State v. Maryland State Board of Contract Appeals

ELDRIDGE, Judge. This case is a sequel to Philip Morris Inc. v. Glendening, 349 Md. 660 , 709 A.2d 1230 (1998), in which this Court upheld the authority of the Attorney General of Maryland to enter into a contingent fee contract with the Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos, P.C., for the purpose of representing the State in ⁴⁵⁰ litigation against the tobacco industry. The present appeal involves a dispute over legal fees and expenses following the settlement of the tobacco litigation. The primary question decided by the trial court and debated by the parties on appeal is whether the Attorney General’s authority to hire private legal counsel is subject to Maryland’s general procurement law, Maryland Code (1988, 1995 Repl.Vol.), §§ 11-101 et seq. of the State Finance and Procurement Article. 1 For reasons set forth later in this opinion, we shall not reach this question.

I. In 1996, with the approval of the Governor and the Board of Public Works, the Attorney General entered into a contingent fee contract with the Firm to “provide legal counsel, representation, and litigation services to the Attorney General and the State of Maryland in connection with the litigation against the tobacco industry.” The contract provides for the Firm to be paid a fee of 25% of the State’s recovered funds in addition to reasonable expenses incurred. • The State’s litigation against the tobacco industry eventually settled in November 1998. The form of that settlement was a “Master Settlement Agreement” that disposed of the claims of the states that had sued the tobacco industry. The settlement agreement created a mechanism for private counsel to be paid their fees from the tobacco industry. The Attorney General requested that the Firm initially seek its fee under the settlement agreement’s reimbursement mechanism.

The Firm, however, submitted three separate contract claims to the Attorney General. Each claim asserted that the Firm is entitled to 25% of the State’s estimated $4.4 billion recovery from the settlement. The Attorney General denied the Firm’s contract claims. The Attorney General also concluded that the contract at issue is not a procurement contract and thus is ⁴⁵¹ not subject to the jurisdiction of the Maryland State Board of Contract Appeals.

The Firm administratively appealed the Attorney General’s denials by filing a complaint with the Board of Contract Appeals. That action is still pending before the Board. On December 8, 1999, before any action by the Board and after the denials of the Firm’s contract claims, the State and the Attorney General filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against the Firm. The State alleged that the Firm breached its contractual and fiduciary duties by failing to seek an award of its legal fees and expenses directly from the tobacco industry.

The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief including a declaration that the Firm’s 25% contingent fee is unreasonable, excessive, and in violation of Rule 1.5 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct. 2 The Firm denied that the State was entitled to relief and filed a two count counterclaim seeking, inter alia, specific performance of the contract. The case proceeded through discovery, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The Attorney General also filed a motion with the Board of Contract Appeals to dismiss the Firm’s appeal to the Board on the ground that the Board lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the disputed contract. The Attorney General argued that Maryland’s general procurement law does not apply to the Attorney General’s authority to hire outside counsel. 3 ⁴⁵² Instead, the Attorney General argued, the employment of private counsel is governed solely by the provisions of Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 6-105 of the State Government Article. 4 The Board denied the Attorney General’s motion to dismiss in a written opinion in which the Board determined that the Firm “is an independent contractor whose Contract is covered by the General Procurement Law and thus subject to the dispute resolution jurisdiction of this Board” pursuant to ⁴⁵³ § 15-211 of the State Finance and Procurement Article. 5 After the Board’s interlocutory decision that it had jurisdiction, the Attorney General filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City challenging the Board’s assertion of jurisdiction over the contract dispute.

The Firm intervened in that case and filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing, inter alia, that the Board had jurisdiction. In a written memorandum opinion and order, the Circuit Court held that the contract between the Attorney General and the Firm is a procurement contract pursuant to the general procurement law and that, therefore, the Board of Contract Appeals has primary jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. Because of its conclusion that the Board has jurisdiction over the dispute, the Circuit Court declined to issue a writ of certiorari. Accordingly, the court entered a final judgment in the certiorari action for the Board of Contract Appeals and the Firm and against the Attorney General.

The Circuit Court simultaneously dismissed, without prejudice, the declaratory judgment action filed by the Attorney General and the State against the Firm. The State filed notices of appeal in both the declaratory judgment action and in the certiorari action, and the Firm ⁴⁵⁴ filed a notice of cross-appeal in the declaratory judgment case. Prior to any proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals, the State filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Circuit Court’s decisions in both cases, and we granted the petition. State et al. v. Maryland State Board of Contract Appeals and Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos, P.C., 361 Md. 433 , 761 A.2d 932 (2000).

The State presents two questions for review, which we re-state as follows: 1. Is the contract for legal representation that the Attorney General entered into with the Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos, P.C., pursuant to Maryland Code, § 6-105 of the State Government Article, subject to the State procurement law, §§ 11-101 et seq., of the State Finance and Procurement Article, such that the Maryland State Board of Contract Appeals has jurisdiction over disputes under that contract? 2. Did the Circuit Court err in dismissing, without prejudice, the State’s action against the Firm for declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that the Board of Contract Appeals and not the Circuit Court has jurisdiction over the parties’ fee dispute? Additionally, the Firm asks us to consider whether the State lacks standing to bring the declaratory judgment action because, according to the Firm, the Board of Public Works effectively transferred or disposed of the State’s interest in the 25% share of the settlement pursuant to the Board’s authority under § 10-305 of the State Finance and Procurement Article, thereby extinguishing any claim by the State. 6 II.

We shall first address the certiorari action filed in the Circuit Court. Recently, in Board of License Commissioners v. Corridor Wine, 361 Md. 403 , 761 A.2d 916 (2000), ⁴⁵⁵ this Court reviewed the three distinct uses of a writ of certiorari under current Maryland practice. We stated (361 Md. at 410-412, 761 A.2d at 920): “First, pursuant to statute, the writ is issued by the Court of Appeals in the exercise of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. See Code (1974, 1998 Repl.Vol.), §§ 12-201 through 12-203 and 12-305 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.” “Second, when there is no statutory provision for judicial review of final adjudicatory decisions by administrative agencies, either a certiorari or a mandamus action in the appropriate circuit court is normally available for ordinary ‘substantial evidence’ judicial review of the adjudicatory administrative decisions.” “Third, ‘it has long been the common law rule in Maryland that a circuit court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari to a lower court for the purpose of inquiring into that tribunal’s jurisdiction.’ Kawamura v. State, 299 Md. 276, 283 , 473 A.2d 438, 442 (1984).” The second use of a writ of certiorari applies only where there is no statutory authorization for judicial review.

With regard to the case at bar, § 15-223 of the State Finance and Procurement Article authorizes any party, including a unit of state government, to bring a circuit court action for judicial review of a final decision of the Board of Contract Appeals. The third use of a writ of certiorari is for the purpose of examining the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal, even in the absence of a final decision by that tribunal. The Attorney General’s certiorari action purportedly fell within this third category. The Attorney General sought a circuit court determination of the Board’s jurisdiction even though there was no final decision by the Board.

The certiorari action brought by the Attorney General, challenging the Board of Contract Appeals’ jurisdiction over the contract dispute, does not lie under the circumstances of this case. In Corridor Wine, supra, we held that a circuit ⁴⁵⁶ court’s authority to issue a writ of certiorari to an inferior tribunal, for the purpose of inquiring into that tribunal’s jurisdiction over a case pending before the tribunal, does not apply to an action pending before an administrative agency in the executive branch of state government or local government. Administrative agencies like the Board of Contract Appeals, we explained, are not inferior tribunals in relation to the circuit courts; rather they are independent units of the executive branch of state government. See § 15-206 of the State Finance and Procurement Article.

See also Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor, 276 Md. 36, 44-47 , 343 A.2d 521, 525-527 (1975) (administrative agencies are not courts of limited jurisdiction and are generally not within the judicial branch of government). Furthermore, circuit courts do not exercise appellate or oversight jurisdiction in regard to such administrative agencies. Oversight of state administrative agencies is generally vested in the executive branch of government. Therefore, the authority of a circuit court to issue a writ of certiorari to determine whether an inferior tribunal has jurisdiction over a matter pending before that tribunal is limited to matters pending before the District Court of Maryland or one of the orphans’ courts.

The Circuit Court for Baltimore City was not authorized to review, by certiorari, the interlocutory jurisdiction decision of the Board of Contract Appeals. The court should have declined to issue the writ of certiorari on this ground.

III

A. The State, in its appeal from