State v. Statchuk

Menchine, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The following statements of charges were filed against Joseph L. Statchuk in the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore City: Charge Date of Offense False Report to Police Art. 27 § 150 2/25/76 False Report to Fire Dept. Art. 27 § 151 2/ 5/76 False Alarm of Fire Art. 27 § 156 2/ 4/76 False Alarm of Fire Art. 27 § 156 1/15/76 False Alarm of Fire Art. 27 § 156 1/26/76 False Report to Police Art. 27 § 150 2/27/76 He was arrested on March 3,1976. The charges, within the jurisdiction of the District Court, were transferred to the Criminal Court of Baltimore when Statchuk elected trial by jury.

When the State brought the charges to trial on January 24, 1977, a previously filed motion to dismiss for want of a speedy trial was granted by the trial judge. The State has appealed. Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc.

Code Ann. § 12-302 (c) (1974). Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 530 , 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 116-17 (1972), makes manifest that the question whether one has been denied a constitutional right to a speedy trial must be approached by the courts on an ad hoc basis by the application of a balancing test in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed. The Supreme Court, leaving open whether there may be other factors that might go into the balancing test, identified four factors that courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right to a speedy trial, namely: length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. The Court of Appeals and this Court consistently have utilized those factors as bench marks in determinations of the question.

Jones v. State, 279 Md. 1 , 367 A. 2d 1 (1976); ¹⁷⁷ Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96 , 345 A. 2d 62 (1975); State v. Wilson, 35 Md. App. 111 , 371 A. 2d 140 (1977); Sylvester v. State, 16 Md. App. 638, 644 , 299 A. 2d 129, 132 (1973). Length of Delay In Barker v. Wingo, supra, it was said at 407 U. S. 530 , 92 S. Ct. 2192 , 33 L.Ed.2d 117 : “The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.” In the subject case the delay was from March 3, 1976 to January 24, 1977, a period of 10 months and 21 days. 1 Although borderline, we conclude that this delay in a case of the subject nature is of constitutional dimension and requires us to consider the other factors. The following chart of events will serve to set the stage for our discussion of the other factors in the balancing process.

March 3,1976 Arrested for subject offenses. March 26,1976 Released on bail. April 18,1976 Arrested on new charge of “impersonating attorney,” jailed when unable to meet increased bail costs. May 12,1976 State ready for trial in District Court for Baltimore City.

Defendant appeared with counsel but elected trial by jury. ¹⁷⁸ May 13,1976 Case transferred to Criminal Court of Baltimore and set for trial on July 8,1976. about May 18,1976 Released on bail. about May 19,1976 Arrested on “another charge of impersonating an attorney.” Jailed. July 8,1976 Case called for trial but defendant appeared without counsel. July 8,1976 Defendant transferred to Clifton T. Perkins Hospital by sua sponte order of court. September 22,1976 Case postponed by defendant absent evaluation from Clifton T. Perkins Hospital.

September 23,1976 Counsel for Statchuk filed insanity plea, speedy trial motion, motion to suppress identification, motion for discovery and inspection. October 14,1976 Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Report filed. November 10,1976 Case postponed, court not available. December 29,1976 Case postponed, end of jury term.

January 5,1977 Motion to dismiss for want of speedy trial. January 24,1977 Case ready for trial but dismissed for want of speedy trial. ¹⁷⁹ Reason for Delay The Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, supra, made plain that different weights should be assigned for different reasons for delay. Because we think that the subject delay ranges from the justified through the unjustified, we shall divide the period from arrest to trial into segments for our discussion. We observe at the outset that there is not the slightest indication in the record that the State had made a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense.

See Barker, supra, at 531 , [2192], [117]. March 3, 1976 to July 8, 1976 (Arrest to Initially Scheduled Trial Date) The offenses took the form of a series of six similar but separate offenses, each of which posed a potential threat of public danger. False alarms or reports of fire carry within themselves a potential for public harm. Emergency vehicles responding to them present traffic dangers of significance.

Absences of fire equipment from their stations on fruitless missions carry a potential for harm by reason of the likelihood of less timely response to a real emergency. False reports to the police cast added investigative burdens upon them such as necessarily lessen availability of officers to avert criminal offenses or to seize criminal offenders. The multiple cases presented, in short, a degree of complexity and importance distinguishing them from routine, “run-of-the-mill” offenses. The trial judge assessed this period of time against the State.

We think it was error to do so. Judge Moylan for this Court pointed out in State v. Lawless, 13 Md. App. 220 , 283 A. 2d 160 (1971), that blame should not be assigned to the State for the reasonable and ¹⁸⁰ necessary delay inherent in a particular prosecution, saying at 230 [169]: “Recognizing that the right to a ‘speedy trial’ is not the right to an immediate trial, but that time must be allowed for reasonable preparation on the part of the prosecution and for the orderly process of the case from indictment to retention (or appointment) of counsel to arraignment to trial, we reckon as ‘delay’ only the passage of time beyond that which is the obvious requirement of orderly procedure.” (Footnotes omitted.) The validity of that idea was affirmed in Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96 , 345 A. 2d 62 (1975), where the late Judge O’Donnell, speaking for the Court of Appeals, said at 110 [72]: “The appellant, of course, upon being charged ‘was not entitled to demand an immediate trial,’ Jones v. State, supra, [241 Md.] at 610, 217 A. 2d at 374; sufficient time must be allowed for the reasonable preparation of the case on the part of the prosecution and for the orderly processes of the case ‘because of the many procedural safeguards provided an accused.’ United States v. Ewell, supra; State v. Lawless, supra. For ‘speedy trial’ purposes the delay involved is reckoned only in connection with ‘the passage of time beyond that which is obviously within the requirements of orderly procedure.’ State v. Lawless, supra, [13 Md. App.] at 230, 283 A. 2d at 169 .” We conclude that the period now under discussion was within a time frame in which multiple offenses of the subject nature reasonably could or should be brought to trial, i.e., the delay was “within the requirements of orderly procedure.” We think that no blame attaches to the State for this portion of delay. July 8, 1976 to September 28,1976 (Initially Scheduled Trial Date to Insanity Plea) We have heretofore noted that when the series of cases came on for trial in the District Court of Maryland for ¹⁸¹ Baltimore City, Statchuk appeared with counsel and elected a jury trial.

Such procedure was, of course, quite within the rights of the accused and is mentioned merely because, when Statchuk appeared in the Criminal Court of Baltimore on July 8, 1976 to stand trial, he did so without counsel. Only then was the trial judge informed by the accused that he had chosen to discharge his personal attorney and desired to represent himself. Thus it was that the judge assigned to the scheduled July 8, 1976 trial postponed it and passed an order stating, inter alia, that “the Defendant’s behavior in Criminal Court Part XI on July 8,1976 presents the question of his competency to stand trial on these charges and other charges now pending.” The order went on to require delivery of the accused “to the custody of the Superintendent of Clifton T. Perkins State Hospital to determine his competency to stand trial and whether he is responsible for the criminality of his actions and whether he is a danger to himself or society.” The order also recited that “the said Defendant has been evaluated by the Medical Officer of the Supreme Bench, the report thereof indicating that the said Defendant is dangerous and may not be responsible for his conduct.” The record shows that the accused indeed had been evaluated by a Medical Officer of the Supreme Bench in connection with an earlier incident involving an entirely unrelated offense. Contrary to the recitation in the order, however, the report of that Medical Officer showed that the accused then was competent to stand trial.

The record does not reflect that a hearing concerning competency was held on July 8, 1976. There is no record support for the bald allegation of the order that “the Defendant’s behavior in Criminal Court Part XI on July 8, 1976 presents the question of his competency to stand trial.” Maryland Code (1957, 1972 Repl. Vol.) Article 59, § 23 authorizes passage of an order requesting an examination by the Department of Mental Hygiene whenever it shall appear to the court that an accused is incompetent to stand trial. The section makes plain, however, that the court should pass such an order only “for good cause shown and