State v. Holt

JAMES R. EYLER (Retired, specially assigned), J. On January 13, 2012, Jamar Holt, appellee, was charged with assault, firearms violations, and drug conspiracy charges. Appellee filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the investigatory stop leading to these charges. After a hearing on March 2 and 5, 2012, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted in part and denied in part appellee’s motion to suppress. The State filed a motion for reconsideration, which the circuit court denied on March 5, 2012.

The State filed an interlocutory appeal that same day. On April 4, 2012, the circuit court filed a written order denying the motion for reconsideration. For the reasons set forth below, we shall reverse the circuit court’s decision and remand for further proceedings. Factual and Procedural Background The charges in this case stem from an investigatory stop of appellee’s vehicle on July 13, 2011.

The stop was the result of an ongoing investigation of suspected drug dealer Daniel Blue. The following facts were related by Detectives Joseph Crystal ⁵⁴⁵ and James McShane, members of the Violent Crime Impact Section of the Baltimore City Police Department, in -written statements admitted into evidence and in testimony at the suppression hearing. On June 29, 2011, Mr. Blue, who was “known [by law enforcement] for distributing raw heroin within Baltimore City,” delivered 50 grams of raw heroin to Keith Townsend on a street corner in East Baltimore. The entire transaction was captured on a City Watch, or Blue Light, camera.

Police saw Mr. Blue scanning his surroundings as he “exited the vehicle, as he approached Mr. Townsend, while he spoke to Mr. Townsend, [and] when he left Mr. Townsend.” Mr. Blue then promptly returned to his vehicle and drove out of the area. Mr. Townsend was arrested as he walked away from the street corner, and the arrest team retrieved a plastic bag from Townsend’s pocket that contained a piece of bread with 50 grams of raw heroin inside. Mr. Blue was not arrested that day. On July 13, 2011, Detectives Crystal and McShane conducted surveillance of Mr. Blue when he appeared at the North Avenue courthouse.

Prior to arriving at the courthouse, both detectives reviewed the video of the June 29th interaction between Mr. Blue and Mr. Townsend in order to familiarize themselves with Mr. Blue’s mannerisms and actions. At the courthouse, Detective Crystal noted that Mr. Blue was not scanning his surroundings as he had during the drug transaction two weeks earlier. The detectives placed a GPS tracker on Mr. Blue’s vehicle and followed him after he left the North Avenue courthouse. Mr. Blue drove to an apartment complex located in White Marsh, Baltimore County, where he entered the complex and returned moments later with a small Rubbermaid container.

Mr. Blue then traveled back into Baltimore City, arriving at Lake Montebello in Northeast Baltimore City. 1 ⁵⁴⁶ At Lake Montebello, Mr. Blue parked on a single road encircling the lake, just before a workout station, and got out of his vehicle. Detectives Crystal and McShane both noticed that Mr. Blue was again scanning his surroundings and looking over both of his shoulders. Mr. Blue walked toward and through the workout station and met with a man later identified as appellee. Mr. Blue continued to scan his surroundings while briefly speaking with appellee.

Appellee did not look around before or after seeing Mr. Blue. The two men got into a Jeep Cherokee parked near the workout station. Appellee entered the driver’s side and Mr. Blue entered the passenger’s side.. Appellee drove around the lake once before Mr. Blue got out of the car and walked back to his car.

Appellee remained in the Jeep, turned left out of the park, and drove away. The detectives followed appellee in the Jeep for several minutes. After appellee made a few turns, both detectives activated their emergency lights. 2 The Jeep came to a stop in the 1400 block of Pilmore Street. Detectives McShane and Crystal positioned their vehicles in front and to the side of the Jeep, respectively, but did not block the Jeep.

Both detectives exited their vehicles while announcing themselves as police. Detective McShane approached the Jeep from the front and repeatedly stated, “Police, let me see your hands.” Detective Crystal approached from the rear driver’s side. According to his written statement, Detective Crystal initially saw appellee’s hands on the steering wheel, but then appellee lowered his right hand out of sight and quickly raised it to point a handgun directly at Detective McShane. According to Detec ⁵⁴⁷ tive McShane’s written statement, appellee then started driving the Jeep directly towards Detective McShane, who was able to move out of the vehicle’s path.

At some point during this melee, both detectives discharged their service weapons into the vehicle. Appellee left the scene, but later arrived at the University of Maryland Medical Hospital with gunshot wounds. Appellee was indicted and charged with first and second degree assault, reckless endangerment, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, felon in possession of a firearm, and conspiracy to distribute narcotics. Prior to trial, appellee challenged the legality of the stop.

The circuit court conducted a hearing on March 2 and 5, 2012. The court concluded that the stop violated appellee’s constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment because “there was no reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop of Mr. Holt’s vehicle.” The court stated the following, in part, orally on the record: They wanted to stop it, they had a hunch, but I do not find that the purpose of that stop was for anything more than to find out who the driver of the vehicle was, and see if they couldn’t search the vehicle to find drugs. That’s what they wanted to do. That there were a bunch of innocuous facts, some have absolutely nothing to do with Mr. Holt, even thought [sic] the police would like to pile it on and make it appear that it has something to do with Mr. Holt, it doesn’t.

Had the packaging been similar, had there been a call from Mr. Holt, had there been an observation of an exchange, had there been some way that Mr. Holt was involved in this enterprise, some evidence of it before the meeting at Lake Montebello. But there are too many innocent, innocuous facts. These innocent facts are going to Montebello where people work out. Taking your lunch with you, which is what is normally used.

There’s no evidence that drugs in Baltimore ⁵⁴⁸ when it’s in large quantities are contained in Rubbermaid containers. There’s no evidence that the officers previously observed Mr. Blue to put all his drugs in blue top Rubbermaid containers. There’s no evidence that there was a container taken out [of] Mr. Blue’s car, and placed into Mr. Holt’s car. There’s no connection between Mr. Holt and drug activities of Mr. Blue that go back, at least to June 29th, none at all.

They don’t exist. It’s not in this case. And it’s a figment of the State’s imagination. And the detectives.

They wanted that to be the case, but there was no evidence of it. Their instincts and hunches and the hairs on the back of their necks were raised, but that does not make reasonable suspicion. So there was none. On March 5, 2012, the court heard arguments on the scope of the remedy for the illegal stop.

The circuit court ultimately determined that any testimony of an assault based on appellee pointing a firearm at Detective McShane would be suppressed, but that testimony of an assault based on appellee driving his Jeep toward Detective McShane would not. The court stated in part, orally on the record: As it turns out, the gun is so connected and intertwined with the actions of the officers that the statement “let me see your hands” was an officer’s direction to the defendant. And that direction resulted in him doing something. He’s being ordered by law enforcement to act, let me see your hands.

And that is a direct flow from the initial stop, which was illegal. So he’s at places and at times ordering the defendant to do something for which his presence on and about the defendant is illegal, unlawful, and therefore the Court flows— finds that the gun, and the observation of the gun in the hand of the defendant, directly flows from the initial, illegal stop. Let me see your hands. Yeah, well, what you see is the gun.

Suppressed. But after that the decision of the defendant to then take certain actions of his own initiative, different crime, differ ⁵⁴⁹ ent event, the taint is attenuated by, I believe, a brief passage of time, but a different circumstance, and therefore the Court will allow the State to enter any evidence of an assault by the use of the vehicle, and any charges that flow from that interaction with the police. The State filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on March 5, 2012. The State filed an interlocutory appeal that same day.

On April 4, 2012, the court filed a written order denying the State’s motion for reconsideration, in which it further explained its reasons for finding that the detectives lacked reasonable suspicion for conducting the stop and for suppressing evidence of the firearm and any observations of the firearm. 3 When addressing the issue of reasonable suspicion, the court stated, in part: The State did not provide evidence to say that they saw Mr. Blue exit his vehicle with a Rubbermaid container or that there was a noticeable bulge in Mr. Blue’s clothing in which a Rubbermaid container could have been hidden. Nor was there any evidence provided to support that Mr. Blue packaged all of his drugs in Rubbermaid containers. As to the Defendant, there was no evidence presented that he looked suspicious while at Lake Montebello Reservoir. The State did not suggest that he continually looked over his shoulders as though he were nervous.

There was no evidence that the Defendant being at Lake Montebello wearing gray shorts and a tee shirt was particularly unusual considering that Lake Montebello reservoir has a paved road encircling it; and is often used by the public for exercise. There was no evidence linking the Defendant to Mr. Blue’s known drug activity from June 29, 2011. No prior surveillances involving the Defendant. No prior interaction be ⁵⁵⁰ tween the Defendant and Mr. Blue or exchange of illegal objects for currency between them.

The Court believes that the Detectives stopped the vehicle to identify the Defendant and to look for drugs, but did so without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. When discussing suppression of observations of the firearm, the Court stated: Here, the length of time between the police stop and resulting activity which the State wishes to admit happened in a matter of minutes according to the Detectives [sic] testimony. This Court finds that, like in Ferguson, the events were too close in proximity to purge the taint. This Court also finds that the police misconduct was purposeful.

As stated above, the Court believes that the Detectives stopped the Defendant’s vehicle as a pretext, but lacked probable cause. The Court does not believe there was an intervening factor which displayed the defendant’s ability to carefully consider his options to exercise free will. As stated above, the police stop and resulting events were one sequence which happened in a matter of minutes. Questions Presented As phrased by the State, the following questions are presented for our review: 1.

Did the lower court err in deciding that detectives lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Holt after he rendezvoused with an active heroin dealer at a public park, where the two men had a short private meeting in Holt’s vehicle and promptly parted ways, after the dealer had gone out of his way to collect a small package just before the meeting and behaved the same as he had when he was seen delivering heroin two weeks earlier? 2. Even assuming arguendo that the stop was unlawful, did the circuit court err in suppressing testimony of Holt’s new distinct crimes, where when ordered to show his hands Holt pointed a firearm at a detective and accelerated his vehicle toward him? ⁵⁵¹ Standard of Review Our review of a circuit court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is limited exclusively to facts and information contained in the record of the suppression hearing. Smith v. State, 414 Md. 357, 361 , 995 A.2d 685 (2010). We must accept the circuit court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous.

Id. However, we undertake our own independent constitutional analysis by reviewing the law and applying it to the facts of the case. Id. Discussion The State contends that the circuit court erred in determining that appellee was seized unlawfully in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.

We hold that the stop of appellee’s vehicle on July 13, 2011 was supported by articulable reasonable suspicion, as required by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and therefore reverse the circuit court’s decision to suppress any testimony regarding any of the detectives’ observations of the firearm subsequent to the stop. In addition, assuming the stop was not supported by articulable reasonable suspicion, any new crimes committed by appellee immediately following the stop, such as possessing, raising and pointing the firearm at Detective McShane and accelerating his vehicle towards Detective McShane, purged the taint from the unlawful stop; therefore, the exclusionary rule does not apply. 1. Reasonable Suspicion First, the State argues that there was reasonable articulable suspicion for the detectives to conduct an investigatory stop of appellee on July 13, 2011. The State recites facts that, when considered under a totality of the circumstances, establish reasonable suspicion: “(1) the active narcotics trade of Daniel Blue, the individual with whom Holt met; (2) the actions taken by Blue immediately before coming to meet with Holt; (3) the peculiar nature of the meeting itself; (4) Blue’s nervous behavior throughout his encounter with Holt; and (5) addition ⁵⁵² al similarities between the Blue-Townsend drug transaction on June 29 and the Blue-Holt meeting on July 13.” Further, the State argues that the circuit court applied the wrong standard when determining whether the detectives objectively possessed reasonable suspicion.

In response, appellee notes that most of the evidence was “solely attributable to Daniel Blue,” not appellee, and that a person simply consorting with a criminal is not enough to support a reasonable suspicion that the person is engaging in criminal behavior. The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. It applies to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).

The detention of a motorist by a law enforcement officer is considered a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 283-284 , 753 A.2d 519 (2000). Generally, if a seizure occurs without probable cause, it violates the Fourth Amendment. However, in Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that a law enforcement officer can conduct a brief investigative “stop” of a person if that officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

The officer may detain that person briefly only in order to investigate the circumstances that provoked suspicion. Nathan v. State, 370 Md. 648 , 805 A.2d 1086 (2002). Reasonable suspicion is more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 . Instead, there must be “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.” Id. at 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 .

Reasonable suspicion is a significantly less demanding standard than probable cause or preponderance of the evidence and merely “requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). It is a “common sense, nontechnical conception that considers factual and practical aspects of daily life and how reasonable and ⁵⁵³ prudent people act.” Stokes v. State, 362 Md. 407, 416 , 765 A.2d 612 (2001). The court must analyze the totality of the circumstances to determine objectively whether the officer possessed reasonable suspicion. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989).

The officer’s subjective state of mind or intent has no relevance to a reasonable suspicion determination. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). A string of otherwise innocent behavior may, when analyzed together as part of the totality of the circumstances, constitute reasonable suspicion. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002).

The court should not “parse out each individual circumstance for separate consideration.” Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99, 104 , 816 A.2d 901 (2003). In analyzing reasonable suspicion, the court must allow law enforcement officers to “draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’ ” Id. at 273, 816 A.2d 901 . Here, based on a totality of the circumstances, the detectives possessed reasonable articulable suspicion that appellee had just engaged in a narcotics transaction in order to conduct a brief investigatory stop. The detectives knew that appellee met in a public location with a known drug dealer, Mr. Blue, in what appeared to be a prearranged meeting.

The detectives knew that Mr. Blue entered appellee’s car, and the two drove around Lake Montebello once before quickly parting ways. The detectives knew that neither party worked out at the exercise station while at Lake Montebello. The detectives knew that neither party went to a location to have lunch while at the lake. The detectives knew that Mr. Blue just traveled from the North Avenue courthouse to Baltimore County to pick up a small container and then drove to Lake Montebello, 1.7 miles away from where he started.

The detectives noticed that Mr. ⁵⁵⁴ Blue was looking rapidly around, just as he had at a confirmed narcotics transaction only a few weeks prior. The detectives also knew that Mr. Blue had not looked rapidly around while visiting the North Avenue courthouse. See Bost v. State, 406 Md. 341, 358 , 958 A.2d 356 (2008) quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (“nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.”). Although appellee suggests that Mr. Blue may have been looking around in order to locate appellee, the record reflects that Mr. Blue continued to look around after meeting with appellee and during their brief conversation.

Finally, the detectives were familiar with a previous confirmed narcotics transaction in which Mr. Blue participated. The detectives knew that the previous transaction also took place in a seemingly prearranged public location where the parties arrived separately and parted ways quickly after meeting. To counter these facts, appellee asserts that appellee’s actions were entirely innocent and were not probative of criminal activity. Appellee also asserts that we should not impute any of the circumstances surrounding Mr. Blue to appellee.

In so arguing, appellee focuses on a number of cases in which the courts analyzed whether reasonable suspicion existed to support an investigative stop where the stop was based on a tip or report about a previous crime. See, e.g., Stokes v. State, 362 Md. 407 , 765 A.2d 612 (2001); Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272 , 753 A.2d 519 (2000); Hardy v. State, 121 Md.App. 345 , 709 A.2d 168 (1998). However, more relevant in this case are cases that focus on when reasonable suspicion arises based on an officer’s personal observations of a defendant’s behavior. We shall discuss several cases in turn.

First, appellee cites Cartnail for the proposition that “it is not enough that law enforcement officials can articulate reasons why they stopped someone if those reasons are not probative of behavior in which few innocent people would engage.” 359 Md. at 291 , 753 A.2d 519 . See also Bost v. ⁵⁵⁵ State, 406 Md. 341, 357 , 958 A.2d 356 (2008) quoting Ferns v. State, 355 Md. 356, 391-92 , 735 A.2d 491 (1999) (“It does not allow [a] law enforcement official to simply assert that innocent conduct was suspicious to him or her.”). However, “[a] factor that, by itself may be entirely neutral and innocent, can, when viewed in combination with other circumstances, raise a legitimate suspicion in the mind of an experienced officer.” Ransome, 373 Md. at 105 , 816 A.2d 901 . See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 , 122 S.Ct. 744 (“The court appeared to believe that each of [the agent’s] observations that was by itself susceptible to an innocent explanation was entitled to no weight.

Terry , however, precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analysis.”). There are several Maryland cases which focus on whether and when reasonable suspicion arises based on an officer’s personal observations of a defendant’s seemingly innocent behavior. In Crosby v. State, the Court of Appeals found that law enforcement did not have sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant’s car based on the following behavior: driving in a high-crime area at night a few days after a homicide occurred in the area, the driver slumping down in his seat either before or after spotting law enforcement, driving in a peculiar, although entirely legal, manner, and the fact that defendant’s car was not registered to an address in the immediate area. 408 Md. 490 , 970 A.2d 894 (2009). The Court reasoned that the combination of factors, viewed in their totality, are no more indicative of criminal activity than any one factor assessed individually. [The officer] testified only that he considered what he observed to be suspicious; he did not illuminate how his training and experience caused him to believe that what he observed revealed possible criminal activity.

Id. at 511 , 970 A.2d 894 . See also Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99 , 816 A.2d 901 (2003) (holding that law enforcement did not have sufficient reasonable suspicion to either stop or frisk the defendant when the defendant was in a high-crime area, had a large bulge in his pants pocket, and acted nervously when approached by officers). ⁵⁵⁶ Contrary to Crosby and Ransome , in Graham v. State, the Court of Appeals found reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory stop where the defendant was carrying a cardboard box with “computer-type” equipment protruding from the top, the defendant’s companion began walking quickly away once he spotted law enforcement, and both suspects made contradictory statements regarding ownership or knowledge of the box before law enforcement officers said a word. 325 Md. 398 , 601 A.2d 131 (1992). See also Bost, 406 Md. at 358 , 958 A.2d 356 (finding reasonable suspicion where the defendant was in a known drug trafficking area, fled when approached by police, and continuously clutched at his waistband). Outside of Maryland, there are two federal cases that are particularly relevant.

In United States v. McCoy, a police officer witnessed a series of otherwise innocent behaviors which, based on a totality of the circumstances, supported reasonable suspicion to detain and frisk the defendant. In that case, an experienced police officer was conducting surveillance in a grocery store parking lot, where, he testified, many illegal drug transactions in the area occurred. 513 F.3d 405, 407 (4th Cir.2008). The officer saw a truck park in front of the defendant’s car and overheard the truck driver and the defendant discuss where to meet. Id. at 408 .

The officer then observed both vehicles leave the parking lot and drive to another grocery store parking lot. Id. The defendant then entered the truck, spoke with the driver, and exited the truck after about a minute. Id.

The truck driver then began to drive away. Id. In that case, the district court suppressed the fruits of the seizure, noting that the officer did not hear the entirety of the defendant’s conversation with the driver, did not observe a hand-to-hand drug transaction, and did not have any knowledge that either party was involved with drugs. Id. at 412 .

The Fourth Circuit reversed, noting that the district court erred in emphasizing what “factual circumstances did not exist” and in considering “the ‘innocent’ facts here without considering how an experienced police officer might approach the same factual circumstances.” Id. at 413 . ⁵⁵⁷ In United States v. Dubose, a law enforcement officer witnessed a defendant approach and lean into the front driver’s side of a car “with both hands and his upper torso inside the vehicle.” 579 F.3d 117, 119 (1st Cir.2009). A few moments later the defendant turned around and walked back the way he came. Id. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence resulting from the defendant’s subsequent seizure, reasoning that the law enforcement officer had a sufficient reasonable suspicion that the defendant had engaged in a drug transaction because of the defendant’s conduct and the fact that the whole encounter was “similar to the conduct involved in other drug transactions in the area.” Id. at 121 .

Appellee argues that the detectives here did not know as much as the law enforcement officers in McCoy or Dubose, and what they did know added up to entirely innocent conduct. Admittedly, there is much that the detectives did not know on July 13th and did not testify to at the suppression hearing. Unlike in McCoy and Dubose, there was no evidence that Lake Montebello was commonly used for drug deals or that the detectives had previously observed similar transactions at Lake Montebello. There was no evidence that drug dealers in Baltimore commonly carry narcotics in tupperware containers.

There was no evidence that Mr. Blue actually handed the tupperware container to appellee. However, these types of circumstances are not necessarily required in order to find reasonable suspicion in a narcotics case. Evidence of a high crime area or similar conduct occurring during similar crimes may be used to support an inference that a drug transaction had occurred. The totality of the circumstances is what controls, however, in light of how an experienced police officer might objectively view the circumstances.

Unlike in Crosby, Detective Crystal testified at the suppression hearing that based on