State v. Graves

²³⁵ HOTTEN, J. In this case, we decide whether the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County (“circuit court”) satisfied Md. Rule 4-215(e), which requires the court to “permit the defendant to explain the reasons for [a] request” to discharge counsel. We shall hold that, where an assistant public defender (“defense counsel”) indicated that Jeriko Graves (“Respondent”) wished to obtain a postponement to hire private counsel that Respondent had retained in the past, Md. Rule 4-215(e) required that the circuit court seek an explanation for the request to discharge counsel from the defendant, or ensure that the defendant agreed with the reasons proffered by defense counsel. We explain. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY I. Proceedings in the circuit court Respondent was charged by criminal indictment in the circuit court with two counts of possession of a controlled dangerous substance (“CDS”), one count of possession of CDS with intent to distribute, and one count of second-degree assault. 1 On November 9, 2012, defense counsel entered his appearance on behalf of Respondent.

On February 22, 2013, Respondent and defense counsel appeared for a motions hearing, and defense counsel moved for a postponement: [Defense Counsel]: Thank you, Your Honor. This is defense request for a postponement. The Court: All right, go ahead. [Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, thank you very much. I have had the opportunity to speak to [Respondent]. [Respondent] has informed me that he would prefer to have John Robinson represent him in this matter as opposed to myself. ²³⁶ In speaking to [Respondent], apparently Mr. Robinson has represented him in several cases in the past and he has been satisfied with Mr. Robinson’s services as his attorney in the past.

In terms of [Respondent’s] situation right now, Your Honor, I would tell you, obviously, we are here for a motions hearing today. We have the trial date that is set. It is my understanding that Hicks[ 2 ] runs from an arraignment that was held on October 1st. So we are becoming close to Hicks. [Respondent] is being held now on — he anticipates being held for another 20 days.

It is his hope to postpone this case both the motions hearing as well as the trial date. I have spoken to him about Hicks and the ramifications of that. He would be willing to waive his rights under Hicks but he would like to postpone the motions hearing and the trial date to have the opportunity to essentially become removed from the incarceration and hire John Robinson to represent him in this matter, both for the motions as well as in the trial. The following exchange between Respondent and the court ensued: The Court: Okay, Well, I have to hear him if that is what he is requesting.

Sir, state your name for the record? [Respondent]: Jeriko Graves. The Court: Mr. Graves, if you would like to fire your Public Defender, then I must explain to you that before I could allow you to do that, I would have to continue the case if there is a meritorious reason. If there is no meritorious reason, then the case is going to go forward. Do you understand that? [Respondent]: Yes, sir. ²³⁷ The Court: Did you at some point in time receive a copy of the charges in this case? [Respondent]: Yes, I have.

The Court: And you understand how important counsel is, how an attorney can assist you, protect your constitutional rights whether you want to plead guilty or not guilty, an attorney can help you. Do you understand that? [Respondent]: Yes, sir, I do. The Court: You are charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine. It carries 20 years in jail, $25,000 fíne.

You are charged with possession of cocaine. It carries four years in jail, $25,000 fine. You are charged with possession of marijuana. It carries a year in jail, a $1,000 fine.

You are charged with second-degree assault. It carries 10 years in jail, $2,500 fine. Do you understand that? [Respondent]: Yes, I do. The Court: Are there any subsequent mandatory? [Petitioner]: Yes, he is mandatory.

The Court: From what? [Petitioner]: He is mandatory on the possession with intent. The Court: If you are convicted of Count 1, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, you may face a mandatory sentence of 10 years in prison without parole. Please indicate mandatory penalties advised. Now, sir, if I find that you do not have a meritorious reason to discharge counsel, then the trial will proceed as scheduled.

Do you understand that? [Respondent]: Yes, I do? The Court: All right. Have you hired John Robinson? [Respondent]: No, sir, I haven’t hired him. The Court: Have you paid John Robinson? [Respondent]: Sir?

The Court: Have you paid him? [Respondent]: No, sir. ²³⁸ The Court: All right. Have you personally spoken to him about this case? [Respondent]: Yes, I was incarcerated and my fiance, Jodi Johnson, went and got a figure from him what he would represent me for. The Court: Okay. [Respondent]: And I was trying to get that together as soon as I got out of here. The Court: All right.

The Court will deny your request to postpone the motions hearing. The case is set here today for a motions hearing. This motions hearing has been scheduled for quite some time. There was originally a trial date of January 8, it was postponed.

It was rescheduled until today’s date. This had to do with the fact that the case is in trial posture and there was a motions hearing agreed upon. [Your public defender] filed for it, it was granted on the 28th day of January. The case is set today. [Respondent] may wish to hire Mr. Robinson but there is nothing to indicate that he has paid Mr. Robinson, met with Mr. Robinson or has hired Mr. Robinson. I will deny the request.

If you want to fire the Public Defender, you can ask me to do that. Otherwise, [the public defender] is in your case. Do you want me to fire [your public defender]? [Respondent]: I will keep him on. The motions hearing then proceeded as scheduled.

On March 21, 2013, Respondent was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, possession of marijuana, and possession of cocaine. 3 He was sentenced to ten years’ incarceration with all but eighteen months suspended, and five years’ supervised probation. ²³⁹ II. Proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Respondent argued, inter alia, that the circuit court “failed to comply with [Md.] Rule 4-215(e) by never asking [Respondent] why he wished to replace his counsel.” The Court of Special Appeals agreed. The Court observed that, under Md. Rule 4-215(e), “[i]f a defendant requests permission to discharge an attorney whose appearance has been entered, the court shall permit the defendant to explain the reasons for the request.” (emphasis omitted). According to the Court of Special Appeals, a request to discharge counsel triggering Md. Rule 4-215(e), is “ ‘any statement from which a court could conclude reasonably that the [accused] may be inclined to discharge counsel.’ ” (quoting Gambrill v. State, 437 Md. 292, 302 , 85 A.3d 856, 862 (2014)).

Thus, defense counsel’s request for a postponement required that the circuit court permit Respondent to explain the reasons for the request. The Court held that this requirement was not satisfied at the motions hearing: At no point during the hearing did the court permit [Respondent] to explain why he wanted to obtain private counsel. Although [Respondent’s] counsel did provide some explanation regarding why [Respondent] desired to be represented by private counsel, [Respondent] was never asked if that was an accurate or complete statement. Compare State v. Taylor, 431 Md. [615, 625, 66 A.3d 698, 705 (2013) ] (accused was given the opportunity to explain his reason for desiring to discharge counsel where his current counsel stated the relevant reasons and the accused asserted “that pretty much sums it up,” adding that he did not see “eye-to-eye” with his current counsel).

Accordingly, because the court failed to engage in a colloquy with [Respondent] regarding the reason for his request, the circuit court erred, and a new trial is required. See State v. Davis, 415 Md. 22, 31 , [ 997 A.2d 780, 785 ] (2010) (“The failure to inquire into a defendant’s reasons for seeking new counsel when the proper request has been made to the court is reversible error.”). ²⁴⁰ (parallel citations added). The State of Maryland (“the State”) filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari on August 7, 2015, and we granted that petition to determine whether the circuit court complied with Md. Rule 4-215(e). STANDARD OP REVIEW In addressing the circuit court’s compliance with Md. Rule 4-215(e), we apply a de novo standard of review.

Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604 , 861 A.2d 78, 80-81 (2004) (“Because our interpretation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and Constitution, provisions of the Maryland Code, and the Maryland Rules are appropriately classified as questions of law, we review the issues de novo to determine if the trial court was legally correct in its rulings on these matters.”) (citation omitted); Cole v. State, 378 Md. 42, 56 , 835 A.2d 600, 607 (2003) (observing that the application of the Maryland Rules to a particular situation is reviewed de novo). We also adhere to the familiar principles of statutory interpretation. Lisy Corp. v. McCormick & Co., 445 Md. 213, 221 , 126 A.3d 55, 60 (2015) (“[T]he principles applied to statutory interpretation are also used to interpret the Maryland Rules.”). We abide by the plain meaning of Md. Rule 4-215(e), “[w]hen the plain meaning of the language is clear and unambiguous, and consistent with ... the broad purposes of the legislation^]” Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 653 , 705 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1998) (citing Philip Electronics v. Wright, 348 Md. 209, 216-17 , 703 A.2d 150, 153 (1997); Frank v. Baltimore County, 284 Md. 655, 661 , 399 A.2d 250, 254 (1979)). “If, however, the meaning of the plain language is ambiguous or unclear, we seek to discern legislative intent from surrounding circumstances, such as legislative history, prior case law, and the purposes upon which the statutory framework was based.” Id.

(citing Haupt v. State, 340 Md. 462, 471 , 667 A.2d 179, 183 (1995)). DISCUSSION Md. Rule 4-215(e) governs the “court procedure when a defendant expresses a desire to discharge his or her current ²⁴¹ counsel.” Davis, 415 Md. at 30 , 997 A.2d at 784 . The rule provides: If a defendant requests permission to discharge an attorney whose appearance has been entered, the court shall permit the defendant to explain the reasons for the request. If the court finds that there is a meritorious reason for the defendant’s request, the court shall permit the discharge of counsel; continue the action if necessary; and advise the defendant that if new counsel does not enter an appearance by the next scheduled trial date, the action will proceed to trial with the defendant unrepresented by counsel.

If the court finds no meritorious reason for the defendant’s request, the court may not permit the discharge of counsel without first informing the defendant that the trial will proceed as scheduled with the defendant unrepresented by counsel if the defendant discharges counsel and does not have new counsel. If the court permits the defendant to discharge counsel, it shall comply with subsections (a)(1) — (4) of this Rule if the docket or file does not reflect prior compliance. Md. Rule 4-215(e). We have observed that Md. Rule 4-215(e) protects and administers the fundamental right to the assistance of counsel, along with the attendant right to counsel of one’s choice, secured under both the United States Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

Taylor, 431 Md. at 644 , 66 A.3d at 716 (citations omitted); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 , 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Pinkney v. State, 427 Md. 77, 90 , 46 A.3d 413, 421 (2012) (quoting Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260, 262-63 , 523 A.2d 597, 598 (1987)). In light of the fundamental rights implicated, Md. Rule 4-215(e) provides a “precise rubric[ ]” with which we demand “strict compliance.” Pinkney, 427 Md. at 87 , 46 A.3d at 419 (citing Parren, 309 Md. at 280 , 523 A.2d at 606 , and Broadwater v. State, 401 Md. 175, 182 , 931 A.2d 1098, 1102 (2007)). A request for permission to discharge counsel triggering the process mandated by Md. Rule 4-215(e) is “ ‘any ²⁴² statement from which a court could conclude reasonably that the defendant may be inclined to discharge counsel. ” Gambrill v. State, 437 Md. 292, 302, 85 A.3d 856, 862 (2014) (quoting Williams v. State, 435 Md. 474, 486-87 , 79 A.3d 931, 938 (2013)). Such a statement does not need to be in writing or worded in a particular manner, and may come from defense counsel as opposed to the defendant.

See State v. Campbell, 385 Md. 616, 632 , 870 A.2d 217, 226 (2005) (“[Defendant’s] request did not need to be a talismanie phrase or artfully worded to qualify as a request to discharge, so long as a court could reasonably conclude that [he] sought to discharge his counsel.”); Davis, 415 Md. at 32 , 997 A.2d at 786 (“[A]ny statement that would reasonably apprise a court of defendant’s wish to discharge counsel will trigger a Rule 4-215(e) inquiry regardless of whether it came from the defendant or from defense counsel.”). Where the court is unsure about whether the defendant is dissatisfied with his or her counsel, the court should clear up any ambiguity by questioning the defendant regarding the statement to avoid the risk of reversal on appeal. Id. at 35 , 997 A.2d at 787 . Once Md. Rule 4-215(e) is implicated, the rule “begins with a trial judge inquiring about the reasons underlying a defendant’s request to discharge the services of his trial counsel and providing the defendant an opportunity to explain those reasons.” Pinkney, 427 Md. at 93 , 46 A.3d at 423 (citation omitted).

This first step imposes an affirmative duty on the circuit court to provide a “forum” in which the defendant can “explain the reasons for his or her request.” Taylor, 431 Md. at 631 , 66 A.3d at 708 ; See Williams, 435 Md. at 492 , 79 A.3d at 942 (noting that “the onus [is] on the [circuit [c]ourt to ‘permit the defendant to explain the reasons for the request.’ ”) (citing Md. Rule 4-215(e)). Inquiry into the reasons for the request to discharge counsel is vitally important because the reasons given dictate how the court proceeds under the rule: If the court determines that the request is supported by meritorious reasons, it must (1) permit the discharge; (2) ²⁴³ order a continuance, if necessary; and, (3) “advise the defendant that if new counsel does not enter an appearance by the next scheduled trial date, the action will proceed to trial with the defendant unrepresented by counsel.” [Pinkney, 427 Md. at 93-94 , 46 A.3d at 423 ]; Md. Rule 4-215(e). In contrast, if the court finds that the defendant’s reason for discharging his defense counsel is not meritorious, it must first inform the defendant that “the trial will proceed as scheduled with the defendant unrepresented by counsel if the defendant discharges counsel and does not have new counsel.” Md. Rule 4-215(e). Once the defendant is notified thus, the trial judge may proceed by “(1) denying] the request and, if the defendant rejects the right to represent himself and instead elects to keep the attorney he has, continue the proceedings; (2) permit[ting] the discharge in accordance with the Rule, but require counsel to remain available on a standby basis; [or] (3) granting] the request in accordance with the Rule and relieve counsel of any further obligation.” Williams, 321 Md. at 273, 582 A.2d at 806 (citing Fowlkes v. State, 311 Md. 586, 604-05 , 536 A.2d 1149, 1158-59 (1988)); Md. Rule 4-215(e).

Taylor, 431 Md. at 631-32 , 66 A.3d at 708 . As such, the circuit court must actually consider the reasons for the request, and make a further inquiry if necessary to determine whether those reasons are meritorious. Moore v. State, 331 Md. 179, 186 , 626 A.2d 968, 971 (1993); Johnson v. State, 355 Md. 420, 446 , 735 A.2d 1003, 1017 (1999) (“The trial judge must give much more than a cursory consideration of the defendant’s explanation.”). I. Md. Rule 4-215(e) was plainly triggered by defense counsel’s statement Defense counsel’s statement at the motions hearing clearly triggered the requirements of Md. Rule 4-215(e).

Our decision in Gambrill , where we held that the circuit court erred in failing to engage in a Rule 4-215(e) colloquy, is particularly instructive. 437 Md. at 305 , 85 A.3d at 864-65 . In Gambrill , defense counsel appeared before the court and ²⁴⁴ stated: “Your Honor, on behalf of Mr. Gambrill, I’d request a postponement. He indicates he would like to hire private counsel in this matter.” Id. at 296 , 85 A.3d at 858 . The court immediately responded: “All right.

Postponement is denied.” Id. On appeal, we held that the circuit court committed reversible error in denying the motion without inquiring into the reasons for the request. Id. at 305 , 85 A.3d at 864-65 . We observed that, “[w]hen an ambiguous statement by a defendant or his or her counsel is made under Rule 4-215(e), the fulcrum tips to the side of requiring a colloquy with the defendant.” Id. at 306-07 , 85 A.3d at 864 .

In the case at bar, defense counsel’s statement during the motions hearing' — that “[Respondent] has informed me that he would prefer to have John Robinson represent him in this matter as opposed to myself[ ]” — was materially indistinguishable from the statement of defense counsel in Gambrill— “Your Honor, on behalf of Mr. Gambrill, I’d request a postponement. He indicates he would like to hire private counsel in this matter.” Id. at 296 , 85 A.3d at 858 . Thus, like Gambrill , “the fulcrum tip[ed] to the side of requiring a colloquy with the defendant.” Id. at 306-07 , 85 A.3d at 864 . The State argues that the present case is distinguishable from Gambrill because the circuit court “follow[ed]-up” with Respondent after addressing his request for a postponement.

Cf. Davis, 415 Md. at 35 , 997 A.2d at 787 (“Any court that fails to follow-up with the defendant following a possible, albeit unclear, Rule 4-215(e) request risks appellate reversal of its judgment.”). The State notes that the court first treated Respondent’s motion as a request to postpone to hire private counsel, and explained that if Respondent had a meritorious reason for discharging his current counsel, then the court would grant a postponement. After denying the motion to postpone, the State observes that the court asked Respondent: “Do you want me to fire [your public defender]?” When Respondent stated that he would “keep him on[,]” the State contends that any