Smith v. State

ADKINS, J. In this case, we must pull over and decide a narrow legal issue that emerged from a routine traffic stop. Petitioner Tyrone L. Smith was convicted of driving without a license in 2009. He appealed, claiming that the State’s evidence was insufficient to convict him under Section 16-101(a) of the Transportation Article. That section reads: In general. — An individual may not drive or attempt to drive a motor vehicle on any highway in this State unless: ²⁹⁴ (1) The individual holds a driver’s license issued under this title; (2) The individual is expressly exempt from the licensing requirements of this title; or (3) The individual otherwise is specifically authorized by this title to drive vehicles of the class that the individual is driving or attempting to drive.

Md.Code (1977, 2008 Repl.Vol.), § 16-101(a) of the Transportation Article. 1 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed his conviction, finding the evidence sufficient. The statute that defines driving without a license contains three parts, and Petitioner argues that the State must prove all three as part of its case. The State counters that the latter two parts are merely affirmative defenses, either of which a defendant must raise himself to avoid conviction. We granted certiorari to clarify the statutory ambiguity and to answer the following question, which we have summarized and restated: To convict a defendant of driving without a license in violation of Section 16-101(a) of the Transportation Article, must the State prove all three parts of the statute, as elements of the offense, beyond a reasonable doubt? 2 We shall hold that the State need only prove the first part of the statute, and that the second and third parts are affirmative defenses that must be raised by a defendant. ²⁹⁵ Facts and Legal Proceedings The facts in this case are not disputed.

On January 30, 2009, Petitioner was stopped by the Westminster City police. The police ran checks on Petitioner with the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”), revealing that his registration had been suspended and had expired. Additional checks revealed that Petitioner’s driver’s license had been suspended in 2002 for failing to perform a driving improvement program and in 2003 for child support violations. His license was never reinstated, and his expired license was deleted from MVA records in 2005.

Although Petitioner had an MVA-issued photo identification, he did not have a valid driver’s license when stopped in 2009. The Circuit Court for Carroll County found Petitioner guilty of driving without a license and entered a nolle prosequi to the remaining traffic counts against him. The Circuit Court sentenced Petitioner to 60 days at the Carroll County Detention Center. Petitioner then timely appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.

In that Court, Petitioner raised the question: “Was the evidence insufficient to convict [Petitioner] of violating Section 16-101(a) of the Transportation Article?” In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals found no error and affirmed the Circuit Court. It held that the evidence sufficiently supported Petitioner’s conviction, because the State needed only to prove part (1) of Section 16-101(a): The exceptions to the license requirement set forth in subsection (2) and (3) are not constituent elements of the offense itself, but rather affirmative defenses to be raised by a defendant should they apply. A petition for certiorari to this Court followed, which we granted on October 24, 2011. See Smith v. State, 422 Md. 353 , 30 A.3d 193 (2011).

Discussion Petitioner asks us to interpret the language of Section 16-101(a) of the Transportation Article. He argues that the State ²⁹⁶ was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that (1) he did not have a Maryland driver’s license, (2) he was not expressly exempt from the licensing requirements, and (3) he was not specifically authorized to drive vehicles of the class that he was driving. The State counters that the offense is defined by Section 16 — 101(a)(1), and the subsequent exceptions must be raised by a defendant as affirmative defenses. Both parties cite Mackall v. State, in which this Court discussed the test for whether a statutory exception to a crime is an essential element of the offense that the State must negate or an affirmative defense that a defendant must raise: [W]hen a penal act contains an exception so incorporated with the substance of the clause defining the offense as to constitute a material part of the description of the acts, omission or other ingredients which constitute the offense, the burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that the offense charged is not within the exception.

In other words, when an exception is descriptive of the offense or so incorporated in the clause creating it as to make the exception a part of the offense, the State must negate the exception to prove its case. But, when an exception is not descriptive of the offense or so incorporated in the clause creating it as to make the exception a part of the offense, the exception must be interposed by the accused as an affirmative defense. (Citation omitted.) Mackall v. State, 283 Md. 100, 110-11 , 387 A.2d 762, 767-68 (1978). The statute in question in Mackall governed deadly or dangerous weapons: (a) Carrying concealed or openly with intent to injure; carrying by persons under eighteen at night in certain counties. — Every person who shall wear or carry any dirk knife, bowie knife ... or any other dangerous or deadly weapon of any kind, whatsoever (penknives without switchblade and handguns, excepted) concealed upon or about his person, and every person who shall wear or carry such weapon openly with the intent or purpose of injuring any ²⁹⁷ person in any unlawful manner, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. ...

(c) Exceptions. — Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the carrying of any of the weapons mentioned in subsection (a) of this section by an officer of this State, or of any county or city therein, who is entitled or required to carry such weapon as part of his official equipment, or by any conservator of the peace, who is entitled or required to carry such weapon as part of his official equipment, or by any officer or conservator of the peace of some other state temporarily sojourning in this State, or by any special agent of a railway or by any person to whom a permit to carry a concealed weapon has been issued under § 36E of this article, or by any person who shall carry such weapon as a reasonable precaution against apprehended danger.... Id. at 103-06, 387 A.2d at 763-65 . The Mackall Court concluded: [I]t is manifest that the weapons exception in subsection (a), set out in the enacting clause defining the offense, is an essential ingredient of the offense. The offense defined is committed only if certain weapons are carried.

What those weapons are can be determined only in terms of those which are proscribed and those which are excepted. The weapons excepted are as necessary to the description of the offense as are the weapons proscribed. Id. at 111 , 387 A.2d at 768 . The exceptions in subsection (c), however, were in a subsection that followed the enacting clause and were thus not incorporated within the definition or description so as to constitute a part of it.

See id. The State therefore had to negate the exceptions in subsection (a) only. The parties disagree how the rule in Mackall should be applied to Petitioner’s case. The State argues that Section 16 — 101(a)(1) defines the proscribed act, whereas (a)(2) and (a)(3) “are not necessary to the description of the offense because ... they do not define any conditions under which an individual may drive a motor vehicle.” The State asserts that, ²⁹⁸ because (a)(2) and (a)(3) “refer to conditions that are defined elsewhere,” 3 they do not fit within Mackall’s definition of the elements of an offense, as they are neither within the “enacting clause” nor “so incorporated with the definition or description of the offense as to constitute a part thereof.” Id. at 110-11 , 387 A.2d at 768 .

Petitioner synthesizes Mackall and the legislative history to argue that all three parts of Section 16-101(a) must be proved as part of the State’s case. Since 1969, all statutory versions of this section have used the same three-part structure. See Chapter 159 of the Acts of 1969. Before that, the statute provided, in pertinent part, that “[n]o person except those hereinafter expressly exempted shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in this State unless such person has a valid license as an operator or chauffeur under the provisions of this article.” Md.Code (1957, 1967 RepLVol.), Art. 66 % § 86(a).

In 1969, the statute was revamped, and that version is substantially the same as the current statute. See Chapter 159 of the Acts of 1969. Without explicitly saying so, Petitioner implies that this 1969 revision transformed the exemptions into a part of the offense that must be proved by the State. The title to Chapter 159 indicates that the Legislature did intend to “revamp and consolidate” the entire licensure law in Maryland.

See id. Petitioner’s implication that this “substantive revision” of the statute somehow transformed the exemptions into elements of the offense, however, is unpersuasive. Petitioner can cite no further legislative history supporting this interpretation, as the 1969 revision predates comprehensive legislative record-keeping. 4 Instead, Petitioner states that the ²⁹⁹ statute’s “plain language ... compels the conclusion that to establish a violation, the State must prove” all three parts of the statute. Although cited and discussed by both parties, the legislative history of Section 16-101 offers little help in interpreting the statute.

Instead, we turn to one of our well-established canons of statutory interpretation: In every case, a statute must be given “a reasonable interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible with common sense.” See Robinson v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 424 Md. 41, 51 , 33 A.3d 972, 978 (2011); State v. Johnson, 415 Md. 413, 422 , 2 A.3d 368, 373 (2010). This principle applies even when the statute is ambiguous, as we explained in Allen v. State: Legislative purpose is critical, that purpose must be discerned in light of context, and statutes are to be construed reasonably with reference to the purpose to be accomplished. The purpose, in short, determined in light of the statute’s context, is the key.

And that purpose becomes the context within which we apply the plain-meaning rule. Thus results that are unreasonable, illogical or inconsistent with common sense should be avoided with the real legislative intention prevailing over the intention indicated by the literal meaning. (Citations omitted.) Allen v. State, 402 Md. 59, 75 , 935 A.2d 421, 430 (2007). The State argues that interpreting parts two and three as affirmative defenses comports with common sense.

Petitioner responds that if we adopt the State’s interpretation, consonant with our “common sense” jurisprudence, then the Legislature would never have to grapple with and solve the enforcement problem that its statute created, and thus we would “never know whether the Judiciary’s solution is the one the Legislature would have adopted.” Furthermore, Petitioner believes that the State’s interpretation would ³⁰⁰ undermine the guidance that a case like Mackall could give legislative drafters, and it would