State v. Logan

RAKER, J. We granted review to consider two issues in this case. We granted the State’s petition for certiorari to consider whether the trial court acted within its discretion in refusing to pose Logan’s multi-part voir dire questions regarding the defense of not criminally responsible (NCR) and the potential effect of pretrial publicity. We granted Logan’s cross-petition to consider whether the trial court’s error in admitting into evidence his confession in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), was harmless error. I. James Ramiah Logan was indicted by the Grand Jury for Prince George’s County for two counts of first-degree premeditated murder and two counts of use of a handgun during the commission of a crime of violence.

He entered a plea of not guilty and not criminally responsible. The jury found him guilty of two counts of second-degree murder and two counts of the handgun offense. He was also found criminally responsible. The Circuit Court sentenced Logan to a total term of incarceration of one hundred years.

On or around August 25, 2003, Logan began behaving in a manner that alarmed his family. He went to Prince George’s County Hospital for an evaluation and while there, admitted to past use of PCP. His blood tested positive for cocaine. Lo ³⁸⁵ gan’s family requested that Logan admit himself voluntarily to a hospital, but Logan refused to do so.

On August 29, 2003, Logan’s wife and his mother obtained a court order directing the Prince George’s County Sheriffs Office to transport Logan for the purpose of conducting an emergency psychiatric evaluation. That day, Logan smoked several “bowls” of marijuana and then went to his parents’ house with two friends to conduct a bible study. On the evening of August 29, 2003, Deputies James Arnaud and Elizabeth Magruder went to Logan’s parents’ home to enforce the emergency order for psychiatric evaluation. The deputies went to the basement where Logan was participating in the bible study.

Logan fled upstairs and the deputies pursued him. As they were standing outside of his bedroom door, Logan shot and killed both of them. Logan was arrested by the Prince George’s County Police for the murder of the two deputies. He was transported to police headquarters, where he was interviewed by Prince George’s County homicide Detective Vincent Canales for approximately three and one half hours.

Prior to reading Logan his Miranda rights, the detective assured Logan repeatedly that he was not going to harm him, that they were “just talking,” and that he would not allow any harm to come to Logan’s parents about whom Logan had expressed concern. During the discussion of Miranda rights, Detective Canales assured Logan that his role was not to hurt him, and that he would be “one hundred percent” truthful with Logan, if Logan would be the “same way.” Immediately before Logan said he would waive his Miranda rights, the detective told Logan that the only way he would be “jeopardized” was if he did not tell the truth. Logan said he would waive his rights, and then admitted shooting Deputies Arnaud and Magruder. Logan explained to the detective that he had intended to kill the deputies, stating as follows: “DET.

CANALES: Okay, so when you shot them, I mean, it was with the intention of hurting them, was the intention basically getting rid of them altogether? ³⁸⁶ LOGAN: It was intentional on, yeah, to put them down, boom, just you know what I’m saying. DET. CANALES: When you say put them down, I mean, you come and— LOGAN: I came out intending to do it. DET.

CANALES: Intended to kill them. LOGAN: Yeah. DET. CANALES: You knew you were going to shoot them once you came out?

LOGAN: (shakes head.) DET. CANALES: And you came out and you killed them, right? LOGAN: Um-hum.” Logan filed a motion to suppress his confession to Detective Canales on the ground that the police violated Miranda . The Circuit Court denied the motion.

Logan entered a plea of not guilty and not criminally responsible. The State filed a notice of its intent to seek the death penalty. 1 At trial, Logan requested that the judge ask specific questions on voir dire to the venire regarding the NCR defense and pretrial publicity surrounding the case, which the trial judge refused to do. At trial, Logan’s counsel conceded that Logan shot Deputies Arnaud and Magruder, but claimed that Logan was not criminally responsible for his actions. He presented expert testimony that Logan was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the shootings, which prevented him from appreciating the criminality of his conduct or conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law.

In response, the State presented expert testimony that Logan’s behavior was caused by his voluntary ingestion of drugs. The jury found Logan guilty of two counts of second degree murder and found him criminally responsible for the murders. ³⁸⁷ Logan noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. In a reported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals reversed. Logan v. State, 164 Md.App. 1 , 882 A.2d 330 (2005).

The court held that the admission of Logan’s confession was in violation of Miranda , but that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 52, 882 A.2d at 359 . With respect to the voir dire issues, the court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to probe for bias regarding the NCR defense, even if Logan’s proposed questions were improper. In addition, the court held that the question on pretrial publicity posed by the trial judge to the venire was contrary to Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1 , 759 A.2d 819 (2000), because that query sought only to uncover the jurors’ own bottom-line conclusions as to their impartiality.

The intermediate appellate court concluded that the trial court should have inquired whether jurors exposed to pretrial publicity had formed an opinion regarding the case due to such exposure. Logan, 164 Md.App. at 72-73 , 882 A.2d at 369-71 . We granted the State’s petition for certiorari to decide the following question: “Did the Court of Special Appeals err when it vacated Logan’s convictions on the basis that the trial court failed to formulate and pose additional questions to the venire panel regarding the defense of not criminally responsible and the issue of pretrial publicity?” State v. Logan, 390 Md. 284 , 888 A.2d 341 (2005). In addition, we granted Logan’s conditional cross-petition for certiorari to decide the following question: “Did the Court of Special Appeals err in ruling that the admission of Respondent’s confession obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?” Id.

II

We address the harmless error issue first. In his cross-petition, Logan argues that the Court of Special Appeals ³⁸⁸ erred in ruling that the admission of his confession obtained in violation of Miranda was harmless error. In Maryland, error is harmless if “a reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict.” Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 , 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976). The intermediate appellate court found the error to be harmless.

As to the guilt/innocence determination, the court held that, because at trial petitioner conceded criminal agency, the admission of his confession was not prejudicial with respect to the identity of the murderer. Logan, 164 Md.App. at 50 , 882 A.2d at 358 . As to the impact on the NCR defense, the court held that because the defense relied heavily on Logan’s statements to Detective Canales to support the NCR defense, there was no prejudice. See id. at 50-52 , 882 A.2d at 358-59 .

Logan argues that the admission of his confession was not harmless error because the State used the confession in two ways to bolster its claim that Logan was criminally responsible: first, that the State’s experts considered the confession in forming their opinion that Logan was criminally responsible, and second, that the prosecutor used the confession repeatedly in closing argument to show that he was responsible. As to the defense’s use of the confession, Logan responds that once the confession had been admitted into evidence, he had no choice but to make the best of a bad situation and try to rebut or explain the evidence. Before this Court, the State does not dispute the holding of the Court of Special Appeals that the trial court erred in finding a waiver of Miranda . The State argues that the jury verdict rejecting the NCR defense was not impacted by the introduction of petitioner’s confession.

We hold that the error was not harmless. The confession undisputedly was taken by the police in violation of Miranda and was admitted improperly into evidence. Experts for both parties testified that they considered the videotape confession ³⁸⁹ in arriving at their opinion regarding Logan’s criminal responsibility. In closing argument, the State urged the jury to reject the NCR defense, pointed to the videotape of the confession, and argued as follows: “You see in his statement time and time again he says I made the decision to do this.

That tape does not in any way show the person to be schizophrenic. First of all psychotic does not equal schizophrenia. We will get to that in a little bit. That tape shows clearly the person can answer questions, knows what is going on.

He has a different thought process, he has his Biblical references.” In its rebuttal closing argument, the State again alluded to petitioner’s statements, urging the jury to consider all of the evidence — “after they listen to the experts, after they listen to all of the evidence.” The State referred to the detective’s interview with Logan, and read a part of the interview to the jury in which Logan admitted that he had formed the intent to kill the deputies. The State then noted as follows: “The words and actions of the defendant, Mr. Logan, tell us everything we need to know about his intent and his premeditation for purposes of first degree murder under Maryland law. T wanted to annihilate them, I couldn’t leave them alive.’ ” The State urged the jury to look at and to consider the videotaped confession in determining the validity of the NCR defense. In addition, the State’s experts considered the videotaped confession in forming their opinions as to petitioner’s responsibility at the time of the crimes.

The State introduced the entire taped interview of petitioner conducted by Detective Canales. On the tape, Mr. Logan stated repeatedly that he knew what he was doing and that he intended to kill the sheriffs; the jury heard and saw him admit that on the videotape. After hearing such information from the defendant, it would be difficult for the jury not to use the confession in arriving at its verdict. We cannot say that the error in no way influenced the verdict.

See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 , 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1258 , 113 ³⁹⁰ L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (observing that “a full confession in which the defendant discloses the motive for and means of the crime may tempt the jury to rely upon that evidence alone in reaching its decision”). The fact that the defense used the confession does not change our view. The State is arguing that because petitioner used parts of the videotaped confession to support his NCR defense, he either waived the error, or alternatively, that the defense would have introduced the evidence on its own and therefore, the error was harmless. We do not agree.

The defendant does not waive an error by attempting to minimize or explain improperly admitted evidence. 1 Wig-more, Evidence § 18, at 836-38 (Tillers rev.1983) (noting that “an opponent ordinarily waives his own objection if he makes subsequent use of evidence similar to that which he had previously objected, except where such subsequent use was done merely in self-defense, to explain or rebut the original evidence”). It would be unfair to permit the State to introduce evidence, albeit later found to be inadmissible, but not to permit the defendant, upon pain of waiver, to attempt to meet it, explain it, rebut it or deny it. See Rogers v. State, 853 S.W.2d 29, 35 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (stating that while ordinarily the general rule is that a defendant waives an error regarding improperly admitted evidence if the defendant or the State later introduces the same evidence without objection, the error is not waived “when the evidence is brought in later in an effort to meet, rebut, destroy, deny, or explain the improperly admitted evidence”). Here, petitioner did not introduce the confession, but merely attempted to meet it.

The confession showed both Logan’s state of mind and demeanor shortly after the murders, and thus, was powerful evidence against him. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296 , 111 S.Ct. at 1257-58 . Under the circumstances, the State cannot show that prejudice against Logan did not result from the improper admission of his confession at trial. See Collins v. State, 318 Md. 269, 286-87 , 568 A.2d 1, 9 (1990); McLain, Maryland Evidence, ³⁹¹ § 103:22(c), at 99-100.

We cannot conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that the erroneously admitted confession did not contribute to the jury’s rendition of a guilty verdict. Dorsey, 276 Md. at 659 , 350 A.2d at 678 ; see also Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 313-14 , 111 S.Ct. at 1266-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing the significant impact that the admission of a full confession may have upon the trier of fact as distinguished from the impact of an isolated statement that is incriminating only when connected to other evidence). Accordingly, we hold that the admission of Logan’s confession into evidence, in violation of Miranda , was not harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.

III

Although the voir dire issue has become moot in light of our disposition regarding harmless error, we address the issue for guidance because on retrial it is likely to arise again. During voir dire, the trial court propounded questions to three separate venire panels. Logan proposed a number of questions for the trial court to ask prospective jurors during voir dire, including the following multi-part question regarding an NCR defense: “7. Evidence will be produced during trial showing that the Defendant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the crime.

To that end, the defense will argue that the defendant was not criminally responsible at the time of the crime because, due to this mental disorder, he lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. a. If the defendant satisfies his burden in this regard, will any member of the jury be unable to find the defendant not criminally responsible? b. Does any juror anticipate having difficulty following the Court’s instructions on the defense of ‘not criminally responsible,’ particularly in view of the crimes charged in the indictment? ³⁹² c. Has any member of the jury studied psychology or psychiatry? d.

Do you have any reservations or feelings that would prevent you from fairly considering the evidence in the case? e. In view of the defense of ‘not criminally responsible,’ does any member of the venire prefer not to sit on the case?” The trial court did not ask Logan’s Question 7, as proposed, but asked each jury panel whether any member of the venire or members of their families had any experience, training, or education in a mental health field, such as psychology or psychiatry. Each juror who responded affirmatively was asked follow-up questions at the bench. Logan also requested that the trial court ask the following question to uncover bias from any pretrial publicity to which venirepersons were exposed: “4.

The allegation in this case is that on August 29, 2002, two employees from the Prince George’s County Sheriffs Department, Elizabeth Magruder and James Arnaud went to the home of Mr. Logan’s parents to serve him with an Order for an Emergency Psychiatric Commitment. It is further alleged that in the process of serving the Order for an Emergency Psychiatric Commitment, the two Sheriffs were shot and killed by the defendant. With regard to the following questions, please listen to the questions, and if you have an affirmative answer to one or more of these questions, please then stand and we will deal with each of you individually. INDIVIDUAL VOIR DIRE AT BENCH a.

Have any of you read, heard, or seen on TV, anything about the case? b. From where did you obtain your knowledge of the facts? c. What did you hear? ³⁹³ d. As a result of what you heard about the case, have you formed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of Mr. Logan or whether he was ‘not criminally responsible’ at the time of the alleged crimes? e.

What is your opinion? f. In light of your pre-formed opinion do you believe you still could be fair and impartial and render a verdict based solely on the evidence?” The trial court did not ask Logan’s Question 4 as proposed, but did ask whether anyone had personal knowledge of the case or knowledge gained from other individuals or news media about the facts of the case. With respect to the court’s questioning regarding prior knowledge, a total of thirty-eight prospective jurors responded affirmatively that they had prior knowledge of the case. When a prospective juror indicated prior knowledge of the case, the judge asked him or her for the source of the information and whether knowledge of the information would prohibit the juror from serving fairly and impartially.

If the juror responded that he or she could not serve fairly and impartially, the judge excused the prospective juror. Logan objected on several occasions to the manner in which the trial judge was questioning the prospective jurors about their prior knowledge of the case. As to the NCR defense, the Court of Special Appeals held that because the venire’s views towards the NCR defense were crucial to the determination of whether there was cause for disqualification, the trial court should have inquired whether any prospective jurors had reservations or strong feelings regarding such a defense. See Logan, 164 Md.App. at 66 , 882 A.2d at 367 .

The intermediate appellate court concluded that the trial court either erred or abused its discretion in