Smith v. State

Greene, J. In this case, the petitioner, Stephanie L. Smith (“Ms. Smith”), entered into a plea agreement with the State. The terms of the agreement included that Ms. Smith would enter a plea of guilty to the crime of theft and that she would serve jail time. At the guilty plea proceeding, the sentencing Circuit Court accepted the terms of the agreement, binding itself to the agreement. However, the judge imposed a sentence below the terms of the plea agreement by sentencing Ms. Smith to probation before judgment, not finding her guilty of theft, and ordering home detention, rather than actual jail time.

Moreover, this was done without the consent of the State. We shall hold that the more lenient sentence in this case was not consistent with the terms of the binding plea agreement and was without the consent of the State; thus, it was an illegal sentence. Bonilla v. State, 443 Md. 1, 15 , 115 A.3d 98, 106 (2015) (holding “that when a sentencing court violates Rule 4-243(c)(3) by imposing a sentence below a binding plea agreement without the State’s consent, the sentence is inherently illegal and subject to correction under Rule 4-345(a)”). Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

State v. Smith, 230 Md. App. 214 , 146 A.3d 1189 (2016). FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Indictment On September 10, 2015, Ms. Smith was indicted by a Grand Jury for Prince George’s County, on various theft charges for ⁵⁶⁶ making fraudulent insurance claims, including a charge of theft of property with a value of at least $10,000 but less than $100,000. Under Md. Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.), Criminal Law Article (“CR”), § 7-104(g)(ii), the maximum penalty for this violation is imprisonment not exceeding 15 years, a fine not exceeding $15,000, or both.

Plea Bargain A month after the indictment, Ms. Smith, her counsel, and the State began plea negotiations. Eventually the parties reached a plea agreement. Ms. Smith agreed to plead guilty to the primary theft charge. In exchange, Ms. Smith was guaranteed a sentence not to exceed 5 years of incarceration.

Further, with respect to actual jail time, the 5 year sentence would be suspended except for 30 to 90 days of incarceration, followed by 5 years of supervised probation. Moreover, she would not have to pay a fine. As part of the agreement, the State would not seek the maximum sentence of incarceration up to 15 years and a fine up to $15,000. However, ultimately, there would be a conviction on Ms. Smith’s record and a requirement that she pay $47,460.02 restitution to the victims of the theft.

Pursuant to Md. Rule 4-243, plea agreements may be binding on the court. The binding agreement required the approval of the judge. 1 Guilty Plea Hearing On January 5, 2016, before a judge of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, the State called the case for a ⁵⁶⁷ hearing on Ms. Smith’s acceptance of the guilty plea. The State presented the judge with the terms of the agreement that had been reached between the parties: [PROSECUTOR]: It would be a plea to Count 1, which is theft scheme greater than $10,000 but less than $100,000. In exchange for the guilty plea, there is a ceiling and a floor.

The State would be allowed to argue for 5 years, suspend all but 90 days, 5 years supervised probation, and restitution in the amount of $47,460.02. THE COURT: $47,000. [PROSECUTOR]: $460.02. And the defense [is] free to argue for as little as 5 years, suspend all but 30 days, followed by 5 years supervised probation and also the restitution in the $47,460.02. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: [Prosecutor], didn’t we talk about I can ask for weekends? [PROSECUTOR]: That is correct. The defense is free to argue that she serve weekends.

But, no, we didn’t talk about home detention, just weekends. The State agreed to enter a nolle prosequi to the remaining counts in exchange for Ms. Smith’s guilty plea to the top count. The judge informed the defense that the court could impose up to 15 years of incarceration notwithstanding the agreement. The State then clarified that the parties were anticipating that the court would bind itself to the terms they had agreed to: THE COURT: All right.

Now, before I can accept your plea, I have to be satisfied that the State actually has a factual basis for this, that they are not whistling in the wind, that there are basic elements that they would have proven if the matter had gone to trial. Have a seat. Get yourself together. Listen to what [the prosecutor] says the State would have proven had this matter gone to trial. [PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, thank you.

Just briefly, before that I have a housekeeping matter. I would like to add that despite the range, the 90 and 30 days, it is ⁵⁶⁸ contemplated this would be a binding plea, therefore, it can only be modified in the future if both parties agree. THE COURT: Are you saying that if the Defendant is sentenced within the parameters of—first of all, are you asking the Court to bind itself to the 5-year cap? [PROSECUTOR]: To the range. THE COURT: 90-day cap. [PROSECUTOR]: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Or 30-day cap. [PROSECUTOR]: Yes. THE COURT: I have to hear the facts before I’m willing to do that. Okay, number one. And number two, are you saying that the Defendant is prohibited from asking for reconsideration? [PROSECUTOR]: No. They are not prohibited from asking.

But before the motion can be granted, both sides would have to agree. At this point the judge conditionally agreed to be bound by the terms of the agreement subject to some unforeseen issue in the subsequent statement of supporting facts. The judge explained to Ms. Smith the limits on the sentence that the plea bargain had imposed and that he was prepared to follow them. The terms that the judge announced and that Ms. Smith accepted were: THE COURT: Okay, I see.

Ms. Smith, the [State] is asking me to bind myself so I won’t give you any more than 90 days jail time. So since that’s coming from the State, that’s certainly something that I will consider. The defense always wants the Court to bind itself to a fixed amount of time. Your attorney is asking for 30 days.

Naturally, if I did accept this plea, I would take the higher amount, the 90 days. The other thing, in other words, 5 years suspend all but 90 days. You get 5 years but the most I could actually give you in terms of jail time at this time would be 90 days. But if you mess up on probation, because that’s going to be 5 years, then the hammer falls and you get up to 5 years in prison.

Do you understand that, ma’am? ⁵⁶⁹ [SMITH]: Yes. Next, the State gave the court the factual basis and summary of the evidence offered for the plea. Ms. Smith agreed to the accuracy of the statement. After the judge confirmed that Ms. Smith had no prior criminal convictions and that no unexpected development would cause the judge not to go forward with the sentencing limitations, he formally bound himself to the agreement.

THE COURT: That’s helpful to know given that I will accept this as an ABA plea. Which means, Ms. Smith, I agree to sentence you within the ranges recommended by the attorneys. You want to explain that to her, [defense counsel], if that needs any explanation. In other words, ma’am, I’m not going to give you 15 years.

The maximum penalty that I’m going to give you is 5 years. And I will suspend either all but 90 days or maybe 30 days. I will consider weekends, but not necessarily weekends. But I will order restitution in the amount of $47,460.02.

You will be on 5 years supervised probation and the main condition of that probation is that you pay this money back. Ms. Smith agreed to this: “THE COURT: Knowing that, ma’am, how do you wish to plead, guilty or not guilty? [SMITH]: Guilty.” The judge also expressly agreed: THE COURT: The Court is satisfied the State has provided an adequate factual basis for me to accept [Smith]’s plea of guilty. I find that her plea of guilty is freely, voluntarily made and with understanding of what she is doing. And the Court accepts her guilty plea and finds you guilty, ma’am, of Count 1 of the indictment in this case.

The court then turned to the imposition of the sentence and considered Ms. Smith’s personal circumstances, which were relevant as the judge was deciding to impose a sentence between 30 days to 90 days of actual jail time. The judge was concerned with the impact jail time would have on Ms. Smith’s employment and ability to pay restitution. The judge then imposed a more lenient sentence, which modified the terms of ⁵⁷⁰ the plea agreement, without notifying the prosecutor or defense in advance of the proposed change: THE COURT: I’m going to give you a break. The law allows me to keep this off of your record and give you jail time at the same time.

I want you to keep your job. I think that is the most important benefit that you come with. I’m going to defer the imposition of sentence under [Md. Code, Criminal Law Article, § ] 6-220. But you are still going to have to do jail time, 60 days.

Now, I will make it on weekends to be convenient to you, but you say you work on weekends. The judge changed the sentence to benefit Ms. Smith by imposing probation before judgment: “[t]his deal is getting sweeter and sweeter for you, ma’am.” Even further, the judge modified the sentence of 60 days of jail time by changing it to a sentence of home detention. The prosecutor objected and relayed to the judge his concerns about deviating from the terms of the plea agreement: [PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, may I be heard, briefly? So the sentence, I’m unclear, the sentence is probation before judgment?

THE COURT: That is correct. [PROSECUTOR]: I don’t want to be sour grapes, but when we were contemplating a binding plea agreement and now we have arrived at a sentence that doesn’t represent anything with respect to the binding plea agreement. I wasn’t prepared for this to go this direction. The plea agreement clearly provided that Ms. Smith would be found guilty of a crime and serve jail time; instead, the sentence imposed by the judge did not include a finding of guilt or incarceration. As a result of the sentence imposed, the State noted an appeal.

The Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court. Smith, 230 Md.App. at 218 , 146 A.3d at 1193 (holding that the plea agreement was binding under Md. Rule 4-243(c)(3) and the judge’s sentence was illegal under Md. Rule 4-345 as the sentence imposed was ⁵⁷¹ below the floor of the terms, by not including a finding of guilty, and it was imposed without the consent of the State). Ms. Smith filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court. We granted certiorari to answer the following questions: 1.

Do the holdings in Cuffley v. State, 416 Md. 568 , 7 A.3d 557 (2010) and Baines v. State, 416 Md. 604 , 7 A.3d 578 (2010), under which a plea agreement is construed according to what a reasonable lay person in the defendant’s position would have understood it to mean and any ambiguity must be resolved in the defendant’s favor, apply when the State challenges a sentence allegedly imposed in violation of Md. Rule 4-243(c)? 2. Would a reasonable lay person in Petitioner’s situation have believed that probation before judgment was precluded by the plea agreement where the agreement was silent as to probation before judgment and required Petitioner to pay $47,460 in restitution? 3. Under Md. Rule 4-243(c), which provides in part that “if [the guilty plea] is accepted, [the judge] may approve the [plea] agreement or defer decision as to its approval or rejection until after such pre-sentence proceedings and investigation as the judge directs,” is the court bound to the plea agreement upon accepting the guilty plea or may it reject the agreement after accepting the plea, and if the latter, did the trial court reject the agreement after accepting Petitioner’s guilty plea? 4. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in holding that Petitioner’s sentence was imposed in violation of Rule 4-243(c)(3)?

Smith v. State, 451 Md. 250 , 152 A.3d 754 (2017). We hold that the Court of Special Appeals did not err in holding that Ms. Smith’s sentence was imposed in violation of Rule 4-243(c). Ordinarily, where there is a binding plea agreement in place, the judge must impose a sentence consistent with the terms of that agreement. In order to provide a more lenient sentence to the defendant, the judge must obtain the consent of the State and the defense.

Further, we hold that ⁵⁷² the sentence in this case was illegal because it deviated from the terms of the plea agreement and was entered without the consent of both parties. Moreover, Cuffley and Baines provide that a plea agreement should be construed according to what a reasonable lay person in the defendant’s position would have understood it to mean; this analysis is applicable when a defendant challenges the interpretation of a binding plea agreement. We determine, under the facts in the case at bar, the terms of agreement were unambiguous, and thus a reasonable lay person in the defendant’s position would have understood the terms of the agreement to mean that there would be a finding of guilt and actual incarceration. Furthermore, when the State makes a challenge to the interpretation of a plea agreement, we focus on whether both parties to the agreement received fairness and equity in the respective benefits of their bargain.

Here, the State did not receive what it bargained for when the judge imposed a sentence below the terms of the plea agreement. Thus, under the standards for interpreting the plea agreement, the sentence imposed was below the terms agreed upon by the parties and the State did not consent to the deviation of the terms. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. STANDARD OF REVIEW Our review of whether a trial court has violated the terms of a plea agreement is a question of law.

Cuffley v. State, 416 Md. 568, 581 , 7 A.3d 557, 564 (2010). We, therefore, review de novo the question of whether Ms. Smith’s plea agreement has been violated. See Tweedy v. State, 380 Md. 475, 482 , 845 A.2d 1215, 1219 (2004) (‘Whether a plea agreement has been violated is a question of law which we review de novo.”). DISCUSSION Ms. Smith contends that the trial court did not approve the plea agreement and was thus not bound by its terms.

According to Ms. Smith, because the plea agreement was ambiguous ⁵⁷³ and silent as to probation before judgment, it could have been imposed by the judge and a reasonable lay person in the defendant’s position could have interpreted the agreement to allow for such a sentence. Ms. Smith claims that by imposing probation before judgment instead of a conviction, the trial court did not enter a disposition more favorable to her. To the contrary, she maintains that the court imposed a sentence identical to what was expected in the plea agreement, and thus the State should not have appealed. The State, on the other hand, contends that the court unambiguously bound itself to impose a sentence in conformity with the plea agreement and, therefore, erred when it imposed a sentence more favorable to Ms. Smith without the State’s consent.

Moreover, it is the State’s position that the terms of the plea agreement were clearly discernible. Plea Agreements We agree with the Court of Special Appeals’ explanation of a plea agreement: A plea agreement is, of course, a contract between a criminal defendant and the State in which each seeks to gain a benefit and, in return for such benefit, each agrees to pay a price. It is a very special contract, moreover, in that even after the basic quid pro quo is agreed upon by the primary contracting parties, the entire package may be submitted to a criminal court for its approval and its subsequent enforcement. If it should then be the enforcing authority (to wit, the court) that commits a breach of the contract, what evenhanded justice requires is that each of the primary contracting parties, if suffering from the breach, is equally entitled to seek a remedy under equally conducive procedural conditions.

Smith, 230 Md. App. at 218 , 146 A.3d at 1191-92 . This Court in Dotson v. State, 321 Md. 515, 517 , 583 A.2d 710, 711 (1991), discussed the importance of encouraging plea agreements to aid in the administration of justice and eliminate “uncertainties and practical burdens of trial, permit the ⁵⁷⁴ judiciary and prosecution to concentrate their resources on those cases in which they are most needed, and further law enforcement by permitting the State to exchange leniency for information and assistance.” We noted that an overwhelming percentage of criminal cases are resolved through plea agreements, saving time and resources by avoiding the burden of a full-scale trial. Dotson, 321 Md. at 517 , 583 A.2d at 710 . The Court of Special Appeals also discussed the advantages of plea agreements in Banks v. State: One of the reasons the process works effectively is the element of certainty it lends to the criminal justice system.

From the public perspective, it may well be advantageous for the prosecutor to exchange the uncertainty of conviction following trial for the certainty of conviction produced by a guilty plea, even when a plea agreement includes some provision in mitigation of potential sentence. From the defense viewpoint, it may be equally advantageous to give up the possibility of acquittal following trial for the certainty of a relatively lenient disposition included as part of a plea agreement. We recognized the importance of this “certainty” aspect of plea bargaining, and the adverse effect its loss would have on the process, in [ ] Sweetwine[ v. State]: “If the prosecutor cannot rely upon the plea bargain, the potential ‘chilling effect’ upon the very institution of plea bargaining could be devastating.” 42 Md. App. [1,] at 12, 398 A.2d 1262 [ (1979) ]. Similar results could ensue if the defendant were unable to rely upon the bargain.

Thus, plea bargains have been enforced both against the State, as in State v. Brockman, supra[ 277 Md. 687 , 357 A.2d 376 (1976) ], and against the defendant, as in Blinken v. State, 291 Md. 297 , 435 A.2d 86 (1981). Banks v. State, 56 Md.App. 38, 52 , 466 A.2d 69, 75-76 (1983). See also State v. Sanders, 331 Md. 378, 385 , 628 A.2d 209, 212 (1993) (holding that the court may impose a disposition more favorable to the defendant only if the parties agree). Under our jurisprudence, both parties are equally protected from a breach of this agreement: ⁵⁷⁵ That it was critical in Dotson that the violation of the plea agreement prejudiced the defendant does not mean that a violation of a plea agreement that prejudices the State is beyond the reach of principles of fairness and equity or that the institution of plea bargaining cannot be adversely affected.

Just as a defendant would be [sic] loathe to participate in plea bargaining if he or she could not be certain that the bargain that he or she made would be fulfilled, so too would the State. There would be no incentive for the State to engage in plea bargaining if it were possible for a defendant to enter into a binding plea agreement only to have the sentence contemplated by that agreement modified a short time later. Nor would it be fair to the State, which is, after all, one of the parties to the agreement. Chertkov v. State, 335 Md. 161, 174 , 642 A.2d 232, 238-39 (1994).

A sentence is illegal if, without the permission of both parties to the agreement, a judge fails to embody in its judgment the terms o'f the binding plea agreement. See Sanders, 331 Md. at 388 , 628 A.2d at 214 . Md. Rule 4-243(c)(3) provides: Approval of plea agreement. If the plea agreement is approved, the judge shall embody in the judgment the agreed sentence, disposition, or other judicial action encompassed in the agreement or, with the consent of the parties, a disposition more favorable to the defendant than that provided for in the agreement.

The Bonilla case made clear that a sentence is illegal, within the meaning of Rule 4-345(a), if it (1) exceeds the maximum ceiling set by the plea agreement or (2) falls below the minimum floor set by the plea agreement. Bonilla, 443 Md. at 3, 12 , 115 A.3d at 99, 104 (“Considering Dotson, Cuffley, Matthews[ v. State, 424 Md. 503, 512 , 36 A.3d 499, 505 (2012) ], and Chertkov , we conclude that when a sentencing court violates Rule 4-243(c)(3) by imposing, without consent, a sentence that falls below a binding plea agreement, the resulting sentence is inherently illegal under Rule 4-345(a).”). See ⁵⁷⁶ also Cuffley, 416 Md. at 575 n.1, 7 A.3d at 561 n.1 (“Maryland Rule 4-345(a) permits a court to correct an illegal sentence at any time. If a sentence is ‘illegal’ within the meaning