State v. Parker

DAVIS, Judge. On August 17, 1983, Anthony Patrick Parker, appellee, was charged in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County with murder, use of a handgun in a crime of violence, and a host of related counts. On November 10,1983 before the Honorable Cullen H. Hormes, the appellee pled guilty to second degree murder. All remaining charges were to be nolle prossed by the prosecutor at the time of sentencing.

The appellee was sentenced on May 3, 1984 to a twenty year term of imprisonment. The sentence imposed was to run concurrently with a federal sentence that the appellee had received for an unrelated bank robbery conviction. The ⁵⁹⁹ appellee was to begin serving his Maryland sentence in federal prison. Upon being paroled on his federal sentence on April 1, 1991, Parker was returned to Maryland to serve the balance of his Maryland sentence under the supervision of the Division of Corrections.

On June 19, 1991, the appellee filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County for Post-Conviction Relief, seeking release from incarceration. The appellee’s petition was granted on January 23, 1992, and on February 19, 1992, an Application for Leave to Appeal the granting of post-conviction relief was filed by the State. That application was granted. The State now asks: Did the post-conviction hearing court misapply the law in construing the legal effect of concurrent multijurisdictional sentences in determining that the appellee must be granted post-conviction relief?

For reasons which we later explain, we affirm the post-conviction court’s granting of the appellee’s petition for relief. Statement of Facts After the appellee was formally charged with murder and other related counts arising from an incident that occurred at the Coca-Cola Bottling Company in Baltimore County, a plea bargain was struck between the appellee and the prosecution and memorialized in writing. Under the terms of the agreement, the appellee was to plead guilty to one count of bank robbery in federal court and accept a sentence of twenty years, the sentence to be served in the federal correctional system. In exchange therefor, the prosecution agreed to bind itself to a recommendation that Parker not receive more than a twenty year prison term for his plea of guilty to any “and all charges arising out of the aforementioned Coca-Cola robbery-homicide.” The prosecution also agreed to make a recommendation that Parker’s Maryland sentence be made to run concurrently with his federal sentence.

A clause in the written plea agreement ⁶⁰⁰ specified that the contents of the writing represented the only agreements made between the parties. On May 3, 1984, the appellee appeared before Judge Cullen H. Hormes in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County for sentencing upon his conviction for second degree murder. Parker was sentenced to the Maryland Division of Corrections for a period of twenty years, the sentence to run concurrently with the appellee’s federal sentence. The sentencing court stated, “I understand the State’s Attorney will make arrangements so that he will serve his time in the federal institution.” The prosecutor remarked that he would alert the Commissioner of Corrections that “the time is to be served in the federal institution.” The sentencing court commented that it understood that fact to be part of the plea agreement.

The court then remarked that the commitment record should perhaps reflect that the appellee’s Maryland sentence was “to be served with or at the federal institution.” The notation so appeared on the commitment records. A detainer was then lodged by the Baltimore County Police Department and forwarded to the warden of the United States Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas. On April 1, 1991, the appellee was paroled on his federal sentence and, pursuant to the detainer lodged by the Baltimore County Police Department, was remanded to the custody of the Maryland Division of Corrections to complete the balance of his Maryland sentence. Thereafter, the appellee wrote to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County requesting that he be released from his Maryland sentence.

In his response, Judge James L. Smith, Jr. 1 informed the appellee that he would have to be paroled by the Maryland parole authorities and that “the circumstances that you have been paroled by the federal prison system, would not bind the Maryland Department of Corrections. You would ⁶⁰¹ still have to be paroled by the Maryland authorities on the concurrent sentence which Judge Homes imposed.” In response to the appellee’s filing a petition for post-conviction relief, a hearing was conducted. At the hearing, the appellee maintained that, because Judge Homes indicated that the appellee’s concurrent Maryland sentence was to be served in federal prison, the sentencing judge necessarily intended that when Parker was paroled upon his federal sentence he would thereby be paroled from his Maryland sentence. The appellee admitted, however, that Judge Homes never once stated to him that upon completion of his federal sentence he would not be obligated to complete the balance of his Maryland sentence, should there be any time left to serve on the Maryland sentence.

The hearing concluded with the post-conviction hearing judge holding the matter sub