Sanborn v. Lang

Bartol, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. An examination of this case has brought us to a different conclusion from that expressed by the Judge of the Circuit Court. This proceeds, we think, more from a difference of opinion with regard to the facts of the case, as they are disclosed by the record, than from any conflict between us as to the legal principles involved in its decision. These were stated with substantial accuracy by the late Chancellor Johnson, in Hays vs. Henry, 1 Md. Ch.

Dec., 337. In Feigley vs. Feigley, 7 Md., 538 , the Court of Appeals had under consideration the question of the restraints imposed by law upon the power of the husband to alienate Ms property, to the prejudice of Ms wife’s just claim to his maintenance and support; and of her right to assail voluntary conveyances made by him on the ground of fraud. The question arose in this way. The wife had filed a bill praying for a divorce a vinculo; pending the suit, the husband made a voluntary deed, conveying his property to his sister ; which the complainant by a supplemental bill for alimony, alleged to be merely fictitious, not intended really to deprive the grantor of the benefit of the estate, but only to save the same for his own benefit; and prayed that the deed be declared null and void, as fraudulent against her.

The Court held that the wife stood in relation to her husband, in reference to her claim for a support and for alimony, to some extent, in the same attitude as a creditor stands towards his debtor ; and that she was entitled to protection under the Statute of Elizabeth, against conveyances made by Mm fraudulently for the purpose of hindering, delaying or defrauding her of her just and lawful actions, id., p. 561. The Court said, speaking by Judge Mason, who delivered the opinion : “ We do not wish to be understood as carrying this doctrine to an extent which would impose ¹¹⁴ any restraint upon the husband, in the free and unlimited exercise of his right to alienate his property at will, even though in the exercise of this right he strips himself of all means of supporting or maintaining his wife, provided he does so bona fide, and with no design of defrauding her of her just claims upon him and his estate. The fraudulent intent in all such cases being the true test of the validity of the transaction. Ricketts vs. Ricketts, 4 Gill, 105 .

There is this difference between the claim of a wife upon her husband’s estate, and that of a creditor upon the estate of his debtor; in the latter case a debtor cannot, even by a bona fide gift of the whole, or a part of his property to a third person, impede his creditor in the collection of his debt. Under such circumstances, such a transfer would be voluntary, and as against a bona fide creditor, void in point of law. Not so as respects the gifts or voluntary transfers by a husband of his property, in relation to the rights of his wife. If not made with the actual intent of defeating the rights of his wife, they will be sustained, although they leave her without the ■ means of subsistence.” We have quoted the language of the Court at some length, because it expresses clearly the principles of the law, as it is settled in this State, applicable to the delicate <and intimate relation between husband and wife, as respects her rights with regard to his property, and her protection against alienations made by him during the coverture, for the purpose of defrauding her claim upon him for maintenance and support.

In that case, her claim was asserted during his life; but it rests upon grounds very analogous to those asserted by the appellant, in support of her bill impeaching the deed of her late husband, to the appellee, dated the 20th day of May, 1812. To ascertain the intent and purpose with which the deed was made, we must refer to the facts and circumstances attending- its execution, and the acts and conduct of the ¹¹⁵ parties, as disclosed by the evidence; and the first question to be determined arises upon the exceptions to testimony filed by the appellee. These are: 1st. To the competency of the complainant as a witness under the Acts of 1864 and 1868. 2nd.

To the admissibility of conversations between the witness and the deceased after the deed was executed. 3rd. To the letters of the appellee, and especially that dated May 26, 1874, (marked Ex., bio. 4,) as not proved. 4th. To the 10th and 13th questions to the witness Fowler, as leading and otherwise objectionable. 5th. To the conversations between the deceased Sanborn and the witness Reynolds, as testified to by the latter — • which took place after the execution of the deed. 1st.

We see no valid legal objection to the competency of the complainant, Mrs. Sanborn, under the evidence Acts of 1864 and 1868. She does not fall within the exceptions in the Act of 1868, ch. 16, as interpreted in Jones vs. Jones, 36 Md., 457 ; Dennison vs. Dennison, 35 Md., 381 , and Johnson vs. Heald, 33 Md., 352 . This is not a suit with an executor or administrator, touching a claim for or against the estate of a decedent; nor is it a suit upon, or relating to a contract to which the witness was a party, the other party being dead. In our opinion, Mrs. Sanborn was a competent witness, with respect to the matters upon which she was called to testify. 2nd.

We discover nothing in her testimony, to which the second exception can apply. 3rd. Mrs. Sanborn being a competent witness to testify on that point, her evidence sufficiently proved the letters referred to in the third exception. 4th. The 10th and 13th questions asked of the witness Fowler, are not obnoxious to the objection of being leading. The testimony given in response thereto, was to the declarations of the grantor with respect to the deed, and his object and purpose in making it; and being contempo ¹¹⁶ ranecras with its preparation and execution, was clearly admissible. 5th.

As to the declarations of the deceased made to the witness Reynolds, after the deed was executed; we rule them out as wholly immaterial, without stopping to express any opinion, whether they were not inadmissible on other