State Commission on Human Relations v. Talbot County Detention Center

BATTAGLIA, J. This Court must determine whether a circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief to the Maryland Commission on Human Relations from interference with its administrative investigation into two employment discrimination complaints filed against the Talbot County Detention Center, and if so, whether injunctive relief should have ¹²² been granted in this case. We answer in the affirmative to both questions. I. Background The Marylánd Commission on Human Relations (“Commission”) is an independent agency charged with investigating complaints of discrimination in employment, housing and public accommodations under Article 49B of the Maryland Code and bringing legal and equitable actions pertaining to those violations. See Md.Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol.), Art. 49B, § 10. 1 Two verified complaints of employment discrimination ¹²³ were filed with the Commission against the Talbot County Detention Center (“Detention Center”). 2 One complainant alleged that he had been subject to race and gender discrimination in the workplace, the Talbot County Detention Center, and another alleged that she had been sexually harassed in the same workplace.

In accordance with statutory obligations, the Executive Director referred the complaints to the Commission staff to investigate and ascertain facts surrounding the allegations. See Art. 49B, § 10. As part of its investigation, the Commission conducted, or attempted to conduct, numerous interviews of employees of the Detention Center. According to the Commission, however, these interviews were seriously impeded by the Detention Center’s interference, namely, its efforts to discourage nonparty witnesses (other employees) from participating in the interviews and its insistence on appearing at confidential interviews of witnesses. ¹²⁴ As a result, on June 29, 2001, the Commission sought injunctive relief in the Circuit Court for Talbot County to stop the Detention Center from obstructing the Commission’s investigation of employment discrimination.

The Commission’s petition for injunctive relief sought to prohibit [the Detention Center] and [its] agents from appearing at confidential witness interviews, or influencing witness testimony with regard to the instant investigation into allegations of employment discrimination, and from contacting Commission investigative staff, except as required by the investigation, and that the injunction remain in effect until the completion of the administrative proceedings, and that [the Detention Center] post notices in the workplace, as approved by the Commission, setting forth the State’s anti-discrimination law, including a statement that it is unlawful for an employer to retaliate against one who flies, or participates as. a witness in, a complaint of discrimination, ... The Detention Center, in its response dated July 3, 2001, asserted that the Circuit Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Petition for Temporary Injunctive Relief. The Detention Center further alleged that the Commission’s authority to investigate was limited to the investigative mechanisms set forth in Title 14, Subtitle 3 of the Code of Maryland Regulations. 3 Specifically, the Detention Center argued that ¹²⁵ the Commission is only allowed to: (1) require a fact-finding conference; (2) require the respondent to promptly provide answers to requests for information; (3) serve interrogatories on a respondent; and (4) issue subpoenas, if necessary, to ¹²⁶ compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of documents. See COMAR 14.03.01.04.

With respect to the latter, the Detention Center claimed that the use of the word “testimony” indicated that the Commission’s interviews of the witnesses should be formal recorded proceedings, and thus the Commission had no authority to conduct interviews confidentially and in the absence of a representative from the Detention Center. On August 17, 2001, the Circuit Court heard oral argmnent on the Commission’s petition and, ruling from the bench, denied the Commission injunctive relief. In so ruling, the Circuit Court stated, [w]hat you are asking the Court to do is to tell counsel or anyone not to go to your office and this is your office, you have control over it .... if this is your investigation then you can conduct it in your own office, on your own terms. And I don’t see why the Court has to get involved in this.

You also asked me to prevent ... [the Detention Center] or their agents from contacting the Commission’s investigation staff.... * * * but that is not this Court’s function to step in here and tell them not to call your office .... you haven’t even filed a complaint against the Detention Center. You don’t even know at this time that there is a reason to do that, you haven’t held a hearing. So it seems to me that what you are asking the Court to do is not what was intended by granting the Court this authority. And ... the other thing is you want to prevent the agents of the Detention Center from contacting or influencing witness testimony .... that is not the purpose of this statutory provision ... it seems to me you have a right to conduct an investigation under the law.

And how you do that at this ¹²⁷ stage is not the Court’s interest.... So the Court will deny the requested injunction. (emphasis added). It is unclear from the Circuit Court’s verbal ruling whether its denial of the injunction was based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as was initially proffered by the Detention Center, or whether the denial itself was an exercise of the Circuit Court’s discretion.

The parties have proceeded on the assumption that the court’s denial of injunctive relief was for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Our discussion will address this premise as well as the propriety of the Circuit Court’s denial of the injunction based on the merits of this case. The Commission appealed the Circuit Court’s denial of the injunction to the Court of Special Appeals, and this Court ordered, on its own initiative, that a writ of certiorari be issued to consider whether the Circuit Court’s conclusion was erroneous as a matter of law.

II

Standard of Review Generally, appellate courts review a trial court’s determination to grant or deny injunctive relief for an abuse of discretion because trial courts, sitting as courts of equity, are granted broad discretionary authority to issue equitable relief. See J.L. Matthews, Inc. v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm., 368 Md. 71, 93 , 792 A.2d 288, 301 (2002). See El Bey v. Moorish Sci. Temple of Am., 362 Md. 339, 354-55 , 765 A.2d 132, 140 (2001) (stating that while normally a trial court’s decision to grant or deny injunctive relief is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, “no such deference [is given] when we find ‘an obvious error in the application of the principles of equity’ ”) (quoting Western Md. Dairy, Inc. v. Chenowith, 180 Md. 236, 244 , 23 A.2d 660, 665 (1942)); Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Community Ass’n, Inc., 361 Md. 371, 394 , 761 A.2d 899, 911 (2000).

When injunctive relief is provided by statute, however, a court’s decision to issue injunctive relief is no longer rooted in traditional principles of equity; rather, it is based upon the statutory guidelines. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Co-op., 532 U.S. 483, 497 , 121 S.Ct. ¹²⁸ 1711, 1721, 149 L.Ed.2d 722, 736 (2001) (“a court sitting in equity cannot ‘ignore the judgment of Congress, deliberately expressed in legislation.’ ... A district court cannot, for example, override Congress’ policy choice, articulated in a statute as to what behavior should be prohibited.”) (internal citations omitted); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 , 102 S.Ct. 1798, 1803 , 72 L.Ed.2d 91, 99 (1982)(stating that “Congress may intervene and guide or control the exercise of the courts’ discretion.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Massachusetts Water Res. Auth., 256 F.3d 36, 47 (1st Cir.2001).

Rather than relying on the broader notions in equity, our Legislature provided explicit guidelines within which a court must exercise its authority to issue an injunction; thus, it is these criteria to which we look when determining whether the court’s decision to grant or deny injunctive relief was appropriate. We digress momentarily to note that the degree of discretionary authority a court maintains when considering injunctions sought pursuant to, and authorized by, a specific statute is a novel question, not explored by this Court to date. Federal jurisdictions, including the United States Supreme Court, have had the opportunity to consider the inherent differences that exist when a court is asked to issue injunctive relief under its equitable powers versus when the court entertains requests for injunctive relief pursuant to a specific statute and have outlined some considerations for determining whether equitable powers are usurped by statutory mandates. On one end of the spectrum, in Tennessee Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 , 98 S.Ct. 2279 , 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978), the Supreme Court held that Congress, in the Endangered Species Act, clearly circumscribed the courts’ jurisdiction in equity because the statute contained a blanket prohibition against “jeopardizing] the continued existence of endangered species;” thus, upon a concession that the Tellico Dam would destroy the snail darter, the court was required to issue an injunction.

Id. at 193-95 , 98 S.Ct. at 2301-02 , 57 L.Ed.2d at 146-47 . ¹²⁹ In other cases, however, the Supreme Court has refused to find that other statutes spawned an absolute duty upon courts to issue injunctive relief. Most recently, in United States v. Oakland Cannibus Buyers Co-op., supra, the Supreme Court emphasized that its ruling in Hill , i.e. that the District Court lacked discretion to deny an injunction, was based solely on the fact that an injunction in that case was the “only means of ensuring compliance” with the statute and the “order of priorities” established by Congress would otherwise be “deprived of effect.” Oakland Cannibus Buyers Co-op., 532 U.S. at 496-97 , 121 S.Ct. at 1721 , 149 L.Ed.2d at 735-36 . See also Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 313 , 102 S.Ct. at 1803 , 72 L.Ed.2d at 99 (stating that while “Congress may intervene and guide or control the exercise of the courts’ discretion, ... we do not lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from established principles [of equitable jurisdiction]”)(internal quotations omitted). As the Supreme Court pointed out in Romero-Barcelo, supra, “[t]he grant of jurisdiction to ensure compliance with a statute hardly suggests an absolute duty to do so under any and all circumstances, and a federal judge sitting as chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of law.” 456 U.S. at 313 , 102 S.Ct. at 1803 , 72 L.Ed.2d at 99 .

In the case sub judice, we are not presented with requests to enjoin actions which violate the law; rather we are presented with requests to enjoin actions which arguably impede the Commission from performing a lawful task, i.e. conducting an uninhibited investigation, actions for which irreparable harm must be evidenced. Section 4 of Article 49B grants the Commission the power to bring a civil action for injunctive relief, outlines when and where such action can be brought, and further establishes the criteria under which an injunction may be sought and granted, i.e. “to preserve the status of the parties or to prevent irreparable harm.” While Section 4 does not expressly eliminate the circuit court’s discretionary authority or expressly create an automatic injunction, it does, in a sense, “narrow” the circuit court’s discretionary authority by replacing the considerations in eq ¹³⁰ uity with the statutory criteria: the Commission need only establish a reasonable necessity for an injunction “to preserve the status of the parties or prevent irreparable harm.” Art. 49B? § 4. Again, while the statute in question may confine the judicial discretion, it does not altogether eliminate it. In United States Postal Service v. Beamish, 466 F.2d 804 (3rd% Cir.1972), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed an injunction by the district court even though the district court did not apply traditional equitable standards.

The Third Circuit held that the statute under which the injunction was sought clearly circumscribed the traditional equitable discretion that courts possess in granting injunctive relief. See Beamish, 466 F.2d at 806 . The statute provided that “the United States district court ... shall ... upon a showing of probable cause to believe [that 39 U.S.C. § 3005 ] is being violated, enter a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction ...” Id. (quoting 39 U.S.C. § 3007 ).

The critical difference between the statute in Beamish and the statute before us today is that the Beamish provision spoke directly to the judiciary concerning its authority, or rather its duty, to issue an injunction upon a showing of probable cause. Conversely, in Article 49B, Section 4, the Legislature authorizes the Commission to bring action for injunctive relief when reasonably necessary to prevent irreparable harm or preserve the status of the parties. While the Legislature establishes statutory guidelines for the issuance of injunctive relief, it does not directly eliminate a court’s discretion by mandating a certain outcome. Thus, we shall consider the propriety of the court’s decision to deny injunctive relief with the understanding that the court’s equitable discretion is limited to the extent that the Legislature articulated the applicable guidelines for injunctive relief.

III

Discussion Maryland’s anti-discrimination laws are embodied in Article 49B of the Maryland Code, as is the Commission’s investigatory and enforcement authority with respect to the anti-discrimi ¹³¹ nation legislation. The Commission’s comprehensive investigatory powers include the authority to hold investigatory hearings for fact finding, file civil actions for injunctive relief, receive and issue complaints alleging discrimination, conduct investigations into discrimination complaints, endeavor to reach conciliation between the parties, and initiate and pursue litigation to enforce compliance. See Md.Code, Art. 49B, §§ 3, 4, 9A, 10, 11, 12; Molesworth v. Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 631 , 672 A.2d 608, 613 (1996)(citing Weathersby v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat’l Management Co., 86 Md.App. 533, 545 , 587 A.2d 569, 574 (1991); rev’d on other grounds, 326 Md. 663 , 607 A.2d 8 (1992)); Gutwein v. Easton Publishing Co., 272 Md. 563, 564-65 , 325 A.2d 740, 741 (1974). The Commission’s enforcement powers, then, cover the gamut, from investigation to commencement and pursuit of litigation.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction As noted, the Commission’s powers include the power to bring a civil action to obtain an injunction pursuant to Section 4 of Article 49B. Section 4 states: At any time after a complaint has been filed, if the Commission believes that appropriate civil action is necessary to preserve the status of the parties or to prevent irreparable harm from the time the complaint is filed until the time of its final disposition, the Commission may bring action to obtain a temporary injunction. The action shall be brought in the circuit court for the county where the place of public accommodation which is the subject of the alleged discrimination is located, or where the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have occurred, or where the dwelling which is the subject of the alleged discrimination is located. Md.Code, Art. 49B, § 4 (emphasis added).

Section 4 clearly provides a circuit court with statutory jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief at any time after a complaint has been filed with the Commission. Thus, a circuit court’s authority to entertain actions for injunctive relief and issue appropriate orders while discrimination complaints are pending before the ¹³² Commission is absolute and unmistakable. Any conclusion to the contrary by the Circuit Court is erroneous. The Circuit Court also claimed that it had no authority to instruct counsel for the Detention Center not to appear at witness interviews and not to contact witnesses or investigative agents.

The Circuit Court further commented that the Commission “[hasn’t] even filed a complaint against the Detention Center ... [it doesn’t] even know at this time that there is a reason to do that, [it hasn’t] held a hearing.” The Circuit Court erred in basing its ruling on the fact that the Commission had not filed a complaint against the Detention Center; the Circuit Court’s authority to review claims for injunctive relief is triggered upon a filing of a complaint with the Commission, not upon the Commission’s filing of a complaint against the employer. See Md.Code, Art. 49B, § 4. The Circuit Court did have jurisdiction to issue an injunction, an injunction that might specifically instruct the Detention Center not to appear at interviews and not to contact witnesses, and generally speaking, to prevent the frustration of an investigation by the Commission. With subject matter jurisdiction of the Circuit Court confirmed, we pause to note this Court’s authority under Section 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article 4 to review final judgments of the circuit courts, including judgments denying a request for injunctive relief, and our authority, pursuant to Mainland Rule 8-604(e), 5 to order the ¹³³ issuance of injunctive relief.

Therefore, we will review the propriety of the Commission’s request for injunctive relief, the Detention Center’s counter-arguments, and the Circuit Court’s ruling and, where appropriate, order the issuance of an injunction as requested by the Commission. B. Investigative Mechanisms of the Commission Prior to determining the propriety of injunctive relief, however, we shall pause to discuss a few procedural arguments raised by the Detention Center concerning the methods by which the Commission is authorized the conduct its preliminary investigations into employment discrimination claims. The Detention Center alleges that the Commission is limited to the formal investigative mechanisms described in the Code of Maryland Regulations. Specifically, the Detention Center argues that because COMAR 14.03.01.04(5)(a) provides that a subpoena may “compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses,” the fact-finding interviews of witnesses must be recorded and taken under path.

COMAR 14.03.01.04(5)(a). The use of the word “testimony,” according to the Detention Center, indicates that a subpoenaed witness must be interviewed formally, i.e. under oath or affirmation, and the interview must be recorded and transcribed. We disagree with the Detention Center’s suppositions. Most significantly, the statutory authority provided the Commission by Article 49B, Section 10 is not restricted by the subsequently enacted regulations concerning the Commission’s subpoena authority; rather, the regulations provide a more thorough description of the investigative tools that may be utilized by the Commission and the proper procedures for employing these tools.

That COMAR contemplates the Commission’s ability to utilize a subpoena during its investigation does not mean that the investigatory and fact-finding powers of the Commission are limited to eliciting information from subpoenaed witnesses or documents; the provisions in CO- ¹³⁴ MAR regarding the Commission’s investigatory process are not exclusive. The Commission has the ability, as one of its many investigatory tools, to use a subpoena to compel the attendance or testimony of witnesses or the production of documents. Again, that this is a permissible tool, does not mean that it is the only tool. In fact, subpoena use is qualified by the premise that “if completion of an investigation requires the issuance of a subpoena ...” Thus, it is implied that the Commission’s attempts at acquiring the information without a subpoena have failed, which is, in turn, indicative of the Commission’s inherent ability to gather such information absent a subpoena. 6 The Detention Center further argues that Section 10 was enacted to protect employers from unwarranted or frivo ¹³⁵ lous complaints by requiring a preliminary investigation before the employer can be subject to a Commission complaint.

The Detention Center claims that because the investigatory process is for its benefit, the Detention Center was entitled to be present during the interviews and to ensure that testimony was taken properly, i.e. recorded and transcribed. Again, we find no merit in this assertion. While the investigative process may, in part, protect an employer from frivolous claims, it was never intended to provide an impenetrable shield through which no investigation could be completed in confidence and without undue influence or intimidation by the employer accused of violating the statute. The Legislature did not mandate that the preliminary investigation must be conducted through formal transcribed interviews where both the witness and the accused are privy to the questioning process; to the contrary, Section 13 of Article 49B indicates that the Legislature intended to keep the investigations confidential, to the extent feasible.

As such, we refuse to find that the Detention Center’s presence was required at the witness interviews during the preliminary investigation; nor do we conclude that the statute and regulations require recording and/or transcription of the interviews. C. The Propriety of Injunctive Relief We turn now to the pivotal issue in this case, i.e. whether the Commission’s request for injunctive relief pursuant to Article 49B, Section 4, should have been granted by the Circuit Court. While the title of Section 4, i.e. “[pjower to bring civil actions for temporary injunction,” would seemingly allude that such an injunction is interlocutory or preliminary in nature, in reality, this statutory injunction shares more of the characteristics of a permanent injunction. As we reiterated in Bey v. Moorish Sci.

Temple of Am., 362 Md. 339 , 765 A.2d 132 (2001): A permanent injunction is, as its names indicates, “an injunction final or permanent in its nature granted after a determination of the merits of the action.” But a permanent injunction is not “permanent” in the sense that it must ¹³⁶ invariably last indefinitely. Rather, it “is one granted by the judgment which finally disposes of the injunction suit.” The difference between an interlocutory injunction and a permanent injunction turns on “whether there has been a determination on the merits of the claim. If that determination has been made, then the injunction may be final; if not, it is interlocutory.” Id. at 354 , 765 A.2d at 140 (quoting Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Community Ass’n, Inc., 361 Md. 371, 395 , 761 A.2d 899, 911 (2000)(intemal. citations omitted)). The statutory injunction authorized by Section 4 is one which may finally dispose of the injunction suit, although its length may only be for the duration of the investigation, as in the case sub judice.

Therefore, the factors traditionally required to obtain an interlocutory or preliminary injunction in equity, i.e. (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits; (2) the “balance of convenience” determined by whether greater injury would be done to the defendant by granting the injunction than would result from its refusal; (3) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury unless the injunction is granted; and (4) the public interest, see J.L. Matthews, Inc., 368 Md. at 83 n. 8, 792 A.2d at 294 -95 n. 8 (quoting Fogle v. H & G Rest., Inc., 337 Md. 441, 455-56 , 654 A.2d 449, 456 (1995)); Department of Transportation v. Armacost, 299 Md. 392, 404-05 , 474 A.2d 191, 197 (1984), are largely inapplicable when reviewing the propriety of a statutorily authorized injunction. See Massachusetts Water Res. Auth., 256 F.3d at 47 (explaining that court’s usual role of chancery is not appropriate where Congress has provided guidelines for assessing the propriety of a statutory injunction); Gov’t of the Virgin Islands, Dept. of Conservation v. Virgin Islands Paving, Inc., 714 F.2d 283, 286 (3rd Cir.1983)(holding that, contrary to injunctions in equity, no showing of irreparable harm was required under the Air Pollution Control and Coastal Zone Management Acts); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.

Co. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255 , 259-60 (10th Cir.l981)(discussing the several federal statutes under which a showing of irreparable harm, a requirement under a court’s equitable jurisdiction, is not required for injunctive relief); ¹³⁷ Beamish, 466 F.2d at 806 (stating that the standard for determining the propriety of injunctive relief was restricted by the provision which required only a probable cause showing of a statutory violation); see also Fogle, 337 Md. at 456 , 654 A.2d at 457 (stating that when considering circumstances where injunctive relief implicitly affects a governmental interest, “the court is not bound by the strict requirements of traditional equity as developed in private litigation” and the courts “may, and frequently do, go much farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go only when private interest are involved”)(internal quotations and citations omitted). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit aptly stated: The function of a court in deciding whether to issue an injunction authorized by a statute ... to enforce and implement Congressional policy is a different one from that of the court when weighing claims of two private litigants. This is not to say that the [statutory] violation ... automatically requires a district court to issue an injunction. The essence of equity jurisdiction is the power of the court to fashion a remedy depending upon the necessities of the particular case.

However, the fact that a federal statute is being enforced by the agency charged with that duty may alter the burden of proof of a particular element necessary