Singer Co., Link Simulation Systems Division v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.

GARRITY, Judge. We shall decide whether electricity remaining in a utility company’s distribution system prior to being transformed into a useable state by passing through a customer’s electric meter falls within the classification of “goods” to which the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), Title 2 of the Maryland Commercial Law Code Annotated is applicable. We shall also examine the application of the statute of limitations to common law breach of contract and negligence claims which are based upon successive interruptions of a utility company’s service to a customer. Finally, we shall determine the extent to which a utility company is liable for service interruptions when a provision of its service tariff exempts the company from liability for any such interruption which is not due to “willful default or neglect” on the utility’s part. ⁴⁶⁵ The action giving rise to these questions was initiated on June 7,1987, when the appellant, the Singer Company, Link Simulation Systems Division (Singer), filed suit in the Circuit Court for Howard County against the appellee, the Baltimore Gas & Electric Company (BG & E), asserting causes of action for (Count I) common law breach of contract; (Count II) breach of the UCC implied warranty of merchantability; (Count III) breach of the UCC implied warranty of fitness for a particular use; (Count IV) negligence in the supply of electric power; (Count V) negligent repair; and (Count VI) gross negligence.

Singer’s claims were premised upon various power outages it had experienced at its place of business from June 8, 1984 through September 9, 1986. BG & E responded to Singer’s complaint by moving to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment with respect to all counts raised in the complaint. The circuit court (Sybert, J.) dismissed Singer’s UCC implied warranty claims and ruled that BG & E was entitled to judgment on the common law contract and negligence counts as a matter of law. Standards of Review As a threshold matter, we address our role in reviewing the circuit court’s granting of BG & E’s motion.

Singer’s UCC implied warranty claims were disposed of on a motion to dismiss. Under Md. Rule 2-322, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim serves the same function as a demurrer under former Rules 345 and 371b. Sharrow v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 306 Md. 754, 768 , 511 A.2d 492 (1986); Broadwater v. State, 303 Md. 461, 466-67 , 494 A.2d 934 (1985). Consequently, in considering the propriety of the trial court’s order dismissing Singer’s causes of action for breach of UCC warranties, we must assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts in Singer’s complaint, as well as inferences which may reasonably be drawn from those well-pleaded facts.

See Wimmer v. ⁴⁶⁶ Richards, 75 Md.App. 102, 105, 540 A.2d 827 , cert. denied, 313 Md. 506 , 545 A.2d 1344 (1988). Summary judgment was entered in favor of B G & E with respect to Singer’s common law contract and negligence counts. A grant of summary judgment is appropriate only where the moving party demonstrates the absence of any genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Md.Rule 2-501(a).

See Dietz v. Moore, 277 Md. 1, 4 , 351 A.2d 428 (1976); DeGroft v. Lancaster Silo Co., 72 Md.App. 154, 159 , 517 A.2d 786 (1987); Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hospital, 69 Md.App. 325, 332 , 527 A.2d 1316 (1986), cert. denied, 309 Md. 325 , 523 A.2d 1013 (1987). A fact is “material” if it somehow affects the outcome of the case. King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 111 , 492 A.2d 608 (1985). The court, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, must consider the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits submitted by the parties.

Md. Rule 2-501(e). In determining whether to grant summary judgment, the trial court must view all disputed facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made. DiGrazia v. County Executive, 288 Md. 437, 445 , 418 A.2d 1191 (1980); Honaker v. W.C. & A.N. Miller Dev. Co., 285 Md. 216, 231-32 , 401 A.2d 1013 (1979); Barb v. Wallace, 45 Md.App. 271, 275 , 412 A.2d 1314 (1980).

Consequently, in reviewing the trial court’s grant of B G & E’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Singer’s common law contract and negligence claims, we must also decide whether there is a genuine dispute as to any material fact, with inferences drawn in favor of Singer, and whether BG&E is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Brady v. Ralph Parsons Co., 308 Md. 486, 496 , 520 A.2d 717 (1987); Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co., 303 Md. 619, 621 , 495 A.2d 838 (1985); Washington Homes, Inc. v. Interstate Land Dev., Inc., 281 Md. 712, 717-18 , 382 A.2d 555 (1978). See also King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. at 110-12, 492 A.2d 608 ; ⁴⁶⁷ Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Products, Inc., 273 Md. 1, 8 , 327 A.2d 502 (1974). Facts As the matter sub judice is in an early stage of factual development, the facts are gleaned from the allegations contained in Singer’s complaint, along with the evidentiary materials submitted in connection with the motions that developed during discovery. 1 The facts are substantially as follows: BG & E is a regulated public utility which furnishes gas and electricity to consumers in Maryland.

The Link Division of Singer is a high technology software engineering firm which makes training simulators for government and industry. In 1982, Singer opened a manufacturing facility at the Sieling Industrial Park, located in Columbia, Maryland. As BG & E was the exclusive supplier of electricity to the Sieling Industrial Park, Singer contracted with the utility company for a supply of electrical power to its facility. During all relevant time periods, Singer’s business was dependent upon a constant and uninterrupted supply of electricity.

Singer’s simulators were run by computer systems which could not be operated without electrical power. The heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems in the building Singer occupied were also driven by electrical power. During 1983, Singer experienced eight electrical power interruptions or outages at its Columbia facility. 2 The date, time and duration of those interruptions follows: ⁴⁶⁸ Date Time Duration May 27, 1983 2:00 p.m. Minutes May 28, 1983 7:30 a.m. 1 hour May 29, 1983 Time Not Recorded Minutes August 3, 1983 6:30 a.m.

Minutes August 29, 1983 1:00 p.m. 2 hours September 8, 1983 5:00 p.m. Minutes October 4, 1983 7:45 a.m. Minutes October 13, 1983 1:30 p.m. Minutes After the October 13, 1983 outage, the power interruptions ceased for nearly eight months.

Commencing June 8, 1984, however, Singer’s Columbia facility experienced the following interruptions in its supply of electricity: Date Time Duration June 8, 1984 11:40 a.m. to 1:15 p.m. 1.5 hours June 21, 1984 6:20 p.m. Minutes Oct. 23, 1984 5:30 a.m. to 6:30 a.m. 1 hour Nov. 30, 1984 10:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. 1 hour Dec. 7, 1984 12:00 noon to 3:30 p.m. 3.5 hours Jan. 10, 1985 11:10 a.m. to 12:40 p.m. 1.5 hours Jan. 10, 1985 2:30 p.m. Minutes Apr. 29, 1985 1 Power Dip Minutes May 21, 1985 12:45 p.m. Minutes June 5, 1985 5:30 p.m.

Minutes July 24, 1985 1:30 p.m. to 2:15 p.m. .75 hour Aug. 1, 1985 1:30 p.m. Minutes Aug. 11, 1985 Time Not Recorded 2.5 hours Aug. 13, 1985 10:50 a.m. to 1:15 p.m. 2.5 hours Sept. 15, 1985 2:30 p.m. Minutes Oct. 31, 1985 Time Not Recorded 3 Separate Power Dips Nov. 30, 1985 Time Not Recorded 1.5 hours Dec. 30, 1985 10:00 a.m. Minutes Feb. 5, 1986 9:30 a.m. to 10:20 a.m. 1 hour Mar. 22, 1986 4:30 p.m.

Duration Not Recorded Apr. 5, 1986 8:40 p.m. Minutes June 2, 1986 5:15 a.m. Minutes June 3, 1986 3:00 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. 2.5 hours June 6, 1986 2:50 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. 2.75 hours July 8, 1986 10:30 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. 3.5 hours July 8, 1986 8:30 p.m. to 8:45 p.m. .25 hour July 17, 1986 12:30 p.m. to 2:30 p.m. 2 hours ⁴⁶⁹ Time Date Duration July 29, 1986 5:40 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. 4.75 hours July 30, 1986 1:35 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. 1.5 hours Aug. 7, 1986 3:26 p.m. to 10:32 p.m. 7 hours Sept. 9, 1986 3:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. 1.5 hours Upon the occurrence of those power outages which were more than momentary interruptions or dips in power, Singer contacted BG & E and reported the incident. During extended power outages, Singer would contact BG & E at thirty minute intervals throughout the time period of the outage.

Upon the restoration of electric power after an outage, four Singer employees usually were required to devote approximately two hours to restore the simulator computer facility; another four employees usually were required to devote approximately three hours to repair and restart the simulator equipment. On August 29, 1986, shortly after the seven hour August 7, 1986 power outage, BG & E sent a letter to Singer explaining the cause of the power interruptions experienced at Singer’s facility. That letter stated, in pertinent part, as follows: During the past several months your portion of the Sieling Industrial Park has been subjected to frequent service interruptions. These were due primarily to multiple failures on the underground cable leading from our Columbia Sub-Station.

Additionally, we have experienced damage to cable terminations at several transformers supplying the Industrial Park following severe lightning storms. To address these problems we have taken the following action: * The 4,000 foot section of underground cable which experienced failures has been replaced. * Our construction personnel will be inspecting all transformer terminations within the Industrial Park and will make repairs as necessary. ⁴⁷⁰ Prior to sending the letter, BG & E had not informed Singer that the power interruptions it experienced at the Columbia facility were the result of a defective underground cable. 3 Uniform Commercial Code — Implied Warranties The trial court dismissed Singer’s claims (Counts II and III) that the electric power outages constituted breaches of the UCC implied warranties of merchantability, Md. Comm.Law Code Ann. § 2-314 (1975, 1988 Cum. Supp.), and fitness for a particular use. Md.Com.Law Code Ann. § 2-315.

The court’s decision was based upon its determination that Title 2 of the UCC applied only to “transactions in goods,” Md.Com.Law Code Ann. § 2-102, that electricity did not fall within the classification of “goods” as defined in the UCC, Md.Com.Law Code Ann. § 2-105, and, therefore, that UCC implied warranties were inapplicable to the electrical power outages at Singer’s facility. Singer asseverates that the trial court erred in dismissing its UCC warranty claims. On this point, Singer contends that the electricity BG & E agreed to provide to its facility comprised “goods” as that term is defined in Section 2-105. 4 Whether electricity may be considered a good — thus subjecting a utility company to breach of warranty actions under Title 2 of the UCC — has not previously been addressed by either the Court of Appeals or this court. See Lathroum v. Potomac Elect.

Power Co., 309 Md. 445 , 451 ⁴⁷¹ n. 8, 524 A.2d 1228 (1987). Courts in other jurisdictions, however, applying uniform codes identical or similar to Maryland’s UCC, have had occasion to decide this issue. See, e.g., Hedges v. Pub. Serv.

Co., 396 N.E.2d 933 (Ind.App.1979); Helvey v. Wabash County REMC, 151 Ind.App. 176 , 278 N.E.2d 608 (1972); Williams v. Detroit Edison Co., 63 Mich.App. 559 , 234 N.W.2d 702 (1975); Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 38 Mich.App. 325 , 196 N.W.2d 316 (1972); Farina v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 81 A.D.2d 700 , 438 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1981); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. v. Goebel, 28 Ohio Misc.2d 4 , 502 N.E.2d 713 (Hamilton County Mun. Ct.1986). We think it significant to our resolution of the present issue, however, that no reported decision which we have encountered has held electricity to be a good while it remained in a utility company’s distribution system.

On the contrary, in Hedges, supra, an Indiana appellate court held, inter alia, that raw electricity encountered in an unmarketed and unmarketable state in an overhead transmission cable was not a good covered by that jurisdiction’s version of the UCC. Similarly, in Goebel, supra, an Ohio court, after a thorough review of the relevant caselaw, impliedly held that electricity in its raw state — i.e., that which had not yet been transformed into metered amounts by passing through utility-owned conduits and into the homes of consumers — was not a good as defined in that state’s UCC. We believe the reasoning contained in Hedges and Goebel to be sound and, accordingly, view those cases as persuasive authority. In addition, we are mindful that raw high voltage electricity contained in a utility company’s distribution system, because it has not yet been converted into a useable state of lower voltage by passing through a meter into a customer’s home or place of business, is not the refined product that the customer intends to buy.

See Hedges, 396 N.E.2d at 936 ; Goebel, 28 Ohio Misc.2d at 5 , 502 N.E.2d at 715 . See also Md.Regs.Code tit. 20, § 50.07.02 (1988). For those reasons, we are convinced that ⁴⁷² electricity which remains in a utility company’s distribution system is not a good within Title 2 of Maryland’s UCC. Applying the foregoing to the present case, we recognize that Singer’s UCC warranty claims are apodictically premised upon its allegation that defects in an underground feeder — part of BG & E’s distribution system — resulted in electrical current failing to pass through its meter and, thus, into its facility.

We hold, therefore, that the trial court did not err in dismissing Singer’s UCC warranty claims. Limitations — Breach of Contract The trial court, relying upon the “discovery rule” as adopted by the Court of Appeals in Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 637-38 , 431 A.2d 677 (1981), determined that Singer’s common law contract action (Count I) accrued immediately after the August 29, 1983 power interruption and, therefore, was time-barred pursuant to the three-year limitations period of Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 5-101 (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol., 1988 Cum.Supp.). Singer takes issue with the trial court’s determination on this point. In particular, Singer contends that BG & E had a continuing contractual obligation to supply it with electricity.

Singer thus posits that each power outage at its facility constituted a separate and distinct breach of BG & E’s contractual obligation. Accordingly, Singer would have us conclude that each successive breach commenced a separate cause of action for limitations purposes. Section 5-101 provides that “[a] civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues unless another provision of the Code provides a different period of time within which an action shall be commenced.” As there is no other applicable Code provision, Section 5-101 governs the limitations period applicable to common law contract ⁴⁷³ actions. 5 Mayor of Federalsburg v. Allied Contractors, Inc., 275 Md. 151, 157 , 338 A.2d 275 , cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 , 96 S.Ct. 452 , 46 L.Ed.2d 389 (1975); DeGroft, 72 Md.App. at 171 , 527 A.2d 1316 ; Antigua Condominium Ass’n v. Melba Investors Atlantic, Inc., 65 Md.App. 726, 748 , 501 A.2d 1359 , aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 307 Md. 700 , 517 A.2d 75 (1986). As a general rule, a common law contract action accrues under Section 5-101 when there is a breach or at least an anticipatory breach of the contract.

DeGroft v. Lancaster Silo Co., 72 Md.App. at 171 , 527 A.2d 1316 ; Yingling v. Phillips, 65 Md.App. 451, 460 , 501 A.2d 87 (1985). With respect to such actions, however, we have stated that “[i]f the aggrieved party is unaware of the breach when it occurs, the discovery rule applies and the cause of action accrues when the aggrieved party is aware or should be aware that he has been injured.” Yingling v. Phillips, 65 Md.App. at 460-61, 527 A.2d 1316 (citing Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. at 636 , 431 A.2d 677 ). We observe that while the discovery rule may thus delay the accrual of a contract matter, it cannot operate to make such an action accrue earlier than the date of the breach or anticipatory breach. In the present case, it is undisputed that, subject to certain limitations, BG & E had a continuing contractual obligation to provide Singer with electricity.

See Md.Regs. Code tit. 20, §§ 50.04.06 and 50.07.05. We thus perceive that our resolution