State v. Samples

Opinion by Graeff, J. This case addresses when a preliminary hearing is required when the State charges a defendant by information in the circuit court. Specifically, can the State charge a defendant with misdemeanor offenses in the circuit court in the absence of a preliminary hearing? The Circuit Court for Baltimore City answered that question in the negative and dismissed the criminal charges against Kelsey Samples, appellee. On appeal, 1 the State presents the following question for our review: Did the circuit court improperly dismiss [appellee’s] criminal case based upon the prosecutor’s having charged misdemeanors by criminal information in a case where no preliminary hearing was conducted?

For the reasons set forth below, we shall reverse the judgment of the circuit court. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On March 19, 2015, appellee was charged by way of a statement of charges in the District Court of Maryland with four misdemeanors, three involving firearms and one involving ⁵³³ drugs. On April 10, 2015, a criminal information was filed in the circuit court, charging appellee with: Count 1, wearing, carrying, and transporting a handgun in a vehicle; Count 2, possession of a regulated firearm by a minor; Count 3, wearing, carrying, and transporting a handgun on her person; and Count 4, possession of a controlled dangerous substance. At a hearing in the circuit court on May 6, 2015, appellee moved for dismissal of the charges.

She argued that the State improperly filed a criminal information on misdemeanor charges without a preliminary hearing in violation of Maryland Code (2008 Repl. Vol.) § 4-102(2) of the Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”) and Maryland Rule 4-201(c)(2)(A). The State argued that a defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing only if he or she is charged with a felony not within the jurisdiction of the District Court, and there is no right to a preliminary hearing where a criminal information is filed with respect to a crime that is a misdemeanor. It asserted that, because appellee was charged only with misdemeanors, she was not entitled to a preliminary hearing.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the case without prejudice. The State’s timely appeal followed. DISCUSSION I. STANDARD OP REVIEW The sole question raised by the State on appeal is whether, in dismissing the information filed against appellee, the circuit court misapplied CP § 4-102(2), which governs charges by criminal information. The resolution of that question involves the interpretation of a statute.

Recently, this Court explained: It is well-settled in Maryland that “the goal of statutory interpretation is to ‘ascertain and implement, to the extent possible, the legislative intent.’ ” Rodriguez v. State, 218 Md.App. 573, 634 , 98 A.3d 376 (2014) (quoting Forster v. ⁵³⁴ Public Defender, 426 Md. 565, 579 , 45 A.3d 180 (2012)). In doing so, we look first to the statute’s plain language, “giving the words their natural and ordinary meaning.” Id. “If the language is clear and unambiguous on its face, our inquiry ends.” Forster, 426 Md. at 580 , 45 A.3d 180 . Accord Montgomery County v. FOP, 427 Md. 561, 572 , 50 A.3d 579 (2012) (“ ‘If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written.’ ”) (quoting Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hayward, 426 Md. 638, 650 , 45 A.3d 224 (2012)). Although we will neither “add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, and we do not construe a statute with ‘forced or subtle interpretations’ that limit or extend its application,” we “do not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor do we confine strictly our interpretation of a statute’s plain language to the isolated section alone.” Mummert v. Alizadeh, 435 Md. 207, 213 , 77 A.3d 1049 (2013). “Rather, the plain language must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute.” Id. “We presume that the Legislature intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law, and, thus, we seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible consistent with the statute’s object and scope.” Id.

If the language of the statute is ambiguous, the “ ‘courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of [the] enactment [under consideration].’ ” Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 662 , 911 A.2d 1245 (2006) (quoting FOP v. Mehrling, 343 Md. 155, 174 , 680 A.2d 1052 (1996)). An ambiguity exists when there are “two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute.” Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 444 , 903 A.2d 388 (2006) (citation and quotation omitted). In that event, an appellate court will resolve the ambiguity by looking to the statute’s ⁵³⁵ legislative history, case law, and statutory purpose, avoiding a construction of the statute that is “ ‘unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense.’ ” Stoddard, 395 Md. at 662-63 , 911 A.2d 1245 (quoting Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 224 , 909 A.2d 1020 (2006)). Allstate Lien & Recovery v. Stansbury, 219 Md.App. 575, 584-86 , 101 A.3d 520 (2014), aff'd, 445 Md. 187 , 126 A.3d 40 (2015).

II

Dismissal of Criminal Charges Under CP § 4-102(2) The State argues that “the circuit court improperly dismissed [appellee’s] criminal case based upon the prosecutor’s having charged misdemeanors by criminal information in a case where no preliminary hearing was conducted.” It asserts that the court’s ruling was based on an erroneous construction of CP § 4-102(2). Title 4 of the Criminal Procedure Article governs “Pretrial Procedures.” CP § 4-102 provides: A State’s Attorney may charge by information: (1) in a case involving a felony that does not involve a felony within the jurisdiction of the District Court, if the defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing but does not request a hearing within 10 days after a court or court commissioner informs the defendant about the availability of a preliminary hearing; or (2) in any other case, if a court in a preliminary hearing-finds that there is probable cause to hold the defendant. The circuit court construed the phrase “in any other case” in subsection (2) to encompass misdemeanors, and therefore, it ruled that misdemeanors could be charged by criminal information in circuit court only when the defendant had a preliminary hearing at which probable cause was found to hold the defendant. Because appellant had not received a preliminary hearing, the circuit court ruled that the information was improperly filed, and it dismissed the case. ⁵³⁶ The State argues that the circuit court’s construction of the statute was “contrary to the tenets of statutory construction, and inconsistent with statutes and rules applicable to the prosecution of misdemeanors and the differences in District Court and circuit court criminal jurisdiction.” It contends that the “right to a preliminary hearing applies where ‘a defendant is charged with a felony other than a felony within the jurisdiction of the District Court’ ” (quoting CP § 4-103(a), (c)), and therefore, the phrase “ ‘in any other case’ patently refers to a ‘felony within the jurisdiction of the District Court.’ ” The State asserts that, because appellee was charged solely with misdemeanors, for which he was not entitled to a preliminary hearing, the circuit court erred in dismissing the misdemeanor charges against appellee.

Appellee disagrees. She contends that the circuit court “correctly construed § 4-102(2) to require a preliminary hearing as a prerequisite for the State to charge a person by criminal information” in the circuit court. Appellee argues that the phrase “ ‘in any other case’ in paragraph (2) clearly means in any case other than a case described in paragraph (1); or, in other words, in any case other than ‘a case involving a felony that does not involve a felony within the jurisdiction of the District Court.’ ” Therefore, she asserts, the circuit court properly concluded that the phrase “any other case” includes “cases involving only misdemeanors