Serio v. Baltimore County

BATTAGLIA, Judge. Petitioner, Robert L. Serio, comes before this Court to challenge the Court of Special Appeals’s affirmation of the trial court’s summary judgment entered against him. Serio argues that Baltimore County’s continued retention of firearms seized from his home and its refusal to restore the seized property to him through a designee or through a sale and remuneration to him because he is a convicted felon violates Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the provisions of Section 551(c) of Article 27 of the Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1998 Cum.Supp.). Based upon the circumstances of this case, we reverse the summary judgment entered in favor of the defendants in light of our decision that Serio retains a property interest in the firearms even though he cannot possess them. ³⁷⁸ I. Background A. Facts On October 8, 1998, the petitioner, Robert Serio (“Serio”), was driving with Stacy Corbin on York Road in Baltimore County when the car struck a guardrail and overturned.

Miss Corbin was thrown from the car and died at the scene of the accident. Subsequently, Serio was charged with vehicular manslaughter, which is a felony in Maryland. 1 He pled guilty to one count of manslaughter by automobile and was sentenced on June 2,1999, to six months imprisonment. On the same day that Serio was sentenced, Officers Steven Russo and Robert Overfield of the Baltimore County Police Department applied for a warrant to search Serio’s house and to seize “any firearms and any ammunition, boxes, receipts, or manuals relating to said firearms,” based upon information that they had gleaned from Serio’s estranged wife and a search of the Maryland Automated Firearms System. Serio was alleged to be a felon in possession of firearms in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1998 Cum.Supp.), Article 27, Section 445(d)(l)(ii). 2 The warrant was issued, and the officers searched Serio’s home on June 3, 1999.

The ³⁷⁹ officers seized numerous firearms from Serio’s home, including seven handguns, five rifles, a shotgun, a silencer, and ammunition. Ultimately, Serio was not charged with possessing firearms in violation of Section 445(d), but the County, nonetheless, has refused to return the firearms to him, or give them to a designee, or sell them and give Serio the proceeds. B. Procedural History On July 20, 1999, Serio filed a five count complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County naming the County and Officer Russo as defendants. The first three counts of the complaint were brought against the County challenging the seizure of the firearms and seeking a return of the property pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1998 Cum.

Supp.), Article 27, Sections 551(a), (b), and (c). 3 In Count IV, ³⁸⁰ Serio requested damages from the County for any harm to the seized property. Serio also alleged a violation of his rights under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights against Officer Russo in Count V for misconduct in obtaining and executing the search warrant used to seize the firearms from Serio’s home. 4 Judge Lawrence Daniels of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County signed an order dated July 20, 1999, requiring the police department to preserve the property seized from Serio’s home. The defendants were represented by the County Attorney’s Office and together they filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, to which Serio filed an opposition. A motions hearing was held in the Baltimore County Circuit Court on November 29, 1999, during which the trial court ordered the parties to submit memoranda of law concerning whether the firearms were contraband.

The court also granted Serio leave to amend his complaint. Serio filed a First Amended Complaint, and Bruce Stanski was added as a plaintiff based upon the allegation that Stanski intended to purchase the seized firearms. Plaintiffs Serio and Stanski re-alleged all of the same counts against the County and Officer Russo that were alleged in the original complaint. Thereafter, the defendants, who still continued to be represented by the same counsel, filed a joint motion to dismiss the original Complaint and the First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim.

Judge Daniels held a hearing on February 7, 2000, to consider the defendants’ motions and ordered the following: 1. That the Court grants summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on whether [Seño] had possession of the guns at issue; ³⁸¹ 2. That the Amended Complaint against Defendant Officer Russo is dismissed with prejudice; 3. That the case is dismissed as to Defendant Baltimore County, subject to [Serio] amending the existing complaint which is to be filed within 15 days of February 7, 2000.

Pursuant to the Circuit Court’s ruling, Serio and Stanski filed a Second Amended Complaint, in which they alleged in Counts I — III claims against the County under Section 551 and sought damages for any lost or damaged property in Count IV. They also re-alleged a claim against Officer Russo in Count V for a violation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, “by taking actions inconsistent with [Serio’s] rights of due process.... ” A new claim against the County was added in Count VI alleging that Serio’s rights had been violated under various articles of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 5 Count VII against the County was also added based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1999), 6 for violating Serio’s rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 7 ³⁸² The County, acting on behalf of both defendants, filed a request to remove the entire case to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, and a motion for summary judgment on all of the claims in the Second Amended Complaint. After hearing arguments on the motion, Judge Catherine Blake filed an Order and Memorandum on July 20, 2000, granting the County’s motion and dismissing Serio’s claims for relief. See Serio v. Baltimore County, 115 F.Supp.2d 509 (D.Md.2000).

Specifically, in her Memorandum Order Judge Blake, addressing the due process claims under Count VII of the complaint, determined that Serio had a property interest in the firearms and that the County had deprived Serio of that interest by retaining the firearms, but granted the County’s motion to dismiss on the ground that Serio had not challenged the validity of Section 551, as violative of his due process rights.- Id. at 516 . The court reasoned that Serio did not make a facial challenge to the applicable statutes; instead, he challenged the County’s execution of the statutes based upon due process. Id. The court reasoned that the County’s actions in seizing the firearms and retaining them did not deny Serio his due process rights because the County at that point could retain the firearms in anticipation of a criminal prosecution.

Id. at 517 . Once the need to keep the firearms terminated, the court held that Serio’s due process rights -would then be implicated. Id. Furthermore, Judge Blake noted that the County could retain the firearms unless Serio could prove that there was no further need for the County to withhold them under Section ³⁸³ 551(c).

Id. at 518 . The additional federal claims against the County under Count VII alleging violations of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution also were dismissed, as well as all of the claims under Count VI of the Second Amended Complaint, which related to Articles 19, 21, 24 and 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 8 Id. at 520 . While the matter was pending in federal District Court, Serio noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals based upon the Circuit Court’s dismissal of the First Amended Complaint. In an unreported opinion, Serio v. Baltimore County, No. 329 (Sept. Term 2000), the Court of Special Appeals dismissed the appeal because a final judgment had not been entered by the Circuit Court pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-602. 9 After the case was remanded for entry of a final judgment, the defendants, still represented by the same counsel, filed a motion for summary judgment as to the First Amended Complaint, and Serio and Stanski filed an opposition together along with a motion for reconsideration of the Circuit Court’s earlier ruling dismissing the First Amended Complaint.

On ³⁸⁴ August 6, 2001, the Circuit Court ruled on the defendants’ motion and granted partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants “as to the issue of whether [Serio] had possession of the guns, which are the subject of the case.” The trial court dismissed Stanski’s claims to have the firearms returned to him as an agent of Serio, as well as the claims against Officer Russo. Finally, the Circuit Court dismissed the claims against the County subject to Serio amending his complaint to add a claim based upon the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. On August 29, 2001, the Circuit Court held a hearing on Serio and Stanski’s motion for reconsideration and determined that Serio should amend his complaint to plead with specificity the items that were taken by Officer Russo during the search. The court entered an order, vacating its previous orders of February 7, 2000, and August 6, 2001, and allowing Serio to amend his complaint “consistent with the Court’s instructions of August 29, 2001.” Serio then filed a Third Amended Complaint re-alleging in Counts I — III violations of Section 551 and seeking return of the seized property to Stanski as his agent.

In Count IV Serio sought damages against the County for any damaged or lost property, and he claimed a violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights against Officer Russo in Count V for misconduct in obtaining the search warrant used to search Serio’s home. The defendants, represented by the County Attorney’s Office, filed a motion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint, and a hearing was held on March 25, 2002. During the hearing, Judge John Hennegan denied the motion to dismiss and determined that it was not ripe because there were “no affidavits, no exhibits, nothing,” to support the motion. Thereafter, defendants, through their counsel, filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts, which was heard by Judge J. Norris Byrnes.

In their motion, the defendants argued that there was probable cause to support the search warrant and that it would be against the law to return the firearms to Serio, a convicted felon. Furthermore, Officer Russo argued that his conduct in executing the warrant did ³⁸⁵ not violate Serio’s due process rights under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. In opposition to the defendant’s motion, Serio argued that the firearms were not contraband per se and that the County was required either to institute forfeiture proceedings or return the weapons. On September 4, 2002, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted on all claims set forth in Counts II, III and V of the Third Amended Complaint, which were those claims related to Section 551(b)-(c) and Officer Russo.

Judge Byrnes also entered a show cause order to determine whether any of the firearms should be returned to Serio under Section 551(a). A show cause hearing was held on November 6, 2002, and Judge Christian Kahl ruled that the seized firearms and related items could not be returned to Serio or given to Stanski for disposal because doing so would allow “the defendant or claimant to profit by what he cannot possess legally.” He ruled, however, that Serio could recover any items that were not firearms or related materials. An order was filed requiring the Baltimore County Police Department to retain the firearms until all appeals had been exhausted. On December 12, 2002, Serio noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals based upon the Circuit Court’s dismissal of the Third Amended Complaint.

Thereafter, an Amended Order was entered on January 6, 2003, to establish a final judgment in this case. 10 ³⁸⁶ In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court’s grant of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See Serio, et al v. Baltimore County, Maryland, et al., No. 2393 (Sept. Term 2002). The Court of Special Appeals, addressing Serio’s claim that items, including the firearms, should be returned to him under Section 551(a) because the search warrant was invalid, held that the warrant was valid because it was not overly broad and was based in part upon untainted information. The court further explained that because seized items that were not named in the warrant had been returned, “Serio ha[d] already received all the relief to which he is entitled under Count I.” 11 The Court of Special Appeals also addressed Serio’s argument that he retained a constitutionally protected property interest in the firearms.

The court noted that Serio did not allege constitutional violations in his Third Amended Complaint. Rather, he relied upon reasoning from the federal district court’s prior dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint, to claim a violation of his due process rights. The intermediate appellate court held that the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment on the due process claim because Serio did not properly raise this issue in his Third Amended Complaint, while it was before that court. The court further stated that even if Serio had properly alleged constitutional due process violations against the County in his Third Amended Complaint, his argument would fail because he could not lawfully possess the weapons and did not have a recognized property interest in the firearms.

With respect to the allegations in Count II involving Section 551(b) (returning seized property), the intermediate appellate ³⁸⁷ court held that Section 551(b) applies to situations where the items were seized from persons charged with illegal possession of weapons. According to the court, because Serio had not been charged with possession of weapons, Section 551(b) was not applicable. The court also agreed with the County that Count III of Serio’s complaint relating to Section 551(c) (restoring wrongfully retained property), should be dismissed because Serio could not lawfully possess the weapons and the weapons must be returned to the person “from whom [they] were taken.” The Court of Special Appeals addressed the question of whether the Circuit Court erred in dismissing Count V, where Serio alleged that Officer Russo had made a false statement on the warrant application and had seized items that either were not mentioned in the warrant or were not contraband, in violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Court of Special Appeals held that the standard for assessing an officer’s conduct in obtaining and executing a search warrant is a “shock the judicial conscience” standard, and that Officer Russo’s conduct fell short of egregious behavior that would warrant liability; thus, the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment as to Count V. 12 Serio filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court in which he asserted that several constitutional provisions applied, including Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

This Court was asked to consider the following questions: 1. Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in construing the verbiage of Article 27 Section 551(c) that seized property shall be “restored to the person from whom it was taken” as precluding a court from ordering property to be handed over to an agent of the owner of the property, as such a narrow construction of the statute precluded its remedial purpose. ³⁸⁸ 2. Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in approving a common law forfeiture of appellant’s property, based upon two reported decisions of the Eighth Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals concerning return of seized property under federal law; rather than upon Maryland law of forfeiture, which precludes common law forfeiture. We granted the petition and issued the writ of certiorari, Serio v. Baltimore County, Maryland, 381 Md. 324 , 849 A.2d 473 (2004), and shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

II

Standard of Review This Court reviews an order granting summary judgment de novo. O’Connor v. Baltimore County, 382 Md. 102, 110 , 854 A.2d 1191, 1196 (2004); Todd v. MTA, 373 Md. 149, 154 , 816 A.2d 930, 933 (2003); Beyer v. Morgan State Univ., 369 Md. 335, 359 , 800 A.2d 707, 721 (2002); Schmerling v. Injured Workers’ Ins. Fund, 368 Md. 434, 443 , 795 A.2d 715, 720 (2002); see Fister v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 366 Md. 201, 210 , 783 A.2d 194, 199 (2001).

In so doing, we must determine, initially, whether a dispute of material fact exists. Md. Rule 2-501(e) (2002); see O’Connor, 382 Md. at 110-11 , 854 A.2d at 1196 ; Todd, 373 Md. at 154 , 816 A.2d at 933 ; Beyer, 369 Md. at 359-60 , 800 A.2d at 721 ; Schmerling, 368 Md. at 443 , 795 A.2d at 720 ; Lippert v. Jung, 366 Md. 221, 227 , 783 A.2d 206, 209 (2001). “ ‘A material fact is a fact the resolution of which will somehow affect the outcome of the case.’ ” Todd, 373 Md. at 155 , 816 A.2d at 933 (quoting Matthews v. Howell, 359 Md. 152, 161 , 753 A.2d 69, 73 (2000)). The facts properly before the court as well as any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them must be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. O’Connor, 382 Md. at 111 , 854 A.2d at 1196 ; Todd, 373 Md. at 155 , 816 A.2d at 933 ; Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 178 , 757 A.2d 118, 127 (2000).

If the record reveals that a material fact is in dispute, summary judgment is not appropriate. O’Connor, 382 Md. at 111 , 854 A.2d at 1196 ; Todd, 373 Md. at 155 , 816 A.2d at 933 ; ³⁸⁹ Okwa, 360 Md. at 178 , 757 A.2d at 127 . If no material facts are disputed, however, then we must determine whether the Circuit Court correctly granted summary judgment as a matter of law. See Md. Rule 2 — 501(e); O'Connor, 382 Md. at 111 , 854 A.2d at 1197 ; Todd, 373 Md. at 155 , 816 A.2d at 933 ; Beyer, 369 Md. at 360 , 800 A.2d at 721 ; Schmerling, 368 Md. at 443 , 795 A.2d at 720 .

III

Discussion Serio argues that the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that the trial court properly entered summary judgment against him on his claim to have the seized firearms restored to him under Maryland Code, Article 27, Section 551(c). In Serio’s view, the language of Section 551(c) permits him to exercise his property interests in the firearms by allowing the property to be “restored” to him through an agent or delegate. Moreover, Serio contends that the Court of Special Appeals approved a common law forfeiture of the firearms by relying upon decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, rather than upon Maryland forfeiture statutes. In his brief, Serio also asserts that he was being deprived of his due process rights under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

During oral argument before this Court, Serio, when questioned, maintained that the County’s continued retention of the firearms was a constitutional violation and that if he were to obtain the proceeds from a sale of the seized firearms, his property interests would be “restored.” The County contends, however, that the firearms were rightfully seized pursuant to a search warrant and are being properly withheld from Serio because he is a convicted felon and is precluded from taking possession of the firearms. The County further claims that the unambiguous language of Section 551(c) does not allow the firearms to be “restored” to Serio through an agent or delegate. Finally, the County argues that the statute governing forfeiture of firearms requires a conviction for possession of firearms and Serio has not been so convicted. At argument, the County’s representa ³⁹⁰ tive iterated that the County was keeping the firearms rather than selling them and returning their proceeds to Serio because Serio was prohibited from possessing the firearms.

Article 27, Section 551(c), states: (1) If, at any time, on application to a judge of the circuit court of any county or judge of the District Court, it is found that property rightfully taken under a search warrant is being wrongfully withheld after there is no further need for retention of the property, the judge must cause it to be restored to the person from whom it was taken. Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1998 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27, § 551(c). When we interpret statutes, our goal is to “identify and effectuate the legislative intent underlying the statute(s) at issue.” Drew v. First Guaranty Mortgage Corp., 379 Md. 318, 327 , 842 A.2d 1, 6 (2003) (quoting Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325, 335 , 748 A.2d 478, 483 (2000)). As we have stated, the best source of legislative intent is the statute’s plain language and when the language is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ordinarily ends there.

Drew, 379 Md. at 327 , 842 A.2d at 6 ; Beyer, 369 Md. at 349 , 800 A.2d at 715 . Although the plain language of the statute guides our understanding of legislative intent, we do not read the language in a vacuum. See Drew, 379 Md. at 327 , 842 A.2d at 6 ; Derry, 358 Md. at 336 , 748 A.2d at 483-84 . Rather, we read statutory language within the context of the statutory scheme, considering the “purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body.” Drew, 379 Md. at 327 , 842 A.2d at 6 ; Beyer, 369 Md. at 349 , 800 A.2d at 715 ; In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 711 , 782 A.2d 332, 346 (2001) (quoting Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387 , 614 A.2d 590, 594 (1992)).

When interpreting the language of a statute, “we assign the words their ordinary and natural meaning.” O’Connor, 382 Md. at 113 , 854 A.2d at 1198 ; Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 653 , 705 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1998). We will “neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words the Legislature used or engage in a forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute’s meaning.” O’Connor, 382 Md. at 114 , 854 A.2d at ³⁹¹ 1198 (quoting Taylor v. NationsBank, 365 Md. 166, 181 , 776 A.2d 645, 654 (2001)). Thus, the provisions must be read from “a commonsensical perspective to avoid a farfetched interpretation.” Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 346 , 772 A.2d 1225, 1235 (2001). We begin with interpreting the language of Section 551(c).

The General Assembly did not define in the statute itself what it means to “restore” property that has been wrongfully withheld. A review of the legislative history also is not helpful in discerning the meaning of “restoring” property under Section 551(c), because there is nothing in that history discussing the use of the term. It appears that the language of subsection (c) was derived from Section 551(a), which also states that property must be “restored to the person from whom it was taken.” Subsection (a), added in 1958, see Ch. 74 of the Acts of 1958, is primarily concerned with the return of property that was not adequately described in the warrant underlying the seizure of the property or property that was seized without the existence of probable cause to issue the warrant. Later, in 1975, Section 551(b), containing similar language, “returned to the person to whom it belongs,” was added as an additional way to have property returned when criminal proceedings against the property owner have ended.

See Ch. 704 of the Acts of 1975. Subsection (c) was added in 1976, as a way to return property that had been properly taken under a search warrant but in circumstances in which the government had no further need to retain the property. See Chs. 194, 704 of the Acts of 1976. Furthermore, this Court has not interpreted the meaning of the term “restored” within Section 551(c).

Nevertheless, Serio contends that this Court’s decision in State v. Denten Corp., 288 Md. 178 , 416 A.2d 271 (1980), accommodates an expanded definition of “restore.” In Denten, the Baltimore City police executed a search and seizure warrant at Follies Bookstore, which was owned by defendants, Denten Corporation and Thomas Frank. Id. at 180 , 416 A.2d at 273 . During the search the police seized several “peep show” motion picture films and film projectors because they were allegedly being ³⁹² shown without a license from the Maryland State Board of Censors (“Board”). Id.

The defendants were convicted of showing unlicensed films, and they appealed, challenging the retention of the films. Id. The defendants argued that they could not be prohibited from distributing the films unless there had been a prior determination that the films were obscene, which had not occurred in the case. Id. at 181 , 416 A.2d at 273 .

In addition, the defendants argued that because the seized materials were the only copies in their possession at the time of the seizure, the State must either return the film or allow the film to be copied for the purpose of submitting the film to the Board for review and licensing. Id. This Court held that the State may not seize the only copy of a film as evidence of a licensing violation and then refuse to return the film or allow it to be copied for purposes of submitting the film to the Board for review and licensing. Id. at 186 , 416 A.2d at 276 .

We explained that the seized film could be copied and delivered to the Board for review under the provisions of Section 551(c). Id. at 187 , 416 A.2d at 276-77 . We explored the meaning of the phrase “wrongfully withheld” and stated: With respect to the very narrow problem area under discussion, which assumes that the sole copy of a motion picture film has been seized, and which further assumes that the person from whom it was taken applies to have the sole copy delivered to the Board of Motion Picture Censors for review or desires to have a copy made for such a submission, we interpret Art. 27, § 551(c)(1) to permit honoring the request. Id. at 187, 416 A.2d at 276-77 .

We then ordered the State to submit the copy seized to the Board for its determination. Denten is inapplicable to the case sub judice, however, because the gravamen of that case was whether the seized film was rightfully taken as proof of distribution of unlicensed material. In Denten, the State “wrongfully withheld” the film when it refused to submit the film for Board review. The Board was not being given the films, as an agent of Denten ³⁹³ and Frank; rather, its determination was a vital element of the State’s charges.

While the present case also deals with whether the County has wrongfully withheld property, the similarities in the issues end before any discussion of restoration to an agent or a sale with remuneration to the property owner, as Serio contends. Restoration to an agent or sale were never implicated in Denten. Serio also asserts that the Court of Special Appeals erred by approving a common law forfeiture in its reliance on decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The intermediate appellate court held that the firearms could not be returned to Serio or a