Sands v. Sands

Morton, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal by Douglas H. Sands from an order entered by Judge John N. Maguire, sitting in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, dismissing the appellant’s petition for reduction of alimony. It appears that the appellee, Catherine Perry Conner Sands, obtained a divorce from the appellant by a decree dated January 10, 1956. The decree provided that appellant was to pay the appellee “the sum of $191.66 per month as permanent alimony * * Another provision of the decree provided for custody and support for their minor children, who are now adults.

Prior to the issuance of the decree, the parties had entered into an agreement dated November 15, 1955. Paragraph 3 of that agreement provided in part: “3. (a) Beginning with November 14, 1955, Husband will pay to Wife the sum of Three Hundred and Seventy-five Dollars ($375.00) per month, of which said sum One Hundred Ninety-one Dollars and Sixty-six Cents ($191.66) per month shall be for the support and maintenance of Wife, and One Hundred Eighty-three Dollars and Thirty-four Cents ($183.34) per month shall be for the support and maintenance of the minor children of the parties. The first of such payments shall be made on November 14,1955, and ensuing payments shall be made regularly on the 14th day of each month.

(Emphasis supplied.) (b) It is understood and agreed that the provisions herein made for support and maintenance of Wife and the minor children of the ⁶⁶¹ parties shall be net to Wife, and that any income taxes due thereon shall be paid by Husband. Wife agrees that, so long as the parties shall remain under the law of the State of Maryland as husband and wife, she will, upon the request of Husband, and without any cost or expense to her, make, execute and join with Husband In the execution of such joint individual Income tax returns as shall be required to satisfy the Internal Revenue Statutes of the United States of America and the regulations promulgated thereunder, as well as any similar statutes, made and passed, or regulations adopted by the State of Maryland, to the end and intent that Husband may lawfully be responsible for only minimum taxes.” The chancellor below in construing the legal effect of paragraph 3 (a) concluded that “the language in the Separation Agreement was clear and definite in its terms and was a contractual obligation. It was not alimony and as the result was not subject to review. The petition for reduction of alimony is hereby denied, and as the result of this conclusion the petition to strike the order of Judge Menchine is also denied.” 1 In contesting the chancellor’s conclusion, the appellant asserts that (1) “The mere existence of a binding separation agreement does not deprive the court of jurisdiction over alimony awarded in its decree”; (2) “The separation agreement * * * did not impose an obligation upon Mr. Sands to pay support and maintenance after the entry of the decree of divorce * * and (3) “The award of alimony in the decree was in complete compliance with the agreement and is subject to the court’s revision and control.” The field involving the distinction between so-called technical alimony and non-technical alimony has been ⁶⁶² plowed and replowed in the cases by the Court of Appeals and this Court, sometimes lightly, sometimes subtly, and sometimes confusingly.

Any confusion or misunderstanding which might have resulted from the various opinions which have been rendered was certainly put asunder and hopefully ended with the in-depth analysis of the concept of alimony by Judge Powers in his opinion in Simpson v. Simpson, 18 Md. App. 626 . There, it is made absolutely clear that unless an agreement between a husband and wife relating to support payments for the wife spells out and provides for every attribute or element which the definition of alimony requires, the support payments are a contractual obligation and not alimony. As defined in Simpson , at 628-629: “Alimony is a money allowance payable under a judicial decree by a husband at stated intervals to his wife, or former wife, during their joint lives or until the remarriage of the wife, so long as they live separately, for her support and maintenance. [Footnote omitted.] a. It must terminate on the remarriage of the wife. b.

It must terminate on the death of the wife. c. It must terminate on the death of the husband. d. If the parties have entered into an agreement providing for payments which meet the required characteristics of alimony, the court may adopt the agreement in ordering the payment of alimony. e. Alimony ordered by the court is always subject to reconsideration and modification by the court in the light of changed circumstances. f.

Payment of alimony may be enforced by the court by the exercise of its contempt power, including attachment and imprisonment of the person.” It is at once apparent that missing in the agreement ⁶⁶³ between the parties here are a number of crucial ingredients necessary for the support payments to reach the legal status of alimony. First, there is no provision that the payments terminate on the remarriage of the wife. Second, there is no provision that