Md Prop. Management v. Peters-Hawkins

Maryland Property Management, LLC, et al. v. Helena Peters-Hawkins, et vir., No. 0278, September Term 2019. Opinion by Salmon, James P. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) Landlord and Tenant – the word “landlord,” as used in Md. Code (2015 Repl. Vol.), Real Property Article § 8-216(a), means owner of the property leased or rented to another.

Appeal and Error – A trial judge has the discretion to grant a new trial on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict even though at trial movant failed to raise that issue. But, in determining whether to grant a new trial on that basis, a trial judge has almost boundless discretion not to grant a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence, even though the result may have been different if a more timely objection had been raised. Landlord and Tenant – Under Real Property Article § 8-216, a landlord may be held liable by changing the lock on the rental property prior to eviction or by entering the rental property prior to eviction and removing the tenant’s personal property. Trial – A party is not precluded from raising for the first time the issue of irreconcilably inconsistent verdicts in a post-trial motion.

Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No. 24-C-18-001445 REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 0278 September Term, 2019 _____________________________________ MARYLAND PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, LLC, ET AL., v. HELENA PETERS-HAWKINS, ET VIR. ______________________________________ Reed, Shaw Geter, Salmon, James, P. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Salmon, J. ______________________________________ Filed: January 28, 2021 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. Suzanne Johnson 2021-01-28 13:17-05:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk This case has its origin in a Baltimore City Landlord/Tenant dispute. The tenants and appellees in this appeal are Helena Peters-Hawkins (“Mrs. Hawkins”) and her husband, Charles Hawkins (“Mr. Hawkins”).

The appellants are Maryland Property Management, LLC (“Maryland Property Management”), ANT Properties, LLC (“ANT”), and Ted Thornton, the managing member of Maryland Property Management, and owner of ANT. On March 14, 2018, Mrs. Hawkins and her husband filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against the three appellants. The complaint contained eight counts, but the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the appellants as to six of those counts. One of the two surviving counts (Count I) alleged a violation by all three appellants of Md. Code, (2015 Repl.

Vol.), Real Property Article (“RP”), § 8-216(b), which reads, in material part, as follows: In general. – (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a landlord may not take possession or threaten to take possession of a dwelling unit from a tenant or tenant holding over by locking the tenant out or any other action, including willful diminution of services to the tenant. (2) A landlord may take possession of a dwelling unit from a tenant or tenant holding over only: (i) In accordance with a warrant of restitution issued by a court and executed by a sheriff or constable; or (ii) If the tenant has abandoned or surrendered possession of the dwelling unit. Section 8-216(a)(2) defines the words “threaten to take possession” as “using words or actions intended to convince a reasonable person that the landlord intends to take imminent possession of the property in violation of this section.” Another surviving count in the complaint alleged a cause of action for common law conversion against all three appellants. After extensive discovery was completed, the case was tried before a jury over a three-day period in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.

The jury set forth its verdicts as follows: COUNT I – Violation of Real Property Article Section § 8-216 1. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Theodore Thornton threatened to take possession of 4909 Morello Road, or took possession by locking the Plaintiffs out or by any other action, in violation of Real Property Article § 8-216? Yes X No ______ 2. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Maryland Property Management, LLC or ANT Properties, LLC, is liable for violating Real Property Article § 8-216 based on either Mr. Thornton’s actions or by any other actions?

As to Maryland Property Management, LLC: Yes X No ______ As to ANT Properties, LLC: Yes X No ______ 3. If you answered yes to any of the above, what damages do you find for: Economic Damages $ 3,000.00 Non-Economic Damages: Charles Hawkins: $ 5,000.00 Helena Peters-Hawkins $ 10,000.00 2 COUNT II – Conversion 4. Do you find that Plaintiffs have proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that any of the Defendants converted any of Plaintiffs’ property? As to Maryland Property Management, LLC: Yes X No ______ As to ANT Properties, LLC: Yes X No ______ As to Theodore Thornton: Yes X No ______ 5.

If your answer is yes as to any of the Defendants mentioned in Question 4 above, what do you find for damages? Damages: $ 10,000.00 [Total] $ 28,000.00 All three appellants filed a motion for new trial and/or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Both the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the motion for a new trial were denied. Mr. Hawkins and his wife filed a “Petition for Statutory Attorneys’ Fees and Costs” pursuant to RP § 8-216(c)(1)(ii).

As the title of their petition suggested, petitioners asked for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in bringing Count I of the lawsuit, i.e., the suit brought to enforce rights under RP § 8-216(b). After the appellants filed an opposition, a hearing was held concerning the petition. The circuit court, on March 5, 3 2019, filed a memorandum and order awarding appellees $66,880.00 in attorneys’ fees and $1,713.39 in costs. The appellants then filed this timely appeal in which they raise five issues, which we have reordered: I. Whether the trial court erred in denying the Rule 2-519 motion of appellant ANT Properties, LLC, at the close of plaintiffs’ case in chief, when plaintiffs presented no evidence that ANT was the landlord, or that ANT had engaged in any supposed acts of conversion.

II

Whether the trial court erred in denying appellant ANT’s motion for a new trial and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, with respect [to] the supposed identity of ANT as a landlord under RP § 8- 216, there being no law or evidence to support a holding that ANT had been the landlord.

III

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant appellants’ motion for a new trial with respect to any liability under RP § 8-216, as there was no evidence from which a jury could have inferred the necessary elements of that cause of action, the Hawkins family having remained living at the house for two weeks after the cancellation of the eviction.

IV

Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for a new trial with respect to illogical and inconsistent jury awards of economic damages. V. Whether the trial court erred in assessing attorney fees against defendants where the award of fees was a multiple of the underlying award of damages. 1 1 Appellees renewed a previously filed motion to dismiss this appeal. None of the reasons advanced by appellees for imposing the sanction of dismissal are persuasive and therefore the motion for dismissal shall be denied. 4 I. UNDISPUTED FACTS On November 12, 2016, Mr. Hawkins and his wife signed a one-year lease for a single family house located at 4909 Morello Road in Baltimore City (“the Property”). The term of the lease was from November 14, 2016 to November 30, 2017 and the rent was $1,550.00 per month.

The first paragraph of the lease read: 1) NAMES OF LANDLORD AND RESIDENT(S): a) Property Manager for Owner (Landlord): Maryland Property Management, LLC b) Address to send rent payments: 40 York Rd., Suite 301, Towson, MD 21204 c) Resident(s) Name: Helena Hawkins SSN:__________ Name: Charles Hawkins SSN:__________ Paragraph 9 of the lease provided: AGENCY – Landlord has authorized Maryland Property Management LLC to enter into this rental agreement on his/her behalf, to receive and receipt for rent, and to do any and all other things necessary or desirable to administer or effectuate this agreement during Resident’s occupancy. Rent shall be paid and all notices, requests or other communications shall be by or to Landlord through Maryland Property Management LLC at the address listed above. Maryland Property Management LLC has full authority from the owner to manage the rented premises. (Emphasis added.) The tenants did not pay the rent that was due on June 1, 2017.

Maryland Property Management thereafter filed an eviction action in the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore City. Next, on August 8, 2017, Mrs. Hawkins filed a rent escrow action in the same court. She contended that there were serious health violations at the Property. A hearing was held on the rent escrow dispute in the district court on September 26, 2017. 5 By the time of that hearing, the appellees had not paid rent since June 2017.

Nevertheless, the district court judge ruled that if the tenants would pay into escrow two month’s rent, the eviction that was then set for October 4, 2017 would be cancelled. The tenants, however, did not pay anything into escrow and as a result, the eviction remained scheduled for October 4, 2017. On the morning of October 4, 2017, Baltimore City Deputy Sheriff Trina Anderson went to the rental premises. Because of what she saw at the premises, she did not feel comfortable in going forward with the eviction, and, accordingly, she appeared in the district court that afternoon and reported to a judge why she had not gone forward with the eviction.

Mrs. Hawkins and a representative of Maryland Property Management attended the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court judge cancelled the eviction.

II

EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL A. Testimony of Deputy Sheriff Trina Anderson Deputy Anderson went to the rental property on the morning of October 4, 2017, to evict the tenants. She explained that at an eviction, a representative of the landlord is usually present with his or her paperwork in hand. On the morning in question, she went to the front door of the Property and encountered a gentleman who she thought was acting suspiciously. That gentleman, it was later discovered, was Hassan Hamilton, who had been sent there by Maryland Property Management.

According to Deputy Anderson, Mr. Hamilton was trying to get to the front door before her and was also trying to open a lockbox on the door before showing her the appropriate paperwork. 6 Mr. Hamilton told her that he was there to change the lock(s). While on the premises, Deputy Anderson saw trash bags in front of the house. She looked into one of the windows of the house and to her, it looked as though the premises had already been “cleaned out.” More specifically, it appeared to her that a maintenance person had cleaned out the premises, not a tenant. Deputy Anderson also testified that her overall impression was that the tenants had been evicted already.

Although she could not recall exactly what she told the judge at the hearing on the afternoon of October 4, 2017, she believed that she told him that she didn’t feel “comfortable proceeding with this eviction because it looked like [the tenants] weren’t there, the house was empty, and I didn’t understand why the guy was trying to change locks on an empty house[,] because if it’s an empty house, why [are] you changing locks if they moved out?” B. Testimony of Helena Peters-Hawkins Mrs. Hawkins testified that the reason she did not pay the June rent was because a close relative of hers had unexpectedly died and she had to help pay funeral expenses. She called Maryland Property Management to talk to one of their agents that worked in the office and to explain the problem. When she called, she spoke to a woman whose first name was Rosemary. Rosemary told her that it would be “okay” if she did not pay the rent for June so long as it was paid by the time that the lease came up for renewal in November 2017. 7 Despite what Rosemary had said, Maryland Property Management filed a failure to pay rent action against her and her husband seeking $1,550.00 for the rent due for June 2017.

In August 2017, Mrs. Hawkins filed a rent escrow action in which she complained about water leaks, mold and other serious deficiencies in the house she and her husband had rented. The rent escrow action was set for hearing in the Maryland District Court for Baltimore City on September 26, 2017. Sometime in September 2017, on a Sunday evening, Ted Thornton (one of the appellants in this case), personally paid a visit to her home. The visit lasted approximately three hours.

During that visit, Mrs. Hawkins showed Mr. Thornton the water leak, mold and other problems with the house. Mr. Thornton inquired of Mrs. Hawkins as to why he had not been notified of these problems prior to her filing a rent escrow action. Mrs. Hawkins replied that she had reported the problems to someone in the Maryland Property Management’s rental office. During the visit, Mr. Thornton looked around the house and said “I cannot believe this.

Oh, I am so sorry that you [are] living in these type[s] of conditions.” Toward the end of the three-hour meeting, Mr. Thornton expressed the view that Mrs. Hawkins shouldn’t have filed the rent escrow case without having first talked to him. He then said, “well, if you drop the rent escrow case, any money [or] whatever that you owe it’ll be gone. And we can start over.” He then inquired: “Do you have that $1,500 on you like right now[?]” She replied in the negative, but Mr. Thornton reiterated that if she paid him $1,500 8 immediately then everything would “go away. You don’t have [to go to] the court, why would you want to involve the courts.” Mrs. Hawkins turned down the offer and said that she would rather leave the situation the way it was.

This caused Mr. Thornton to become very upset. He said, “I want you and your family the f⁕⁕⁕ out of my house, I want y’all out of here.” Mr. Thornton next said that when he got back to his office on Monday, he was going to talk to people there and was going to find out “what’s going on.” Mr. Thornton then said that he had “people watching” her and that if she “didn’t give him the money . . . he was going to come in the house, he was going to remove my stuff, he was going to take my stuff, it’s going to get ugly.” Mr. Thornton added that he had lawyers and money, unlike her. He also expressed the view that she couldn’t afford a lawyer and that she didn’t know who she was dealing with. The next day, after Mr. Thornton had a chance to go back to his office, he phoned Mrs. Hawkins and said “[y]ou’re a f⁕⁕⁕ing liar.

You lied. You never called my office. . . . [N]o one []ever spoke to you, I want you and your family the f⁕⁕⁕ out of here, and I want y’all out of here today.” He then reiterated that she didn’t know who she was “messing with.” The phone call with Mr. Thornton scared Mrs. Hawkins. Because of these two encounters with Mr. Thornton, she called her son and her nephew and told them that she didn’t want them to come to her house to “chill out” because she didn’t know if Mr. Thornton was “going to pop up because he already told me that somebody [was] watching, he was going to come in and take my stuff . . . and I believed him.” 9 On a date between September 26, 2017 and October 4, 2017, a man showed up at her doorstep, identified himself as “Mr. Williams,” and said he was sent there by Mr. Thornton to fix “all the stuff that was wrong with the house.” Mr. Williams also told her that he had been instructed by Mr. Thornton “to retrieve the key to the house from [her], because [she] was getting evicted anyway because he [Mr. Thornton] wanted [her] out of his house.” She complied and gave a key to him. Mrs. Hawkins knew that the eviction was to take place between 9 and 10 a.m. on October 4, 2017.

Prior to that date, she had moved some, but not all, of her furniture and personal belongings out of the Property. She had made arrangements with her son, Douglas, and a family friend named Thomas Holland, to remove the remaining property on October 4, 2017. The two were instructed to go to the premises at 8 a.m. on October 4, 2017 and pick up all of the furniture and other belongings that she and her husband had left on the premises. Mrs. Hawkins and her husband left the Property between 6 and 6:15 a.m. on the morning of October 4, 2017.

She drove her husband to work and dropped her grandchildren off at someone else’s house. At approximately 8 a.m. that morning, she got a phone call from Thomas Holland who said that he was at the Property but could not get into the house because the door was locked. She said, in reply, that maybe the sheriff had already conducted the eviction and that there was nothing he could do about it. 10 Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Hawkins got a call from her son, Douglas, who was also at the Property. He notified her that a deputy sheriff was there and that he thought that she should immediately return to the Property.

Mrs. Hawkins returned to the Property, but when she did so, the deputy sheriff was not there, and she was told by Douglas to call the sheriff’s office. When she did so, she was instructed to appear for a hearing in the district court at 1:00 o’clock that afternoon. When she appeared in court, she heard Deputy Sheriff Anderson testify that the first floor of the house was empty. Mrs. Hawkins immediately inquired as to the whereabouts of her “stuff.” The deputy sheriff could not answer that question.

The judge called off the eviction and told Mrs. Hawkins that she could go back to the house. Although previously Mrs. Hawkins had intended to take her family and move in, temporarily, with her mother, or possibly an aunt, or go to a hotel, she decided to go back to the Property. When she returned to the house on the afternoon of October 4, 2017, after the eviction had been called off, there was a lockbox on the door (that had not been there previously) and the door lock itself had been changed. Despite the fact that the lock had been changed, she was able to regain entry because her daughter climbed through one of the windows and opened the door from the inside.

Thereafter, Mrs. Hawkins and her family lived at the Property for two more weeks. For that two-week period, the appellees had to climb through a window to gain ingress or egress from the house. 11 In her testimony, Mrs. Hawkins described the household furnishings and other items that were missing from the house that had been left behind for Mr. Holland and her son to retrieve. She also gave an estimate of the value of the property that was missing and described the emotional toll that she experienced as a result of the alleged lock out and the threats made to her by Mr. Thornton. During her testimony, the following unobjected-to exchange occurred between Mrs. Hawkins and her counsel, viz.: Q. When you say you don’t know who, do you have an idea about what happened to your property?

A. Yes, I have a[n] idea. Q. And what’s your idea about what happened to it? A. That Ted [Thornton] told the -- William and them to remove my stuff out of the house. Q. Okay.

Did you tell all of your family about the lock out? A. Not all of them. Q. And why didn’t you tell all of them? A. Because I’m embarrassed.

I’m embarrassed because this man told me that he was going to do these things and he actually did it. He actually did it. C. Testimony of Ted Thornton – As an Adverse Witness Mr. Thornton testified that ANT Properties, LLC was the owner of the Property. When Mr. Thornton was asked whether ANT was currently “in good standing,” he replied: “[t]here’s a partnership and the partner’s wife did something a little screwy by cancelling the LLC, and she shouldn’t have done that.

And it created a big problem with the LLC 12 itself, and I have an attorney that’s working on it.” He also said he was not sure whether the “partnership” had been cancelled prior to when the appellees moved out of the Property. But when he was shown Plaintiff’s Exhibit 9, he admitted that the “partnership” had been cancelled in 2015. Later in his testimony, on several occasions, Mr. Thornton said that he owned the subject property. Mr. Thornton also testified that he was the managing member of Maryland Property Management, LLC.

That LLC manages “hundreds of properties.” On a Sunday evening in September 2017, Mr. Thornton went to the Hawkinses’ home because he had been notified by a health inspector that there was water damage and mold problems at the house. Mr. Thornton further testified that Maryland Property Management retained an independent contractor named William Gaskins to perform the necessary repairs to fix the water damage and mold problems at the Property. The lockbox that was on the leased premises was put there by the leasing agent prior to the time the appellees rented the house. In Mr. Thornton’s words, the lockbox was “always on the door.” Nevertheless, during his direct testimony, he admitted that he signed an interrogatory answer, on behalf of Maryland Property Management, that said, in pertinent part: “No one changed the locks on October 4th, 2017.

A key to the residence was in the lock[]box and accessible to Plaintiffs. The lock[]box was placed on the door for workmen to enter the residence.” 13 D. Testimony of Thomas Holland Mr. Holland testified that on the morning of October 4, 2017, he arrived at the Property between 8 and 8:30 a.m. He had a key to the premises that had been given to him by Mrs. Hawkins, but the key would not work. Because the key would not allow him to enter the Property, he called Mrs. Hawkins’s son, Douglas, who was on his way to the premises.

Just as he was doing that, he saw a deputy sheriff and a gentleman at the front door to the house. He overheard the deputy sheriff saying that the lockbox should not be on the door. E. Testimony of Charles Hawkins Mr. Hawkins testified that on the morning of October 4, his wife drove him to work. When he left for work that morning, there were numerous articles of personal property still in the house.

While at work that morning, his wife called and told him to return to the Property. After work, he returned and found that the house was empty except for one mattress. F. Testimony of William Gaskins – as a Defense Witness Mr. Gaskins testified that he was an independent contractor employed, from time- to-time, by Maryland Property Management. Prior to October 4, 2017, he had been to the Property approximately eight times to repair mold, water damage and other problems.

He testified that when he visited the Property, he had seen a lockbox, but he never thought that there was anything in it, nor did he ever put a key in the lockbox. He emphatically denied that he had ever asked Mrs. Hawkins for her key, nor did she ever give him her key. 14 On October 5, 2017, he went to the Property, having been advised that the tenants had moved out the previous day. But when he arrived, he found that someone was living in the house. For that reason, he did not change the locks on the door as he had intended to do.

G. Testimony of Ted Thornton – as a Defense Witness Mr. Thornton said on direct examination that he was the “managing member” of both Maryland Property Management, LLC and ANT Properties, LLC. He also said that ANT owned the Property and that Maryland Property Management managed it. He added, somewhat confusingly, that the premises that the appellees rented was “my house.” In regard to his meeting with Mrs. Hawkins in September 2017, he remembered visiting her house and telling her that she could stay at the premises if she could come up with $1,600.00. He denied that he ever directed anyone to change the lock on the house prior to the eviction.

On the date of the scheduled eviction, October 4, 2017, he sent Hassan Hamilton to go to the Property and to change the locks after the sheriff had approved the paperwork and had gone through the house. He denied that anybody changed the lock prior to the deputy’s arrival on October 4, 2017. He also denied ever confiscating Mrs. Hawkins’s key or asking anybody else to confiscate it. He emphatically denied ever threatening to have someone come into the house and take Mrs. Hawkins’s belongings.

According to Mr. Thornton’s testimony, the lockbox was on the house when the appellees moved in. He testified, however, on cross-examination, that he was not 100% sure that the lockbox was on the door when the lease with the appellees began. Other facts will be added, as needed, to answer the questions presented. 15 III. ANALYSIS A. Question One At the conclusion of the appellees’ case in chief, defense counsel made a motion for judgment as to ANT only.

The following exchange occurred: [Counsel for Appellants]: I don’t know that there’s been any evidence of any separate action by ANT Properties for the two counts. The only evidence has been that their theory is it’s Theodore Thornton and because he’s a member of both LLCs, that both are liable, but the only evidence is that there’s a lease with Maryland Property Management. So[,] I don’t know how they include ANT Properties just because they’re the owner of the property. There [h]as been no evidence that he had properties, did anything relating - - THE COURT: Didn’t - - [Counsel for Appellants]: - - to the two counts.

THE COURT: Didn’t Mr. Thornton say that ANT Properties owned the house - - [Counsel for Appellants]: He did say that - - THE COURT: - - too? [Counsel for Appellants]: - - they’re the owner, but they haven’t done anything related to the two counts. THE COURT: Anything else? [Counsel for Appellants]: No. THE COURT: All right. That’s denied. After the motion for judgment was denied, the appellants proceeded to introduce evidence. 16 When the appellants rested their case, the following colloquy occurred at the bench: THE COURT: Okay.

Sorry. Rebuttal witnesses? [Counsel for Appellees]: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. So we need to talk about jury instructions.

And then we’re going to have a lunch break. And then I have a bench meeting. So we’re probably not going to resume until 2 o’clock at which time I’ll instruct them and let them deliberate. Anything else from them?

THE CLERK: Oh, no. THE COURT: Oh, okay. So let me – [Counsel for Appellants]: And I’ll renew my motion. THE COURT: Okay.

Let me release them. (Whereupon, counsel returned to trial tables and the following occurred in open court:) THE COURT: All right. Members of the jury, at this time, we are going to take a break and we have some instructional issues to go over. And then I have a bench meeting.

So we’re not going to resume until 2 o’clock. But when we do resume, I will then instruct you as to the law and you will be sent to deliberations today. So you do have kind of a long lunch. Please make sure that you’re back here and in the jury room before 2 o’clock.

Thank you. And I’m going to just take a brief recess and I’ll come back. (Emphasis added.) After a short recess, the trial judge and counsel proceeded to have an on-the-record discussion of jury instructions. During that discussion, nothing was said about the motion for judgment and when the jury returned, no mention was made in regard to that subject.

The trial judge next proceeded to instruct the jury. 17 The first argument presented by appellants in this appeal is worded as follows: The trial court erred in denying the Rule 2-519 motion of appellant ANT Properties, LLC, at the close of plaintiffs’ case in chief, when plaintiffs presented no evidence that ANT was the landlord[.] Maryland Rule 2-519 reads, in pertinent part, as follows: Motion for judgment. (a) Generally. A party may move for judgment on any or all of the issues in any action at the close of the evidence offered by an opposing party, and in a jury trial at the close of all the evidence. The moving party shall state with particularity all reasons why the motion should be granted.

No objection to the motion for judgment shall be necessary. A party does not waive the right to make the motion by introducing evidence during the presentation of an opposing party’s case. (b) Disposition. When a defendant moves for judgment at the close of the evidence offered by the plaintiff in an action tried by the court, the court may proceed, as the trier of fact, to determine the facts and to render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render judgment until the close of all the evidence.

When a motion for judgment is made under any other circumstances, the court shall consider all evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made. (c) Effect of denial. A party who moves for judgment at the close of the evidence offered by an opposing party may offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, without having reserved the right to do so and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made. In so doing, the party withdraws the motion.

(Emphasis added.) As appellees point out in their brief, Issue I has not been preserved for review because, as stated in Md. Rule 2-519(c), when a party introduces evidence after a motion for judgment has been denied at the conclusion of the opponent’s case, that motion is withdrawn. In fact, later in appellants’ brief, when discussing Issue II, appellants explicitly 18 admit that “a Motion for judgment, made at the close of the opponent’s case and thereafter denied, is withdrawn when the party making the Motion offers evidence in its own case- in-chief.” For the above reasons, we hold that the first issue presented has not been preserved for appellate review.

IV

ISSUE II Appellants next argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for a new trial and ANT’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”). The grounds for ANT’s motion for JNOV was that appellees had produced no law or evidence to support a holding that ANT had been the “landlord” as that term is used in RP § 8-216. ANT points out, correctly, citing Nelson v. Carroll, 350 Md. 247, 254 (1998), that if, at the end of all the evidence, the movant states that the motion is based upon the same reasons given at the time the original motion for judgment was made, or renews a motion for judgment, the party implicitly incorporates by reference the reasons previously given. The problem in this case, however, is twofold.

First, on this record, it is unclear as to whether counsel for ANT did, in fact, “renew” his motion for judgment. The trial judge, in her memorandum and order denying ANT’s motion for a JNOV said: In the case under review, this [c]ourt, having reviewed its notes and the video recording of the trial, finds that [d]efendants did not move for judgment on December 13, 2018, at the close of the evidence. During a bench conference following [d]efendants’ case, defense counsel said he would like to renew his motion, but was then directed to wait so the [c]ourt could take a recess. Upon reconvening, defense counsel did not move for judgment or make any further argument in support of a motion for judgment. 19 Contrary to [d]efendants’ contention in their Reply, [d]efendants had ample opportunity to make a motion or to assert arguments in support of judgment in their favor.

Principles of preservation require that a movant elicit a ruling on a motion prior to the conclusion of a trial. The [c]ourt finds that defense counsel’s remark during the bench conference was insufficient to satisfy the requirement that a party move for judgment, with particularity, at the close of the evidence. Thus, [d]efendants’ Motion for JNOV must be denied on procedural grounds. (References to transcript omitted.) The issue addressed by the trial judge in her memorandum boils down to whether, in the context of the bench conference, defense counsel’s statement that “I’ll renew my motion for judgment” meant that he was renewing his motion for judgment or whether it meant, as the trial judge believed, that he would renew his motion for judgment at the end of the court recess.

Weighing the scales in favor of the trial judge’s interpretation is the fact that the court never ruled on appellants’ (assumed) renewal of the motion for judgment. If there had been such a renewal, one would expect defense counsel to ask for a ruling, which he never did. A motion for JNOV is, in essence, a motion asking the trial court to reconsider the denial of a motion for judgment made at the conclusion of the entire case. As we said in Nu Car Carriers, Inc. v. Everett, 33 Md. App. 310, 312-13 (1976): a motion for JNOV “may be made only to bring up for reconsideration, a motion for directed verdict (now motion for judgment), made at the close of all of the evidence, and at that time either denied or reserved by the trial court.” (emphasis added).

Here, it is undisputed that at the conclusion of the evidentiary phase of the case, the trial judge did not deny appellants’ motion for judgment. 20 In regard to the motion for JNOV, a second preservation problem is presented. Md. Rule 2-532(a) provides that a motion for JNOV may be made “only on the grounds advanced in support of the [motion for judgment].” As the Court of Appeals said in Sage Title Group, LLC v. Roman, 455 Md. 188, 216 (2017): “Sage Title waived its unclean hands/in pari delicto argument because it failed to articulate this ground in its motion for judgment and could not ‘renew’ the argument for purposes of its JNOV motion.” Id. at 216 . In this case, the first time that counsel for ANT argued that ANT could not be held liable for violation of RP § 8-216(b) because there was no proof that ANT was the “landlord” (as that term was used in the statute), was in ANT’s post-trial motion for JNOV. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ case, counsel only argued, in a very general fashion, that ANT hadn’t “done anything related to the two counts.” Md. Rule 2-519(a) provides that a party making a motion for judgment “shall state with particularity all reasons why the motion should be granted.” The reason for the particularity requirement is “to ensure that the opposing party is not ‘sandbagged.’” Fearnow v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone, 104 Md. App. 1, 27 (1995) (quoting Annapolis Mall Ltd. Partnership v. Yogurt Tree, Inc., 299 Md. 244, 256 (1984)).

For the above reasons, we agree with the trial judge that ANT did not preserve, for post-trial review by the circuit court, the issue of whether appellees had proved that ANT was a landlord, within the meaning of RP § 8-216(b). But even if the issue had been preserved, we conclude that the appellees did present sufficient proof that ANT was the landlord. ANT disagrees and argues as follows: 21 It is a matter of judicial notice that owners of property retain third party entities for the purpose of managing the property and relationships with Tenants or with anyone else. As ANT argued in its Motion [for JNOV], the jury determination would require a finding that there were three Landlords.[2] ANT finds no authority for the proposition that the General Assembly has intended to hold that all owners of property, even when not named on the lease or not involved in management, are, inherently, Landlords.

Where a statute is ambiguous, the [c]ourt also considers the consequences resulting from one meaning rather than another and adopt that construction which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with the common sense. Smith v. State, 425 Md. 292, 300 (2012). Here, in the absence of a Real Property definition of Landlord that provides that all owners are Landlords, the lower [c]ourt should have declined to have adopted that construction of RP § 8-216. The trial [c]ourt should have granted ANT’s Motions.

ANT asks this Court to reverse the judgment against ANT, under the RP § 8-216 claim. At another point in its brief, ANT stresses that the name of ANT does not appear in the lease and that the lease was with “Maryland Property Management.” As mentioned earlier (see page 5, supra), the first paragraph in the lease identifies Maryland Property Management as the “property manager for owner (landlord).” And, paragraph 9 states that Maryland Property Management is the agent for the landlord, and as such, “has full authority from the owner to manage the rented premises.” In other words, the appellees proved that in the lease itself, the words “landlord” and “owner” were used synonymously. And, at trial, through the testimony of Mr. Thornton, the owner of the Property was identified as ANT. 2 We disagree with the “three landlords” argument. The jury could reasonably have determined that ANT was the landlord, and that Ted Thornton, at all times here relevant, was acting as an agent of ANT and Maryland Property Management. 22 The goal in statutory interpretation is to divine the intent of the Legislature.

See Kortobi v. Kass, 410 Md. 168, 176-77 (2009). In this endeavor, we turn initially (and often only) to the plain language of the statute; if the Legislature resolved the present dispute through the plain words of the statute, we are not obliged to consult other sources of legislative history. See Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387 (2003) (“[A]ll statutory interpretation begins, and usually ends, with the statutory text itself . . ., for the legislative intent of a statute primarily reveals itself through the statute’s very words . . . .” (citations omitted)) . Guttman v. Wells Fargo Bank, 421 Md. 227, 234 (2011).

Statutory construction: “begins with the plain language of the statute, and ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology.” Bowen v. City of Annapolis, 402 Md. 587, 613 (2007) (quoting Kushell v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 385 Md. 563, 576 (2005)). Kortobi v. Kass, 410 Md. 168, 177 (2009). See also, Baltimore City Detention Center v. Foy, 461 Md. 627, 645 (2018) (When interpreting a statute “we may consult a dictionary and give words their ordinary meaning.”). Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary (2019) defines the word “landlord” as: 1. the owner of property (such as land, houses, or apartments) that is leased or rented to another. https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/landlord.

Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) defines “landlord” in the following manner: landlord (bef. 12c) 1. At common law, the feudal lord who retained the fee of the land. – Sometimes shortened to lord. 2. Someone who rents a room, building, or piece of land to someone else. Significantly, ANT, in its brief, does not propose any definition of the word “landlord” that it contends the court should have used in determining whether to grant its 23 motion for JNOV.

And, in any event, it is clear the word landlord, as used in the statute, means owner of the property that is leased. It is true, as ANT argues, that a statute should not be construed to have a meaning that would produce an illogical or unreasonable result or one that is inconsistent with common sense. But we fail to see how such a result would occur if the statute were read to treat the word “landlord” and “owner” as synonymous. ANT also argues for the first time on appeal, that because ANT was not called a “landlord” in appellees’ complaint, the jury should not have been allowed to find that ANT was appellees’ landlord. 3 We reject that contention.

Even if we assume that ANT renewed its motion for judgment at the conclusion of the evidentiary phase of the trial, ANT never raised this pleading error as a ground for that motion. Due to the particularity requirement set forth in Md. Rule 2-519, such a belated contention could not be successfully raised as a ground for the grant of a JNOV. Appellant also argues: Jury inferences must be sound logically, and Maryland Courts will refuse to allow a jury of laymen to engage in guesswork, speculation and conjecture. Hamilton v. Kirson, 439 Md. 501 (2014).

ANT submits that it was impermissible to allow a jury to find that ANT was a Landlord, when such had not been . . . proven at trial. Moreover, as stated above, the lower [c]ourt’s authority upon a Motion for a new trial is broad enough that it may prevent miscarriages of justice. 3 The plaintiffs did allege in their complaint that appellant was the owner of the premises and that it had violated RP § 8-216. 24 Here, there was no “miscarriage of justice.” The appellees proved that ANT owned the leased premises and, using the common meaning of the word “landlord,” the jury could have rationally found that the meaning of the words “landlord” and “owner,” as used in the statute, were the same. For the reasons stated above, we hold that the trial judge did not err when she denied ANT’s motion for JNOV. V. ISSUE III Appellants argue: The trial court erred in refusing to grant appellants’ motion for a new trial with respect to any liability under RP § 8-216, as there was no evidence from which a jury could have inferred the necessary elements of that cause of action, the Hawkins family having remained living at the house for two weeks after the cancellation of the eviction.

At the conclusion of the trial, neither Maryland Property Management nor Mr. Thornton made a motion for judgment and ANT’s motion for judgment was not based on the grounds it now raises. Nevertheless, an appellant can raise the issue of insufficiency of the evidence for the first time in a motion for new trial. See Cam’s Broadloom Rugs, Inc. v. Buck, 87 Md. App. 561, 575-76 (1991) (“the trial court may grant a new trial for any reason that will support its determination that a party was denied a fair trial, and there is nothing in Md. Rule 2-533 which precludes a judge from granting a new trial on the basis of an issue that could have been, but was not, raised during trial.”). Whatever the ground for a motion for new trial, the standard for granting the motion differs from the one employed in granting a motion for judgment under Rule 2-519 or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the 25 verdict under Rule 2-532.

The requirement for granting those motions is the absence of substantial evidence to support a verdict. Determination of whether to grant a motion under this rule is made on the judge’s consideration of “the core question of whether justice has been done.” Butkiewicz v. State, 127 Md. App. 412,