State v. Campbell

BATTAGLIA, J. In this case we are asked to consider whether the defendant, Bernard Campbell, a.k.a. Sean Kelly, made a request to discharge counsel when he expressed dissatisfaction with his attorney during trial. If Campbell’s statements constitute a request to discharge counsel, we also must determine whether the trial court properly denied the request. We conclude that under the circumstances of this case, Campbell’s expressed dissatisfaction with his attorney qualified as a request to discharge counsel that was properly denied by the trial court.

I. Facts and Procedural History On November 16, 2001, Destiny Campbell, then thirteen months old, was in the care and custody of her father, Bernard Campbell, when she suffered second degree burns to her lower torso and legs, a deep-colored bruise on her left cheek, a small cut across her nose, and a skull fracture. She was rushed to the hospital by her mother and treated by doctors, who called the Baltimore County Police Department to report Destiny’s injuries. Baltimore County Police began an investigation of the incident, questioned Campbell, inspected his home, and obtained a warrant for Campbell’s arrest. Campbell was arrested and charged with two counts of child abuse 1 and three counts of assault. 2 ⁶²¹ Subsequently, Campbell’s ease was set for trial but was interrupted after Campbell became disruptive during the course of the proceedings.

The trial judge declared a mistrial after an evaluation of Campbell’s competency yielded a conclusion that, in fact, Campbell was competent but exhibited a history of malingering. At the second trial, Campbell’s attorney, who had been trial counsel for the first time as well, had the following colloquy prior to Campbell being brought into the courtroom: [CAMPBELL’S COUNSEL]: I[’d] just like to just let the court be aware that I am a little bit apprehensive. I have a client that’s off the hook, so to say. One of the reasons why we are still with that case is because when we were trying this case before Judge Cahill he went off and started throwing things and screaming and yelling in the court and the judge stopped the proceeding near the end of the State’s case and had him NCR.

He comes back with a high score in the history of malingering. That’s what they said, Your Honor. So I told him today that we have to make an election [i.e., whether to elect a court or a jury trial]. THE COURT: Okay. [CAMPBELL’S COUNSEL]: And he is determined not to make an election, he has a lot of things he’d like to say to the court.

And he is threatening me and that’s where my apprehension comes in, Your Honor. Deputies escorted Campbell into the courtroom, and Campbell elected to be tried by a jury. Campbell then stated: ⁶²² [CAMPBELL]: Okay — I say Your Honor — I would like a postponement because of the fact that this guy didn’t come see me, talk to me about this case in nine months since the first case in April. And on the behalf that I have somebody in this very same townhouse complex that daughter had got burnt by the same hot water that my daughter got burnt in and she — would like for her to come to court to testify as a witness saying that her daughter got burnt by mistake at the same place in the hot water.

And I got this defense on my side this man do not know nothing about. And I need a postponement for me to subpoena her to court to say this in front of the jury so, therefore, I have a lot of things going for me in my defense that I like to bring up as well. Campbell’s attorney responded that he had visited Campbell “several times in the last month” and that Campbell’s witness was not material to the case. The trial court recessed the case to have the administrative judge consider Campbell’s request for postponement, which was denied.

Following the recess, Campbell told the court that he “would like to challenge the array of the jury,” to which the court explained that such a challenge could not be made until “there was an array.” When asked by the court whether there was anything else, Campbell replied: “No. Not until the trial starts.” While the judge discussed the questions to be asked during voir dire of the potential jury members, Campbell indicated that he wanted to address the court, and the following dialogue occurred: THE COURT: What would you want to say if you came up? [CAMPBELL]: I bring it up later. We bring it up. [CAMPBELL’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, Mr. — just to let the court know because it’s going to come up, Your Honor, my client has done some attempt to acquaint himself with the law while he’s been locked up. He has done some reading in the area of the law. And he’s read just enough to think now that he can take over this ease.

He wants to challenge the jury array. We don’t know who is in the jury ⁶²³ array. And he wants, he has some argument about conflict of interests. I — • THE COURT: Who’s conflict of interest? [CAMPBELL’S COUNSEL]: I can’t see it, Your Honor, but that’s what he wants to talk to you about.

THE COURT: I have no idea what it’s about. [CAMPBELL]: That’s — Your Honor, we bring it up, we will bring it up. THE COURT: Okay. [CAMPBELL]: We will bring it up. The trial proceedings continued and at the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Campbell’s counsel asked for a brief recess because Campbell was “interested in the plea [agreement] that was initially offered [by the State].” After a short recess, Campbell’s counsel stated that Campbell had refused the State’s offer. Thereafter, Campbell again wanted to address the court and the following conversation ensued: THE COURT: Yes sir.

What do you want to say? [CAMPBELL]: [My attorney], this guy right here, my public defender, Your Honor, he told me that just a few minutes ago that I already lost the case, the jury ain’t like me, the jury, before even the case was started, the jury was already going to convict me any way. I don’t like this man as my representative. He ain’t have my best interest at heart. He told me I am dumb just a few minutes ago, that I deserve this, that I should get all these years, and he is my representative.

How is he going to tell me this and he representing me? THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this; Would you rather have a lawyer tell you, I mean, let’s say you could pick anybody, and one lawyer will tell you exactly what you want to hear, not what the lawyer really thinks from their experience. They will tell you, Oh, you know, it is going to be fine, everything is okay, you have a great shot, and everything like that, what you want to hear. ⁶²⁴ Or, would you rather have a lawyer tell you what the lawyer honestly thinks from their experience. I would think I would want, if it was me, I would rather have somebody tell me the truth when I am facing, what you are facing.

Now, all [your attorney] can do is give you his advice. That is all a lawyer can do. [CAMPBELL]: That is a conflict with the attorney. That is a conflict. We had conflicts way before this ever started, man in the first trial.

THE COURT: Well, we are beyond that at this point, sir. We are now at the point where I guess we are ready to go to the jury if there is no other evidence. [CAMPBELL]: This ain’t no fair trial. The man told me he ain’t going to represent me. THE COURT: He is representing you.

He hasn’t done anything to not represent you. [CAMPBELL]: Under force, because you all wouldn’t let me fire him. THE COURT: Okay. Well, now, he says you do not want to testify; is that correct? [CAMPBELL]: Yes. THE COURT: Okay.

All right. Is there any other evidence, [Campbell’s Counsel], that you have to offer? [CAMPBELL’S COUNSEL]: No, Your Honor. The trial proceeded with instructions to the jury and closing arguments. On the same day, the jury returned its verdict and found Campbell guilty of child abuse and first-degree assault.

Thereafter, on April 2, 2003, the trial judge imposed a fifteen-year sentence for child abuse and a consecutive twenty-five-year sentence for first-degree assault. On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Campbell argued that the Circuit Court’s denial of his request to discharge counsel should be reversed because the judge did not properly inquire about the reasons for his request. In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals agreed with Campbell ⁶²⁵ that the trial judge should have made further inquiry based upon Campbell’s statements that his attorney did not have his “best interests at heart” and that the two had “conflicts way before this ever started.” In the view of the Court of Special Appeals, the Circuit Court briefly opined on the quality of Campbell’s attorney rather than assessing the reasons for the request, which amounted to an abuse of discretion. The State filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court to consider the following question: Did the Court of Special Appeals majority misapply State v. Brown, 342 Md. 404 , 676 A.2d 513 (1996), to conclude that additional inquiry is required when a defendant raises a mid-trial complaint about his counsel, but does not explicitly ask to discharge counsel, and the trial court has responded to the complaint raised?

We granted the petition and issued the writ of certiorari, 382 Md. 688 , 856 A.2d 724 (2004). We reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, even though we agree that Campbell’s request was adequate to trigger a mandatory inquiry by the trial judge about Campbell’s reasons for seeking to discharge his counsel, because we hold that Campbell’s request occurred after “meaningful trial proceedings” had begun and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the request for discharge.

II

Discussion The State contends that the Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that an additional inquiry into the reasons for a discharge of counsel request was required in this case pursuant to our decision in State v. Brown, 342 Md. 404 , 676 A.2d 513 (1996). In the State’s view, Campbell’s statements to the trial court were “complaints” and did not rise to the level of a request to discharge counsel. Alternatively, the State argues that if Campbell’s “complaints” are found to be a request to discharge counsel, the request was untimely because “meaningful trial proceedings” had commenced. Furthermore, the State asserts that the judge sufficiently acknowledged Camp ⁶²⁶ bell’s request and made a reasonable assessment that the request lacked merit.

Campbell argues that a request to discharge counsel is not required to be “artfully worded or precisely espoused,” and that his statements amounted to a request for new counsel, which was not properly addressed by the lower court. Campbell maintains that in assessing a request for discharge of counsel even when made after the trial begins, the judge must still determine the reason for the request before deciding whether a dismissal should be allowed. According to Campbell, if the judge had conducted the proper inquiry the request to discharge might have been granted. Therefore, Campbell argues that the Court of Special Appeals was correct in its conclusion that the trial court had not properly ascertained the reasons for Campbell’s request to discharge counsel.

A. Request to Discharge Counsel A defendant’s request to discharge counsel implicates two fundamental rights that are guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution: 3 the right to ⁶²⁷ the assistance of counsel and the right of self-representation. See State v. Brown, 342 Md. 404, 412-13 , 676 A.2d 513, 517 (1996); Fowlkes v. State, 311 Md. 586, 589 , 536 A.2d 1149, 1151 (1988); Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260 , 262-63 523 A.2d 597, 598 (1987); Leonard v. State, 302 Md. 111, 119 , 486 A.2d 163, 166 (1985); Snead v. State, 286 Md. 122, 123 , 406 A.2d 98, 99 (1979). The right to counsel may be waived by the defendant provided that “he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with his eyes open.” Fowlkes, 311 Md. at 589 , 536 A.2d at 1151 quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 , 63 S.Ct. 236, 242 , 87 L.Ed. 268, 275 (1942).

A waiver of the right to counsel must “ordinarily [be] an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Leonard, 302 Md. at 119 , 486 A.2d at 167 . In circumstances where a defendant elects to forego the assistance of counsel to represent himself, the court must permit the defendant to proceed pro se if the request is timely and unequivocal. See Brown, 342 Md. at 413-14 , 676 A.2d at 518 ; Fowlkes, 311 Md. at 589 , 536 A.2d at 1151 , citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 , 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2527 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Because a defendant, by choosing to represent himself, is waiving the right to counsel, the court must conduct an inquiry to ensure that the defendant’s waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent.

See Brown, 342 Md. at 414 , 676 A.2d at 518 , citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Fowlkes, 311 Md. at 589 , 536 A.2d at 1151 ; Snead, 286 Md. at 130 , 406 A.2d at 102 . Alternatively, a defendant may elect to discharge his counsel to obtain substitute counsel. Under these circumstances, the defendant must be afforded an opportunity to explain the reasons for the request and only may substitute counsel if good cause is shown, although the defendant is not ⁶²⁸ entitled to substitute a specific appointed attorney if represented by the Office of the Public Defender. See Brown, 342 Md. at 414 , 676 A.2d at 518 ; Grandison v. State, 341 Md. 175, 199-204 , 670 A.2d 398, 410-11 (1995); Fowlkes, 311 Md. at 605 , 536 A.2d at 1159 .

In this case we first must decide whether Campbell’s statements should have been construed as a request to discharge counsel. Maryland Rule 4-215(e) outlines the procedures a court must follow when a defendant desires to discharge his counsel to proceed pro se or to substitute counsel: If a defendant requests permission to discharge an attorney whose appearance has been entered, the court shall permit the defendant to explain the reasons for the request. If the court finds that there is a meritorious reason for the defendant’s request, the court shall permit the discharge of counsel; continue the action if necessary; and advise the defendant that if new counsel does not enter an appearance by the next scheduled trial date, the action will proceed to trial with the defendant unrepresented by counsel. If the court finds no meritorious reason for the defendant’s request, the court may not permit the discharge of counsel without first informing the defendant that the trial will proceed as scheduled with the defendant unrepresented by counsel if the defendant discharges counsel and does not have new counsel.

If the court permits the defendant to discharge counsel, it shall comply with subsections (a)(l)-(4) of this Rule if the docket or files does [sic] not reflect prior compliance. 4 ⁶²⁹ The Rule was designed to protect both the right to counsel and the right to self-representation and ensures that decisions to waive counsel would pass constitutional muster. Brown, 342 Md. at 424 , 676 A.2d at 523 . The Rule, however, is silent as to what level of discourse is required to discharge counsel. This Court addressed that issue in Snead v. State, 286 Md. 122 , 406 A.2d 98 (1979), in which we considered whether a defendant’s statements were sufficient to invoke the right of self-representation.

At trial, the defendant, Richard Lee Snead, filed a motion for continuance and also orally expressed dissatisfaction with his attorney by stating: “I feel as though that [sic] I would like to get a delay in this case to get my nephew and my family time to get another attorney. From my understanding, [my attorney], the way he is talking, I am guilty before I even come in the courtroom.” Id. at 125 , 406 A.2d at 100 . The trial court denied Snead’s motion for continuance and stated that his attorney would not be discharged, after which the following dialogue occurred: [SNEAD]: He told me every time he come to see me, he tell me I am guilty before I come in the courtroom. Why should I have a man — he feels that way, before I come into the courtroom.

THE COURT: Make your mind up [your attorney] is going to represent you. [SNEAD]: I can’t get time for my people to get me no attorney? THE COURT: No, sir. [SNEAD]: I don’t want no attorney then. Id. at 126 , 406 A.2d at 100 . Snead was convicted, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, but this Court reversed, reasoning that, “any statement by the defendant from which the court could reasonably conclude that the defendant desired self-representation would be sufficient.” Id. at 127 , 406 A.2d at 101 .

In so holding, we found that Snead’s statements were sufficient to require an inquiry by ⁶³⁰ the trial court as to whether the defendant wanted to represent himself. Id. We iterated this conclusion in Leonard v. State, 302 Md. 111 , 486 A.2d 163 (1985), in which, the defendant, Leonard, requested a continuance to discharge his attorney and proceed pro se: THE COURT: I understand you want to conduct your own defense. [LEONARD]: That’s the only choice I got. THE COURT: I take it your answer is yes. [LEONARD]: It’s got to be yes.

It’s the only choice I have. THE COURT: Alright. I’m going to allow [your current attorney] to stay.... [LEONARD]: I don’t want you to allow him to do nothing. I have a right to do it [ ].

Id. at 125 , 486 A.2d at 170 . Leonard further stated that his attorney was “no legal advisor for [him]” and that he did not want his attorney at the defense table. Id. The judge denied Leonard’s request to represent himself, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, id. at 118 , 486 A.2d at 165 , but this Court reversed, holding that Leonard’s statements were an obvious expression of his desire or inclination to represent himself.

Id. at 125 , 486 A.2d at 170 . Quoting from Snead , we stated that “[a]ny statement by the defendant from which the court could reasonably conclude that the defendant desired self-representation would be sufficient.” Id. at 124 , 486 A.2d at 169 . Moreover, we explained that “a defendant is not required to utter a