Chance v. State

Lowe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Carla Sue Chance was convicted in the Criminal Court of Baltimore of murdering her erstwhile paramour but the case was not tried for twenty-one months and four days from her arrest. She has raised six assignments of error, but because we are convinced that she was denied a speedy trial, it will be unnecessary to address the other five. We have analyzed the delay pursuant to the admonition of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), and find that the State was responsible at least for twelve months of the delay, the defendant was responsible at most for two months, and the balance of something over seven months fall under a no-fault category being either neutral or possibly attributable to both State and appellant.

See Nocera v. State, 36 Md. App. 317, 322-323 (1977), cert. denied, 281 Md. 741 , 742, 744 (1977). In light of the recent rule (Md. Rule 746) and rulings (State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310 (1979)) of the Court of Appeals, it is apparent that an unjustified delay in excess of six months is no longer tolerable. But see Wilson v. State, 44 Md. App. 1, 17-18 (1979). Having erred, if at all, on the side of neutrality in our balancing process, we find that a year in excess of time admittedly adequate for "orderly procedure” is too much.

The time periods will be considered in seven parts: 1. 7/6/76 (arrest) to 11/3/76 (continuance) — 3 months 27 days. Reason — orderly procedure conceded. Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96, 112 (1975). Neutral 2. 11/3/76 to 3/14/77 — 4 months 11 days State justification a.

Docket entry shows "no court available” — but see Epps v. State, supra at 114-116. b. State contends delay necessary to investigate defense counsel for alleged ⁵²³ subornation, but see Jones v. State, 279 Md. 1, 9-10 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 915 (1977). c. Appellant rearrested on separate charge but released same day. No justification.

Charged to State 3. 3/15/77 to 5/16/77 — 2 months 1 day State justification Absent police witness (for medical reasons), would have been forgiveable, Nocera v. State, 36 Md. App. at 323 ; however, because witness ultimately was never called and the delay was coincidental while this case was still subject to the investigation of the defense attorney, the delay is not justified. Charged to State 4. 5/16/77 to 9/14/77 — 4 months (less 1 day) State justification Defense filed insanity plea after suicide attempt. Case postponed to permit psychiatric evaluation at the Springfield Hospital Center. The first 2 months within which a report must be submitted by the State, Md. Code, Art. 59, § 26 (a) is "neutral and reasonable”.

State v. Statchuk, 38 Md. App. 175, 183 (1977), cert. denied, 282 Md. 739 (1978). The following 2 months are unexplained and chargeable to the State which is responsible for the delay in reporting as well as for bringing defendant to trial. See Smith v. State, 276 Md. 521, 529 (1976). Charged to State — 2 months Neutral — 2 months 5. 9/14/77 to 11/29/77 — 2 months 15 days State justification Jewish holiday for both counsel and the judge.

That would excuse one day; however, it should have been foreseen by the court administrator. ⁵²⁴ There is no justification offered for the remaining 2 and 1/2 months. Charged to State 6. 11/29/77 to 3/3/78 — 3 months 4 days State justification Joint postponement request. Absence of both State and defense witnesses. Charged to Neutral 7. 3/3/78 to 4/10/78 — 1 month 6 days State justification Two witnesses (police officers) unavailable.

One was recuperating at home from an accident, the other was attending a police school. Neither excuse was justifiable absent a showing that the police officer recuperating was too ill to attend. Court cases on the other hand come before police seminars. Charged to State In no instance but one did the defense consent to the postponements or to their length and several times objected to the delays.

On at least three occasions the record shows express objections. Such objections are in themselves assertions for a speedy trial, Nocera, supra, and while not formal assertions by motion, are something more than acquiescence to the inevitable. Appellant is not saddled with the heavy burden of failing to assert altogether, Barker v. Wingo, supra at 532, but neither did she add but little weight to her cause. Although no specific prejudices were pointed to, appellant testified to her state of mind brought on by anticipation indicating intensely