Blandon v. State

COUCH, Judge. William Blandón, appellant, was convicted of attempted rape in the second degree on January 11, 1984 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol., 1984 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27, § 643B(c), 1 ³¹⁸ he was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment without possibility of parole. 2 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence in Blandon v. State, 60 Md.App. 582 , 483 A.2d 1320 (1984). We granted Blandon’s petition for a writ of certiorari to eliminate yet another alleged ambiguity .arising under Maryland’s enhanced penalty statute for repeat offenders.

The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether second degree rape constitutes a “crime of violence” as defined in Art. 27, § 643B(a). We hold that appellant’s crime is within the purview of that statute. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. Blandón argues that § 643B(a) is ambiguous and that this ambiguity must be resolved in his favor. “Crime of violence” is defined in this section as follows: “(a) Crime of violence. — As used in this section, the term ‘crime of violence’ means abduction; arson; burglary; daytime housebreaking under § 30(b) of this article; kidnapping; manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter; mayhem and maiming under §§ 384, 385, and 386 of this article; murder; rape; robbery; robbery with a deadly weapon; sexual offense in the first degree; sexual offense in the second degree; use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or other crime of violence; an ³¹⁹ attempt to commit any of the aforesaid offenses; assault with intent to murder; and assault with intent to rape.” Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol., 1984 Cum.Supp.).

The alleged ambiguity arises because the legislature was degree specific as to which sexual offenses constitute “crimes of violence” but did not specify or distinguish among degrees of rape in the same context. Appellant maintains that this doubt should be resolved by our finding that the term “rape” as used in § 643B(a) encompasses only first degree rape. We disagree. As we have stated time and again, in cases of ambiguity or doubt, a statute must be construed to effectuate the real and actual intention of the legislature.

See State v. Intercontinental, Ltd., 302 Md. 132, 137 , 486 A.2d 174 (1985). Moreover, rules of statutory construction require us to avoid construing a statute in a way which would lead to absurd results. Holy Cross Hosp. v. Maryland Empl. Sec., 288 Md. 685, 698-99 , 421 A.2d 944 (1980); Coerper v. Comptroller, 265 Md. 3, 6 , 288 A.2d 187 (1972).

In other words, we should reject a proposed statutory interpretation if its consequences are inconsistent with common sense. State v. Intercontinental, Ltd., supra, 302 Md. at 137 , 486 A.2d 174 ; Bailey v. Woel, 302 Md. 38, 43 , 485 A.2d 265 (1984). A comparison of Maryland’s rape and sexual offense statutes reveals that an adoption of appellant’s position would lead to precisely the absurd results we are compelled to avoid. Second degree rape is statutorily defined in Art. 27, § 463 as follows: “(a) What constitutes. — A person is guilty of rape in the second degree if the person engages in vaginal intercourse with another person: (1) By force or threat of force against the will and without the consent of the other person; or (2) Who is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless, and the person performing the act knows or should reasonably know the other person is ³²⁰ mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless; or (3) Who is under 14 years of age and the person performing the act is at least four years older than the victim.

(b) Penalty. — Any person violating the provisions of this section is guilty of a felony and upon conviction is subject to imprisonment for a period of not more than 20 years.” Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.). The elements of a second degree sexual offense are also set forth in article 27. Section 464A(a) defines this crime and states: “(a) What constitutes. — A person is guilty of a sexual offense in the second degree if the person engages in a sexual act with another person: (1) By force or threat of force against the will and without the consent of the other person; or (2) Who is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless, and the person performing the act knows or should reasonably know the other person is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless; or (3) Under 14 years of age and the person performing the sexual act is four or more years older than the victim. (b) Penalty. — Any person violating the provisions of this section is guilty of a felony and upon conviction is subject to imprisonment for a period of not more than 20 years.” Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.).

As can be seen, the two crimes are virtually identical in their elements and potential penalties. The only distinction is that second degree rape requires an act of vaginal ³²¹ intercourse while the second degree sexual offense is based on the commission of a sexual act. 3 As the State correctly points out, an adoption of appellant’s position would result in enhanced punishment being meted out to the defendant who by force or threat of force, against the will and