St. Cyr v. St. Cyr

ARTHUR, J. In a divorce judgment, the Circuit Court for Harford County ordered Mark St. Cyr (“Husband”) to pay child support and rehabilitative alimony to Lauren St. Cyr (“Wife”). The court also granted Wife use and possession of the family home for several months. On appeal, Wife challenges the court’s factual findings as to her potential income, the court’s exercise of discretion in determining the amount and duration of alimony, and the court’s exercise of discretion in determining the time limit for use and possession of the family home. Although we leave many of the court’s findings and rulings undisturbed, we vacate the judgment in part and remand so that the court may re-evaluate the alimony award. ¹⁷¹ Factual and Procedural Background A. The Marriage and its Demise The parties to this case were married in 1994.

Before the marriage, Wife worked as an assistant branch manager at a surety company, earning around $45,000 per year. She stopped working in 1995, upon the birth of the family’s first child, a daughter. Another daughter was born in 1997, followed by a son in 1999. Wife served as primary caregiver to the children.

During most of the marriage, Husband served as the family’s sole wage earner. In the first year of the marriage, he earned less than Wife. His income gradually increased as his career in sales and distribution progressed. In 2000, Husband started working in a management position.

During the marriage, Husband and Wife consumed nearly all of their household income, saving little. They lived in a house that tested the extent of their means. 1 In 2004, they nearly lost the home to foreclosure. Wife did not return to work at that time. Instead, Husband sold the house to a lender, rented it from the lender for two years, and repurchased it at a substantially higher price.

When he fell delinquent on mortgage payments again in 2010, he negotiated a loan modification that allowed him to make payments at a temporary interest rate of two percent, subject to sharp annual increases beginning in March 2015. In 2009, Wife was diagnosed with Hodgkin’s lymphoma. She underwent chemotherapy and bone marrow extraction, and her cancer went into remission. Husband provided little emotional support during this time of medical need.

In the fall of 2011 at the latest, Husband started an extramarital affair. Wife learned of the relationship, but agreed to ¹⁷² attempt to reconcile with Husband after he denied that the relationship was sexual. For several months, Husband lived in the family home on many nights, while secretly spending other nights with another woman at an apartment that he had rented. Wife eventually learned of her husband’s deception.

In September 2012, the parties separated permanently. Husband did not return to the family home. B. The Divorce Action On July 1, 2013, Husband filed a complaint for absolute divorce in the Circuit Court for Harford County. He asked the court to grant him sole legal custody and shared physical custody of the parties’ minor children.

Wife counterclaimed for divorce, sole legal custody and primary physical custody of the minor children, alimony, child support, equitable division of marital property, use and possession of the family home and family-use personal property, and counsel fees. Adopting a master’s report and recommendation, the circuit court issued a pendente lite order that granted Wife use and possession of the family home and required Husband to continue paying the mortgage (approximately $2,850 per month). In addition, the order required Husband to pay alimony and child support for the two minor children. Wife later amended and supplemented her pleadings, asking the court to transfer title of the family home to her and to declare the couples’ oldest child to be a destitute adult child for support purposes.

C. Trial in the Circuit Court The court heard the case on five trial days between September 22, 2014, and October 6, 2014. Much of the testimony concerned the parties’ financial circumstances. At the time of trial, Husband was 46 years old with an extensive work history. He earned in excess of $200,000 in ¹⁷³ annual salary and bonuses in an executive or management position.

On the other hand, Wife, at the age of 47, had not been employed for nearly two decades. A central issue was whether she was capable of re-entering the workforce. Husband testified that Wife had decided that she did not want to return to work after the birth of their first child and that he had supported that decision while the children were young. According to Husband, he asked his wife to contribute financially when they faced the threat of foreclosure in 2004, but she maintained that she was “never going back to work.” He testified that, at other times when he brought up the possibility of bringing a second income to the household, she would respond that there was “no way” that she would resume working.

He admitted that his wife sometimes slept excessively when she was experiencing health problems during the later years of the marriage. He had observed that she had always been able to wake up in the morning “if she needed to” to attend to the needs of the children. According to Wife, she and her husband mutually decided that she would be a stay-at-home mother so that the family could follow Husband’s career path. During cross-examination, Wife stated that she believed that Husband should continue to bear sole financial responsibility for the family after the separation: “That is what we signed up for....

That is his responsibility!.]” She added: “From the very onset of the marriage, the agreement that Mark and I set forth was Mark would be the person who was the breadwinner in the family, that was extremely clear, and I would be the one raising the children.” When counsel asked more specifically about her future expectations of support, she answered: “I expect Mark to fulfill the duties that he said that he would twenty years ago.” Regarding her physical condition, Wife testified that she began to experience chronic fatigue around 2007. At the time of her cancer diagnosis in 2009, she also tested positive for mononucleosis, which she characterized as “the cause of the fatigue.” Wife testified that, after learning of her husband’s ¹⁷⁴ affair, she underwent therapy at the instructions of her doctors. She reported that she was currently taking an antidepressant, a mood stabilizer, thyroid medication, and blood pressure medication. She stated that her cancer was in remission at the time, but that she suffered from neuropathy in her hands and feet as a result of her chemotherapy.

At the time of trial, Wife did not believe that she would be able to resume employment. She said that she was still physically weak and continued to experience episodes of depression. Regarding her daily functioning, she stated: “I have to pace myself. I know I can’t go out for twelve hours in a day.

I know I can’t do a ten hour day.” In response to a question about her future employment capacity, she answered: It depends on what my doctors suggest____I’m in constant contact with them. I still have a few months left in remission. Right now, based on the limited amount of energy that I have to pace myself during the day, I don’t believe that I would be able to perform a full day’s work that would be required by any employer. So, I would have to consult with my doctors.

Maybe in November this year we’ll see if things have improved healthwise. Nonetheless, Wife testified that her fatigue had not prevented her from involving herself heavily in her children’s activities. She opined that her level of activity outside the home was “a little different than working full-time” and not “a twelve hour day,” which she said was “typically how long you work when you’re working in a corporate world.” She stated that she needed “to pace [her]self” and she “wish[ed] that [she] had more energy to do some things even better.” When asked whether she was capable of working full-time, Wife responded: “Not at this time.” She said that her ability to work part-time “would depend” on the circumstances, but she believed that she “wouldn’t be able to do anything that has to do with standing up or typing.” Regarding her intention to provide financial support to her children, she answered: “It would depend on my health in the future. I don’t know.” ¹⁷⁵ During closing arguments, counsel for Husband asked the court to impute income of $400 per week to Wife for the purpose of calculating alimony and child support.

Counsel argued that Wife’s testimony “made it abundantly clear [that] she [had] no intention to return to work” and that the court should not simply accept her self-reported opinion that she was physically unable to work. He pointed out that she had made no efforts to seek employment or to increase her employability and that she produced “no medical evidence” of documentation of her alleged ongoing symptoms. Counsel for Husband argued that, although it would be unreasonable to expect a 47-year-old woman with a 20-year employment gap to “go to work in some office and make $50,000.00 a year,” the court should conclude that she could at least “get a job for forty hours a week making $10.00 an hour.” During closing, counsel for Wife asserted that she had not worked for two decades “by the agreement of the parties.” Her attorney commented that, under her existing circumstances, “[s]he is at $10.00 an hour and [Husband] has admitted that.” Her attorney argued that she was “entitled to indefinite alimony” because “her history of medical problems and ... her current physical limitations” meant that she could “never hope to achieve a level of self-sufficiency that will enable her to obtain the standard of living the parties would have.” D. Judgment of the Circuit Court On February 25, 2015, the circuit court issued a thoughtful and comprehensive memorandum opinion setting forth its rulings on each of the claims raised by the parties. First, the court granted the divorce on the ground of Husband’s adultery, finding that the allegations of adultery had been admitted and proven.

Wife received sole legal custody of the parties’ two minor children. The court granted Husband’s request for visitation rights with the parties’ son, who was then a 15-year-old high school sophomore. Husband had not requested a visitation ¹⁷⁶ order regarding the minor daughter, a 17-year-old high school senior who was estranged from her father. The court granted Wife use and possession of the family home until February 2016 and ordered Husband to continue paying the mortgage, taxes, and insurance during that period.

The court directed that a trustee be appointed to sell the house as soon as possible after February 1,2016, and to divide any net proceeds from the sale evenly between the parties. 2 The court rejected Wife’s argument that she was incapable of working and instead found that she was voluntarily impoverished. The court concluded that she had the capacity to work 40 hours per week at an “entry level” position with a salary of $10 per hour. The court agreed with Husband that “a conservative approach” of imputing a gross monthly income of $1,733.33 per month was “fair and appropriate.” In addition, the court determined Husband’s monthly gross income to be $18,614, a figure that was in line with some of the highest estimates offered by Wife. After weighing the statutory factors pertaining to an alimony award, the court awarded rehabilitative alimony of $1,800 per month for a period of 15 years.

The court stated that Wife had not met her burden of proving that she was entitled to indefinite alimony. In view of Wife’s failure to adduce medical or other evidence to substantiate her insistence that she was incapable of working, the court commented that it would not “speculate” on the questions of “how long it [would] take” for Wife to make sufficient progress and “how far she can be expected to progress.” The court evaluated the parties’ child support obligations based on its findings that Husband’s actual income was $18,614 per month and that Wife’s potential income was $1,733 per month. The court ordered Husband to pay child support in the amount of $1,600 per month until February 2016 (the end of the period for use and possession of the family home) ¹⁷⁷ and $2,116 per month thereafter. The court also ordered Husband to continue to pay for medical insurance, dental insurance, and extraordinary medical expenses for the two minor children.

The court rejected Wife’s claim that the parties’ 19-year-old daughter was a destitute adult child. Among its other orders, the court granted Wife a monetary award of $81,122, representing one-half of the value of her husband’s 401(k) retirement account. The court also awarded her 75 percent of the family furniture and transferred Husband’s interest in an automobile to her. Finally, the court ordered Husband to pay $15,000 of the attorney’s fees that Wife had incurred in pursuing her claims.

The court finalized its orders in a judgment entered on April 20, 2015. Thereafter, Wife filed a timely appeal. While the appeal was pending, Wife moved for a partial stay of the judgment. Effectively, she asked this Court to modify the portion of the judgment that provided that her use and possession of the family home would terminate on February 1, 2016.

This Court denied the motion. Questions Presented In her appeal, Wife presents a number of questions and sub-questions. For analytical clarity, we have reorganized those issues 3 in this form: ¹⁷⁸ I. Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in imputing income to Wife for the purposes of alimony and child support?

II

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding Wife rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $1,800 per month for a period of 15 years?

III

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting Wife use and possession of the family home until February 1, 2016? Addressing the first question, we conclude that there is no basis to set aside the court’s findings as to Wife’s short-term earning capacity. Nevertheless, we conclude that the court’s alimony analysis was incomplete. After fully accepting the court’s findings about the parties’ incomes, we are unable to determine whether the court erred or abused its discretion in determining the amount and duration of alimony.

Therefore, the awards must be vacated. On the final issue, we conclude that the court properly exercised its discretion in setting a time limit for use and possession of the family home. Discussion I. The trial court imputed income to Wife for the purpose of evaluating her claims for alimony and child support. She contends that the court erred by finding that she was currently capable of earning $1,733 per month. “Technically, ‘imputed income’ is a child support concept predicated on a finding of voluntary impoverishment[.]” Reynolds v. Reynolds, 216 Md.App. 205, 220 , 85 A.3d 350 (2014).

The Maryland child support guidelines define a parent’s income as either: “(1) actual income of a parent, if the parent is employed to full capacity; or (2) potential income of a parent, if the parent is voluntarily impoverished.” Md.Code (1984, 2012 Repl.Vol.), § 12-201(h) of the Family Law Article (“FL”); see also FL § 12-204(b) (providing that “if a parent is ¹⁷⁹ voluntarily impoverished, child support may be calculated based on a determination of potential income” but that “[a] determination of potential income may not be made for a parent who ... is unable to work because of a physical or mental disability”). Potential income means “income attributed to a parent determined by the parent’s employment potential and probable earnings level based on, but not limited to, recent work history, occupational qualifications, prevailing job opportunities, and earnings levels in the community.” FL § 12-201 ((). Although the legislature has not defined the term “voluntary impoverishment,” the courts have held that a parent is “considered ‘voluntarily impoverished’ whenever the parent has made the free and conscious choice, not compelled by factors beyond his or her control, to render himself or herself without adequate resources[.]” Wills v. Jones, 340 Md. 480, 490 , 667 A.2d 331 (1995) (quoting Goldberger v. Goldberger, 96 Md.App. 313, 327 , 624 A.2d 1328 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 The Family Law Article does not expressly require a trial court to consider a spouse’s voluntary impoverishment or potential income for alimony purposes. Using more general terms, the alimony statute directs the court to “consider all the factors necessary for a fair and equitable award,” including: “the ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly or partly self-supporting” (FL § 11 — 106(b)(1)); “the time necessary for the party seeking alimony to gain sufficient education or training to enable that party to find suitable employment” (FL § 11 — 106(b)(2)); and “the financial needs and financial resources of each party, including ... all income and assets” (FL § ll-106(b)(ll)(i)).

Consequently, the court may consid ¹⁸⁰ er the potential income of a voluntarily impoverished spouse when it considers an alimony request. See Reynolds, 216 Md.App. at 220 , 85 A.3d 350 ; Turner v. Turner, 147 Md.App. 350, 385 , 809 A.2d 18 (2002); Durkee v. Durkee, 144 Md.App. 161, 181 , 797 A.2d 94 (2002); Long v. Long, 141 Md.App. 341, 350-53 , 785 A.2d 818 (2001); Digges v. Digges, 126 Md.App. 361, 379-81 , 730 A.2d 202 (1999). After a bench trial such as this one, an appellate court “will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Md. Rule 8-131(c). We review the court’s findings as to a party’s earning capacity under the clearly erroneous standard.

See Sieglein v. Schmidt, 224 Md.App. 222, 249 , 120 A.3d 790 (2015), aff'd, 447 Md. 647 , 136 A.3d 751 , 2016 WL 2941117 (2016); Reynolds, 216 Md.App. at 222 , 85 A.3d 350 ; Long, 141 Md.App. at 352 , 785 A.2d 818 ; Crabill v. Crabill, 119 Md.App. 249, 265-66 , 704 A.2d 532 (1998). Under that standard, “[i]f there is any competent evidence to support the factual findings [of the trial court], those findings cannot be held to be clearly erroneous.” Solomon v. Solomon, 383 Md. 176, 202 , 857 A.2d 1109 (2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In explaining its decision to impute income to Wife, the court stated that Wife had earned a bachelor’s degree before the marriage and that she had earned $45,000 annually before she decided to stop working in 1995. 5 Although the parties had offered conflicting narratives about that decision, the court credited Husband’s testimony that he had merely acquiesced in Wife’s unilateral decision. This finding was consistent with the court’s other comments that Wife had demon ¹⁸¹ strated an “unwillingness to work” regardless of circumstances during the marriage and that she “insisted] on being totally supported by husband, because that was her perception of their agreement 19 years ago.” The court credited Wife’s testimony that she had endured “severe lethargy” around the time of her 2009 cancer diagnosis.

Yet the court was not persuaded by her testimony regarding the extent of her current condition: The problem with wife’s assertions on her health status is that she produced absolutely no medical testimony to support it. While it is not disputed that she suffered from cancer, this appears to be in remission. There was no testimony as to her diagnosis, prognosis or current status. There was no testimony to support her other allegations of health problems and concerns.

To the contrary, it was pointed out that she endured long days of trial and never presented as being unable to continue with the same. She spent many hours on the witness stand and did not appear fatigued, and quite frankly, she was quite combative and energetic in her sparring with opposing counsel, even at the end of long days. Such reflects her energy and ability. In addition, she provided much testimony of her running around for her children’s activities, going on college visits and attending innumerable sports tournaments.

None of these activities were limited by her alleged medical conditions. Something more than her bald assertion, which was unsupported by her other testimony and her courtroom demeanor, should be shown to make a claim for permanent disability.... Concluding that Wife “should be able to work a 40-hour week earning $10 per hour at this time,” the court imputed to her “$20,800 annual income, which equates to $1,733.33 per month.” We see no error, let alone clear error, in these findings. In her appeal, Wife asserts that the evidence showed that she was wholly incapable of earning income.

Relying on her own testimony regarding fatigue, depression, and neuropathy, ¹⁸² she asserts that the facts at trial “paint a picture of someone who is not likely” to be able to support herself. It may be true that her testimony, if believed in its entirety, would have been sufficient for a court to find that she was incapable of holding a job. See Allison v. Allison, 160 Md.App. 331, 345 , 864 A.2d 191 (2004). On the other hand, her testimony “by no means compelled that conclusion.” Id.

The court was entitled to weigh Wife’s testimony in light of the other evidence about her active lifestyle. See Schwartz v. Wagner, 116 Md.App. 720, 725 , 698 A.2d 1222 (1997) (noting that prior appellate decision in same case had upheld trial court’s decision to impute income to wife where the wife’s “allegation that she [could not] work long hours because of her health was belied by the fact” that she had endured extensive travel periods and where she produced no corroborating medical testimony). The court was also competent to draw inferences about Wife’s condition based on its first-hand observations. See Blake v. Blake, 81 Md.App. 712, 728 , 569 A.2d 724 (1990).

Even where a court accepts uncontradicted evidence that a person has medical problems, the court need not necessarily conclude that the person is incapable of earning income. See Karmand v. Karmand, 145 Md.App. 317, 333-34 , 802 A.2d 1106 (2002) (upholding finding that husband was capable of supporting himself where judge “accepted the uncontradicted evidence about the state of the [husband’s] health, but found, contrary to his assertion, that the state of his health was not interfering with his ability to work”); Long, 129 Md.App. at 581, 743 A.2d 281 (holding that trial court did not err in finding that wife was “at least somewhat capable of supporting herself,” where evidence of wife’s depression and other “mental health problems was uncontested” but where other evidence showed that these conditions “did not totally bind her to the family home” and that wife had been financially successful in the past); see also Hiltz v. Hiltz, 213 Md.App. 317, 344-46 , 73 A.3d 1199 (2013) (holding that trial court was not required to conclude that wife was disabled for alimony ¹⁸³ purposes, where she testified about her disability and offered documentation of her Social Security disability benefits, but where she produced no medical testimony and where other evidence indicated that she was otherwise active and did not “stay in bed all day as she claim[ed]”). In any event, even if the court had been required to credit every word of Wife’s testimony (which it was not), the court would not have been required to infer that she was incapable of working an eight-hour day. As the trial court indicated, her own testimony was inconclusive on this point, because she had discussed her inability to work a 10- or 12-hour day.

She opined that she was not ready for full-time work “at this time,” but she stated that her opinion on that matter “would depend” on her future doctors’ recommendations and on the type of work. She also suggested that the divorce itself was contributing to her vulnerability, and she expressed her intention to re-evaluate in November 2015 — i.e., the month after the trial. In her own words, she stated that she “d[id]n’t know” whether she would be capable of contributing financially to the support of her children in the future. Similarly, during closing argument, her attorney was equivocal about whether Wife contended that she was utterly incapable of supporting herself, or only partially so.

Wife has expressly challenged the court’s finding that she had the ability to work, but she does not argue that the court otherwise erred or abused its discretion in determining the amount of potential income. Potential income “is not the type of fact which is capable of being verified through documentation or otherwise[,]” and indeed “any determination of potential income must necessarily involve a degree of speculation.” Malin v. Mininberg, 153 Md.App. 358, 406-07 , 837 A.2d 178 (2003) (citing Reuter v. Reuter, 102 Md.App. 212, 223-24 , 649 A.2d 24 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). An appellate court will uphold a trial court’s determination of potential income as long as the underlying factual findings are not clearly wrong, and “the amount calculated is realistic” and not “so unreasonably high or low as to amount to an abuse of ¹⁸⁴ discretion[.]” Sieglein, 224 Md.App. at 249 , 120 A.3d 790 (citing Reuter, 102 Md.App. at 223 , 649 A.2d 24 ) (quotation marks omitted). In the present case, Wife has challenged only the court’s finding as to the number of hours she could reasonably work.

She had not disputed the assertions that, if she were capable of working, she could earn $10 per hour, which is slightly higher than this State’s minimum wage. 6 During closing arguments, Wife’s attorney essentially conceded that the reasonableness of this estimate, by stating: “She is at $10 an hour[.]” We see nothing unreasonable in the conclusion that Wife, as a capable, college-educated, 47-year-old woman, had the potential to gain full-time employment at that modest hourly rate, despite her health problems and employment gap. Thus we see no error in the decision to impute income to Wife of $1,733.33 per month.

II

Even though we accept the court’s finding as to Wife’s potential income at the time of the divorce, we cannot do the same for the court’s assessment of her future earning capacity. The court’s findings on this matter are central to an award of rehabilitative alimony. The court must re-evaluate the award in this case because the original order was not grounded in the analysis required by the statute and the cases interpreting it. In Maryland, the principal function of alimony is “rehabilitation of the economically dependent spouse.” Whittington v. Whittington, 172 Md.App. 317, 335-36 , 914 A.2d 212 (2007) (citing Karmand, 145 Md.App. at 327 , 802 A.2d 1106 ).

The “ ‘statutory scheme generally favors fixed-term or so-called rehabilitative alimony ... where practicable to ease the ¹⁸⁵ transition from the joint married state to their new status as single people living apart and independently.’ ” Solomon, 383 Md. at 195 , 857 A.2d 1109 (quoting Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 391 , 614 A.2d 590 (1992)). In other words, “alimony’s purpose is to provide an opportunity for the recipient spouse to become self-supporting.” Tracey, 328 Md. at 391 , 614 A.2d 590 (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Hull v. Hull, 83 Md.App. 218, 223 , 574 A.2d 20 (1990) (stating that the goal of rehabilitative alimony is “to vitiate any further need for alimony”). On the other hand, an alimony award should not be “designed to create a subsistence level for the more [dependent] spouse.” Strauss v. Strauss, 101 Md.App. 490, 512 , 647 A.2d 818 (1994). Section ll-106(b) of the Family Law Article lists the familiar monetary and equitable factors that a court must consider in determining the amount and period of an alimony award.

The circuit court’s opinion included a detailed and thorough discussion of these considerations. Many of the court’s findings are not at issue in this appeal. In summary, the court found that: the parties “enjoyed a high, upper middle class standard of living,” but had lived “beyond their means” during the marriage (addressing FL § 11 — 106(b)(3)); the marriage lasted for 20 years, but it was only an “active marriage” for 18 of those years (FL § 11— 106(b)(4)); Husband made almost all of the monetary contributions, while Wife made most of the non-monetary contributions as primary caregiver to the children (FL § 11 — 106(b)(5)); the breakup directly resulted from Husband’s affair and his subsequent deceptive behavior, but other underlying problems with the parties’ financial habits and Wife’s “confrontation and aggression” also contributed to their estrangement (FL § 11— 106(b)(6)); Husband and Wife were 46 and 47 years old, respectively (FL § 11 — 106(b)(7)); Husband had no significant health concerns, but Wife suffered from both physical and mental health problems (FL § ll-106(b)(8)); Husband’s high income was currently overwhelmed by the mortgage and other financial obligations, and both parties would “need to make serious adjustments in their spending habits” (FL § 11- ¹⁸⁶ 106(b)(9)); Husband had agreed to pay for the children’s ongoing medical expenses (FL § ll-106(b)(10)); and the parties had few assets aside from equity in the marital home and Husband’s retirement savings, which the court would divide evenly (FL § ll-106(b)(ll)). In its discussion of “the ability of the party seeking alimony to be wholly or partly self-supporting” (FL § 11 — 106(b)(1)), the court found that Wife was currently capable of earning $20,800 in annual income, the equivalent of $1,733.33 in monthly income.

Yet the court did not explicitly compare that level of income with Wife’s reasonable needs. Hence, the opinion included no express statement about whether Wife would be either “wholly” or “partly” self-supporting with that amount of imputed income. The court’s analysis “seemed to suggest” that Wife would not be fully self-supporting at that imputed income level, but then it “fail[ed] to make that finding.” Brewer v. Brewer, 156 Md.App. 77, 101 , 846 A.2d 1 (2004). A spouse is not necessarily “self-supporting” under the alimony statute merely because the spouse has enough income “to hold body and soul together.” Tracey, 328 Md. at 392 , 614 A.2d 590 .

In general, a party is self-supporting if the party’s income exceeds the party’s “reasonable” expenses, as determined by the court. See id. at 390 , 614 A.2d 590 ; Reynolds, 216 Md.App. at 221-22 , 85 A.3d 350 ; Lee v. Lee, 148 Md.App. 432, 448 , 812 A.2d 1089 (2002); Reuter, 102 Md.App. at 223 , 649 A.2d 24 . The court determines the appropriate level of reasonable need based on all of the statutory alimony factors, including the standard of living established during the marriage. See Reynolds, 216 Md.App. at 226 , 85 A.3d 350 .

The court discussed Wife’s financial needs elsewhere in its opinion. Wife had submitted a financial statement in which she claimed monthly expenses of $6,244 for herself and $4,309 for her children. The court identified a total of $2,525 of those expense items that Wife had either agreed to eliminate or that the court believed were inflated. The court commented that the apparent exaggerations tended to “draw her entire ex ¹⁸⁷ pense sheet into question[ ] and make it difficult to accurately assess her needs.” It is “an unfortunate fact that expenses are sometimes exaggerated when financial statements are prepared for use in domestic relations cases,” and therefore “the trial court is not required to set forth its exact thought process in arriving at conclusions” regarding a spouse’s reasonable expenses.

Allison, 160 Md.App. at 345 , 864 A.2d 191 . Yet despite the court’s effort to give a realistic evaluation of Wife’s expenses, the opinion still left the parties and this Court without any clear statement about her reasonable needs. As a consequence, we cannot determine whether she would be wholly self-supporting with her imputed income, or even -with her imputed income plus a monthly alimony payment. A calculation of the recipient spouse’s future expenses and income “is obviously an important component to any finding of self-sufficiency” (see Doser v. Doser, 106 Md.App. 329, 353-54 , 664 A.2d 453 (1995)), and without those findings it is “unclear whether, and if so the degree to which, [the recipient spouse] will be able to become self-supporting.” Id. at 357 , 864 A.2d 191 ; see also Brewer, 156 Md.App. at 101 , 846 A.2d 1 .

The circuit court went on to decry the dearth of evidence regarding the time necessary for Wife to improve her employ-ability, under FL § 11 — 106(b)(2). This Court has characterized “the mandatory factor in section 11-106(b)(2)” as an element that “goes to the heart” of Maryland’s rehabilitation-based alimony scheme. Long, 129 Md.App. at 582 , 743 A.2d 281 . The court observed that Wife had offered “no anecdotal or current experience testimony to shed light on this issue” and had produced no “vocational expert to discuss her potential income.” For his part, Husband merely asserted that she would be wholly self-supporting within two years, without any evidence or even an argument to justify that time frame.

The court found that the evidence supported the inference that Wife’s income would grow over the years, but the court could ¹⁸⁸ not (at that time) hazard a guess as to how much growth could be expected over any period of time: Wife does not present as any shrinking violet, but rather as a very strong personality, and given her education, past work experience (although dated) and her personality, this Court would expect her to progress quickly beyond that starting level. As indicated before, there was a lack- of evidence on what her earning growth could be expected to be, and it seems that both parties want the Court to speculate about wife’s earning potential or lack thereof. This Court will not do that. While wife should be able to gain employment at an entry level, it would be expected to take some time for her income to grow.

Although the court’s refusal to speculate is perfectly understandable (see Walter v. Walter, 181 Md.App. 273, 288 , 956 A.2d 255