Shaefer v. Hewes

Marbury, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant, Catherine Shaefer, filed suit under the common counts in assumpsit against the appellee, J. Edward Hewes, executor of the estate of Maggie May Hundertmark, alleging that she had performed certain services for the appellee’s decedent during the latter’s lifetime. The trial before the court, sitting without a jury, resulted in a judgment in favor of the appellee for costs, from which the appellant appeals. The appellant is a housewife residing in the village of Boring, Baltimore County, and is the wife of Edgar Shaefer, who was the nephew by marriage of Mrs. Maggie May Hundertmark (appellee’s decedent).

She knew Mrs. Hundertmark for many years dating from before her marriage to Edgar Shaefer, who at that time did work on the Hundertmark farm. Mrs. Hundertmark was widowed in 1941, and a year later, after a stroke which paralyzed her left side, moved to a house on Old Hanover Road, where she lived until her death on November 10, 1958. From the time of moving to her last residence she was compelled to use a walker or wheel chair, and could not do anything for herself. After the stroke a series of elderly women companions lived with Mrs. Hundertmark for nominal pay and room and board.

The real work of the many tasks necessary to run the household of an invalid was done by the appellant who went to the home three or four times every day, doing the cleaning, cutting wood, laundry, ironing, running errands, putting on ²¹⁰ storm doors, cooking, mowing grass, painting, nursing and so forth—far beyond the call of friendship. These services testified to by the appellant were completely corroborated by Mrs. Ross Gill, the only other witness who testified, who had known Mrs. Hundertmark practically all her life and who was her next door neighbor from 1942 until her death in 1958. Mrs. Gill testified that Mrs. Hundertmark had told her a number of times that “she hoped when she was gone, Catherine would put a bill in against the estate, and make it a good one.” At the conclusion of the appellant’s evidence the appellee rested. The sole question presented in this case is whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant’s claim against the estate of appellee’s decedent in view of the uncontradicted testimony that decedent agreed that her estate should pay for appellant’s services, and that the appellant by her continued services accepted the offer.

The trial judge in his oral opinion rested his verdict upon the premise that he felt that at the time of the rendition of the services sued for there was no expectation to pay or to be paid for them and for that reason “reluctantly” entered judgment for the defendant. It is the appellant’s contention, with which we agree, that because of the lack of family relationship, in that the claimant is the wife of the nephew of the decedent’s husband, there is no presumption of gratuity. This relationship has been clearly ruled on by this Court in