Russell v. Gaither

ZARNOCH, Judge. In this case, we are asked to determine whether the orphans’ court or the circuit court is the proper forum for the determination of factual issues in appellant’s caveat proceeding. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the Orphans’ Court for Baltimore City erred in rejecting as untimely the appellant’s Petition to Transmit Issues to the Circuit Court. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS The relevant facts in this case are not in dispute.

On January 2, 2006, Yinnie R. Henderson of Baltimore City died leaving two wills. A March 23, 2005 will named appellant Juanita Russell personal representative and left the decedent’s home and automobile to her niece, Marquitta J. Russell, and the residue of her estate to her and Henderson’s other nieces, Tina R. Brown, Renee K. Sample, and Serrena D. Russell. A July 12, 2005 will named appellee Jennifer Gaither personal representative, made a series of specific bequests, and left Henderson’s entire residuary estate to Nathaniel Jacobs. On February 3, 2006, Gaither filed with the Register of Wills for Baltimore City a petition for probate based on the July 12, 2005 will, which was admitted to administrative probate.

Nearly six months later, on July 26th, Marquitta Russell (“Russell”) filed a Petition to Caveat in the orphans’ court, seeking to have the July 12, 2005 will invalidated and the March 23, 2005 will admitted to probate. The petition alleged various reasons for the invalidation of the later will, including lack of capacity, undue influence, and fraud. These allegations were denied in an August 29, 2006 Answer to Petition to Caveat filed by Gaither. On January 18, 2007, the orphans’ court entered a PreTrial Order, which, among other things, required that all pretrial motions, including requests for transmittal of issues, be filed no later than April 16, 2007.

Seven weeks after this deadline, on June 4th, Russell petitioned to transfer issues in ²⁸ the caveat proceeding to the circuit court. 1 The petition was opposed by Gaither as untimely because it was not filed “within the time determined by the [orphans’] court” under Md.Code (1974, 2001 Repl.Vol.), § 2-105(b) of the Estates & Trusts (ET) Article. On July 26, 2007, the orphans’ court dismissed Russell’s petition “as not timely filed in accordance with this Court’s order dated January 18, 2007.” This appeal followed. 2 DISCUSSION , Both parties in this case rely on subsection (b) of § 2-105 of the Estates and Trusts Article. Section 2-105, which has not been amended since the revised Article was enacted in Chapter 11 of the Laws of 1974, provides that: (a) In a controversy in the court, an issue of fact may be determined by the court. (b) At the request of an interested person made within the time determined by the court, the issue of fact may be determined by a court of law.

When the request is made before the court has determined the issue of fact, the court shall transmit the issue to a court of law. (c) After the determination of the issue, whether by the court or after transmission to a court of law, the court shall . enter an appropriate judgment or decree. (d) This section does not apply where the estate is administered under the jurisdiction of a court having general equity . jurisdiction. Appellee steers our focus, to the first sentence of § 2-105(b), arguing that the orphans’ court has the statutory authority to determine “the time” when a request to transmit issues to the circuit court may be made, that it has done so here in its pre ²⁹ trial order, and that Russell’s petition failed to meet that deadline.

On the other hand, appellant relies on the second sentence of § 2 — 105(b), contending that because the orphans’ court has not yet “determined” the factual issues sought to be transmitted to the circuit court, her petition is timely. 3 Both sides attempt to harmonize these apparently conflicting provisions. The appellee posits this theory: The first sentence clearly states in what time period the transmittal is allowed, i.e., within the time determined by the (orphans’) court. The second sentence clearly addresses what shall be transmitted, i.e., all issues of fact not previously determined. Gaither also notes that a contrary construction would result in an unreasonable result, where a party facing apparent defeat in the orphans’ court could successfully transmit issues at final argument.

The appellant would harmonize the provisions in this fashion: The second sentence establishes that the Orphans’ Court lacks authority to require a motion for transmission of issues be made before determination of the issue by the Orphans’ Court. Under the first sentence, however, the Orphans’ Court retains some authority to allow a petition for transmission of issues after the court has determined the issue of fact so long as the request is made “within the time determined by the court.” To resolve these conflicting views as to the meaning of the statute and to clarify the apparent ambiguity of the two sentences in § 2-105(b), an examination of the legislative history is in order. The second sentence traces its lineage to 1777, see Chapter 8, Laws of 1777 (Feb. Sess.), and has been interpreted or applied numerous times by Maryland appellate courts. See, e.g., Banashak v. Wittstadt, supra, 167 Md.App. at 679-688, ³⁰ 893 A.2d 1236 ; Hill v. Lewis, 21 Md.App. 121, 126-27 , 318 A.2d 850 (1974)(collecting cases). 4 These cases have frequently emphasized the mandatory nature of the orphans’ court’s duty to transmit issues at the insistence of a party.

See, e.g., Ades v. Norins, 204 Md. 267, 272 , 103 A.2d 842 (1954)(Upon the request of either party, the orphans’ court is “required” to frame issues and send them to a court of law for trial); Flaks v. Flaks, 173 Md. 358, 365 , 196 A. 116 (1938)(Duty to transmit issues “is imperative”); Schmidt v. Johnston, 154 Md. 125, 133 , 140 A. 87 (1928)(It is the “imperative duty” of orphans’ court to send issues to a law court). In addition, at least in caveat proceedings, Court of Appeals cases have said that a party may request that issues be transmitted to the circuit court at any stage of the proceeding before final adjudication. Humes v. Shillington, 22 Md. 346, 358 (1864); Pegg v. Warford, 4 Md. 385, 393-94 (1853); Barroll v. Reading, 5 H & J 175, 176 (1821). In Barroll, supra, 5 H & J at 176, Judge Buchanan explained the rationale for this rule: The regular mode of proceeding in opposition to the admission of a will to probate is by a caveat; and it may often happen, (and probably most frequently does happen) that the necessity for a plenary proceeding and a trial by jury is only discovered after a part, at least, of the testimony is taken; and at any stage of the proceedings, before final adjudication, either party may require it, and the court is not at liberty to refuse it.

It was not until the 20th Century that the Court of Appeals placed some limits on the timing of a request to transmit issues to the circuit court. In Maynadier v. Armstrong, 98 Md. 175 , 56 A. 357 (1903), in a case involving a dispute over payments from an administrator’s distribution account, the ³¹ orphans’ court refused to halt a trial in order to transfer issues to the circuit court. The Court of Appeals affirmed, noting, id. at 179 , 56 A. 357 : There can be no valid reason after a plenary proceeding has been commenced, in a case such as this, why the parties cannot determine before beginning the testimony thereunder whether they want a jury, which is the object of having issues sent to a Court of law. No ease has been cited and we recall none in this State in which, after testimony has been begun before the Court under plenary proceedings, the same questions then being inquired into have been withdrawn from the consideration of the Orphans’ Court, and issues sent to a Court of law.

Distinguishing Barroll as a caveat case, the Maynadier Court said: [W]e are of the opinion that the [statutory predecessor of the second sentence of § 2 — 105(b) ] does not require the Orphans’ Court to stop the investigations being made before it, as these were, and send to a Court of law issues for the determination of such questions as those proposed in this petition, when that investigation is being made under a plenary proceeding, and the parties had elected to try the questions before the Court. There may be cases under caveats to wills and possibly some other plenary proceedings, in which it may be proper, but when that Court is actually engaged in the hearing of the question whether administrators are entitled to be allowed for such items as these, it might lead to dangerous practices if either party has the right to stop all proceedings in that Court and require issues to be sent to a Court of law. If the petitioners had such right, then, under the statute, administrators would have, which might not only result in delay and useless expense, but might enable dishonest administrators to avoid proper investigations of their administration of estates by imposing such expenses on those seeking to have them as they would be unable to meet. If issues could be demanded when these were, then they could be at any time before final adjudication, and certainly so far as issues of the character ³² proposed are concerned, the Legislature never could have intended to have given the privilege to the parties to demand that they be sent to a Court of law when the Orphans’ Court was actually engaged in hearing the very questions proposed to be submitted.

Id. at 180-81, 56 A. 357 . (Emphasis added). Unlike the second sentence of § 2-105(b) of the ET Article, the key language in the first sentence (“within the time determined by the court”) is of comparatively recent origin. It is the 1969 product of the substantive and non-substantive revision