Simpson v. Simpson

⁶²⁷ Powers, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In the case of Dickey v. Dickey, 154 Md. 675 , 141 A. 387 (1928) the Court of Appeals said, at page 678: “Since the case of Wallingsford v. Wallingsford, 6 H. & J. 485 , it has been the settled law of Maryland that permanent alimony is a provision by the husband for the wife’s support that continues only during their joint lives or so long as they live separate and apart. (Citations omitted) It is equally well established in this state that a final decree of divorce a mensa et thoro or a vinculo matrimonii may be modified at any subsequent time as to alimony. (Citations omitted) If, however, the allowance to the wife in the decree is the result of a previous agreement between the spouses and does not fall within the accepted definition of alimony, so that it would have been impossible for the chancellor to have allowed permanent alimony as the decree provides, then, notwithstanding the parties and even the court called it alimony, the allowance for the wife in the decree was not alimony, and a court of equity has no power to modify the decree as in the case of an award of alimony.” The Dickey case reached the Court of Appeals after the wife had sought to have the husband held in contempt for failure to make the payments originally provided for in an agreement between them, to be paid until the wife’s death or remarriage.

The lower court had decreed payment of the same amount to the wife, as permanent alimony, until her death or remarriage, or until the further order of the court. The Court of Appeals held that the lower court had correctly ruled on the contempt petition that the payments were not alimony, and so could not be enforced by attachment of the person for contempt. Between 1964 and 1970 the Court of Appeals considered in at least eight cases whether support payments originally ⁶²⁸ agreed upon by the parties and thereafter incorporated in a decree of the court were or were not alimony. The cases, which need not be analyzed in detail here, are Stevens v. Stevens, 233 Md. 279 , 196 A. 2d 447 (1964), Grossman v. Grossman, 234 Md. 139 , 198 A. 2d 260 (1964), Schroeder v. Schroeder, 234 Md. 462 , 200 A. 2d 42 (1964), Woodham v. Woodham, 235 Md. 356 , 201 A. 2d 674 (1964), Bebermeyer v. Bebermeyer, 241 Md. 72 , 215 A. 2d 463 (1965), Bellofatto v. Bellofatto, 245 Md. 379 , 226 A. 2d 313 (1967), Paylor v. Paylor, 254 Md. 154 , 253 A. 2d 911 (1969), and Heinmuller v. Heinmuller, 257 Md. 672 , 264 A. 2d 847 (1970).

In Wolfe v. Wolfe, 12 Md. App. 581 , 280 A. 2d 1 (1971), this Court was required to decide whether an agreed payment for support and maintenance of the wife, later incorporated into a divorce decree, was or was not alimony. The payments were to cease on the death or remarriage of the wife. Although there was no express provision that the payments terminate on the death of the husband, we held, as did the Court of Appeals in Stevens v. Stevens, supra, that a waiver and release of all rights of inheritance and all other rights or claims growing out of the marriage accomplished the same result. The Court of Appeals gave a clear and concise definition of alimony in Knabe v. Knabe, 176 Md. 606 , 6 A. 2d 366 (1939).

Beginning with that definition, found at page 612, we summarize the law relevant to the issue in the case before us as follows: 1. Alimony is a money allowance payable under a jucicial decree by a husband at stated intervals to his wife, or former wife, during their joint lives or until the remarriage of the wife, so long as they live separately, for her support and maintenance. 1 a. It must terminate on the remarriage of the wife. b. It must terminate on the death of the wife. ⁶²⁹ c.

It must terminate on the death of the husband. d. If the parties have entered into an agreement providing for payments which meet the required characteristics of alimony, the court may adopt the agreement in ordering the payment of alimony. e. Alimony ordered by the court is always subject to reconsideration and modification by the court in the light of changed circumstances. f. Payment of alimony may be enforced by the court by the exercise of its contempt power, including attachment and imprisonment of the person. 2.

If the parties have entered into an agreement providing for payments which do not meet all of the requirements of alimony, the court may nonetheless incorporate all or part of the agreement in its decree. However, the obligation to pay rests upon the agreement of the parties, and does not become alimony. a. Such payments may not be modified by the court, in the absence of collusion, mistake, or fraud. b. Such payments do not take the character of alimony because they are described as alimony. c.

Such payments do not take the character of alimony because the parties by their agreement or the court in its decree attempt to give the court or reserve continuing jurisdiction to modify the payments. d. Such payments, if