Simms v. Dept. of Health

Romechia Simms v. Maryland Department of Health, et al., No. 20, September Term, 2019 DUE PROCESS — CONDITIONAL RELEASE — HOSPITAL WARRANT — DANGEROUSNESS — The legal standard for a court issuing a hospital warrant pursuant to § 3-121 of the Criminal Procedure Article of the Maryland Code (2001, 2008, 2018 Repl. Vol.) (“CP”) is whether the court has probable cause to believe that an individual violated her conditional release. Because a committed person is presumed dangerous if she violates a term of her conditional release, a separate finding of dangerousness is not required for the issuance of a hospital warrant. The Court of Special Appeals did not err in concluding that CP § 3-121 does not violate due process under the Federal Constitution or the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

Circuit Court for Howard County Case No. 13-C-17-112909 Argued: October 4, 2019 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 20 September Term, 2019 ROMECHIA SIMMS v. MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL. Barbera, C.J. McDonald Watts Hotten Getty Booth Greene, Clayton Jr. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) JJ. Opinion by Barbera, C.J. Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Filed: January 30, 2020 Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2020-01-30 11:42-05:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk Maryland law provides a mechanism by which a person can be determined to have been guilty of a crime but “not criminally responsible” for its commission. See generally Incompetency and Criminal Responsibility in Criminal Cases, Md. Code (2001, 2008 Repl.

Vol., 2018 Cum. Supp.) Crim. Proc. (“CP”) §§ 3-101–123.

Under that circumstance, the person is committed to the Maryland Department of Health (“Health Department”). The statutory scheme provides, in appropriate circumstances, the option of a court order allowing for the committed person’s “conditional release” to the community with specific conditions to which the committed person must adhere. The statutory scheme also spells out what occurs if a committed person, after having been placed on conditional release, is alleged to have violated one or more conditions of release. The present case focuses on the steps a court is to take upon receiving a State’s Attorney (“State”) petition alleging that a committed person has violated conditional release.

Ms. Romechia Simms, upon pleading guilty in the Circuit Court for Charles County to involuntary manslaughter in connection with the death of her young child, was found not criminally responsible. She was committed to the Health Department and conditionally released pursuant to court order. Later, the State filed with the circuit court a petition for revocation or modification of Ms. Simms’ conditional release, alleging that she had violated a condition of her release. Acting pursuant to CP § 3-121, the court reviewed the petition, and upon “determin[ing] that there is probable cause to believe” that Ms. Simms “has violated a conditional release,” issued a hospital warrant.

Upon execution of the warrant and in furtherance of the court’s order, Ms. Simms was recommitted to a mental health facility in anticipation of a required hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) “[w]ithin 10 days after the committed person is returned to the Health Department in accordance with the hospital warrant.” CP § 3- 121(e)–(f). Ms. Simms asserts that the process for issuing a hospital warrant and recommitment pending the hearing on the petition for revocation or modification violates constitutional due process. Ms. Simms argues that recommitment of a person alleged to have violated conditional release must be based not only upon the stated requirement that the court find “probable cause to believe that the committed person has violated a conditional release,” CP § 3-121(e), but must also include a finding, not mentioned in that subsection or elsewhere in Title 3 of the Criminal Procedure Article (“Title 3”), that the committed person was currently a danger to self or to the person or property of others. For reasons that follow, we hold that CP § 3-121(e) does not violate due process under either the Federal Constitution or the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

We are satisfied that a court may issue a hospital warrant upon a finding of probable cause to believe that the committed person violated a term of her conditional release, without also having to make a finding that the committed person is presently dangerous. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. I. Statutory Procedures Related to Conditional Release and Hospital Warrants The question before us requires that we focus on the hospital warrant procedure set forth in CP § 3-121(e)(1). It is helpful, though, to consider that subsection together with 2 the remainder of that section and others contained in Title 3.

We therefore begin with a brief overview of the relevant portions of Title 3.1 Title 3 provides that a court2 is to commit a person to the Health Department if that person has been found not criminally responsible for the commission of a criminal act.3 Once committed, the “committed person”4 may be granted conditional release if that person “would not be a danger . . . to self or to the person or property of others if released from confinement with conditions imposed by the court.” CP § 3-114(c). CP § 3-121 (“Allegations of violations of conditional release”) lays out the process by which such allegations are addressed. Subsections 3-121(a) through (e) provide, among other procedures, that upon a petition from the State for revocation or modification of conditional release,5 the court is to review the petition to determine whether “there is 1 Title 3 also provides procedures involving competency to stand trial, which are not at issue in this case. See CP §§ 3-101(f), 3-103–08. 2 CP § 3-101 defines certain terms used throughout Title 3.

Subsection 3-101(c) defines “[c]ourt” to mean “a court that has criminal jurisdiction.” 3 The test for criminal responsibility is found in CP § 3-109. That section provides in relevant part: A defendant is not criminally responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time of that conduct, the defendant, because of a mental disorder or mental retardation, lacks substantial capacity to: (1) appreciate the criminality of that conduct; or (2) conform that conduct to the requirements of law. 4 CP § 3-101(b) defines “[c]ommitted person” to mean “a person committed to the Health Department as not criminally responsible under the test for criminal responsibility.” 5 CP § 3-121 provides the following in subsections (a) through (c): 3 (a) Determination of factual basis by a State’s Attorney. — (1) If the State’s Attorney receives a report that alleges that a committed person has violated a condition of a conditional release, or if the State’s Attorney is notified by the court or Health Department under subsection (b) of this section, the State’s Attorney shall determine whether there is a factual basis for the complaint. (2) If the State’s Attorney determines that there is no factual basis for the complaint, the State’s Attorney shall notify the person who made the report and take no further action. (3) If the State’s Attorney determines that there is a factual basis to believe that the committed person has violated the terms of a conditional release and believes further action by the court is necessary, the State’s Attorney promptly shall: (i) notify the Health Department of the alleged violation; and (ii) file with the court a petition for revocation or modification of conditional release and send a copy of the petition to the Health Department.

(b) Action by the court and Health Department. — (1) If a court receives a report that alleges that a committed person has violated a condition of a conditional release, the court promptly shall: (i) notify the Health Department; and (ii) notify the State’s Attorney and provide the name, address, and telephone number of the person who reported the violation and a copy of the order for conditional release. (2) If the Health Department receives a report that alleges that a committed person has violated conditional release, the Department shall: (i) notify the court and the State’s Attorney; and (ii) provide the State’s Attorney with the name, address, and telephone number of the person who reported the violation and a copy of the order for conditional release. (c) Petition for revocation or modification. — The petition for revocation or modification of a conditional release shall contain: (1) a statement that the committed person has violated a term of a conditional release and that there is therefore reason to believe that the committed person no longer meets the criteria for eligibility for conditional release; (2) a statement of the conditions violated; (3) the factual basis for the statements in items (1) and (2) of this subsection; (4) the most recent evaluation report on the committed person; and 4 probable cause to believe that the committed person has violated a conditional release[.]” CP § 3-121(e). If the court finds there is such probable cause, then the court “promptly shall . . . issue a hospital warrant6 for the committed person and direct that on execution the committed person shall be transported to the facility designated by the Health Department[.]” CP § 3-121(e)(1).

The court then sends a copy of the hospital warrant to the State, the Public Defender, counsel of record for the committed person, the Office of Administrative Hearings (“Office”), and the Health Department. CP § 3-121(e)(2). “Within 10 days after the committed person is returned to the Health Department in accordance with the hospital warrant, the Office shall hold a hearing[.]” CP § 3-121(f). At that hearing the committed person is entitled “to be represented by counsel[,] . . . to offer evidence, to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and to exercise any other rights . . . consider[ed] necessary for a fair hearing[.]” CP § 3-121(g)(1)–(2). The ALJ presiding over the revocation hearing determines “(i) whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the State has proved that the committed person violated (5) the designation by the Health Department of the facility to receive the returned committed person.

CP § 3-121(a)–(c). 6 CP § 3-101(e) defines “[h]ospital warrant” to mean the following: a legal document issued by a court that: (1) authorizes any law enforcement officer in the State to apprehend a person who is alleged to have violated an order for conditional release and transport the person to a facility designated by the Health Department; and (2) requires that the issuance of the warrant is entered in the person’s criminal history record information of the criminal justice information system. 5 conditional release; and (ii) whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the committed person nevertheless has proved eligibility for conditional release.” CP § 3-121(g)(3). Once the hearing is concluded, the ALJ “promptly shall: (i) send a report of the hearing and determination to the court; and (ii) send copies of the report to the committed person, counsel for the committed person, the State’s Attorney, and the Health Department.” CP § 3-121(h)(1). Section 3-121(h)(2) provides a five-day opportunity for the committed person, the State, or the Health Department to file exceptions to the determination of the ALJ. Section 3-121(i) addresses the court’s obligations upon receiving the ALJ’s report: After the court considers the report of the Office, the evidence, and any exceptions filed, within 10 days after the court receives the report, the court shall: (1) revoke the conditional release and order the committed person returned to the facility designated by the Health Department; (2) modify the conditional release as required by the evidence; (3) continue the present conditions of release; or (4) extend the conditional release by an additional term of 5 years.

CP § 3-121(i). The committed person has the right to appeal the court’s decision. CP § 3- 121(k).7 7 Subsection 3-121(k) provides: “(1) An appeal from a District Court order shall be on the record in circuit court. (2) An appeal from a circuit court order shall be by application for leave to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.” 6 II.

This Case: The Facts and Procedural History A. Underlying Facts and Court’s Imposition of Conditional Release The facts of this case are undisputed. In February 2016, Ms. Simms appeared before the Circuit Court for Charles County and entered an Alford plea to the commission of involuntary manslaughter in causing the death of her three-year old son.8 After accepting the plea, the court found that, at the time of the crime, Ms. Simms suffered from a mental disorder that caused her to lack the capacity to appreciate the criminality of her act and act in accordance with the law. Then, pursuant to CP § 3-110, the court made the additional finding that Ms. Simms was not criminally responsible at the time of the offense. The circuit court determined that Ms. Simms would not be a danger to herself or others if released from confinement with certain conditions.

Pursuant to CP § 3-111 and § 3-112, the court issued an Order of Conditional Release in March 2016 that detailed sixteen conditions requiring Ms. Simms’ compliance over a five-year period. Among those conditions Ms. Simms was required to attend regularly scheduled therapy appointments. In March 2017 the court amended its original Order of Conditional Release 8 The reported opinion of the Court of Special Appeals contains a thorough description of the facts surrounding the death of the child, Ms. Simms’ mental health history, and the state of her mental health at the time of the child’s death. Simms v. Md. Dep’t of Health, 240 Md. App. 294 , 300–01 (2019).

We cannot improve upon that summary and therefore do not repeat or summarize it here. 7 to change Ms. Simms’ treatment from the Assertive Community Treatment team to regular out-patient clinical services with QCI Behavioral Health. B. The Court’s Revocation of Conditional Release and Issuance of Hospital Warrant In September 2017, Ms. Simms’ therapist expressed concerns to the Health Department that Ms. Simms was exhibiting a “decrease in psychological functioning.” The therapist noted that Ms. Simms missed therapy appointments and showed “symptoms of depression, anxiety, irritable mood,” and had become “easily distracted[.]” The therapist added that Ms. Simms was “unable to concentrate/focus,” experienced “short term memory loss, and” was “grieving the death of her son.” The therapist recommended that Ms. Simms “obtain a psychological evaluation and be reconsidered for a higher level of treatment than what is currently being given.” The State conducted an investigation pursuant to CP § 3-121(a) and, on September 13, 2017, filed a petition for revocation of Ms. Simms’ conditional release. The petition alleged that Ms. Simms violated conditional release by missing required therapy appointments. On the same day, at what had been a regularly scheduled status hearing,9 the court, although not required by Title 3 to do so, allowed Ms. Simms’ counsel to address his concerns about the procedures set forth in § 3- 9 Both the original and modified conditional release orders issued in Ms. Simms’ case include a condition that, in the first year, “the Court will hold a hearing every 90 days to determine [Ms. Simms’] progress and compliance with her treatment and release[;]” in subsequent years, such hearings are to be conducted at the discretion of the court.

That condition directs Ms. Simms to “appear at each hearing.” 8 121(e).10 As described earlier, those procedures governed the court’s decision whether to issue a hospital warrant in response to the State’s petition for revocation of conditional release. Counsel for Ms. Simms argued, among other matters, that the procedure for issuance and resultant execution of the hospital warrant violates constitutionally based notions of procedural due process. The hearing spanned portions of September 13 and 14. The circuit court heard from Ms. Lori Mannino.

Ms. Mannino generally described Title 3’s procedural regime including—most relevant to the matter before the court at the time—the provisions of § 3- 121(a) through (e). Ms. Simms argued, through counsel, that a hospital warrant could not be properly issued under § 3-121(e) unless the court first found not only probable cause to believe that Ms. Simms had violated conditional release, but also that she currently was a danger to herself, others, or property. Absent such a finding of dangerousness, Ms. Simms argued, the hospital warrant procedures as set forth in § 3-121(e) violate due process.11 10 Also present at the hearing were Ms. Simms, her counsel, Assistant State’s Attorney Tiffany Campbell, and Lori Mannino, a Community Forensic Aftercare Provider and Ms. Simms’ treatment monitor. 11 Ms. Simms, through counsel, further argued at the hearing before the Circuit Court for Charles County that CP § 3-121(e) violates due process because that subsection does not provide Ms. Simms or other similarly situated persons notice and an opportunity to defend against issuance of a hospital warrant. Ms. Simms continued to press that constitutional claim at the subsequent hearing on her petition for habeas corpus relief.

Ms. Simms no longer makes that argument. 9 When the hearing resumed on September 14, counsel for Ms. Simms informed the court that at the close of the previous day’s hearing Ms. Mannino, with defense counsel’s concurrence, advised Ms. Simms to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation. That same evening, Ms. Simms reported to University of Maryland Charles Regional Medical Center for evaluation but was told to return early the following morning, which she did. Ms. Simms was evaluated by a licensed clinical professional counselor and a doctor who together determined that Ms. Simms did not meet the criteria for in-patient admission at the time of the evaluation. Counsel for Ms. Simms, incorrectly assuming that Ms. Simms was not dangerous to herself or others simply because she did not meet the criteria for in- patient admission, argued, without success, that the court could not legitimately issue a hospital warrant based solely on a probable cause finding that Ms. Simms had violated conditional release.12 At the close of the September 14 proceedings, the court, finding probable cause to believe that Ms. Simms had violated conditional release, issued a hospital warrant directing that she be recommitted to the Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center (“Perkins”) for evaluation and examination.

The court noted that pursuant to CP § 3-121(f) and (g), an ALJ would determine Ms. Simms’ dangerousness at an administrative hearing within ten days of execution of the hospital warrant. 12 As far as we can discern, nothing in Title 3 or elsewhere in the Maryland Code or the Code of Maryland Regulations suggests that the evaluation of Ms. Simms at University of Maryland Charles Regional Medical Center served to assess a committed person’s dangerousness, as that concept is described in Title 3. 10 C. The ALJ’s Hearing and Circuit Court’s Ruling Seven days after Ms. Simms’ admission to Perkins, an ALJ conducted the required hearing to determine whether Ms. Simms violated her conditional release and, if so, whether she was eligible for conditional release.13 See CP § 3-121(f). Among other exhibits presented at that hearing was a report by Dr. Monica Chawla. Dr. Chawla had evaluated Ms. Simms following her admission to Perkins on September 14, 2017. Ms. Simms was placed on ward observation and met with her treatment team on September 18 and 19.

Dr. Chawla’s report detailed Ms. Simms’ history, symptoms, and risk assessment. Dr. Chawla determined that Ms. Simms would not pose a danger to herself or others if