. McBride had been shot three times: once in the back of the head, once in the back of the shoulder, and once in the front of the thigh. McBride was taken to the hospital where he was pronounced dead.

Robinson made three separate statements to police about the shooting. The first was taken at the scene of the shooting, the second was taken the same day at the homicide unit, and the third was taken approximately five weeks after the shooting at the homicide unit following Robinson’s arrest. The first statement was taken by Officer Andre Godfrey. Officer Godfrey was called to the scene of the shooting.

Upon arrival, Officer Godfrey saw Robinson attempting to enter a white van. Inside the van were three individuals, who were later determined to be Robinson’s mother, sister, and a male companion of Robinson’s mother. Because Officer Godfrey was not certain of what, if any, role these individuals had in the shooting, he detained all four individuals at the scene. Officer Godfrey then asked them if they knew McBride.

Robinson responded that McBride was her boyfriend, that they had been arguing all day, “and then it moved upstairs and that’s when she heard gunshots.” This untaped statement was taken without any pressure or force from officer ⁶⁰⁸ Godfrey, while Robinson was in her mother’s van, surrounded by family. After Robinson finished this statement, Officer Godfrey’s supervisors instructed him to place bags on Robinson’s hands and place her in a patrol car. These supervisors also informed Robinson and her family that there was an investigation going on and instructed them not to leave. After being placed in the patrol car, with her hands and feet uncuffed, Robinson was transported to the police facility.

Once there, Robinson was photographed and her hands were tested for gunshot residue. She was then placed in a holding cell. Her mother and sister, who were also transported to the police facility, were placed in an interview room. Later that evening, Robinson was moved from the holding cell to an interview room.

At that time, she was questioned by Detective Joseph Phelps and Detective Sergeant Kelvin Sewell. Robinson gave a taped statement in which she admitted to being with McBride in the house at the time of the shooting, that they had been arguing throughout the day, and that their relationship had become rocky, marked by constant arguments. Robinson, however, insisted that she did not shoot McBride. She stated that the shooting occurred as she was attempting to leave the home because of an argument.

Robinson further stated that she opened the front door and an unknown person fired shots into the open door. She insisted that these were the shots that struck and killed McBride. After completion of her statement, Robinson was allowed to leave without any conditions and driven to her mother’s home. Robinson’s third statement was taken approximately five weeks after her first two statements.

This statement was taken after she had been arrested. Robinson was advised of, and waived, her Miranda rights. In this statement, Robinson told Detective Phelps that what she had said previously, in the recorded statement, was true. Detective Phelps could not recall what specifics he restated to Robinson when he asked her about the prior statement.

He did ⁶⁰⁹ however, testify that he had summarized some of the details and Robinson agreed to them. Robinson’s third statement was similar to the first two statements. Prior to trial, defense counsel made motions to suppress Robinson’s first two statements. Those motions were based on the argument that her constitutional rights had been violated because she was in custody and not informed of her Miranda rights.

The court first heard testimony regarding the second statement. The hearings were held in this order because Officer Godfrey[, the officer who had taken the initial statement at the scene,] was not available until after the completion of the initial suppression hearing. After hearing testimony, the suppression court rejected Robinson’s motion. The court found: And she testified that, in fact, she knew she didn’t have to talk to the police and she knew that she had a right to a lawyer.

I think from the totality of the facts and circumstances, I am satisfied, in fact, well, Pm satisfied by clear and convincing evidence that, in fact, the Defendant’s statement was voluntary, wasn’t induced, there was no threat, force. And I’m also satisfied by clear and convincing evidence that the March 31st statement was not a custodial interrogation that would have required Miranda Because after all, she did leave.... And it was a repetition of what she had said earlier and she never asked to leave, she never asked them to stop, and she was free to leave and was free to do anything she wanted for a good month after that until she was formally charged. ... she said she wanted to talk to police on both occasions. So I deny your motion to suppress all statements made in this case.... ⁶¹⁰ During the afternoon of the first day of trial, when Officer Godfrey became available, the court reopened the suppression hearing regarding Robinson’s first statement.

The court again, for similar reasons, denied Robinson’s motion to suppress. Robinson v. State, No. 667, September, 2008, filed November 19, 2009, slip opinion pp. 1-5. Petitioner made her post-arrest statement after she was arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by a District Court Commissioner on the basis of an Application for Statement of Charges filed by Detective Phelps which, in pertinent part, stated: I, the undersigned, apply for statement of charges and a summons or warrant which may lead to the arrest of the above named Defendant because on or about 31 March 2007 at 6622 Knottwood Ct., the above named Defendant on 31 March 2007 @ 1445 hours Dispatcher # 87 contacted the Homicide Office and advised that 4B24 was on the scene of the shooting at 6622 Knottwood Ct. and was requesting Homicide to respond. Investigators responded to the scene.

Investigation revealed that on 31 March 2007 at 1432 hours, Northeaster District Officers were dispatched to 6622 Knottwood Ct. on. a call for a shooting. Upon arrival, Officers found the victim, Andre McBribe, M/B 21 yrs. lying inside the doorway of that location being attended to by Fire Department personnel. The victim had sustained at least one gunshot wound to the head, Medic # 18 transported the victim to Sinai Hospital where he was pronounced dead by Dr. Genute at 1539 horn’s that date. The crime scene was secured and proper notifications were made.

A search and seizure warrant was obtained and the crime scene at 6622 Knottwood Ct. was processed. The victims girlfriend, Juanita Robinson, F/B 27 yrs., from 6622 Knottwood Ct. was transported from the scene to the Crime Lab processing bay where a GSR (Gun Shot Residue) Test was performed. Ms. Robinson was then transported to the Homicide Office for interview. In a tape ⁶¹¹ statement Ms. Robinson advised that on 31 March 2007, she and the victim were involved in an ongoing dispute.

Ms. Robinson advised that at some point she had attempted to open her front door and exit the dwelling, however, the victim pushed Ms. Robinson to the kitchen floor and closed the door. At that point Ms. Robinson heard a gunshot, got up and ran into the living room when she heard additional gunshots. Ms. Robinson returned to the kitchen and found the victim lying in the doorway with his head resting on interior steps. Ms. Robinson advised that she then left the dwelling and asked the neighbors for help.

On 1 April 2007 an autopsy was performed on the victim at the OCME by Drs. Mary Ripple and Jonrika Malone. The post mortem exam revealed that the victim was shot 3 times. Once to the back of the head, once to the back and once to the front of the left thigh.

The doctors ruled that the cause and manner of death was Homicide by Shooting. During the course of the investigation, witnesses were interviewed and advised that no one else was seen in the court except for Ms. Robinson who was calling for someone to call for help. Additionally, on 13 April 2007 the results of the GSR Test were provided by the Trace Unit. The GSR Test for Ms. Robinson was positive, meaning that her hands were immediately adjacent to a discharging firearm or were themselves used to fire the firearm.

(Emphasis supplied). Discussion The following standard of review is applicable to the rulings of the suppression hearing court: “ ‘[W]e view the evidence and inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the prevailing party on the motion,’ ” here, the State. Owens v. State, 399 Md. 388, 403 , 924 A.2d 1072, 1080 (2007) (quoting State v. Rucker, 374 Md. 199, 207 , 821 A.2d 439, 444 (2003)), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1144 , 128 S.Ct. 1064 , 169 L.Ed.2d 813 (2008). “We defer to the motions court’s factual findings ⁶¹² and uphold them unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous.” State v. Luckett, 413 Md. 360 , 375 n. 3, 993 A.2d 25 , 33 n. 3 (2010). “We, however, make our own independent constitutional appraisal, by reviewing the relevant law and applying it to the facts and circumstances of this case.” Id., 993 A.2d at 33 n. 3 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Lee v. State, 418 Md. 136, 148-49 , 12 A.3d 1238, 1245-46 (2011).

While affirming the rulings of the suppression hearing court, the Court of Special Appeals stated: A reasonable person in Robinson’s position would have believed that she was not in custody for at least two reasons: [ (1) ] Robinson’s status in the investigation and what occurred after she completed her statements. At no time during the day did any officer inform Robinson that she was a suspect. Officers informed her that there was an investigation and they wanted to know what happened. In all the information reports regarding Robinson on the day of the shooting, she was listed as a witness. [ (2) ]Additionally, at the completion of the interview, Robinson was driven to her mother’s residence.

She was free to do as she pleased until she was arrested approximately five weeks later. We agree with the holding that Petitioner was not entitled to suppression of the statement that she made to Officer Godfrey at the scene of the shooting. We conclude, however, that the State should have been prohibited from introducing into evidence during its case-in-chief the statements Petitioner subsequently gave to Detectives Phelps and Sewell. I. Petitioner first argues (in the words of her brief): Petitioner was in custody for Miranda purposes when she made her initial bare-bones statement to Officer Godfrey, because Godfrey and his superiors all communicated to her that she was not free to leave, bagged her hands, and ⁶¹³ transferred her from the refuge of her family’s vehicle to the far more coercive environment of a patrol car.

The suppression hearing court and the Court of Special Appeals rejected this argument. So do we. When Petitioner was originally questioned at the scene, she was a potential witness. The officers attempting to obtain information about what had occurred were entitled to (1) require that potential witnesses remain at the scene, and (2) question those witnesses without advising them of their Miranda rights.

The record shows that Petitioner’s freedom of movement was not restricted beyond what was required in order to take her statement, which she gave to Officer Godfrey while she and her family members were seated in her mother’s van. Petitioner next argues (in the words of her brief): ... the custodial pressure increased exponentially by the time she provided the more detailed and inculpatory account of her mutually destructive relationship with McBride, as by that point she had been separated more definitively from her family, taken to a police facility, photographed, had her hands swabbed for evidence of murder, been placed for hours in a holding cell, and then taken to an interview room, where she faced two experienced detectives. She could not conceivably have felt free to terminate the interrogation and leave. No reasonable person could have done so.

The State argues, however, that under the “totality of the circumstances,” the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals were correct in their conclusions that Detectives Phelps and Sewell were not required to advise Petitioner of her Miranda rights when they questioned her in an interview room at the Homicide Unit. In the words of the State’s brief: Robinson’s freedom of movement was never restricted to the “degree associated with a formal arrest.” Owens, 399 Md. at 428 [ 924 A.2d 1072 ] (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 [ 103 S.Ct. 3517 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 ] (1983)). She was not the only person transported to the Homicide Unit for questioning as a potential witness; there is no evidence that she was placed in handcuffs or leg irons; ⁶¹⁴ she was allowed to use the bathroom and get a drink of water; she was questioned as a witness, not a suspect; and after the interview, she was taken to her mother’s house, and was not arrested until over a month later. In light of those circumstances, Miranda warnings were not required.

In Abeokuto v. State, 391 Md. 289 , [ 893 A.2d 1018 ] (2006), in fact, this Court held that appellant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda, even though he was questioned and then held in a “small locked room” of one police station for two and a half hours before police transported him to another police station where he waited for three hours before police questioned him again. This Court concluded that, “while some circumstances [of appellant’s questioning] hint at restraint or coercive elements,” The totality of the circumstances did not rise to the level of custody for purposes of Miranda. Abeokuto, 391 Md. at 332 [, 893 A.2d at 1043 ]. This Court added: “[t]hat the questioning occurred in a police station is not determinative of whether a custodial interrogation occurred.” Id.

The fact that Robinson had bags placed on her hands in advance of a test for the presence of gunshot residue is likewise not dispositive of the issue of Miranda custody. The Fourth Circuit considered this very issue in United States v. Jamison, 509 F.3d 623, 629-31 (4th Cir.2007), and concluded that, while a reasonable person “might find it odd” that bags were placed on his or her hands, such curiosity does not “lead to an inference that a reasonable person would consequently feel unable to refuse police questioning.” Id. at 630-31 . Even assuming, arguendo, that bagging someone’s hands would suggest to a reasonable person that he or she was a suspect in the crime being investigated, that is wholly different than conveying the message that the person is under arrest. Moreover, other circumstances would have led a reasonable person in Robinson’s position to believe that she was free to terminate police contact.

Robinson was not at the Homicide Unit alone; several people present at the scene ⁶¹⁵ were taken to the police station for questioning. She was given water and permitted to use the restroom while she waited for Detective Phelps. Detective Phelps never “accuse[d] [her] of doing anything wrong[,]” or otherwise indicated that she was being treated as a suspect. Finally, she was driven home after the interview, and was not arrested until over a month later.

All of these factors would suggest to a reasonable person that he or she is not under arrest, and is free to terminate the encounter with police. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 , 97 S.Ct. 711 , 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (Supreme Court considered that respondent left police station “without hindrance” in concluding that he was not in Miranda custody); Owens, 399 Md. at 429 [, 924 A.2d at 1095-96 ] (“whether the defendant left freely, was detained or arrested,” can assist in determining whether defendant would have felt free to discontinue the questioning). Under the totality of circumstances, a reasonable person in Robinson’s position would not have felt pressure sufficient to impair the free exercise of his or her right against self-compulsion. At no point during the evening was there a restriction upon Robinson’s freedom of movement to the degree associated with formal arrest.

As such, Miranda warnings were not required. The lower court correctly denied Robinson’s motion to suppress. We hold that Petitioner’s second statement was the product of a custodial interrogation that did not comply with the requirements of Miranda. This holding is based upon our independent, constitutional appraisal of the record, which clearly shows that Petitioner was subjected to custodial interrogation.

Immediately after Petitioner made her initial statement to Officer Godfrey, she was placed in the back of a marked police car, where Tyvek bags were placed over her hands. 1 At that ⁶¹⁶ same time, police informed Petitioner’s family members that the investigation was “ongoing” and that they should remain at the scene. Rather than ask Petitioner any additional questions at the scene, the investigating officers transported her to the Homicide Unit, where she was photographed and her hands were tested for gunshot residue. Petitioner was then placed in a holding cell, where she remained for five hours. At approximately 10:15 p.m.,