State v. Phillips

GRAEFF, J. This appeal involves Baltimore City’s Gun Offender Registration Act (the “Act” or “GORA”), a local ordinance that requires persons convicted of delineated gun offenses to register with the Police Commissioner of Baltimore City. Balt. City Code, art. 19, §§ 60-1(d)(1), 60-(f), 60-3(a) 1 Appellee, Adrian Phillips, a convicted gun offender, was charged in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City with failure to register. The circuit court granted appellee’s motion to dismiss the charge because: (1) the Commissioner did not file regulations as required by the Act; and (2) the Act is unconstitutionally vague.

On appeal, the State raises the following issues for our review, which we have rephrased slightly: 1. Did the circuit court err in dismissing the charge based on its finding that the Police Commissioner failed to comply with regulatory filing provisions of the Act? 2. Did the circuit court err in finding the Act void for vagueness? Appellee raises three additional issues as grounds to uphold the circuit court’s dismissal of the charge: 3.

Does the Act violate Equal Protection principles? 4. Does the Act violate separation of Powers principles? 5. Is the Act void because the State has preempted the field? ²⁴⁷ For the reasons set forth below, we shall reverse the judgment of the circuit court. THE ACT Before discussing the details of this case, a brief summary of GORA is warranted.

The Act requires that a “gun offender,” a person convicted of a gun offense in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City or the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore City, register with the Police Commissioner of Baltimore City or his or her designee. Balt. City Code, art. 19, §§ 60 — 1(d)(1), 60 — 1(f), 60-3(a). The registrant must specify the gun offender’s name, any other name by which he or she has been legally known, and a list of all aliases he or she has used, id. § 60 — 5(b)(l),(4)—(5), as well as a description of the crime for which he or she was convicted, the date of conviction, his or her residence, and “any other information required by the rules and regulations adopted by the Police Commissioner under this subtitle.” Id. § 60 — 5(b)(2)—(3),(7)— (8).

An offender must register within 48 hours of either release from prison, if the conviction included imprisonment, or the date that the sentence was imposed, if the conviction did not include imprisonment. Id. § 6CM:(a)(l)-(2). Baltimore City residents have additional verification requirements, including updating the contents of their registration every six months for three years from the date of the initial registration. Id. § 60 — 6(a)—(c); § 60-7. 2 The Act created a misdemeanor crime for the failure to register, and for City residents, the failure to verify their registration information as required.

It provides: § 60-10. Prohibited conduct. No gun offender may: (1) knowingly fail to acknowledge in writing his or her duty to register under this subtitle; ²⁴⁸ (2) fail to register as required by this subtitle or the rules and regulations adopted under it; (3) fail to verify information as required by this subtitle or the rules and regulations adopted under it; or (4) provide false information in the registration or verification required by this subtitle or the rules and regulations adopted under it. § 60-11. Penalties.

(a) In general. Any gun offender who violates any provision of § 60-10 of this subtitle is guilty of a misdemeanor and, on conviction, is subject to a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment for not more than 12 months or both fíne and imprisonment for each offense. (b) Each day is a separate offense. Each day that a violation continues is a separate offense.

Pertinent to the issues raised in this case, and discussed in more detail, infra, the Act gives discretionary regulatory authority to the Police Commissioner to adopt rules and regulations regarding “the form and content of the registration requirement.” The ordinance states that “[a] copy of all rules and regulations adopted under this subtitle must be filed with the Department of Legislative Reference before they take effect.” Id. § 60 — 2(c). FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On June 24, 2010, appellee was charged with failing to verify his registration pursuant to § 60-10 of the Act. According to the Statement of Charges, on December 1, 2008, appellee was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of armed robbery and wearing, carrying, and transporting a handgun. As a result, he became a “gun offender” subject to the Act’s registration requirements.

Balt. City Code, art. 19, §§ 60-1(e)(1)(i) (listing wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun pursuant to Md.Code (2002) § 4-203 of the Criminal Law Article (“C.L.”), as a gun offense pursuant to the Act). ²⁴⁹ The Application for Statement of Charges stated that, after appellee’s conviction, he was advised of his requirement to register, and he “signed and dated a copy of the Gun Offender Registration Requirements form[,] which was forwarded to the Gun Offender Monitoring Unit.” This form, which is referred to as the “Acknowledgment Form,” advised: “In accordance with the provisions of the Baltimore City Code, Article 19 § 60, this is to notify you that you must register as a gun offender with the Baltimore City Police Department.” It also stated: By signing below I acknowledge that I have a duty to register and that the following requirements were explained to me: A) I must personally appear at the Baltimore Police Department Gun Offender Monitoring Unit, 2100 Guildford Avenue, Room # 111, Baltimore, MD 21218, within 48 hours of my release, if I am imprisoned, or within 48 hours after sentence is imposed, if I am not imprisoned. I must verify my address and provide other information that the Baltimore Police Department requires and I may be photographed. B) I am required to appear in person at the Gun Offender Monitoring Unit, 2100 Guildford Avenue, Room # 111, Baltimore, MD 21218, within 20 days of each 6-month anniversary of my initial registration date for a period of three years to update my registration.

C) If I move from one address to another within the City of Baltimore or move into the City of Baltimore from outside the City of Baltimore, I must personally appear at the Gun Offender Monitoring Unit, 2100 Guildford Avenue, Room # 111, Baltimore, MD 21218, within 10 days to verify and update my address. D) Before I move from an address within the City of Baltimore to an address outside of the City of Baltimore, I must personally appear at the Gun Offender Monitoring Unit, 2100 Guildford Avenue, Room # 111, Baltimore, MD 21218 to provide my new address. ²⁵⁰ The form further stated that violation of the Act “is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $1000, or imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or both. Each violation ... is a separate offense.” The record reflects that, on December 3, 2009, appellee completed his initial registration at the Gun Offender Monitoring Unit. A form, entitled The Baltimore Police Department Gun Offender Registration (the “Registration Form”), was signed by appellee.

The form contained various fields of information, including: name, date of birth, address, phone number, information relating to physical description, date of registration, next registration date, “Gang Affiliation/Source of Information,” and “Additional Information.” Given appellee’s registration date, and that he was a resident of Baltimore City, appellee was required to verify and update his registration by June 23, 2010. Balt. City Code, art. 19, § 60-6(a)-(b). 3 According to the Statement of Charges, the police made efforts to ensure that appellee complied with the re-registration requirement. On June 4, 2010, a detective called appellee and left a voice mail message reminding him to re-register.

On June 7, 2010, appellee “contacted the Gun Offender Monitoring Unit and advised [an officer] that he would respond to the office on [June 9, 2010] to re register.” A detective subsequently went to the Baltimore City address appellee provided on his initial registration to advise him of his requirement to re-register. A woman who lived there informed the officers that appellee had not lived at the residence since his arrest for the gun charge in July 2008. On June 10, 2010, appellee contacted the Gun Offender Monitoring Unit and stated that, due to an injury, he was unable to go to the office. He also stated that he was living with his grandmother, and he provided that address.

On June ²⁵¹ 15, 2010, officers went to the residence of appellee’s grandmother, who stated that appellee was not staying with her, she had not heard from him, and she was not aware that he had been in an accident. The officers also contacted appellee’s probation officer and his stepfather in an attempt to locate him. On June 21, 2010, a detective left a final voice mail message for appellee. On June 24, 2010, appellee was charged with the failure to register pursuant to Baltimore City Code art. 19 § 60-10, and a warrant was issued for his arrest.

On December 9, 2010, appellee was arrested. On January 24, 2011, appellee requested a jury trial, and his case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. On February 16, 2011, appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss and Request for Hearing. In his motion, appellee argued that the Act was “without force or effect as the authority of local government entities to regulate in the area of firearms is specifically pre-empted by state law.” On March 7, 2011, after the State filed a response to appellee’s motion, arguing that the Act was not preempted by State law, appellee filed an answer to the State’s response.

In this answer, appellee raised additional reasons to dismiss the charge: (1) the Act was unconstitutionally vague; (2) it violated constitutional protections against self-incrimination; (3) it violated separation of powers; (4) it imposed a cruel and unusual punishment; (5) it violated the equal protection clause; and (6) it lacked legal effect because the Police Commissioner failed to file accompanying rules and regulations with the Department of Legislative Reference. On March 9, 2011, the circuit court held a hearing on appellee’s motion to dismiss. Appellee argued that the Act violated the Fifth Amendment because it required that a person submit to “any questions the police officers might have for them” while in a “custodial situation.” He asserted that the Act was vague because it required the registrant to give “[a]ny other information required by the rules and regulations adopted by the Police Commissioner under this sub title.” He ²⁵² argued that the registrant was subject to a “full trilemma,” explaining: “You can’t remain silent. If you say something it will be used against you.

And if you lie you will be charged too because providing false information is also a crime. Also a violation of the statute. And on top of that you also have no lawyer.” Finally, appellee argued that the Act violated the separation of powers doctrine because the “commissioner is acting as a defacto legislature,” and it violated equal protection principles because Baltimore City residents were subject to treatment different from non-city registrants under the Act, resulting in “sentencing enhancements on a state law that punishes people who live in the City.” The State argued that the court should deny the motion to dismiss. It asserted that the Act was not vague because it is clear “what he needs to do as far as reporting.

What information he needs to provide. And how often and where he needs to report.” It further argued that the Act did not violate the Fifth Amendment because the registrant is “not in a custodial situation.” Regarding the separation of powers argument, the State maintained that “the Police Commissioner is enforcing the law that is set out by the City Council,” and regarding equal protection, it asserted that “the Supreme Court has reasoned that residence is not a fundamental constitutional right nor is it a classification that the Court has listed for areas of heightened scrutiny.” On April 8, 2011, after the parties filed additional memoranda, the court granted appellee’s motion. It gave “three basic reasons” for its ruling: (1) the Police Commissioner had failed to comply with the requirement that all regulations must be filed with the Department of Legislative Reference (“DLR”); (2) “the citizens of Baltimore City have not been given constitutionally] sufficient notice of the substance of the regulations;” and (3) the Act was “unconstitutionally vague and awfully broad” and “lacks the specificity of regulatory language.” In a Memorandum Opinion issued the same day, the court, as discussed in more detail, infra, elaborated on these state ²⁵³ ments. The court additionally discussed appellee’s arguments based on preemption, equal protection, and protection against self-incrimination, rejecting these arguments.

On April 27, 2011, the State timely noted this appeal. STANDARD OF REVIEW When we review a circuit court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, “ ‘our task is confined to determining whether the trial court was legally correct in its decision to dismiss.’ ” Menefee v. State, 417 Md. 740, 747 , 12 A.3d 153 (2011) (quoting Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. Phillips, 413 Md. 606, 618 , 994 A.2d 411 (2010)). “[W]e assume the truth of all well-pleaded facts and allegations in the complaint, as well as the reasonable inferences drawn from them, in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Forster v. Office of Pub. Defender, 426 Md. 565, 579 , 45 A.3d 180 (2012). DISCUSSION I. THE ACT’S FILING REQUIREMENT The State’s first issue involves the circuit court’s finding that the charges should be dismissed because the Police Commissioner did not comply with the provisions of the Act providing that regulations must be filed with DLR.

Section 60-2 of the Act provides as follows: a) Commissioner may adopt. The Police Commissioner may adopt rules and regulations to carry out this subtitle. b) Scope. These rules and regulations may govern: (1) the form and content of the registration required under this subtitle; (2) the documentation required to verify the content of the registration required under this subtitle; ²⁵⁴ (3) the maintenance, use, and availability of the information that is collected by the Police Commissioner under this subtitle. c) Filing. A copy of all rules and regulations adopted under this subtitle must be filed with the Department of Legislative Reference before they take effect.

(Emphasis added). Recognizing that the language “may” in a statute usually connotes discretion, whereas the word “must” is viewed as “required or obliged by law,” Gazunis v. Foster, 400 Md. 541, 565 , 929 A.2d 531 (2007), cert. denied, 406 Md. 113 , 956 A.2d 202 (2008), both parties agree that the ordinance gives the Police Commissioner discretion whether to adopt regulations, but if the commissioner exercises that discretion and adopts such regulations, it is mandatory that they be filed with DLR. The issues here are: (1) whether the Commissioner exercised his discretion and adopted regulations pursuant to § 60-2; and (2) if so, whether that requires dismissal of the charges against appellee. Appellee’s argument in this regard is based on § 60-5, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (a) In general.

The registration must be in the form and contain the information that the Police Commissioner requires. (b) Specific information. The registration must specify: (1) the gun offender’s name; (2) a description of the crime for which he or she was convicted; (3) the date the gun offender was convicted; (4) any other name by which the gun offender has been legally known; (5) a list of all aliases that the gun offender has used; ²⁵⁵ (6) identifying factors of the gun offender, including a physical description; (7) the gun offender’s residence; and (8) any other information required by the rules and regulations adopted by the Police Commissioner under this subtitle. Appellee argues that “[t]he existence of a detailed acknowledgment form that offenders must sign and the existence of an equally detailed registration form that police must fill out indicate that the Police Commissioner exercised the discretion given to him ... [and] adopted rules and regulations to carry out the Act.” The circuit court agreed, finding that “the Commissioner’s registration forms are the embodiment of regulations and subject to the filing requirements of § 60-2(c),” stating that they are “enforcement devices that affect the substantive penal rights of prescribed gun offenders and possess both a general application and future effect.” The court explained that within the forms, the Commissioner requires all sorts of additional information from the offender that was not specifically enumerated in the ordinance, e.g., the name, address, and phone number of the nearest relatives and friends, their relationship with the offender, the offender’s occupation, vehicle information, and “Gang Affiliation/ Source of Information.” All, arguably, pursuant to the regulatory authority given to the Commissioner by GORA.

The court further found that, if the mandatory filing “does not occur, the rules and regulations do not take legal effect.” The State contends that the circuit court erred in finding that the Police Commissioner “had issued de facto regulations without filing the same with DLR, rendering GORA without legal force and effect, and thus requiring dismissal of the charging document.” The State advances several arguments in this regard. First, it asserts that appellee “has suffered no injury relating to, and thus has no standing to challenge, his allegations of error.” Second, addressing the substance of ²⁵⁶ appellee’s claim before the circuit court, the State argues that, “in the relevant period, the Police Commissioner did not issue regulations implicating the regulatory filing requirement relied upon by appellee.” Third, the State contends that, even if the forms issued by the Police Commissioner did amount to de facto regulations, “the administrative filing requirement contained in GORA does not preclude a regulation, let alone the law itself, from being in full force and effect.” Appellee argues that the circuit court properly granted his Motion to Dismiss. He asserts that “the Gun Offender Registration Act is without legal effect because the Police Commissioner failed to file a copy of ‘All Rules and Regulations’ with the [DLR] as required by the Act.” He contends that he “has standing to challenge the Act on the grounds that the Police Commissioner did not comply with the Act’s filing requirement” because he “did in fact suffer injury or harm arising from the Commissioner’s blatant disregard of the Act’s requirement.” A. Standing The State asserts that, because appellee was “on notice of both the location of the GORA Office and the form and contents of the registration form,” he did not suffer any injury or harm from the Police Commissioner’s failure to formally issue or file the forms as regulations. It argues, therefore, that appellee has no standing to pursue his claim of error.

Appellee argues that he does have “standing to challenge the Act on the grounds that the Police Commissioner did not comply with the Act’s filing requirement.” He asserts that he did suffer injury or harm from the Police Commissioner’s failure to properly file regulations in accordance with § 60-2(c). Specifically, he contends that, because § 60-5 of the Act “states that offenders will be required to provide ‘any other information required by the rules and regulations adopted by the Police Commissioner under this subtitle,’ ” and because the Commissioner failed to file any regulations, he was “left to ²⁵⁷ speculate as to what information might be required from him at re-registration,” and therefore, he was prevented “from seeking the advice of counsel as to whether he could refuse to answer certain questions,” and prevented “from making a reasoned decision about whether he should comply with the re-registration process.” He argues that his awareness of the contents of the Registration Form that was used at his initial registration “does not change this conclusion” because: (1) the form contained a section captioned “additional information”; and (2) he had “no assurance that the same form and the same questions would be used at his re-registration.” The circuit court rejected the State’s argument that appellee had no standing to contest the Police Commissioner’s failure to file the registration form with DLR because he had notice of the re-registration requirements, and therefore, he suffered no harm. The court stated that appellee “was unable to balance his constitutional rights, e.g., privilege against self-incrimination, without knowing the substance of the regulation beforehand,” and he “rightfully argues that he does not know or have notice of when, where or how he could inspect the registration form, etc., to make an informed decision on how to proceed.” As this Court recently explained, “[standing is a threshold issue; a party may proceed only if he demonstrates that he has a real and justiciable interest that is capable of being resolved through litigation.” Norman v. Borison, 192 Md.App. 405, 420 , 994 A.2d 1019 (2010), aff'd on other grounds, 418 Md. 630 , 17 A.3d 697 (2011). “In order to have standing, a party must demonstrate an ‘injury-in-fact,’ or ‘an actual legal stake in the matter being adjudicated.’ ” Id. (quoting Hand v. Mfrs. & Traders Trust Co., 405 Md. 375, 399 , 952 A.2d 240 (2008)).

Here, we agree with the State that appellee has no standing to argue that the Acknowledgment Form constituted a regulation. To be sure, this form listed the location of the GORA ²⁵⁸ office. 4 As the State notes, however, and appellee does not dispute, it is clear that appellee “was repeatedly informed of, and did in fact know,” the location of the place to register. Thus, even if the Acknowledgment Form did constitute a regulation, appellee was not harmed by the Police Commissioner’s failure to file it with DLR, and he has no standing to challenge any such failure to comply with the law. The main argument in this case involves the Registration Form, and whether it constitutes a regulation by containing fields to obtain information other than that set forth in § 60 — 5(b)(1)—(7).

As indicated, appellee argues that he was injured in this regard because he did not know what information he would be asked at re-registration, and therefore, he could not ask counsel if he could refuse to answer questions. Although the State is correct that the Acknowledgment Form presented to appellee when he completed his initial registration provided him with notice that he was required to re-register, neither that form, nor the Registration Form itself, indicated what information he would be required to provide upon verification of his registration after six months. Appellee has standing to challenge whether the Registration Form constituted a regulation specifying the “other information” required. Thus, we turn to the merits of the argument, whether regulations were adopted, and if so, the effect of the failure to file such regulations with DLR.

B. Regulations The State contends that, “in the relevant period, the Police Commissioner did not issue regulations implicating the regulatory filing requirement” set forth in § 60-2(c). 5 It asserts ²⁵⁹ that the form upon which the Baltimore City Police Department conducts registrations and re-registrations is “not a de facto regulation requiring formal issuance and filing.” Rather, it asserts: The registration form is an internal [Baltimore City Police Department] office document upon which the Gun Offender Monitoring Unit collects information and has gun offenders review and verify that information’s accuracy. Reflective of the fact that the registration form does not require the issuance of a regulation is that the form itself is a creature of the ordinance: “[t]he registration must be in the form and contain the information that the Police Commissioner requires,” id. § 60-5(a); “[t]he registration must be signed and dated by the gun offender,” id. § 60-5(c). In any event, the State argues, “the administrative filing requirement contained in GORA does not preclude a regulation, let alone the law itself, from being in full force and effect.” Appellee argues that the “existence of a detailed acknowledgment form that offenders must sign and the existence of an equally detailed registration form that police must fill out, indicate that the Police Commissioner exercised” his discretion pursuant to § 60-2(a) of the Act and “adopted rules and regulations to carry out the Act.” He asserts that, because the Police Commissioner failed to file these regulations with DLR in accordance with the mandatory language of § 60-2(c), the Act is “without legal effect,” and the circuit court properly granted his motion to dismiss the charge against him. In determining the meaning of the term “regulation,” we apply well settled principles of statutory interpretation: In statutory interpretation, our primary goal is always to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision, be it statutory, constitutional or part of the Rules.

We begin our ²⁶⁰ analysis by first looking to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute, reading the statute as a whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory. If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute’s provisions and our analysis ends. If, however, the language is subject to more than one interpretation, it is ambiguous, and we endeavor to resolve that ambiguity by looking to the statute’s legislative history, case law, statutory purpose, as well as the structure of the statute. When the statute is part of a larger statutory scheme, it is axiomatic that the language of a provision is not interpreted in isolation; rather, we analyze the statutory scheme as a whole considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body, and attempt to harmonize provisions dealing with the same subject so that each may be given effect.

Lowery v. State, 430 Md. 477, 490 , 61 A.3d 794 (2013) (quoting Doe v. Montgomery County Bd. of Elections, 406 Md. 697, 712-13 , 962 A.2d 342 (2008)). In light of these principles, we start by looking to the language of the Act itself and whether it provides a definition of “regulation.” Id. at 490-91, 61 A.3d 794 . The Act does not define the term. Thus, we turn to a dictionary to seek guidance on the meaning of the word regulation.

See id. (looking to a dictionary definition to help determine the meaning of a statutory term). Regulation is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “[a] rule or order, having legal force, [usually] issued by an administrative agency.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1311 (8th ed. 2004). We also find instructive the definition of the term in the Maryland Annotated Code, noting that the State Government Article defines the term “regulation” as “a statement or an amendment or repeal of a statement that (i) has general application; (ii) has future effect; [and] (iii) is adopted by a unit” to “(1) detail or carry out a law that the unit administers; (2) govern organization of the unit; (3) govern the procedure of the unit; or (4) govern practice before the unit.” A ²⁶¹ regulation can be “in any form,” including: (1) a guideline; (2) a rule; (3) a standard; (4) a statement of interpretation; or (5) a statement of policy.

Md.Code (2009 Repl.Vol.) § 10-101(g) of the State Government Article (“S.G.”). A regulation does not include, however, a statement that “concerns only internal management of the unit” and “does not affect directly the rights of the public or the procedures available to the public.” Id. Applying these definitions, we agree with the State that the Registration Form is not a “regulation.” The form does not constitute a statement, rule, or order. Rather, it merely is an internal document to assist the police in complying with the provisions of the ordinance.

See Wacha v. Kandiyohi County Welfare Board, 308 Minn. 418 , 242 N.W.2d 837, 839 (1976) (Bulletin that was “merely a restatement of existing welfare policy and a directive concerning internal management” that “was intended merely to implement existing law” was “not a rule within the definition of a rule in the [Minnesota] Administrative Procedure Act.”). To be sure, as appellee notes, the form included “other information” as specified in § 60-5(b), such as “gang affiliation.” There is no evidence in the record, however, that this information was asked of registrants, much less required by the police. Indeed, as counsel for the State noted at oral argument, it can be inferred that the Registration Form contains fields clearly intended only for internal management, such as the “cc #,” which the State advised was the central complaint number, information unlikely to be asked of a registrant. The record does not support a finding that the form was a regulation.

As indicated, the Police Commissioner has now filed regulations, which state that they are to “establish procedures to carry out the registration” as set forth in the Act. With respect to the information that a gun offender must supply, the regulations provide that the gun offender will: 3. provide the following information which will be recorded on the Gun Offender Registration (Attachment 2): ²⁶² (A) the gun offender’s name; (B) a description of the crime for which the gun offender was convicted; (C) the date that the gun offender was convicted; (D) any other name by which the gun offender has been legally known; (E) a list of all aliases that the gun offender has used; (F) identifying factors of the gun offender, including a physical description to include date of birth, sex, height, weight, eye color, hair color, any scars, and any visible tattoos; and (G) the gun offender’s residence and home and cellular phone numbers. In addition to the above information, the Gun Offender Registration will also contain the following: (A) the gun offender’s date of registration; (B) the gun offender’s next six month verification date; and (C) the date that the gun offender’s duty to register expires. Regs.

Balt. City Code art. 19 § 60 (2011) (filed with Baltimore City Department of Legislative Reference). 6 This statement, which sets forth the rules that the police will follow, constitutes a regulation. The mere form at issue here, which does not even indicate what information a registrant must supply, is not a regulation. In any event, even if the Registration Form could be considered a regulation, the failure to file the form with DLR does not necessarily justify dismissal of the charges against appellee.

The State argues that “[t]he filing requirement in GORA does not operate to delay a regulation’s effective date but rather serves as an independent administrative dictate aimed at insuring that the City possesses copies of all agency regulations at a centralized location.” It further contends ²⁶³ that, “even assuming that a regulation is not effective until filed, there is no basis to thus conclude that the entire ordinance, validly enacted by the City Council and clear on its face, is rendered inoperative until an implementing regulation is filed with DLR.” “[T]here is absolutely no articulable reason to accept Appellee’s contention that the entire unambiguous and detailed ordinance is rendered inoperative until a regulation is filed.” The State asserts: Appellee was charged with failing to appear and re-register; this obligation — and thus Appellee’s violation — is entirely separate and apart from the alleged regulations at issue in this case. Appellee’s legal duty to re-register is created by the plain text of the ordinance itself and is not dependent on any action or inaction by the Police Commissioner. Appellee argues that § 60-2(c) of the Act plainly states: “A copy of all rules and regulations adopted under this subtitle must be filed with the [DLR] before they take effect.” Because the Act could not be implemented if the regulations that were adopted to carry it out were not in effect, appellee argues, the Act was without legal effect at the time he was charged. We agree with the State that, even if forms did constitute regulations, they did not invalidate the Act or appellee’s duty to re-register pursuant to the Act.

Appellee asserts that the Act provides that gun offenders have to provide “‘any other information required by the rules and regulations adopted by the Police Commissioner,’ ” § 60 — 5(b)(8), but if regulations are not filed, they have no way to determine what information they must provide. Our reading of the Act, however, is that a gun offender must provide the specific information listed in the Act, as well as other information set forth in regulations adopted by the Police Commissioner. If regulations listing additional information to be provided are not adopted and filed, a gun offender could refuse to give the information. 7 Under those circumstances, a gun offender ²⁶⁴ would have an argument that he did not violate the statute. That, however, did not happen here.

Appellee simply failed to re-register, as required. The Commissioner’s failure to file the forms, if they constituted regulations, had no effect on appellee’s duty to re-register, and it did not justify the court’s dismissal of the charges against him.

II

VAGUENESS The State next contends that the circuit court erred in finding that the Act was “void for vagueness in violation of the United States and Maryland Constitutions.” It asserts that the Act “clearly and unambiguously spells out the law’s requirements, the prohibited conduct, and the potential penalties for non-compliance,” and the Act’s “delegation of regulatory authority to the [Police Commissioner] does not create an unconstitutionally vague enforcement regime.” Appellee contends that the court properly determined that the charges against him should be dismissed because “the Act is unconstitutionally vague.” In support, he points to subsection § 60 — 5(b)(8) of the Act, which, as indicated, requires a gun offender to provide, in addition to seven specified items of information, “any other information required by the rules and regulations adopted by the Police Commissioner.” Appellee argues that this provision fails to give “fair notice” of the information a gun offender might be required to provide, asserting that the “Act provides absolutely no guidelines, either explicit or implicit,” on what the police might seek, and it provides no limitations on what the police might ask. 8 ²⁶⁵ In its reply brief, the State argues that § 60 — 5(b)(8), a provision that it deems “commonplace,” does not render the law, or any portion of it, vague. In support of this argument, the State points to other federal and state statutes that contain similar language and have not been found to be unconstitutionally vague. See e.g. Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. § 16914 (a)(7) (2006) (“The sex offender shall provide the following information ...

(7) Any other information required by the Attorney General”); Gun Offender Registration Act, Admin. Code of New York City, § 10-603(c)(6) (2013) (“A gun offender shall ... provide the following information to the department: ... Any other information deemed pertinent by the department.”). It further contends that, even if the regulatory provisions of the Act are void because they are unconstitutionally vague, this Court should sever those provisions and uphold the remaining valid parts of the law.

This Court recently explained: In deciding the constitutionality of a statute, we begin with the presumption that the statute is valid. Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 610 , 781 A.2d 851 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 990 , 122 S.Ct. 1547 , 152 L.Ed.2d 472 (2002). We will not find a statute unconstitutional if, “ ‘by any construction, it can be sustained.’ ” Id. at 611 [ 781 A.2d 851 ] (quoting Beauchamp v. Somerset County, 256 Md. 541, 547 , 261 A.2d 461 (1970)). When the challenge to a statute is based on vagueness, the burden of establishing unconstitutionality is on the party attacking the statute.

Id. Livingston v. State, 192 Md.App. 553, 568 , 995 A.2d 812 (2010). When considering whether a law is void for vagueness, courts consider two criteria. McFarlin v. State, 409 Md. ²⁶⁶ 391, 411 , 975 A.2d 862 (2009). “The first criterion is that a statute must be ‘sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them hable to its penalties.’” Livingston, 192 Md.App. at 568 , 995 A.2d 812 (quoting Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 458-59 , 569 A.2d 604 (1990)).

The Court of Appeals has explained that “[t]he standard for determining whether a statute provides fair notice is ‘whether persons of “common