State v. Lee

BELL, C.J. The sole issue, which the State of Maryland, the petitioner, raises in this Court is whether evidence seized pursuant to a warrant, executed without knocking and announcing the police presence prior to forcing the door to the premises, is admissible pursuant to the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. The Circuit Court for Harford County denied the motion to suppress, filed by the respondent, Kai Ruchell Lee, ruling that the possibility of the destruction of the cocaine recovered was an exigent circumstance that justified the unannounced entry. The Court of Special Appeals reversed. Lee v. State, 139 Md.App. 79 , 774 A.2d 1183 (2001).

It held that the failure to knock and announce, without justification, rendered the entry, albeit with a valid warrant, unreasonable and requires exclusion of the evidence seized. Id. at 94 , 774 A.2d at 1192 . Application of the doctrine of inevitable discovery under the circumstances of this case, the intermediate appellate court concluded in response to the State’s motion for reconsideration, “would render the knock- and-announce provision of the Fourth Amendment meaningless.” Id. We granted the writ of certiorari at the petitioner’s request and, for the reasons that follow, we shall affirm the judgment of the intermediate appellate court. ²⁷⁹ I. During the month of August, 1998, the respondent made two separate sales of cocaine to a confidential informant, acting at the direction of the Baltimore County Police.

After subsequent police surveillance, a warrant to search the respondent’s home in Harford County was obtained from a District Court judge. The warrant did not contain a “no-knock clause;” authorizing entry, even by force, without first knocking and announcing police presence. 1 The Court of Special Appeals described the search as follows: “Early on a weekday morning late in September 1998, a large combined task force of law enforcement officers from the Baltimore County Police Department, the Harford County Sheriffs Office, the Harford County Police Department, and the Maryland State Police, assembled in front of a single-family, colonial style home in a residential area of Harford County. The task force, which arrived in several cars and trucks, surrounded the home, while eight Harford County deputy sheriffs, wearing black hoods and fatigue style uniforms, battered down the door of Lee’s home with a two handled ‘ram,’ which is essentially a pipe filled with concrete. Once inside, the task force ‘secured the premises’ by dispersing throughout the house.

Task force officers handcuffed two adults found upstairs in the master bedroom, gathered three small children from other bedrooms, and then herded all five members of the household together in the downstairs family room. The task force leader, a Maryland State Police trooper, and the Harford County deputy sheriffs then summonsed the remaining task force officers to enter and search the entire house.” Lee, 139 Md.App. at 81-82 , 774 A.2d at 1185 . Seized in the search were a clear plastic bag containing 26 grams of co ²⁸⁰ caine 2 ; four smaller baggies containing a total of 6.6 grams of cocaine; $1,369 dollars in U.S. currency; a rental agreement; and a 1986 white Chevy Astro Van. The respondent, who acknowledged that the cocaine seized was his, was arrested and charged with possession with the intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance.

Before trial, the respondent moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search. He asserted that the search was invalid because the task force, lacking a reasonable suspicion to believe exigent circumstances existed to permit its doing so, failed to knock and announce its presence before entering his home. The motion was denied by the Circuit Court for Harford County. The court reasoned: “[The police] make a determination that they are going to enter without first knocking.

They make that determination based on the hand-to-hand buys that were known---They make that determination based on the ease with which evidence may be destroyed. They make that determination on the basis of the fact that they had a reasonable expectation they would find cocaine in that location and that Mr. Lee was known to them. sir % * * * * “So when I look at the fact that they arrived there, [the officer] brings the warrant, they have a discussion about what they are going to do and .they make a decision, at that time, based on those factors, that they are going to enter without first knocking and the reason is ... because of the ease with which the evidence could be destroyed. When I look at the totality of the circumstances in this case I have no reason to doubt that that was a tactical decision they ²⁸¹ made and based on the totality of the circumstances it was an appropriate one.” The respondent noted an appeal of that judgment to the Court of Special Appeals, which, as we have seen, reversed. The intermediate appellate court held that the failure of the police to knock and announce their presence prior to entering the respondent’s residence was not justified by exigent circumstances: “It is clear that, although Maryland law and the opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States presumptively require knocking and announcing before entry when searching with a proper warrant, the law also forgives the failure to do so when there are legally sufficient exigent circumstances.

It is equally clear that there is no blanket or per se exception for drug searches. Rather, in each case, the police must articulate a reasonable suspicion, based upon, particularized facts, that exigent circumstances exists which justify not knocking and announcing. * * * * * * “At the suppression hearing, the only witnesses to testify were two Maryland State Police troopers called by the State, one of whom testified primarily about having taken a statement from the appellant and not about the conduct of the search. The other trooper, who led the task force, candidly admitted that the only reason he had for not knocking and announcing was that this was a cocaine case, and he always battered down the doors in cases where the object to be seized was narcotics, such as cocaine, that could be easily ‘flushed down the toilet.’ The trooper testified that the only exceptions would occur, hypothetically, if the quantity of drugs exceeded the occupant’s ability to dispose of them, or the occupants were not at home. The State was unable to elicit from the task force leader any particularized evidence about Lee, Lee’s home, or anything else that would qualify as exigent circumstances, as contemplated by Wil ²⁸² son 3 and Richards.” 4 Lee , at 89-90, 774 A.2d at 1189-90 .

The State filed a motion for reconsideration, asking the court to address whether exclusion of the evidence was required in view of the inevitable discovery doctrine, arguing that, in any event, it would have been discovered inevitably pursuant to the validly issued search warrant. Although the Court of Special Appeals granted the motion for reconsideration, it rejected the inevitable discovery argument. That exception should not be applied in the case sub judice, the intermediate appellate court opined, because: “To apply the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule in this instance would render the knock-and-announce provision of the Fourth Amendment meaningless. The application of inevitable discovery in such cases negates the rule against per se exceptions to the knock-and-announce requirement.

The United States Supreme Court has twice unanimously affirmed the requirement to knock and announce. In light of two rulings from the nation’s highest court, finding this requirement to exist in both our common law and the Constitution, it would be wrong and utterly inconsistent for Maryland, in effect, to expunge this requirement and establish such an exception as was created in Michigan, 5 by attaching the doctrine of inevitable discovery to violations of the well established knock-and-announce requirement.” Id. at 94 , 774 A.2d at 1192 . We granted the State’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, State v. Lee, 366 Md. 246 , 783 A.2d 221 (2001), to address this case of first impression. In its petition, the State did not challenge the determination by the intermediate appellate court that ²⁸³ there were no exigent circumstances at the time of the unannounced entry.

Thus, we will address only whether the doctrine of inevitable discovery applies under the facts of this case. Stated differently, all we shall decide is the correctness of the Court of Special Appeals’ holding that the evidence seized should have been suppressed.

II

A. The Knock and Announce Rule It is well settled in Maryland, and long has been so, that a police officer executing a search warrant “must give proper notice of his purpose and authority and be denied admittance before he can use force to break and enter” the premises to be searched. Henson v. State, 236 Md. 518, 521-22 , 204 A.2d 516, 518-19 (1964); Goodman v. State, 178 Md. 1, 8 , 11 A.2d 635, 639 (1940) (“A demand is necessary prior to the breaking in of the doors only where some person is found in charge of the building to be searched.”); Frankel v. State, 178 Md. 553, 561 , 16 A.2d 93, 97 (1940) (citing Cornelius on Search and Seizure, 2nd Ed., sec. 218, for “the rule that an officer, in executing a warrant to enter a house, which warrant is valid on its face, may break open the doors if denied admittance, but a demand is necessary prior to breaking doors when the premises are in charge of someone”). In Henson , the appellant argued, inter alia, “that the police officers who executed the search warrant broke open the door of the house being searched without first announcing who they were and making demand that entry be granted, and that this was illegal and vitiated all that followed.” 236 Md. at 520 , 204 A.2d at 518 . Characterizing the claim as the extension of “the old rule,” id. at 521 , 204 A.2d at 518 , and one “of long standing,” id. at 522 , 204 A.2d at 519 , which has been codified in federal law and a number of the states, id., citing Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 , 309 n. 8, 78 S.Ct. 1190 , 1195 n. 8, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 , 1338 n. 8 (1958), 6 the Court stated the reasons underlying the ²⁸⁴ rule: “the law abhors unnecessary breaking or destruction of any house,” id., citing Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng.

Rep. 194 (K.B.1603) 7 and “the dweller in the house would not know the purpose of the person breaking in, unless he were notified, and would have a right to resist seeming aggression on his private property.” Id., citing Launock v. Brown, 106 Eng. Rep. 482 (K.B.1819). 8 The Court observed, however, that “the ²⁸⁵ rule often has been made subject to qualifications and exceptions even in states with statutes, so that by judicial decision announcement and demand are not a requisite where the facts make it evident the officers’ purpose is known or where they would frustrate the arrest, increase the peril of the arresting officer or permit the destruction of evidence.” Id. For that proposition, it cited, among other authorities, Miller, 357 U.S. at 309 , 78 S.Ct. at 1195 , 2 L.Ed.2d at 1338 . The Court held that the entry by breaking and without warning in that case was “reasonable, permissible and legal and the evidence seized was admissible against the appellant.” 236 Md. at 524 , 204 A.2d at 520 .

Supporting that holding was the Court’s conclusion that, “[practicalities and exigencies in searches for narcotics require the element of surprise entry, for if opportunity is given all evidence easily may be destroyed during the time required to give notice, demand admittance and accept communication of denial of entry,” id. at 523 , 204 A.2d at 519 , and the testimony of the officer in charge of those executing the warrant, that his “experience in the past twelve years [has been] when you knock on a door when you suspect drugs being on the premises, they are often disposed of by Hushing down the toilet or thrown out in some manner.” Id. at 523 , 204 A.2d at 519-520 . As to the former, the Court quoted, with approval, Kaplan, Search and Seizure, A No Man’s Land in the Criminal Law, 49 Cal. L.Rev. 474, 502 (1961): “... it would seem that the perfection of small fire-arms and the development of indoor plumbing through which evidence can quickly be destroyed, have made [statutes requiring notice and entry before the use of force to enter] ... a dangerous anachronism. In many situations today ..., a rule requiring officers to forfeit the valuable element of surprise seems senseless and dangerous.” As Henson indicates, the Supreme Court of the United States has commented on the vintage of the knock and announce rule.

Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-34 , 115 S.Ct. 1914, 1916-18 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976, 980-82 (1995); Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 589 , 88 S.Ct. 1755, 1758 , 20 L.Ed.2d 828, 833 (1968); Miller, supra, 357 U.S. at 306-08 , 78 ²⁸⁶ S.Ct. at 1194, 2 L.Ed.2d at 1337-38 . In Miller , after the Court traced the history of the rule, it concluded that “[t]he requirement of prior notice of authority and purpose before forcing entry into a home is deeply rooted in our heritage and should not be given grudging application.” 357 U.S. at 313 , 78 S.Ct. at 1198 , 2 L.Ed.2d at 1340 . Although the entry in that case was “tested by criteria identical with those embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 3109 ,” id. at 306 , 78 S.Ct. at 1194 , 2 L.Ed.2d at 1336 , the Miller Court observed that Congress “codif[ied] a tradition embedded in Anglo-American law.” Id. at 313 , 78 S.Ct. at 1198 , 2 L.Ed.2d at 1340 . See Wilson, 514 U.S. at 933-34 , 115 S.Ct. at 1917-18 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 982 ; Sabbath, 391 U.S. at 591 n. 8, 88 S.Ct. at 1759 n. 8, 20 L.Ed.2d at 834 n. 8.

In both Miller and Sabbath , the Court held inadmissible evidence obtained as a fruit of an arrest effected in violation of the knock and announce rule. In neither case was the remedy of exclusion of the evidence challenged. Despite the vintage of the knock and announce rule and its deep roots in Anglo-American jurisprudence, it was not until Wilson that the Supreme Court “constitutionalized” the doctrine, by squarely holding that the knock and announce principle “is an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment.” 514 U.S. at 934 , 115 S.Ct. at 1918 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 982 . In that case, the Supreme Court of Arkansas, having rejected the accused’s argument that the knock and announce principle is required by the Fourth Amendment and “concluded that neither Arkansas law nor the Fourth Amendment required the suppression of the evidence,” id. at 930 , 115 S.Ct. at 1916 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 980 , affirmed the accused’s drug convictions.

The High Court reversed, holding: “Given the longstanding common-law endorsement of the practice of announcement, we have little doubt that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment thought that the method of an officer’s entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure. Contrary to the decision below, we hold that in some circumstances an officer’s unannounced entry ²⁸⁷ into a home might be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 934 , 115 S.Ct. at 1918 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 982 It cautioned, however, that the “flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests.” Id. at 934 , 115 S.Ct. at 1918 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 982 . Indeed, the Court acknowledged that considerations of officer safety and the ease with which drugs may be destroyed “may well provide the necessary justification” for unannounced entries. Id. at 937 , 115 S.Ct. at 1919 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 984 .

Consequently, the Court characterized its opinion to “simply hold that although a search or seizure of a dwelling might be constitutionally defective if police officers enter without prior announcement, law enforcement interests may also establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry.” Id. at 936 , 115 S.Ct. at 1919 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 984 . Rather than “attempt a comprehensive catalog of the relevant countervailing factors,” it left “to the lower courts the task of determining the circumstances under which an unannounced entry is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 936 , 115 S.Ct. at 1919 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 984 . That the High Court intended the determination of the factors that inform the reasonableness of an unannounced entry to be made on a case by case basis has subsequently been confirmed. In Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 , 117 S.Ct. 1416 , 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997), that Court addressed whether a blanket exception to the knock and announce rule was permissible when police execute a search warrant in felony drug investigations.

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, concluding that Wilson did not preclude per se rules with respect to the knock and announce requirement, reaffirmed a pre-Wilson holding that police officers need never knock and announce their presence when executing a search warrant pursuant to a felony drug investigation. Id. at 387-88, 117 S.Ct. at 1418 , 137 L.Ed.2d at 620 . The High Court reversed. Although reiterating what was recognized in Wilson , “that the knock-and-announce requirement could give way ‘under cir ²⁸⁸ cumstances presenting a threat of physical violence’ or ‘where police officers have reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given,’ ” id. at 391, 117 S.Ct. at 1420 , 137 L.Ed.2d at 622 , and characterizing as “indisputable” the fact that “felony drug investigations may frequently involve both of these circumstances,” id. at 391 , 117 S.Ct. at 1420 , 137 L.Ed.2d at 622-23 , the Court rejected the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s rationale for adoption of the per se rule, identifying two “serious concerns”: “First, the exception contains considerable overgeneralization.

For example, while drug investigation frequently does pose special risks to officer safety and the preservation of evidence, not every drug investigation will pose these risks to a substantial degree. For example, a search could be conducted at a time when the only individuals present in a residence have no connection with the drug activity and thus will be unlikely to threaten officers or destroy evidence. Or the police could know that the drugs being searched for were of a type or in a location that made them impossible to destroy quickly. In those situations, the asserted governmental interests in preserving evidence and maintaining safety may not outweigh the individual privacy interests intruded upon by a no-knock entry.

Wisconsin’s blanket rule impermissibly insulates these cases from judicial review. “A second difficulty with permitting a criminal-category exception to the knock-and-announce requirement is that the reasons for creating an exception in one category can, relatively easily, be applied to others. Armed bank robbers, for example are, by definition, likely to have weapons, and the fruits of their crime may be destroyed without too much difficulty. If a per se exception were allowed for each category of criminal investigation that included a considerable — albeit hypothetical — risk of danger to officers or destruction of evidence, the knock-and-announce element of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement would be meaningless.” ²⁸⁹ Id. at 393-94 , 117 S.Ct. at 1421 , 137 L.Ed.2d at 623-24 (footnote omitted). The Court concluded: “Thus, the fact that felony drug investigations may frequently present circumstances warranting a no-knock entry cannot remove from the neutral scrutiny of a reviewing court the reasonableness of the police decision not to knock and announce in a particular case.

Instead, in each case it is the duty of a court confronted with the question to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing with the knock-and-announce requirement.” Id. at 394 , 117 S.Ct. at 1421 , 137 L.Ed.2d at 624 . It held: “In order to justify a ‘no-knock’ entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence. This standard — as opposed to a probable cause requirement — strikes the appropriate balance between the legitimate law enforcement concerns at issue in the execution of search warrants and the individual privacy interests affected by no-knock entries.” Id. at 394 , 117 S.Ct. at 1421-22 , 137 L.Ed.2d at 624 . 9 The issue this case presents, whether the inevitable discoveiy exception to the exclusionary rule, enunciated in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 , 104 S.Ct. 2501 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), renders evidence seized during a search conducted in violation of the knock and announce rule admissible was made to, but not decided by, the Wilson Court. Declining to address it and ²⁹⁰ a companion argument based on the “independent source” doctrine, the Court explained: “Respondent and its amici also ask us to affirm the denial of petitioner’s suppression motion on an alternative ground: that exclusion is not a constitutionally compelled remedy where the unreasonableness of a search stems from the failure of announcement.

Analogizing to the ‘independent source’ doctrine applied in Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805, 813-816 , 82 L.Ed.2d 599 , [608-09], 104 S.Ct. 3380 , [3385-86] (1984), and the ‘inevitable discovery' rule adopted in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 440-448 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377 , [385-90], 104 S.Ct. 2501 [, 2507-11] (1984), respondent and its amici argue that any evidence seized after an unreasonable, unannounced entry is causally disconnected from the constitutional violation and that exclusion goes beyond the goal of precluding any benefit to the government flowing from the constitutional violation. Because this remedial issue was not addressed by the court below and is not within the narrow question on which we granted certiorari, we decline to address these arguments.” Wilson, 514 U.S. at 937 n. 4, 115 S.Ct. at 1919 n. 4, 131 L.Ed.2d at 984 n. 4. A different, but nevertheless similar, argument was presented to the Court, but rejected, in Richards : “The State asserts that the intrusion on individual interests effectuated by a no-knock entry is minimal because the execution of the warrant itself constitutes the primary intrusion on individual privacy and that the individual privacy interest cannot outweigh the generalized governmental interest in effective and safe law enforcement. See also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16 (‘occupants’ privacy interest is necessarily limited to the brief interval between the officers’ announcement and their entry’).

While it is true that a no-knock entry is less intrusive than, for example, a warrantless search, the individual interests implicated by an unannounced, forcible entry should not be unduly minimized. As we observed in Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. at 927, 930-932 , 115 S.Ct. 1914 , 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995), ²⁹¹ the common law recognized that individuals should have an opportunity to themselves comply with the law and to avoid the destruction of property occasioned by a forcible entry. These interests are not inconsequential. “Additionally, when police enter a residence without announcing their presence, the residents are not given any opportunity to prepare themselves for such an entry. The State pointed out at oral argument that, in Wisconsin, most search warrants are executed during the late night and early morning hours .... [t]he brief interlude between announcement and entry with a warrant may be the opportunity that an individual has to pull on clothes or get out of bed.” 520 U.S. at 393 n. 5, 117 S.Ct. at 1421 n. 5, 137 L.Ed.2d at 623 n. 5.

B. Independent Source/Inevitable Discovery The State challenges the conclusion of the Court of Special Appeals that “[t]o apply the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule in this instance would render the knock-and-announce provision of the Fourth Amendment meaningless.” Lee, 139 Md.App. at 94 , 774 A.2d at 1192 . In support of its position, it proffers two related reasons: “[t]he search warrant in this case served as an independent source for seizure of the cocaine in Lee’s residence, rendering the seizure causally disconnected from the entry violation, and the cocaine inevitably would have been discovered pursuant to that warrant.” (Petitioner’s brief, at 6-7). In other words, the State relies on the “independent source” 10 and “inevitable ²⁹² discovery” exceptions 11 to the exclusionary rule. Having reviewed the prerequisites of the “independent source” and “inevitable discovery” doctrines, the State concludes that “[t]he inevitable discovery rule thus presents a ²⁹³ factual causation question: Would the evidence have been found, absent the illegal conduct?” Answering that question, it submits: “Turning to the facts of this case, the warrant to search Lee’s residence was premised on probable cause to believe that Lee was involved in the distribution of cocaine and that drugs and related paraphernalia would be discovered in his home.

The police had a valid warrant that would have allowed them to thoroughly search Lee’s residence, and any containers therein, and that search would have taken place regardless of whether the police first knocked and announced themselves at the door. What difference would those few seconds have made to the search? None. There is no question that the officers were going to enter.

There is no question that the officers were going to search. There was no evidence that the occupants of the residence were poised to destroy the contraband in those few seconds that would have made the difference between compliance and noncompliance with the knock and announce rule.... Indeed, ‘[i]t is hard to understand how the discovery of evidence inside a house could be anything but “inevitable” once the police arrive with a warrant; an occupant would hardly be allowed to contend that, had the officers announced their presence and waited to enter, he would have had time to destroy the evidence.’ United States v. Jones, 149 F.3d 715, 716-17 (7th Cir.1998).” (Petitioner’s brief, at 9-10) (Footnote omitted). The State readily acknowledges that, “[njumerous state and federal cases have declined to apply the inevitable discovery or independent source exceptions to the exclusionary rule to knock and announce violations.” Id. at 11.

It is not persuaded by those cases, characterizing them as proceeding “on the same misguided premise as the Court of Special Appeals!,] that to do so would render the knock and announce rule meaningless.” Id. What those cases ignore, the State maintains, is that application of either or both of the doctrines to knock and announce cases does not vitiate the knock and announce rule; rather, “The rule stands; only the remedy ²⁹⁴ differs.” People v. Hoag, 83 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1214 , 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 556 (Cal.Ct.App.2000) (concurring opinion). Not surprisingly, the State is more persuaded by those cases that, distinguishing the rule from the remedy, have applied the inevitable discovery doctrine to knock and announce violations, notably, in addition to the concurring opinion in Hoag, supra, People v. Vasquez, 461 Mich. 235 , 602 N.W.2d 376, 379 (1999); People v. Stevens, 460 Mich. 626 , 597 N.W.2d 53, 56 (1999); Richardson v. State, 787 So.2d 906, 910 (Fla.App.2001) (concurring opinion); People v. Lamas, 229 Cal.App.3d 560, 571 , 282 Cal.Rptr. 296 (Cal.Ct.App.1991); United States v. [Kip] Jones, 214 F.3d 836, 838 (7th Cir.2000); United States v. [Dennis] Jones, 149 F.3d 715, 716-17 (7th Cir., 1998); United States v. Hidalgo, 747 F.Supp. 818, 832 (D.Mass.1990). 12 Stevens is illustrative. There, the Supreme Court of Michigan, having determined that the police violated the knock and announce rule by their method of entry into the defendant’s home to execute the validly issued search warrant-knocking and waiting only a few seconds before forcibly entering-and thus violated the Fourth amendment, addressed whether that violation required exclusion of the evidence seized. 597 N.W.2d at 55 .

Although acknowledging the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Wilson , at 934, 115 S.Ct. at 1918 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 982 (“[I]n some circumstances, an officer’s unannounced entry into a home [notwithstanding a valid warrant] might be unreasonable under the Fourth amendment.”) and in United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 , 118 S.Ct. 992, 996 , 140 L.Ed.2d 191, 198 (1998) (“The general touchstone of reasonableness which governs Fourth Amendment analysis ²⁹⁵ ... governs the method of execution of the warrant.”), Stevens, 597 N.W.2d at 58 , and that “the exclusionary rule is sometimes needed to deter police from violations of constitutional and statutory protections, even at a great cost to society,” id. at 62, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that, in that case, “the evidence would have been discovered despite any police misconduct,” id. at 62, and that “the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule should be available to the prosecution.” Id. As to the latter holding, the court reasoned, consistent with the Nix statement of the purpose of the exclusionary rule in the inevitable discovery context, id. at 61: “Given that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered, allowing the evidence in does not put the prosecution in any better position than it would be in had the police adhered to the knock-and-announce requirement. However, excluding the evidence puts the prosecution in a worse position than it would have been in had there been no police misconduct.” Id. at 62. The former holding is premised on a violation of the knock and announce rule having no effect on the validity or the execution of the warrant.

As to that, the court opined that the knock and announce requirement “does not control the execution of a valid search warrant; rather, it only delays entry,” id. at 63, one purpose of which “is to allow the occupants a ‘brief opportunity ... to order [their] personal affairs before the [officers] enter.’ ” Id., quoting United States v. Kane, 637 F.2d 974, 977 (3rd Cir.1981). Adopting the rationale, stated in dicta in United States v. [Dennis] Jones, 149 F.3d 715, 716-17 (7th Cir., 1998), i.e., “It is hard to understand how the discovery of evidence inside a house could be anything but ‘inevitable’ once the police arrive with a warrant; an occupant would hardly be allowed to contend that, had the officers announced their ²⁹⁶ presence and waited longer to enter, he would have had time to destroy the evidence,” id. at 64, the court explained: “The officers were armed with a valid search warrant. Defendant does not argue that the officers’ search exceeded the scope of that warrant. It was not the means of entry that led to the discovery of the evidence, but, rather, it was the authority of the search warrant that enabled the police to search and seize the contested evidence.

Therefore, the searching and seizing of the evidence was independent, of failure to comply with the ‘knock and announce’ statute. “As in Jones , the discovery of the evidence in the present case was inevitable, regardless of the illegalities on the police officers’ entry into defendant’s home. One of the purposes of the statute is to allow a defendant a brief opportunity to put his personal affairs in order before the police enter his home. United States v. Kane, supra at 977. It is not meant to allow the defendant the time to destroy the evidence.

In the present case, the police did not exceed the scope of the search warrant. Therefore, they would have discovered the contested evidence, unless the defendant had been afforded the opportunity to destroy the evidence. The timing of the police officers’ entry into the home in no way affected the inevitability of the discovery of the evidence.” Id. In addition to [Dennis] Jones, supra, the court relied on United States v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030 (7th Cir.1999).

With respect to the appropriate sanction for the knock and announce violation, the court opined: “There are both state and federal sanctions for such violations that serve as deterrents for police misconduct that are less severe than the exclusion of the evidence. Additionally, exclusion of the evidence will put the prosecution in a worse position than if the police misconduct had not occurred.” Id. at 64. Critical to the State’s argument, whether premised on inevitable discovery or independent source, is the presence of a ²⁹⁷ valid warrant, lawfully obtained, which is separate and distinct from its manner of execution, as well as the search itself. Armed with such a warrant, the argument, like the argument that carried the day in Stevens , proceeds on the premise that “where the police are in possession of a valid warrant, and yet are somehow deficient in the manner of announcing their entry as they execute the warrant, it is only their entry, not the search itself that suffers from a taint of unreasonableness.

In essence, [the argument is] ... that, where the entry is unlawful or unreasonable, the remainder of the search is nonetheless lawful because it occurs pursuant to a ... lawfully obtained and valid warrant.” Stevens, 597 N.W.2d at 69 (Cavanagh, J, dissenting). Generally, evidence obtained as a result of a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible. 13 The primary reason for excluding such evidence is to “curb improper police conduct, which it accomplishes by disallowing the use of the evidence illegally obtained.” Brown v. State, 364 Md. 37, 44 , 770 A.2d 679, 683 (2001) (Bell, C.J. dissenting). See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-43 , 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2508 , 81 L.Ed.2d 377, 386-87 (1984); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. ²⁹⁸ 643, 650, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1689 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1087 (1961); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 , 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3048 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067, 1083 (1976); One 1995 Corvette VIN No. 1G1YY22P585103433 v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 353 Md. 114, 128 , 724 A.2d 680, 687 (1999) (acknowledging that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to curb improper police conduct); Potts v. State, 300 Md. 567, 582 , 479 A.2d 1335, 1343 (1984). On the other hand, although the State is not permitted to profit from its illegal activity, “neither should it be placed in a worse position than it would otherwise have occupied,” Murray, 487 U.S. at 542, 108 S.Ct. at 2535, 101 L.Ed.2d at 483, when evidence, or knowledge of that evidence, is gained from an independent and lawful source, that evidence is admissible.

Id. at 538, 108 S.Ct. at 2533-34, 101 L.Ed.2d at 481. See also Segura, 468 U.S. at 805 , 104 S.Ct. at 3385 , 82 L.Ed.2d at 609 , in which the Court, quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487, 83 S.Ct. at 417, 9 L.Ed.2d at 455, in turn quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 , 40 S.Ct. 182, 183 , 64 L.Ed. 319, 321 (1920), reiterated that “the exclusionary rule has no application [where] the Government learned of the evidence ‘from an independent source.’ ” Thus, if the State can show that the source of the evidence was “wholly independent of any constitutional violation,” Nix, 467 U.S. at 443 , 104 S.Ct. at 2508 , 81 L.Ed.2d at 387 , then that there was an' illegal search that took place at some point during a criminal investigation will not render the evidence in question inadmissible. That was the case in Segura . In Segura , having probable cause to believe that Segura and another were engaged in selling narcotics, the police arrested Segura.

Taking him to his apartment, they knocked without announcing that they were police officers. When the door was opened, the police entered the apartment and conducted a limited security sweep for other persons, in the process of which drug paraphernalia was seen in plain view. The occupant of the apartment, Colon, was then arrested, but two of the police officers remained in the apartment awaiting the securing of a search warrant. The warrant was obtained 19 ²⁹⁹ hours later; however, the information on the basis of which the warrant was issued was neither derived from, nor related to the initial police entry nor obtained during that entry, but, rather, “constituted an independent source for the discovery and seizure of the evidence ... challenged.” 468 U.S. at 814 , 104 S.Ct. at 3390, 82 L.Ed.2d at 615 .

Executing the warrant, the police seized both the paraphernalia they had seen earlier and cocaine discovered during the later search. Id., 468 U.S. at 799-801 , 104 S.Ct. at 3383, 82 L.Ed.2d at 605-06 . Finding no exigent circumstances justifying the initial warrantless, unannounced entry, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York concluded that the entry was illegal. It thus granted Segura’s motion to suppress all of the evidence seized, the paraphernalia seen on the initial warrant-less entry as well as the cocaine seized after the warrant was issued.

Id. at 802 , 104 S.Ct. at 3383-84, 82 L.Ed.2d at 606 . The Second Circuit affirmed that ruling with respect to the paraphernalia seized prior to the issuance of the warrant, holding that it was properly suppressed, but reversed with respect to the cocaine seized under the warrant. Id. at 802-803 , 104 S.Ct. at 3384, 82 L.Ed.2d at 607 . The former ruling, not having been challenged by the Government, was not before the Supreme Court.

Id. at 802-03 n. 4, 104 S.Ct. at 3384 n. 4, 82 L.Ed.2d at 607 n. 4. With respect to the cocaine seized pursuant to the warrant, concluding that to do so would not weaken the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule because “officers who enter illegally will recognize that whatever evidence they discover as a direct result of the entry may be suppressed .. .,” id. at 812 , 104 S.Ct. at 3389, 82 L.Ed.2d at 613 , the Court held that it was admissible. It reasoned that, as to that cocaine, “[wjhether the initial entry was illegal or not is irrelevant to the admissibility of the challenged evidence because there was an independent source for the warrant under which that evidence was seized,” id. at 813-14 , 104 S.Ct. at 3390, 82 L.Ed.2d at 614 , and that was because it “was discovered the day following the entry, during the search conducted under a valid warrant; it was the product of that ³⁰⁰ search, wholly unrelated to the prior entry.” Id. at 814 , 104 S.Ct. at 3390, 82 L.Ed.2d at 615 . Murray, supra, is factually similar.

There, without a warrant and there being no exigent circumstances, federal agents illegally entered a warehouse, observing, as a result, bales of marijuana in plain view. 487 U.S. at 535, 108 S.Ct. at 2532, 101 L.Ed.2d at 479. They left without disturbing the evidence. Keeping the warehouse under surveillance, but without including the observations made during the illegal entry in the affidavit for the warrant, the agents obtained a warrant for the search of the warehouse. Id. at 536, 108 S.Ct. at 2532, 101 L.Ed.2d at 479.

Therefore, eight hours after the initial warrantless entry, the agents reentered the warehouse and seized the bales of marijuana they had previously observed. Id. The Circuit Court of Appeals, assuming the initial entry to have been illegal, affirmed the District Court’s denial of Mum-ay’s motion to suppress the marijuana and thus the rejection of the claim that the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant was tainted by the prior illegal entry. Id.

Noting that “[s]o long as a later, lawful seizure is genuinely independent of an earlier, tainted one (which may well be difficult to establish where the seized goods are kept in the police’s possession) there is no reason why the independent source doctrine should not apply,” id. at 542, 108 S.Ct. at 2535, 101 L.Ed.2d at 483, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further fact finding. Id. at 543-44, 108 S.Ct. at 2536, 101 L.Ed.2d at 484. In that regard, the court observed: “The ultimate question, therefore, is whether the search pursuant to the warrant was in fact a genuinely independent source of the information and tangible evidence at issue here. This would not have been the case if the agents’ decision to seek the warrant was prompted by what they had seen during the initial entry ... or if information obtained during that entry was presented to the Magistrate and affected his decision to issue the warrant.” Id. at 542, 108 S.Ct. at 2536, 101 L.Ed.2d at 483-84 (footnote omitted). ³⁰¹ The identical argument as that made by the State has been rejected, as the State itself acknowledges, by the majority of the courts considering it in the knock and announce context. 14 See United States v. Cantu, 230 F.3d 148, 153 (5th Cir.2000); United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978, 984-85 (6th Cir.2000); United States v. Bates, 84 F.3d 790 (6th Cir.1996); United States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216, 1220 (8th Cir.1993); United States v. Becker, 23 F.3d 1537, 1541 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Shugart, 889 F.Supp. 963, 973-75 (E.D.Tex.1995), aff'd.

United States v. Shugart, 117 F.3d 838, 844 (5th Cir.1997); Mazepink v. State, 336 Ark. 171 , 987 S.W.2d 648, 657 (1999), cert. denied sub nom. Arkansas v. Mazepink, 528 ³⁰² U.S. 927, 120 S.Ct. 321 , 145 L.Ed.2d 250 (1999); State v. Taylor, 135 Ohio App.3d 182 , 733 N.E.2d 310, 312 (1999); People v. Tate, 323 Ill.App.3d 905 , 257 Ill.Dec. 152 , 753 N.E.2d 347, 352 (2001). See also, District of Columbia v. Mancouso, 778 A.2d 270 , 275 n. 10 (D.C.2001); Commonwealth v. Mason, 535 Pa. 560 , 637 A.2d 251, 257 (1993) (concurring opinion) (independent source doctrine should be strictly limited to a source which is “truly independent from both the tainted evidence and the police or investigative team which engaged in the misconduct by which the tainted evidence was discovered”). In Dice , the court, characterizing it as an attempt “to recast evidence that is in fact the direct fruit of an unconstitutional search as indirect evidence from an independent source,” and labeling it a misunderstanding of the doctrine, 200 F.3d at 985 , emphatically rejected the independent source rule argument.

It distinguished