Maryland case law › Ruckle v. Warden

Ruckle v. Warden

220 Md. 683 (2001) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: Denied✓ Good law
SummaryMorris Ruckle and Charles E. Midgett were convicted of robbery and kidnapping of a police officer. Midgett's conviction was reversed by this Court in Midgett v. State, 216 Md. 26, 139 A.2d 209 (1958), on the ground that the defendants had been denied their absolute right to be present at every stage of trial. Ruckle had initially appealed but dismissed his appeal before it was heard. After Midgett's reversal, Ruckle filed a petition for post conviction relief. On May 13, 1959, Judge Tucker of the Criminal Court of Baltimore set aside Ruckle's judgment and sentence and granted him a new trial, relying on the same constitutional defect identified in Midgett. Ruckle then sought leave to appeal, contending that because he had dismissed his appeal from the invalid judgment, he was entitled to immediate and final release from custody, and that a new trial was not sufficient relief. The Court o
Questions presented
  • Whether, because he had dismissed his appeal from the invalid judgment and sentence, Ruckle was entitled to immediate and final release from custody, and whether granting him a new trial was sufficient relief.
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684 P®r Curiam. Morris Ruckle (Ruckle), the applicant for leave to appeal, together with Charles E. Midgett (Midgett), had appealed his conviction for the robbery and kidnapping of a police officer [Midgett v. State, 216 Md. 26 , 139 A. 2d 209 (1958)]. Ruckle subsequently dismissed his appeal before it was heard by this Court. On May 13, 1959, Judge Tucker, upon the petition of Ruckle for post conviction relief, set aside the judgment and sentence of the Criminal Court of Baltimore and granted the petitioner a new trial on the ground that he —as we had held with respect to Midgett—had been denied his “absolute right to be present at every stage of his trial from the time the jury is impaneled until it reaches a verdict or is discharged.” However, the petitioner below and applicant here contends that because he had dismissed his appeal from the invalid judgment and sentence, he was entitled to immediate and final release from custody and that granting him a new trial was not sufficient.

Judge Tucker noted that the court had authority to enter an appropriate order with respect to the judgment or sentence {Code (1958 Supp.), Art. 27, sec. 645G] and decided that Ruckle was entitled to a new trial, which was the same relief as Midgett had been granted by this Court, but not the preferred status Ruckle contended he was entitled to. We agree with the conclusion reached by the court below. Application denied.