Shoemaker v. Sheriff of Carroll County

FINAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This case is before us on appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Carroll County denying appellant’s writ of habeas corpus. The appellant, Donald Shoemaker, was indicted by the State of Pennsylvania for bringing stolen property into the state. While the date of the alleged offense was December 20, 1966, the indictment was not returned until April 23, 1968, even though Pennsylvania had reason to know as of December 20, 1966, that the appellant was a prime suspect.

On May 20, 1968, the Governor of Pennsylvania issued a requisition to the Governor of Maryland requesting that the appellant be returned. After an extradition hearing on September 30, 1969, a rendition warrant was issued by Governor Mandel. On this same date, appellant applied for his writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court for Carroll County pursuant to Article 41, Section 25, of the Annotated Code of Maryland. After a hearing his petition was denied and this appeal followed.

The affidavits accompanying the application for requisition of the appellant and the testimony of the witnesses for the State of Pennsylvania, at the habeas Corpus hearing, established that there was an eyewitness who saw the appellant bring certain property to him on December 20, 1966, in Pennsylvania. There was evidence that this prop ¹³¹ erty was stolen. The appellant testified that he presently did not know his whereabouts on December 20, 1966, because of the time lapse since that date. He did acknowledge that he was aware of the charge because of a fugitive warrant served upon him in Washington County on April 10, 1868.

On November 4, 1968, the appellant was sentenced to one year in the Maryland House of Correction and was confined until March 24, 1969, at which time he was released on parole. During his confinement in the House of Correction, the State of Pennsylvania failed to file an interstate detainer on the Pennsylvania charge. In August, 1969, he was once again served with a fugitive warrant. Appellant filed a writ of habeas corpus which was granted.

Another warrant was issued August 29 but not served until October 28,1969. Appellant raises two major contentions on appeal. He first argues that the delay in indicting and extraditing him by the State of Pennsylvania prejudiced his right to a speedy trial and denied him due process of law. His second contention is that the delay prejudiced his chances of effectively countering the extradition proceedings because the time lapse made it difficult for him to show he was not in Pennsylvania on the date of the alleged offense.

The first contention is beyond our province to examine. There may be merit to the claim that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was infringed by the long delays in indictment and extradition; however, this is a matter for the Pennsylvania courts to determine. They will be in the best position to determine what harm, if any, was done to the appellant and will have before them the full reason for any delays. We believe this first contention is analogous to an instance where a substantive defense is raised to the crime charged, such as that limitations has run.

The law is clear that the demanding state should pass upon the defense raised. In Lincoln v. State, 199 Md. 194, 202 , 85 A. 2d 765 (1952), we stated: “The question is raised whether it appears from the face of the papers in this case that limitations have run against abandonment and de ¹³² sertion in Massachusetts on September 15th, 1941. From Chapter 277, Section 63, General Laws of Massachusetts, 1932, Vol. 2, it seems that such is not the case. However, that question is not before us here.

In Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128 , 38 S. Ct. 41, 43 , 62 L. Ed. 193 , supra, the Supreme Court of the United States in a case in which extradition was sought by the State of Illinois from the State of New York said: The statute of limitations is a defense and must be asserted on the trial by the defendant in